Ideally, there would be c 120 for Tornado GR replacement (8 sqns + OCU) and about 80 for the FAA - all Dave-Cs. But that's not where we are, or are likely to be. |
So let me get this right, UK plc has taken a decision to invest about £5 billion on potent warships... [which]..instead of patrolling and cruising the world’s oceans with a potent air wing they will spend most of their operational service just carrying a few helicopters, whilst the aircraft that gives them their capability operate as a Tornado replacement for the RAF in the UK? As well as brains and hard graft, a run of good fortune would not go amiss. And UK plc's economy starting to grow again would be mighty welcome too. |
Dave C would have been the RAF's Tornado replacement.
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I am surprised that nobody has commented on CDS's article in the Telegraph last week(there's a thought, a General pontificating on a subject that involves ships and fast jets). Anyway, he made the point that the lower range of the -B doesn't matter "Because of our investment in AAR". If it's reliant on land based tankers then why don't we just base the damn things alongside the tankers and AAR all the way there and back!
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Because the engine would run out of oil, the pilot would be out of crew duty time and CDS either doesn't understand Air, has been seriously misled or is spinning some kind of inappropriate party line. IMHO.
Anyway, two things cropped up this week: A statement that the addition of EMALS (or something similar had been considered during the design of the carriers - first and last I heard of that), but it would have made installation easier. The other thing that occurs to me is that BAES was the reason for inflating the price of the modification of the carriers. This would be because BAES wanted to keep us in the market for the B model. My understanding is that the move to a conventional carrier aircraft meant that we would go for the C instead and that carried the risk of eventually moving to the Super Hornet if the Government were ever to work out that it's less expensive, proven and pretty much does what we need. Plus, of course, we would be able to launch Growlers, AAR, AEW, etc. BAES has a stake in the F-35 programme and none in the F-18. So by pricing the country out of cats and traps they skillfully preserved their profits in the JFS programme. No proof of any of that, but it rings true to me. Kevlar body armour at the ready. :cool: |
Squirrel,
The point is that it will not be operating around UK. It will either be working up off the E Seaboard of the US or deployed to Med/Indian Ocean. A bit like the old Ark etc as the UK will not have the facilities to work up the CVF+air group, the USN does. |
Lowe Flieger is right and that was the point I was making earlier. If the UK seriously invested, or had a plan to seriously invest, in the sort of hardware, training and support necessary to form a CAG of such proportions to do it true justice (a la US CVN) we wouldn't be having this debate.
Bismarck, As for RAF doing exchange tours with the USMC, if they cannot stand being on board for anything other than the minimum amount of time how will an exchange officer cope with a 9-12 month sea deployment?...reason there are no RAF F-18 exchange officers. The RAFF need to smell the salt water and get real. Just like the mess they created with Joint Force Harrier Justanopinion (which you are welcome to) Quote: at the time of the demise of the GR9 there were more qualified and 'in-practice' RAF pilots than FAA ones. Pathetic. Courtney, As I've said before, any F-35 'could' be a Tornado replacement. The radar, sensor capability and range of all three are a significant step-up and the growth of those capabilities are already being looked at I'm lead to believe. |
It is worth explaining why I, and my fellow military chiefs, proposed this move. Carriers are expensive - there is no way around that. But they offer a capability that few can match: an independent, flexible, sovereign base, not tied to other countries' wishes, that can operate around the world. By choosing the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) model of the Joint Strike Fighter over the Carrier Variant that we had previously ordered for our two new aircraft carriers, the UK is significantly shortening the time it will take to deploy our maritime air power. For me, this is the key factor. We are getting an exceptional military tool that is capable of projecting power, deterring our enemies and supporting our friends. In an uncertain world, this is a capability that I know we all wish to have sooner rather than later. Whilst apparently it is strange to have a General pontificating on a subject that involves ships and fast jets |
Saying that USMC exchanges are irrelevant is slightly muddying; big navy experience is certainly better if you're going to be a big navy yourself however early on, the reality of CEPP for the UK will be more akin to the MEU because we don't have the gear in size or capability to be like big daddy warbucks USN. If we get our economy and grow our military might somewhat in the future then our QEC decks have the potential to operate at the scale of a Nimitz but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that's what it will be like for a while. VSTOL in F35 is meant to be so disimilar from Harrier ops, building VSTOL experience in an AV8 is, in my opinion, outweighed by the benefits of operating a 4.5 Gen platform and all that involves, in a maritime environment. a true statement is a true statement. It wasn't meant to enflame and I'm sorry if I did - I was merely talking to the great British public's perception that it is always the FAA who fly off carriers. There were 3 squadron-sized units at Cottesmore and only one of those was RN A true statement can also be misleading. Whilst the RAF Squadrons did obviously fly from the carrier in the GR7/9 days, I am struggling to remember an RAF det (since Oman Feb 05, IV Sqn) which was longer than a couple of weeks and purely there to gain quals rather than actually be involved in larger scale exercises. Equally the RN had the majority of the Night Boat Qualified pilots by the end. |
...
...BAES was the reason for inflating the price of the modification of the carriers. This would be because BAES wanted to keep us in the market for the B model... An item in Defence News gave a brief explanation of the ever increasing cost of EMALS conversion, but it may need one of our learned engineers to tell us if this explanation has any validity. F-35B: Anatomy of a decision - Defence Management |
USMC plan on IOC in 2014 - while this is not strictly a date set in the type of stone that won't get shattered as we near it, it means that the good ole' Grunts (so lovingly referred to by LO) will be the first military force in the World to deploy 5th Gen airpower from sea with their F-35Bs. That is a powerful tool and could offer an opportunity for UK Defence to learn about JSF at sea much earlier than our flying F-18s and awaiting our ships. It is also relevant because while the USMC F-35B CONUSE is different the CONOP of [what is now] our common platform is broadly the same.
I am struggling to remember an RAF det (since Oman Feb 05, IV Sqn) which was longer than a couple of weeks and purely there to gain quals rather than actually be involved in larger scale exercises. |
If huge amounts of money have been wasted in the procurement of the VSTOL F35 just consider the effect on the carrier project if the Americans cancel the aircraft - not beyond the bounds of possibility.We could end up with two multi billion pound carriers unable to operate any available aircraft.
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bcgallacher,
We have to assume that we have talked with the decision makers in the US, and LM, and established that the risk of F35B being cancelled is sufficiently small as to be outweighed by other considerations. Even so, it's highly unlikely they were reassured that it would a completely risk-free option. By going cats & trap, we had more fall-backs, as well as more inter-operability with allies. If B should fall over, then we would be in a big hole from which I doubt UK fixed-wing carrier operation would escape. But it is the executives' job to make these hard calls (and they are hard, likely harder still when you have more knowledge than is available to most on here), and they have made their call. |
ICBM,
I do have to come in here, as once again we are getting partial views of historical fact. JFH was, in the end, a failure. I say that with some real regret, having been part of setting it up. It failed because, in the end, the people who owned it (the RAF, who had been given the assets and people) did not do what they had been tasked to do, which was to maintain a force capable of both land based and maritime operations. They got to failure by a combination of active decision (delete SHAR) obfuscation (assuring Fleet that 4 GR7/9 squadrons could maintain a dual land/sea capability) and then neglect (failed to maintain seagoing currency). The failure was confirmed by the 'Fail' assessment awarded to the last JFH embarkation on Ark Royal. The fact that it was an RN led unit just showed how far Strike Command had let the capability decline. It was a mess, and no, it's not at all 'rich' to but the blame on the 'light blue'. JFH was under the command of the RAF, its assets and personnel owned by the RAF. All fact. Some like those facts, some don't. Going forward, which is what this thread is about, there needs to be careful thought now over ownership (by which one could consider SDH/DDH/ODH) of the maritime strike capability. My own view is that it has to be owned by an organisation that is committed to maintaining it. Best Regards as ever Engines |
Hi Engines
I normally respect all that you say but wouldn't mind a little more detail on the 'fail' assessment of the last JFH embarkation on Ark. The last unit to deploy was 1(F) to the States for a month. Not RN led, longer than 2 weeks, and so far as I know entirely successful. I didn't embark on that one but was closely involved. I was also dark blue. In the year post Herrick JFH came a long way in the development of embarked syllabus and qualifications as well as Maritime Tactics. Such a shame it couldn't have continued along that path before the rug was pulled. Regards |
Sammy,
You beat me to it! I was also about to again raise the issue of the HERRICK commitment and it being the highest priority from Aug 04 to Apr 09. Auriga was a particular success, first-hand. |
SammySu,
I got that from a normally reliable source, but happy to admit an error if error made. What i do know is that a late embarkation in Ark had some serious issues with deck crews, as well as weapon loading and basic operating currency. The point is that under RAF control, JFH's maritime operating capability was treated as something to be addressed when land based operational commitments permitted. When JFH took on Herrick, Fleet were assured that maritime capability would still be maintained. It wasn't. Details of JFH matter to me only when they are presented in a partial way so as to serve an agenda. I try to stick to facts, once again I apologise fully if I've got some wrong. The facts behind the JFH story are important only if they are used to inform the future. Going forward, the country needs a maritime strike capability owned by an organisation that is fully committed to making it a real one. In my honest view, the RAF isn't that organisation. Not because they aren't as 'good' as the FAA - they are better at land based ops, and hugely professional. But they just don't 'get' maritime air power. The RN does, I sincerely hope. Best Regards Engines |
Important to remember that at SO1 level and below JFH of both cloths worked damn hard to provide the best embarked capability possible and it was embraced by all.
JFH didn't fail. JFH was failed- by an RAF leadership that wanted to eliminate FW FAA and by an RN leadership that sadly didn't 'get' maritime air power. On the day of the announcement 1SL stood infront of all RN officers and said he didn't care who flew off the carriers, the important thing was that we were getting the carriers. That was the betrayal right then and there. |
Engines,
I still believe that it was too much to ask JFH to maintain the required CVS promise whilst conducting HERRICK. To be assured otherwise, though noble by virtue of ambition alone, was sadly never going to be born out in reality because manning the OP became the focus for 5 years. Post-HERRICK there was a real appetite and drive to regenerate the less-focused skills and quals. Back to the thread though... |
SammySu,
Thank you for making a vital point that my own deficient posts missed. The effort at SO1 and below to (both cloths) make JFH work were massive, and my respect for my RAF counterparts grew every day I spent at Strike. The 'failure' of JFH was not down to those individuals, and I am sincerely sorry if my post came over like that. Sadly, there was a concerted effort at RAF 1 star and above to make maritime aviation a non-capability. This led, I believe, to a decline in basic competencies and currencies - on the deck and in the ship as much as in the cockpit. Best Regards Engines |
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