Davejb

Correct. Spot on.


A lesson in MoD(PE)/DPA etc civilian staffing. With a few exceptions, the lowest technical grade is PTO2/ HPTO/C2 (or TTO equivalents, depending how old you are!).


In the late 80s, the absolute minimum experience for a specialist avionic engineer HPTO in MoD(PE) seeking promotion to SPTO (C1) was to have managed a raft of radar, sonar, comms, navaids, EW and ELINT projects, in each stage of the procurement cycle. He will have already served at up to 5 previous grades, been a project manager in at least one lower grade (e.g. minor works at a workshop), an Engineering Authority and very often an HQ “staff” job as what is now called Requirements Manager.

(Tell me, how many in DE&S have that background?”)

To attain promotion, he had to satisfy a promotion board consisting of 3 persons, all at least two grades above him, that he was suitable to fill ANY post at the higher grade.

By the late 90s, the C2 merely had to have been bagman for his boss for a year and, if he knew how to write, minutes secretary at a few meetings before going in front of a board. The board could partly consist of staff JUNIOR to him, normally some clerk in Personnel (sorry, Human Resources). He merely had to persuade them that, in time, he would become reasonably competent in the post he was applying for.

As I’ve said before, not many Wg Cdrs on here would be happy if their promotion was determined by a Pilot Officer (with all due respect to any POs). And you wouldn’t expect a 21 year old graduate who’d never been near an aircraft to be appointed Senior Pilot. But, effectively, that is what happens daily in MoD acquisition. Looking at the DE&S senior staff list, I think I’m fairly safe saying that not one of them meets the 1989 criteria for the most junior post in PE.



I have a feeling recent events (Nimrod cancellation and the SAR-H fiasco) will be right up Bernard Gray’s alley, and his proposal to privatise procurement/acquisition (not yet clear he understands the difference) will be pushed forward. BAeS and others will be knocking at his door already. Think of the money they'll save not having to bid for contracts. They'll just run the whole show under a consultancy contract. Rest assured, they were working on their proposal long before Gray submitted his report.

Ogre:

Oh, you are SOoo right.

Was that from the heart, or do you KNOW?

I was glad to see tucumseh put his point in; he’s usually bang on the money with procurement/PT and is this time too.


As for whether BAE is to blame or not – I don’t think they are to blame. Any contractor will only be as poor as the customer allows them to be. To pick on tucumseh’s point, the lack of experience in managing complex contracts has led to ineffective management of the contractor. Just because you’ve had the training, doesn’t mean you have the experience to make the right judgment. If the contractor fails to succeed on the program and gets a bad profit/report (I work in a slightly different acquisition system to DE&S) then the government manager is equally to blame. Successful requirements stability is, IMO, a function of a solid requirements generation process and strong project leadership on both the government side and the contractor side; this will ensure cost, schedule, performance are met. I fully understand the glacial time periods needed for config/requirement change – it’s not easy as earlier posts have alluded to.

There is also the macro-economic view to consider, in that the Government has some responsibility for national industry for the good of UK PLC. I truly believe in fair competition and a free market economy, but some core competence has to be retained by the UK to meet the political aims and foreign/defence policy. BAE has very cleverly (and sensibly) diversified away from over reliance on the UK defence market, which it holds a huge stake in. To be successful in other markets, they must be competitive. As an example, they cannot expect the USA gov’t to give them an easy ride on certain contracts to keep jobs alive.

The only people to blame are, either rightly or wrongly, the politicians, who make the calls for the good of wider economy, and ineffective management for letting the contractor fail or allowing reqm’t changes when it really is too late in the project.

Thanks Tuc,
and as for Herc - U - Lease

Quite right. I note that most of my recent posts (those since 1901, approx) tend to speak ill of politicians, but the simple fact is that these are the people supposedly empowered - at no small cost - to supervise departments/ministries and to make policy decisions. If BAEs, for example, run rings around us on contract after contract, then it is ultimately the politicians in charge of the relevant departments who have failed to provide oversight and leadership.

Perhaps we should consider the idea of appointing our political leadership on some other, new criteria, other than 'best in breed' at the local dog beauty contest?

Dave

Dengue_Dude

Been there, done that, both sides of the equator! More than once I've been in the "meet and greet" for the new customer rep, only to end up in on the receiving end of an in-depth grilling of the fundamental issues his (or her) predecessor had agreed and on which we had based the technical solution. The results was along the lines of "well I think it should be.......".:ugh:

The other point to remember is that defence contractors are businesses, and have to keep their shareholders happy. Perhaps the information won't be readily available, but if you can see the company financials then you will find that on certain big projects they will make very little profit, or indeed posted a loss. A lot of the posters on threads assume that the contractors are fat cat companies coining in the cash at the expense of the customer. Sorry folks, it just ain't so!

Herc,
You are right. I have always been uneasy about the full on criticism of BAE, as the level of oversight has been pathetic. The set up of the company management and engineers exacerbate the problems tenfold however, and they will try and pull the wool.

Even when there was a large element of risk on BAE, the MOD removed the spec compliance, and accepted a lower standard of verification. This left BAE a clear run, with little or no risk, and in essence it is of little financial impact to them that the project has been cancelled. IMO of course.

It hadn't been a happy morning oop at 't big house for 't Bungling Baron Wasteospace. He had awoken in a foul mood, thanks to rather too much brown ale 't previous night - and his mood hadn't improved when Old Scrotum, his wrinkled retainer, had brought 't morrning paperrs.

't Baron had thought he werr safe from criticism about 't cancellation of ' 't owd Comet 2000', as he fondly called it - because all comment seemed to be aimed at " 't soft sootherrn poof Tory Boy Camerron an' 't mithering Fox boogerr". But the Sunday Times had made him 'reet proper blazin''.

"By 'eck!", he exploded over breakfast, expelling a choice piece of ram's testicle sausage which was deftly caught by Booggerroff, his trusty but rather flatulent whippet whose fielding skills were barely diminished by age, "Has't tha' seen this?", he queried Seth, 't foreman of 't werrks, "Yon air force folk are trying to blame us ferr 't 'owd Comet 2000!".

't Baron's first idea was simple and a few calls were made. "Tony lad", he queried, "Has't tha' got any brass in 't fund left over from 't bungs we gave them little brown lads for 't Torrnado sale?". Assured that there was indeed a source of funding available, he then made another call. "Now then, Rupert lad, what's this in 't paperr o' yorn? 'ow much to silence 't booggerr?"

There was a short intake of breath at the other end of the phone, before an anitpodean response involving an invitation to perform an unusual sexual act upon himself was proposed to 't Baron, followed by a loud click.

"That's knackerred that then", mused 't Baron. "Any road, what arr them booggerrs moanin' about? Stickin' bomb doors? Nowt that a drop of WD40 won't fix. Sticking nosewheel - a bit 'o fittin' at £1000 an hourr'll soon fix that. And 't hot air pipe - 't lads can find a nice bit o' asbestos laggin' to wrap 't booggerr wi'. Gaps in 't engine walls? A few tubes o' marine' silicone sealing mastic'll see them right - 't ll cost us £85.78 for a carton of 25 x 310 ml tubes, so with VAT that'll be £13282.07 a litre to 't air force as them boogerrs in MoD won't notice 't decimal point. Never have to this day!!"

Seth, however, had further bad news. "But Master, they've starrted terr cut oop 't Comets at Woodferrd, tha' knows".

"Well, I'll go to the foot 'o owerr sterrs! By 'eck, Seth, don't fret thee sen. Gerrout 'n find someone as needs some scrap an' there'll be a nice little earner in it ferr thee! Don't forget how much them silly soft southern sods paid us to do that. 'That'll learrn fatty Brown oop in Jockland', Foxy 'ad said, an by 'eck, 'ee werr right"

About time Beags. You need to team up with a cartoon artist and do a weekly strip. I hasten to add, comic strip.

I too have 2 sinple comments:
1. As a CUSTOMER, doesn't the MoD have the high ground when purchasing new equipment? If a company wants to sell to the Forces then surely they need to deliver or incur costs/penalties.
2. I don't think we help ourselves by assigning SO1/2s in PROMOTION TICK IN BOX procurement assignments. Get proper SMEs involved from the outset, who follow the project through and who are accountable for any short comings.

Twotunnels,

I agree with both items, but the nature of defence procurement does not always fall the way we think it should. If we were any ordinary customer buying a bespoke item, then we would go to a specialist who is capable and experienced in producing such a good; usually a company with strong experience. Not quite so easy in the defence realm with costly developments (£Bs) and often novel technologies. Although we strive for firm fixed price contracts, there are often occasions where the customer (us in this case) assumes some, if not most of the development risk. If BAE were to assume the development risk this would add in very expensive protection/risk factoring, making for an hugely expensive contract - or the risk would be simply too great that no sensible CEO would accept the project. I agree we should be in the driving seat as customer, but the complex and horrendously expensive nature of defence projects precludes that under the current acquisition thinking.

as for the point about ticking boxes, couldn't agree more. in the current assignment it took me 18 months just to feel useful - fortunatley i've got a good amount of time on the project as have the key decision makers.

TT, the best analogy for youas a customer is getting some building work done.

The first thing you find is that your choice of contractrs soon becomes limited. First some put in silly bids just in case you are stupid. Eventually one puts in a sensible bid. So sensible that the contractor realised he underbid and so fails to turn up.

Then you start again, perhaps with a new spec. As your contractor starts work Mrs TT decides she want a change - underfloor heating say. Now there is little extra work for the tiler but that doesn't stop him doubling the price.

See where I am coming from?

Last year, scrap Jaguar, howls of protest on here.
This year, scrap Harrier, more howls of protest.
Fine products, eh! What's up with you lot.