TD, you remind me of a prized bit of kit my old man had. It was a sort of green canvas sleeveless jacket lined with fur. It was a hard fur rather than soft and cuddly. It too was in green.

It went well with his navy uniform :)

http://www.uasvision.com/wp-content/...RAF_Reaper.jpg

Small money that has made a HUGE difference and saved many Coalition lives; plus a small and perfectly formed DE&S Team to boot! :ok:

LJ

PS. Not a whiff of the River Ribble with this one, either. Perfect!

Ah, OK.

But it was still green.

Not trying to be funny but define "success". IIRC the Chinook Mk3 programme was regarded as a huge success around 2000 with one of the main culprits rewarded with grade skipping (CS terminology?) and a specially created job under his Director General. What I remember is this job entailed offering advice to project mangers and he started all his e-mails with something like "Based on my experience and success managing Chinook Mk3, I require you to....". I worked on ILS at the time so his missives didn't affect me as he didn't understand support and hadn't bothered with it on Chinook.

Think I've got the gist of this right but perhaps tecumseh would correct me if I'm wrong.

Success!
 

I understand that one of the most successful projects undertaken in recent years was the Seaking AEW radar system. It was under budget, ahead of schedule and is the best system of its type in the world.

I also understand that it was done after the Falkands by a small team of RN engineers with little involvement from the MoD.

I also understand that this is shortly to be scrapped with nothing to replace it.:ugh:

pulse1

These are two different but related systems. The original AEW Mk2 was upgraded to AEW Mk7, then redesignated ASaC Mk7. I hear both have a very good reputation.

Fairer to say they were joint RN/MoD efforts and excellent examples of what happens when the procurers speak to the aircrew and maintainers from the beginning and understand what they are talking about. I do know there was a large degree of continuity from Mk2 to Mk7 in PE, as the Mk7 programme manager (a CS) had extensive and continuous experience of the Mk2 going back to mid 80s. Probably a rarity in MoD and no doubt a significant factor.

dervish

Chinook Mk3 - Good memory! I could correct a couple of minor points but it would be splitting hairs. The same 2 Star was responsible for management oversight of Nimrod MRA4 and what you describe regarding the ludicrous missives we received from his tea boy took place at the same time he was being told EXACTLY what was going to happen on both programmes. Both RAF and Civil Servants were ignored, and placed under orders not to dare criticise the graduate he was mentoring.


AEW - Spot on. In later years I was lucky enough to work for both the RN officer who worked 24/7 on the Mk2 in 1982 and the Civil Servant radar designer. Both brilliant men.

Not a Procurement story, per se........
 

On the staff at JATOC in the mid 90s, I was introduced to a very nice CS IT geek who was running a project assisting the RUC in processing claims for deceased livestock. (Op SADDLE). She would spend all day plotting lift/land times, and used the data to determine when an aircraft passed over a particular claimant's stock, as part of the evidence to be used when paying-out/dismissing. When I met her she'd been ensconsed in her cupboard processing data for a few months. At my suggestion, we got her a couple of transit flights about the Province, with which we managed to convince her that, despite what the computer might say, we didn't fly in straight lines.

MK 7
 

M Dee

I believe you are right. It was well known at the time these guys did most of the Man Machine Interface design work as the prime contractor couldn't hack it.

Someone should write a book about that programme as it was a triumph over adversity. The RN's Aircraft Support Executive withdrew all support almost from the beginning and did their best to scupper it. That's why I remember it because the programme manager was only allowed to proceed because he knew how to do all the ASE jobs himself, and did so for years. I provided a small support element and found it strange having to deal with him instead of the RN's Logs and Eng people. He knew his stuff alright. I will never understand how he managed to get round the RN's statement they didn't need a Trainer for the rear crew but it was a feature of the programme that much of it wasn't endorsed by the RN but the PM worked out what the RN needed. :D

Success
 

I reckon that most Fast Jet dudes would accept that RAIDS is useful, reliable and cost effective - in service from CQWI 2003!

There are lots of procurement successes coming out of DE&S and its predecessor organizations. Unfortunately it seems that only the really big ticket projects flounder, calling down the wrath of the NAO, DSC, Daily Rant etc, which totally obscures all the good stuff.

One of the recent success stories to have actually caught some daylight is PANAMA. Those of you on DII can find out more in the announcements archive.

Consultant-News.com

UORs have been the name of the game for several years and that has prompted questions as to whether or not all projects should be approached in a similar way.

R

Hmmm RAIDS, had a good hand in the procurement of RAIDS, good to see it's regarded as a success. Plenty of mistakes made though by those who wouldn't listen. :ugh:

S-D

I've said it many times here - the press and committees don't want to hear about complex programmes delivered with effortless competence. These far outnumber the disasters we read about. The problem is MoD don't learn from these successes and ask why simpler programmes flounder. The answer is already known and they don't like it. People.

The UOR process has always worked reasonably well, especially with relatively simple kit which doesn't require too much integration. However, in the aircraft domain it breeds sloppiness among those who have never been trained properly in the first place. New kit is hung from aircraft and it works fine, but the basic continuing airworthiness work which underpins the process, in the main configuration control which is directly linked to the Safety Case, is ignored; sometimes for good reason (operational imperative). But if you let this get out of control, then you are left with an inability to define and maintain the basic prerequisite to a Safety Case, the Build Standard. Resurrection becomes so difficult, the beancounter solution is to scrap the aircraft. (After all, they need something to do having been sidelined by the UOR process). Recognise this scenario? It's happening as I write.