Gentlemen please, can we all just calm down.

AIUI, the situation is this.

1. The US is proceeding with both the F35B and F35C, although concerns are being raised about the flyaway prices of both and their availability "off-the-line". F35C is also currently having some developmental issues with its tailhook, for which design modifications are being developed, but their effectiveness will not be known until trialled. We don't know whether it works or not at this point in time.

2. The US is currently developing the EMALS (and EARS system for recovery). The demonstrator system is installed at Navy Lakehurst and has successfully shot a number of US aircraft, including the F35C. So far all appears to be well in terms of fitting the first production set (of 4) to USS Ford. The second production set (of 2) is coming to the UK. EMALS appears to work well at this point in time.

3. The £1Bn being bandied about for a UK EMALS is not to "redesign" the ship, it is a budgetary estimate produced quickly when the decision to go from B to C was made during SDSR. Specifically, the activities required are to integrate the EMALS system into the ships structure (an alignment / local strength issue) and into the ships electrical distribution grid (principally a power management, software control issue) and also supply the shipset(s), which will not be cheap. However, the actual costing work is (as far as I'm aware), not yet complete, so the £1Bn may be about right, too high or too low. Simply put, we don't know at this point in time.

4. Were F35B to fall victim to US cuts, there is no fallback. The UK (and Spain, Italy) would be permanently out of FW maritime air. In order to meet the UK requirement, the F35B also has to engage in some pretty unwholesome practices on recovery. If the F35C were to fall victim to cancellation, there are at least two fallback options. That makes going back to B a non-starter I'm afraid, when we know the risk appears to be primarily in the aircraft, rather than the ship.

5. The first ship with EMALS fit is unlikely to be available for ops until 2019-ish, so we have seven years before we have to rock up at the ship with an aircraft. In other words, it doesn't have to be sorted right this second! In the next year, no more than two, definitely. However, we do not have to make a decision (F35C or FA18/Rafale) at this point in time.

I don't think there's a man alive who thinks that the QEC/JCA saga is how one should go about procuring a carrier and its aircraft. However, one of the main sources of delay and cost escalation has been the endless speculation (often ill-informed) in MoD, industry, the Navy and the press. "It's too big (for which read expensive)/training burden/shipbuilding capacity/unsafe recoveries" have become a mantra over the years, constantly deflecting / deferring progress.

QEC build appears to be going very well (largely because folk have been left to get on with it) - there may be a lesson in that.......

As usual very wise words and have we signed contracts for the second production set of the EMALS system? I would be very surprised if we had not.

We have negotiated to exchange our last F-35B for an early F-35C, are we seriously suggesting we would go back and ask that this be cancelled and please may we have our 35B back?

NaB,

Thanks very much.

May I elaborate on Point 4. The only reason that the F-35B exists in the first place is because of the Marines' political power, which stems from the fanatical loyalty to the Corps which they instil into every member of the service, and the leadership's willingness to shill for contractors as long as it suits their perceived needs, jointness be damned.

There is no Pentagon-wide strategic justification for investing that much money, and sacrificing a good deal of USAF/Navy capability, to get six short-range jets on to nine or ten decks (forget 11 - we are not there now, and will never be) with no tanker, AEW or EA support.

People who believe that the B will survive are either regurgitating the Marines' rubbish propaganda, or are simply running on the old DC logic that the "Lola of the services" will get what it wants anyway.

However - given the tenuous ability of the B to meet modest KPPs, the number of unsolved problems, the jet's real acquisition and operating cost and the budget crisis, Lola could be in for a reality check.

And, for a nation that has chained its naval air capability to the B (which the US has not), that is an unacceptable risk.

PS - The Marines' toxic lobbying and major acquisition are distinct from their character and ability as a fighting organization. For instance, their adoption of contractor-supported ScanEagles for ISR is one of the better mil-tech stories out there.

LO and Others,

The Uk has gone for the F-35C and decided to get out of STOVL. That's done (hopefully, although the reports of current uncertainties are, well, unsettling).

What is off target is the level of vitriol being thrown at the B and the USMC. Some posters might not understand that the whole F-35 programme started out from STOVL strike fighter studies in the 80s, these led to CALF, then JAST and on to JSF. The JSF.mil website does a good job of setting this history out.

I did a few years in DC. The USMC's political power does not stem from 'fanatical loyalty', it stems from the fact that they are organised, consistent and honest to Congress. Every year, the US Army's aviation plans are savaged. Every year, the USAF pitches up and admits to another humunguous cost overrun on its programmes. Or changes them. Or gets told to buy something else by Congress. The USN does well, mainly due to the success of the Super Hornet programme.

The USMC lobbying 'toxic'? No, just effective. And done at a fraction of the sums expended by the USAF on the same activities. If anyone wants more facts, PM me.

JSF was, and remains, a DoD programme. So is the F-35B. The JORD (Joint Operational Requirements Document) was signed off at the highest levels after 5 years of development. The B was, and remains, a part of a programme to meet USAF/USN and USMC future air power requirements, and buying the B does not mean 'sacrificing' USAF/USN capability. In fact, it has been the main factor in keeping the F-35 design single engine, single seat and thereby affordable. And I got that from the Pentagon civil servant who was the driving force for the whole programme. And this programme's achievements make the UK's attempts at 'jointness' look pretty thin, in my view.

The B meets its KPPs. The UK 'bring back requirement' (not in the JORD) led to the development of RVLs, and according to the quite excellent TPs over there (USAF, USN, USMC and also UK) RVL were quite feasible and not at all 'unwholesome'. But why let facts get in the way of a good post?

I'm a straight STOVL guy - spent many years working on it, and an unashamed admirer of the way that brilliant Brits worked with brilliant US guys for over 40 years to develop the technology that led to the F-35B. There are penalties and tradeoffs (there always are) but the USMC have a solid and well argued concept of operations for this jet. If you don't agree with it, well fine, it's a free thread. But 'rubbish', 'toxic', 'fanatical'? Throwing that stuff around just weakens an argument, in my view.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

Something people tend to overlook with the B is that other nations have got decks that could take them, including partner nations already involved. As I understand it Australia is getting a couple of LHD from the Italians (please correct me if wrong) with a ski jump. The Japanese with their 'Through-Deck destroyers' (sounds familiar...) have decks that a B could launch from which might be useful with China having a carrier capability.

If you can't afford a big carrier to go with the C variant jet, then a small off the shelf carrier and B variant may be a good option.

Spain's AV8Bs will not last forwever and that's another possible B buyer if the money can be found.

Although the A variant is the most technologically straightforward jet and is the export variant for most partner nations do not write the B off yet.

Excellent posts :D:D:D which are in so many ways reassuring and hopefully Engines will accept that some of the comments are possibly meant in a light hearted way. ;)

US Marines second to none

Royal Marines = None

I have always been envious of any military service that manages to master the art of political lobbying and if that is what it takes to get resources, then that is what it takes. I guess some folks fail to realise the size of the US Marine Corp and the tremendous power projection it offers its Commander in Chief.

Having said all this I am still VERY firmly in the 'C' or sea corner :ok::O

This is the boost the project has been waiting for!

Top Gun 2 will rock the F-35, Tom Burbage says - The DEW Line

F-35 Test Pilot in Hollywood film - already done in Green Lantern! (shame he bins it in the first 10 minutes....)

No need to worry about vertical landings and FODing the lift fan if he's in a C...

Filming carrier landings may be tricky at the moment :{

The whole UK Carrier/Carrier Fighter project is in a right old pickle. It will now take a lot of luck for it to come together in a positive outcome for the UK.

The US has backed off from large scale commitment to the F35 (all versions) ostensibly for cost reasons but also because they have fallen out of love with the concurrency fantasy too. Not until the 2020's will they order in significant numbers (significant for them that is). If the fighter does not come up to scratch, they could still bug out even then. The US naval forces have hedged this risk by ordering more Hornets and the UK's Harriers to help keep their AV8's going for longer, and the USAF by committing to F16 upgrades while considering both capability and airframe life extension upgrades to it's F15 fleet.

So while the US doesn't actually fully commit to the F35 for another 8 years, we and other nations find ourselves in a situation where we may have to before the launch customers. This is not a good place to be, and other buyers like the Australians and the Canadians are beginning to get understandably nervous about the timing conundrum they are faced with.

The UK's response is political, sorry I mean strategic: it has deferred the decision until 2015 when the next strategic defences review is due. As luck would have it that's when the next general election must be held too, so there is every prospect that any unpopular decisions can be left to the next administration. But even leaving it until 2015 requires the UK to show more faith in the aircraft that it's launch customer - not in absolute numbers maybe but it will be 100% of our fixed wing naval capability. The US will still have F18's and AV8's to rub by with. Maybe not what they want for the 2020's and beyond but they will still have something proven. We will have only helicopters to turn to while we await UCAV's or something else.

I don't see any perfect ways out of this mess for the UK. In my opinion the best solution would be to buy or lease Super Hornets. If the UK carrier(s) survive the 2015 SDR (not a foregone conclusion by a long chalk), then we can work up a very credible naval air strike component that could survive until 2025 at least, while re-acquiring carrier operation skills in readiness for F35 beyond 2025, if it has proven itself by then. F35 cost will be known, it's capabilities will be better known. If stealth has been busted by then, you might not want to pay so much for it. Whatever, you make your choice with a whole heap of currently critical 'unknowns' now very much 'knowns'.

And if the 2015 SDR cans the carriers, well we could still order F35A or B (proven as above) to supplement Typhoon, or the long range bomber, or UCAV's, or more Typhoons, or continued investments in nuclear attack subs, or a combination of these. At least we would be in control of our options, as opposed to only be able to react to unfavourable circumstances that could be forced on us by others.

Engines -

We're clearly on opposite sides of this issue, and I will accept that sometimes I get a little frustrated. However...

On the Marines: I don't see a lot of honesty in Marine leaders talking about "11 more aircraft carriers" or pooh-poohing the very real problems that the B has (to the point where even the Brits have bailed). This is very top-level: The Marines know the power of memes, simple ideas that get people's attention.

And it's not just the B: There's the EFV, a classic case of bad requirements leading to bad results, a project that should have been killed long before the deed was done. There's the V-22, which is very impressive - but is it really worth what it costs compared to a helicopter? Has it really been worth the 25-year influence on US rotorcraft R&D? (If I'm AgustaWestland or Eurocopter, at this point I yell "Yes, a thousand times over.")

The F-35A/C are respectively CTOL and CV versions of the F-35B. The STOVL/LH-compatible requirements dictated the weight, the single engine, its size and location, internal layout and overall dimensions (with an awkward scaled wing and H-tail for the C). As for saving money, the projected cost for the F135 is still more than two F414s, which provide more thrust and weigh a ton less.

As for keeping the program affordable... If this is what we call affordable, we're in trouble. Indeed (aside from the development cost of the engine) the B has cost the program dearly, through the weight gain and SWAT.

I have yet to see the Marines' "solid and well argued CONOPS". Where is the situation in which you need a sea-based supersonic stealth fighter, but don't need tankers/AEW/EA? How do you forward-deploy an F-4-sized aircraft on to 3,000-foot strips, even accepting that its exhaust is not an asphalt-removing system?

LO,

Thanks for the reply - always good to trade views.

The B's problems are real, because it's a really, really challenging aircraft - in some ways (not all) the most challenging of the three. But the int I get from the team (and I have good contacts) is that there are no major stoppers right now - it was interesting to note that the recent 'quick look' report did not bring up any major B peculiar issues. Lost of common ones, though.

Actually, this is a family of three types from a single common baseline that is more or less the A model. The A was the first to be designed and that formed the basis for the B and C. But, the overall sizing was driven by STOVL, deliberately so. The US had come off the back of four large failed combat aircraft projects, all twin engined. The rationale (and argue with it if you want, but that was their call many years ago) was that the next generation aircraft had to be single seat, single engined to be even remotely affordable.

Oh, and V-22 was an Army led joint programme (JVX), not a USMC one. They took it on and have stuck with it through all its travails. If you want to know what they aim to do with it and the F-35B, go to Quantico and watch their open strategy and tactics sessions, where one and two stars get really and openly grilled by the junior joes for days on end. Once they've agreed it, the whole of the USMC falls into line. It doesn't indulge in the puerile 'Tornado vs Harrier' backstabbing I saw at Strike. Actually, it's quite refreshing. Of course, disagree with it, but it's their train set and their call.

Oh, and finally, I spent a few years planning the the very thorough surface erosion testing on JSF. It's been done at Warton. The USMC plan to do STO RVL ops from 1500 ft strips. At those angles and with a moving aircraft, the exhaust does not rip up the asphalt. VLs would, but they don't plan to do those. That's why the team has built in incredibly good powered lift handling qualities.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

Re. F35B showstopper issues
 

Not doubting your contacts but saying that there are no potential big issues
with the F35B that could still lead to its demise is a somewhat simplistic representation of the trueth I think.
Not too long ago that the GAO and other sources involved in the program where , and at present still are, severely concerned about the weight and CoG issues with the F35B model, limits are razorthin and it is no longer deemed useable on the shorter carriers (think the new Oz Navy ones eg) with a useful load of weaponry.

Besides all the other issues it has in common with the other models it still has a fair amount of big problems specific to the B model which until today remain unsolved, not the least with regards to its very complicated propulsion setup (eg, 2 attempts to solve the blistering panels at the exhaust failed to solve the problem AFAIK).
the inlet airflow door that still needs a redesign, granted not really a showstopper, too high fuel consumption, noise issues, etc.

Engines,

I don't think that there is anything with the B that can't be worked through, although the DOT&E has a long list of squawks...

But... When everything is fixed to meet KPPs, what will the price tag, acquisition and O&S (which is not a KPP), be? And what will it cost to add any growth capability?

Having been pretty close to what was happening in 1994-96, what I saw was (1) DARPA CALF designs (STOVLs, with CTOL versions created by replacing the lift fan with a fuel tank) being adapted to add CV and (2) Boeing's design, which was an outside push into CALF, but which was clearly STOVL-based with its front engine. Clearly the USAF assumed that one engine would cost less than two, but we all know how to spell "assume".

V-22? What I saw was a Marine program for a helicopter called HXM (to which spec the Boeing 360 was designed) being rolled into JVX... The Marines were always the biggest customer and the one where the JVX was most important. The Army was looking at casevac, never logistics.

Good point: RVL will reduce the ground effect. But don't you still need 3,000 feet for the KC-130Js?

Would this be purchased from Sainsburys or Tesco? ;)

Apologies for the humour and please note it is humour and not sarcasm.

'Off the shelf' for a warship capable of carrying a state of the art very complex aircraft which has already seen the USS Wasp having to undergo modifications to operate it. I am guessing this shelf will not be overflowing with choices :)

I wonder if this same shop might have any spare carriers with cats and traps.

Thinks

http://t0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:A...2VrEqqqXJRFwBi

Engines

I was going to reprise the history of the programme myself, but you did it so much better. The B always had the UK STOVL requirement thoroughly embedded, so it is absolutely right to suggest that it isn't just a Marine shibboleth.

My point about RVL was not to denigrate the TPs that made it work on CdG with VAAC or the aircraft variant. My concern has always been that in an operational environment, RVL is an unnecessary risk - no other form of landing at sea that I can think of results in such a limited range of options (bang out) at the end of the first approach. Once the ship became large enough for F35C ops, given the difficulties B was having with the UK bring-back requirement, the decision IMO was a no-brainer.

That said, I agree that the B is a fantastic technological achievement, even if it looks god-awful when it dirties up. However, I think many people's concern with the B is down to whether the JORD actually fits what non-US operators may be after. We have an aircraft optimised for high-end strike missions (JSF, JAST and SSF speak for themselves) and although I've seen the ACM and BVR engagement modelling results, (which were very good IIRC) I am a little worried about the aircraft in a OCA/DCA role.

As there appears to be a growing hysteria about both the aircraft and ship programmes (some of which can be pinned on LM overoptimism), I personally think it would be a good idea if folk allowed the programme to concentrate on the operational development and testing without constant brickbats. Although I too am concerned that future UK & US fighter design and production capabilities rest on a single programme, constantly dumping buckets of ordure on the programme is not being helpful. Indeed, there appears to be an element (and I'm not talking about Boeing) that would be delighted if it failed, but don't really have a credible alternative other than Typhoon or F18, neither of which are the long term answer. If F35 fails, then you can kiss any other manned aircraft programmes goodbye for ever, as there won't be anyone left to design them. UCAVs btw are not the answer to everything in the future either.

Time to let F35 try and deliver it's requirement methinks.....

NaB,

Thanks, and I really agree that there is a bit of a kerfuffle going on now and there's a long way to go with a very talented team working the issues.

Just one thing - the CVF was always big enough for cat and trap - that was a KUR from the start. The UK bringback issue was, in my view, solvable with RVL, especially given the size of the flight deck and length of runway available. At the time I worked the programme, the RVL could be changed into a 'bolter' - indeed, that drove the deck layouts being looked at. The UK (and US) TPs were firm that RVLs were not feasible without it.

Best Regards

Engines

Engines / NaB,

First many thanks for such an informative (and civil!) discussion. My concern is that with Philip Hammond preparing to announce yet more defence cuts (£3 - £5bn?) that the costs of Dave-C are so high that we'll simply have a Potemkin force which looks great at airshows, Spithead, and in MoD/BAES briefing slides but that in reality will be close to operationally useless.

Do we have any serious confidence in the sort of flyaway prices of Dave-C in the 2018-28 timeframe?

Thanks,

S41

I am afraid that I cannot answer...: 20 Feb 2012: House of Commons debates - TheyWorkForYou

Taking Squirrel 41's question literally rather than rhetorically, as of 20 February 2012, Peter Luff didn't know the answer, as the above link confirms. His answer also referred to the carriers as well as the aircraft.

A number of F35 customers, such as Canada, Australia and Japan have become nervous about timing and pricing since the US slowed down acquisitions last month. As the price depends upon the production runs, which are dependent on both US orders and export orders, I'm not sure anyone anywhere knows the answer to this question.

LRIP 5
 

Well, the minister could've been a little more precise. We know that in Low-Rate Initial Production-5 (LRIP-5) Dave-C ran a cool $182.2m, and that by LRIP-9 Dave-C average unit costs fall to "only" $150m which is close to £100m per copy.

On this basis how the post-PR12 budget will be able to fund a serious JSF force (ie, c. 80 = 2 airwings at 36 + 10% margin) is beyond me.

S41

Please enlighten me... just what were these modifications?

All I have read about were:
1. installation of test & measuring instruments specifically and only for the flight tests, not for normal operations,
2. repainting of the aft 1/3 of the flight deck with standard non-skid,
3. painting a rather small area of the aft flight deck with a new non-skid coating that has been developed to vastly increase the period between repaintings (and to handle V-22 exhaust heat better).

When F-35Bs are ready for deployment there certainly will be actual modifications to the ships... specifically, the required maintenance equipment will be installed, just as is done when any new aircraft type comes aboard!