CAW

This is an interesting thread, which you may or may not have read.

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ash-sites.html

Guess I´m a little late... sorry.

Thanks anyway. The thread was unknown to me and I guess there are many very useful and interesting ones here for me to read.

:ok:

I know that this could not be the proper thread to ask about this, but I´ve just come across a UK document that mentions the existence of a "paper" which explores the "intentions" and possibilities of setting up an airstrip somewhere in South Georgia after its re-taken by Operation Parequet.

Has anyone hear anything about this paper??

Can anyone add anything else to this??

Thanks,
Christian

PS: The paper was submitted for discussion and/or approval to the British Commanders Of Staff sometime in April´s third week, 1982.

Christian,

i'm not sure if its the paper you've got wind of, but i (many years ago..) saw a memo from a junior defence minister, apparently on prompting from a cabinet minister from outside MOD, asking if a runway could be built at either South Georgia or Tristan de Cunha.

it was long the lines of 'i know this is a stupid question, but X from Z dept has looked at a map of the South Atlantic and asks if...' with the reply being 'the topography, as you suspected, makes it impossible/spectacularly difficult, as does the timeframe..'

When the Falkands Op was brewing up I was with the group EU. I remember this question was asked in all seriousness as were several other 'interesting' ones.
Anyone who had ever read an account of Shackleton's epic to South Georgia would have known the answer. I think the cunning plan was to drop a grader from the Herc on a Heavy Stressed Platform to make a tac strip.
The fact that the HSP had effectively been out of service for some time seems to have escaped them. Quite what the Herc crew were supposed to do after the drop was not enunciated.

South Georgia and South Sandwich Airports
 

When I was in MoD between '94 and '97 I had reason to use the CIA World Fact Book for some work I was doing. Out of interest I also looked up the entries for FI and the Islands. Much to my surprise the entry for SG and SS noted the presence of at least 3 airports with one runway in excess of 2000 metres.

I note that this entry has now been corrected.

Thanks to all of you for your asnwers!!

So it looks like a paper on the matter actually existed. Here´s the reference I was talking about in my previous post:

http://img17.imageshack.us/img17/3827/io6e.jpg

Uploaded with ImageShack.us

It´s taken from the COS 37Th meeting, dated April 30th.

I surely be interested in getting to read how would someone plan to set up a 4000 fts long runway in South Georgia, in 6 months time in the middle of an antarctic winter!! Don´t get me wrong: I´m not saying it cannot be done, specially when I pay close attention to the FOB San Carlos construction (less than two weeks). It´s just that I´d like to read such a paper.

Talking about FOBs during that War... have you seen this?? (Taken from an INTSUM, dated June 10, 1982):

http://imageshack.us/a/img34/1213/40ec.jpg

A FOB Teal Inlet already set up by June 10th?? Any comments??

Christian

S Atlantic Airfields
 

Further to my above, several years later and after I had transferred my immediate allegiance, we were contacted at Filton by a consultant for the FCO. His brief was to investigate establishing a tourist industry in FI, St Helena and Tristan da Cunha (bird watching being the main/only attraction). For this you need an air service.

Travelling on the Tri*, he had read an article in the inflight magazine about A400M and wondered whether it could be used for TdC. Apparently there was one place they could build a runway 6000 ft long but it would have a cliff going up at one end and a cliff going down at the other. Volcanoes are not designed with runways in mind. The need was to replace the 4 - 6 monthly ship visits - they could only anchor off-shore and then were limited to individual items of no more than 10 tonnes.

Other snippets were that the nearest airfield was in South Africa, 1700 nms away, and even if they also built an airfield in St Helena that would also be 1700 nms away. Clearly it meant a 4 engine aircraft configured as a combi and really meant either C130, C17 or A400M (in civil variants) but none would be really realistic, probably having to carry round trip fuel not least in case of arriving overhead when the weather then prevented landing. With that in mind C130 could carry about 10 tonnes, A400M 20 and C17 about 30. I showed that A400M could theoretically land and take off at those weights and I guess C130 would, but I do not know about C17.

We exchanged 2 or 3 letters before he went away - I never found out whether he was happy with the results or not - I certainly would not want to run any guaranteed air service on the basis of what I had found out and calculated.

Slight thread drift but you may or may not be aware that St. Helena is at long last getting an airfield, predicted to be operational late 2015.

Which for me begged the question where the airlink will fly to (Cape Town?), and what equipment they'll use.

Anybody any idea?

What are the chances that the occasional FI shuttle will get routed via?

ST HELENA INTL
 

Not sure of the RW length but my guess is that it is too short for most ac esp the A330 . My second guess would be a turbo prop of some sort to connect to ASI (and the FI schedule).

Makes sense but thats quite a trek over water to Cape Town.

Can anyone enlighten me on the ETOPS limits for a twin turboprop in such a scenario?

Might it force them to run shorter sectors ie. via Luanda?

Spoze an alternative might be a Cape Town - Ascension jet service but I dare say the numbers wouldnt stack up

St Helena's runway will be 1500m - its supposed to have relatively big 'shoulders' and taxiways etc.. (being a brown job i have no idea what that means...), but its still only 1500m.

from recall the view is that to be of any use regarding 'those islands', we'd need a runway at Tristan de Cunha, a further 1000+ miles south - and the topography just makes that a complete no-no: the only area on the islands almost flat enought to take a runway also happens to be the islands main farming area, and the island is a cliff, so actually getting stuff from ships to a contruction site is a nightmare...

Thanks Cokecan

The original query about this eluded to the prospect of an airfield at Tristan, but clearly that was just a kneejerk response at the time to the desperate situation in spring '82. Surely based on the logic that anything closer than Ascension would be easier fuel wise.

Now that we have MPA, would somebody care to point out why we might still need this? Obvious answer is we dont.

Being a bit of a geography buff might I also add that we wont see an airfield on Gough Island 200 miles south east of Tristan anytime soon either, even if it was achievable (which it aint).

I do still worry however about the vulnerability of FI under certain scenarios, but I understand an open forum is not the place for their discussion. :cool:

I think that Cape Town itself is nearer to The Falklands than St Helena.

Regarding the new St Helena airport, as I understand it the intention is an A319/737-700 operation from Cape Town, but the 1,550m strip (a fraction longer than London City) exposed to Atlantic gales is surely going to be a bit of a challenge. Luanda in Angola is about the same distance, while the nearest airfield is of course Ascension Island. There's going to be a 6 million litre fuel store. Given that the only sea access to the island is by a ship anchored offshore craning onto lighters, I'm not quite sure how the bulk fuel will get there in the first place.

Coochy,

the post-82 thinking on having a runway closer to the FI was about supporting a fleet with AEW and ASW in the unlikely event of an exact re-match.

the more recent thinking is primarily about developing the local island economies - that and the cronic lack of tanking assets available to bring down reinforcements. diversion airfields are also an issue - apparently no one particularly fancies the prospect of a C-17 with a Parachute Coy on board or an F-35 or Typhoon having to divert to a Lat Am airfield because MPA is closed...

Stanley's runway is less than 1000m - it could be extended, but not by that much, and if the weather closes MPA, it will probably close Stanley as well.

Cape town to MPA 3900 NM
ASI-MPA 3900NM so St Helena to MPA would not be much different. Tristan to MPA ?-probably 2500 nm or so. Not sure that diversions has anything to do with it.
As for Stanley-I guess they could extend it to the 6000 or so that it was as a max during the heyday of RAF Stanley.

Thanks for the last few posts chaps, there arent too many avenues for discussion of such a specialised topic but it is of anorak interest to some like myself.

I think we can deduce that the availability of further airfields in the South Atlantic is largely irrelevant to the regional threat.

I do however question the continuing vulnerability of the islands under certain circumstances, one of which Cokecan eludes to.

I believe that on at least one occasion 2 FJs and the tanker launched from MPA but were subsequently unable to recover there due to wx deterioration. It provoked a rather ignominious diversion to Chile, only after having asked Argentina whether they would mind awfully if they overflew.

Fortunately in this instance common sense prevailed and permission was
granted, but what if it hadnt been?

And theres nothing quite like advertising when your in a state of compromise. Any potential aggressor might naturally consider developing a strategy for a more robust response whenever this scenario might recurr.:eek:

Any thoughts?

Maybe someone could at least explain why given that Autoland is older than I am, why we cant land in pea soup however thick it is?

Being in charge of an engineering team that maintains an airfield's Radars, radios, navigation beacons and landing aids, I can answer that one.

The precision of the ILS system required to do full autoland is massively affected by what bits of metal are kicking about the airfield from minute to minute thus it massively restricts ground movement of aircraft and support vehicles (the radio beams don't propagate as they should due to reflections). To put it in perspective, I was on an airfield with a contractor in close proximity to an ILS Glideslope tower and was told over the radio from ATC to get away from the equipment ASAP because the two vehicles we were in where having an adverse effect on the equipment as an aircraft was making its approach on ILS. The classic example of what can go wrong was a tri engined jet that tried to do full autoland on airfield with a non autoland calibrated ILS. The aircraft did a very heavy landing which resulted in major damage to the wing spar(s). Also the infringement regulations for radio site clearances for a full autoland compatible ILS system are extremely restrictive (off airfield to a specific range) and they have to be flight calibrated on a much more regular basis than a non autoland capable ILS.

In fact most of what you ask about is covered in this thread from a few years back http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ert-chile.html.

Thanks for taking the trouble to broaden the knowledge of others MainJafad. :D

I wasnt aware of the linked thread but perhaps should have guessed it would be out there.

I suppose the main point to be learned from it is that the jets in question should really have been landed before MPA got socked in, but then I guess it can happen rather quickly in that part of the world.

And if we cant fly, neither of course then can a potential aggressor. :cool:

One of the reasons for the new airport at St Helena is that the tub that shuttles to & fro is near the end of it's life - the cost of replacing isn't a lot but the cost of running it for another 40 years is apparently horrendous

Location of Photo
 

The photo shown in August is at Saunders Island settlement, I have seen similar shots from there, one showing a house with the fin of a Hercules peeping above it

It looks like at least the RAF Stanley Phantoms did actually fly outside the TEZ after their October arrival. Something really strange must have happened in the final days of December 1982 over the waters close to the argentinean mainland.

http://imageshack.us/a/img541/3120/q6hw.th.jpg

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?f...type=1&theater

Christian

I would say your assumption is correct, CAW. We did fly west (quite a way:cool:) and we did encounter Argentinean aircraft.

Courtney

Correct, leading to the amusing Treasury suggestion to the FCO / DFID that they should consider buying a long-range Beriev-200.... not that the FCO got the joke IIRC. (Well, it would've cheaper than blasting the runway out, and where else can you take a flying boat on holiday?!)

S41

They have upgraded the plan to allow flights from London with a refueling stop in Spain (I can't find where it says the upgrade has been approved)

No flights from London? Woah, I?m going to Barbados? | St Helena Online | Page 4

Ascension shuttle is ?do-able?, says would-be airline chief | St Helena Online

They are building a harbour, fuel pipeline and road as part of the airport construction

http://www.sainthelenaaccess.com/new...-Update-38.pdf

A wharf for Rupert?s Bay | St Helena Online

CourtnetMill,

I heard "rumours", when I was a kid, that at times planes incoming from the sea could be seen from some cities down south.

Would you mind confirming wether or not:

a) low level attacks on Rio Gallegos airstrip were either plan and/or exercised?

b) if Buccanner aircraft were ever deployed south? (L. Freedman states that they were supposed to be used in some sort of retaliation actions against argentinean air and naval bases... he even states that those plans were prepared around October by direct request of the PM.)

Also, did you guys ever get to find any other aircraft than Boeings 737, ARA´s Electra or FAA´s ELINT Boeing 707??

I was told by someone actually in one of the planes that in more than a couple of times, FAA´s Hercules did fly directly over the islands in order to get to Antactica´s Marambio Air Base. Any comments on that?

Thank you.
Christian

Not to my knowledge. Mind you, we were an Air Defence outfit so we would have had no part in such a plan - except, perhaps to provide escort. Assuming you're talking after the war, we would have had no reason to do such a thing anyway. Once the Falklands were liberated, we had no further need for offensive operations. I would say "no".


Can't speak for the PM - he didn't always share his thoughts with me - but I'm sure there were plans to deploy Buccaneers should they have been needed. Again, after the liberation, they weren't needed. As for retaliation, I think you may have been fed a line. The UK had absolutely no wish to retaliate whatsoever. The only reason we were in the South Atlantic at all was to reclaim British teritory and to liberate British passport holders from an occupying power. There was no thought whatsoever of retaliation. What would thathave acheived?

I don't recollect any other type and I'm certain there was no overflight of the Falklands by Argentinean aircraft after the liberation. That was why we were there and why we have been ever since.

Courtney :ok:

P.S. Sorry for rushed typing.

FWIW well after the conflict (AFAIR early '83) a Bucc (? a pair) did make a fleeting visit to Stanley (stayed only for a day or two).

(edited to correct number of aircraft)

18 Jan 83: Air Raid Warning Red! We were tasking on the western end of West Falkland when the warning was broadcast, and told to 'get out of there'. So we (very bravely) flew at 20ft (ish) rapidly eastward whilt the QRF F4s overflew us westbound. Threw the Chinook on the ground at Pt Howard and joined the Gurkhas in their trenches, thankful they didn't shoot us down as all their weapons were now pointing upwards. The only really p*****-**f people were the two FJ mates we had taken with us on sightseeing, who spent all their time divided between looking out for hostiles and cursing 'cos they wouldn't be able to get airborne as well!

It transpired that at least one pair of FJs had come out from Argentina and entered the FIPZ before descending low level and disappearing from radar whilst still on an eastbound track about 50 miles from the coast (they must have then turned away, but no doubt with a good bit of elint/sigint for them).

Fair enough for them to come visiting us. We did it them all the time. "Presence Runs". I wonder what elint they might have gathered and for why? It was all over by then.

CourtneyMill. thank you for your clear answers!!:ok:

I´m sorry I didn´t make myself clear enough. Yes, I was talkling about the "after war events". I apologize to you all, I misused the word "retaliation"; Freedman´s words refer to "reasonable response to any argentine military adventures".

"Upon reading the November JIC paper which reached this conclusion, the Prime Minister expressed an interest in whether or not offensive operations by Britain might be a reasonable response to any Argentine military adventures: ‘Their shipping and bases are now vulnerable, as we have considerable forces in or near the Falklands’"

L. Freedman. "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" Volume 2, Chapter 44: "Fortress Falkland". Rutledge. London. 2005. (Quote in page 585)

As for the motivation to fly outside the FIPZ, Freedman states in page 586 that:

"In December 1983 an Argentine submarine deployed much further south than usual, and Heseltine authorised a temporary change in the ROE...A ‘warning zone’30nm in from the edge of the FIPZ was established in which unidentified submarines could be harassed but not attacked unless they unmistakably demonstrated hostile intent. Once a submarine penetrated further than 30nm inside the FIPZ it could then be attacked...This change applied only to submarines but led to Heseltine asking the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the ROE to ensure that they met the threat from Argentina while minimising the risk of an ‘accidental’ engagement. Out of this came a recommendation that the warning zone concept should be extended to include Argentine surface combatants and combat aircraft, both of which could be unmistakably warned-off by visual means. A warning zone 30nm deep would still leave the Commander British Forces with adequate room and time to engage Argentine combat units that had aggressive intent... The Commander was later given additional discretion to identify potential targets close to, but outside, the FIPZ boundary. This had the added advantage of further extending the range of response to a potential incursion..."

If I´m not clear enough, what I mean to say is that I undoubtly understand that the purpose of the british forces that were either kept or developed to the Malvinas after the argentinean surrender was not to carry on offensive operations against the argentinean mainland. But it´s also true that, since they were to serve defensive popouses only, the best way to acheive just that is to be either ready to strike first (once its known that an offensive action is coming against you) or to have the information and capacities to answer quickly to an "incoming surprise". I believe that both of these options requiere the previous gathering of tactical intelligence.

Since I read the documents released by the UK National Archives in December 2012, and presented in previous pages, I made some connections with Freedman´s statements and came to think that -may be- the UK forces in the island would be needing to gather information/intelligence to be able to properly achive those aims. That´s why I suggest that flights outside the FIPZ were not only a defensive need.

One final note, if I may: as far as I know (and I´m putting a big deal of money and time researching real documents related to this war) most of the "official information" we researchers are able to have access to, comes from the UK. There´s barely a few official documents release and/or published by Argentina on this topic. We basically count on your testimonies, stories, and good will to let us all know about these things that -like me- many find worth asking about.

Hope I´m not a pain in the back to you and thanks again!!
Christian

Buccaneer Boys
 

CAW
If you read the above book, chapter 17 details the trip of 2 Bucc's to RAF Stanley were they stayed for 10 days. These aircraft were from 12 Sqn which were Maritime attack but with the capability of supporting troops.

Jul/Aug 83 ... another "Air Raid Warning Red" with a FIPZ penetration. Stanley launched the QRA F4 pair, rest of station did what it should and dived into assorted holes. ATC moved to Alternate locations.

FIPZ penetrator duly turned for home, F4s recovered to base, normality returned. It was a nice sunny day, IIRC.

RAF Stanley Reinforcement Plans - Buccaneer
 

By mid-83, Buccaneers were an option in the RAF Stanley reinforcement plan. Martel missiles were going to be stored in ISO containers, with side doors for easy access, that were going to be positioned off-base due to the high Net Explosive Quantity in areas inaccessible by most vehicles except Unimog and BV206 - 4-Ton trucks could not get there. The ISOs would have been moved to aircraft dispersals by Chinook.

trap one, that chapter and the quote you meke, it´s just where I got the first mention of any Buccaneers in the islands. Just like happens with Nimrod pics, I´ve just never come across with -let´s say- one of those planes in RAF Stanley´s apron... That´s why I asked about it. Thanks!!

RafEng074to09, are you saying that those were the contingency plans or that they had actually been excersised? (I mean, the deployment of both Martel missiles and attack planes)

MPN11, shackman and wiggy thank you for your posts. I´m trying to round up some conclusions regarding the period December 1982 - January 1983. :ok:

Christian

CAW

The missiles were going to be held forward because there would have been insufficient time to deploy them by any means available then within the sailing time of an invasion fleet.

They had not been deployed by the time I left and I don't know what happened subsequently. The project had got to the point where some ISOs had been bought and ground crew at the Buccaneer base in the UK had rehearsed how to break out the missiles and loading equipment from them and load the aircraft.

Thank you again RafEng!!!:ok:

I take it like you were there sometime around 1983. If I may, a question that might look like out of place: Can you (or anyone) remember an incident around March 29, 1983 in the area of Cape Meredith? (it apparently involved an argentinean civilean vessel)

Christian

Well. When I was there on F4s (Oct-Dec 1982) the main op roles were QRA and Presence. We were briefed that the role of "Presence" was to demonstrate that while Argentinian military ac were not allowed to come into the FIPZ (and we had free rules of engagement on that, excluding the B707), we were perfectly allowed to use international airspace to the 3 mile limit if necessary. The role entailed flying towards Argentinia to the Prudent Limit of Endurance (PLE) and then returning to base - huge fun.

Of course what actually happened was a game amongst the crews to see who could get closest to the Argentinian mainland. Cruise climb, cruise descent, engines set at 93.5% for the whole flight. The furthest achieved I believe was Madsox who reported he turned around "when he got to the mountains". BS no doubt but it earned a "revision of policy" from senior management.

Got a couple of pics of the Buccs at Stanley - March 83 IIRC. Lots of debate about which RHAGS they could use..... and how far West they were allowed to operate, being seen as offensive assets.

Also somewhere might have more dates for QRA launches between Mar 83 and Jul 83, but as I was only on duty for 50% of my time down there I probably missed some.

Bsweeper, thanks for your data!! Much appreciated!!

Single Spey, can you please share any of those pictures? Also, would it be much for me to ask if you can list briefly some of those QRA during your time down there?

For all of you to know, I´m trying to set straight the facts on "a Story" someone told me about a Skyhawks Flight towards San Carlos on... JUNE 26th, 1982. As I was told, it turned around when they overflew the Jasons...

Christian