Wooding?

About 5-7 years ago, some people in the Office of Force Transformation tried to sell the Marines on SKASaC radar installed in the back of a V-22. Total lack of interest from the Corps... I don't know why, unless either (a) they truly believe that networked F-35 sensors will do it for them, or (b) they secretly realize that they will never go into any scenario with serious Red air or ASCMs without CSG backup.

The trouble with (b) is that it cuts the requirement for a supersonic, stealth Marine jet off at the knees.

This requirement in my view was never a reasonable one. That is where the whole thing went wrong.

Up until the late 70s early 80s it was very reasonable for all Ops Requirement Staffs to have every new technical possibility on their 'must have' list whether they were Airforce, Navy or Marine. 10 years later given the capability of smart weapons plus modern nav and comms I think things changed and you did not need to have every capability in every aircraft. It was time to think about the detailed use of each platform and therefore what it really did need to accomplish its MAIN role.

So far as the USMC expeditionary task goes I believe they needed superb reliability and real operating site flexibility with a negligible support trail beyond replenishing their people with food and the aircraft with fuel and weapons. The near total reliability I have in mind would have to be designed in to any aircraft - it would not happen without compromises in many other matters. Stealth and supersonics especially would be bound to reduce reliability, put up cost and reduce numbers and so on.

As it happened when I was still at Kingston in the 80s I proposed a development of the Harrier that would be ultra reliable with minimum maintenance due to a complete redesign of the airframe systems and structure, full FBW to remove the need for any piloting skill/training/currency except when over the target, 0.9M on the deck in the aircombat config plus very good legs. People larfed and said what about stealth and supersonics? They of course were just people who wanted to do that for their own purposes. After all call yourself a designer if you don't do the lot (whatever the lot is at the tiime).

So we have what we have today because of key people not wanting to be associated with anything other than the latest and the best of everything.

Sorry for the rant.

@JF
 

Very interesting indeed, thank you for sharing that.

Engines


Would you explain the "wooding" please?


I remember when Future Organic AEW (FOAEW) was part of the CVS IPT at AbbeyWood in the early 00s. They were looking for staff and turned down anyone with AEW/ASaC experience on the grounds that it was completely irrelevant to FOAEW. None of them even got an interview. Osprey was one of the candidate platforms. So was Merlin, despite the RN rejecting it in favour of a Sea King upgrade.

Wooding is essentially the obstruction of a radar field of view by "stuff". Usually used in connection with ships, but also applicable to aircraft if you're trying to mount a 360 degree FoV radar, in proximity to an airframe.

Think how high above the wings and fuselage the radome is on an E3. You can't get that on an E2 (hangar height) but you try to make it as high as you can. The E2 radome lowers slightly once aboard for stowage. IIRC the original reason was to allow stowage in the old CV-41 hangar (lower deckhead height than CV59 onwards).

This requirement in my view was never a reasonable one. That is where the whole thing went wrong.

Exactly. The first problem in selling a Harrier III in the 1980s, though, was that the RN clearly wanted F-16-like agility and supersonic. So did the Marines, because they expected to be taking on Soviet flank forces in places like Norway. Hence the US-UK ASTOVL parameters set in 1986.

However... between the Powered Lift Conference in 1987 and 1990, the Brits in particular noticed a disturbance in the force: The US side was clearly up to something under the cover of secrecy. This was Lockheed's STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF), which was stealthy.

It led by 1991 to the origins of the JSF: The key was that the STOVL operators could not only get stealth, but they could get it for free, because by swapping the lift fan for a gas tank you could create the longer-range, stealthy Multi Role Fighter that the USAF wanted.

But then when it really went wrong was the decision to bet all of TacAir on that idea before it had been demonstrated, and here we are.

Not a Boffin

Thank you. Understood.

This weeks "Flight" has some pointed remarks from US flyers around the point that with the latest downgrade in "acceptable" performance on the F-35 you might as well be flying an F-4 or F-5

The relaxation of the specification is a bit of a worry. Of the three basics you would like from any military procurement - on budget, on time and on spec, only the last was still up for grabs. It seems F35 now has the full set of undesirables. I wasn't entirely sure if this is a permanent downgrade, linked to the development and test period, with clearance to revert to the original parameters to be reinstated later - presumably not?

All aircraft have their strengths and weaknesses, with tactics developed to play to the strengths and minimise the weak points. But it is concerning that this far into a programme that promised so much, compromises are still eroding desired capabilities. From the outside, it seems huge effort is having to be expended to take three steps back for every two forward. Having to develop more and more tactics to offset performance losses is putting workload back on the pilot when a lot of money has gone into making his/her life so much easier.

As the UK will have to use F35 for air-defence, does this have knock-on operational constraints? If the UK were acting in isolation, does this now mandate at least one if not two T45s to provide protection? Will we have enough ships to protect the carriers (a long standing personal concern)? Can Sea Ceptor be fitted to POW/QE? I don't believe it is currently planned but I may be wrong.

F35 numbers have been vague these last 3 years. Officially still 138, then mooted to be 50-ish initially, with hopes that we will eventually get 'about 100'. All to be debated in SDSR 2015. But what will we know in 2015 that gives confidence to order in numbers? As capabilities reduce would it not be sensible to order small lots to find out whether it will work for us? If it does buy more. If not, don't add to the problem

If F35B falls over entirely, then there are only two realistic candidates to replace it for carrier operation - Super Hornet or Rafale. Both would require (apparently) costly modifications to the carriers. In my view there would be a very real risk that scrapping the whole deal would be a favoured economic option - no F35, no Hornets, no Rafales and no carriers - saves a bundle. So, I am really hoping that F35B comes through for us - we are in a right mugger's buddle if it doesn't. Yet the bad news just keeps on coming. Depressing.

LF

The sustained turn rates of the three variants was reduced to 4.6 g for the F-35A, 4.5 g for the F-35B, and 5.0 g for the F-35C.

The acceleration performance of all three variants was also downgraded, with the F-35C taking 43 seconds longer than an F-16 to accelerate from Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.2.

This was judged by several fighter pilots to be a lower performance level than expected from a fourth generation fighter

43 seconds longer than an F-16 for heavens sake - I hope the stealth works otherwise those guys are going to be sitting ducks

All this money and they produce a stealthy A-7, or have they reduced the LO spec too? :ugh:

LF - It was three years ago this week that SecDef Gates fired the JSF program office director. At that point, USAF IOC was officially set for 2013 (with Block 2, but a combat-effective Block 2).

It's increasingly clear that Gates' Admiral Fixit, Dave Venlet, subsequently opened the lid on Pandora's can of snakes, an apocalyptic FUBAR somewhere between the Charge of the Light Brigade and the Raft of the Medusa. Something had gone colossally wrong with the execution of the program - what that was, is now only slowly coming to light.

Even now, the best guess is that IOC is in 2020 - that is, it is still four years further off than it was supposed to be, three years ago. And software development is still wobbly.

From experience of running COEIAs - including F35 models - the appraisal is only valid and, therefore, the suitability of the system in question to meet the operational requirement confirmed, IF the system confoms to the standards used to create the models. Any changes to specifiacations immediately invalidate the trial and the only way to confirm that the changes are "acceptable" is the re-model and re-evaluate. Believe me, relatively small changes in specs can have disproportionate effects on the overall operational effectiveness. This hasn't been done in this case.

So, unless anyone believes that we should blindly support the project by accepting the changes to the specs without thoroughly re-evaluating it to see if it meets our needs, we should now be "on hold" pending a complete appraisal of the new capability on offer. It looks pretty obvious now that we have here a platform with piss poor performance - way worse than a lot of platforms we've operated before. The remaining strength, stealth, may not be enough to carry the day.

Is this about the UK's investment in the system or procuring the system we really need for our carriers?

Time to stop and do a thorough re-evaluation.

That's the 'top gun' detection system: "they must be close, I'm getting a hard on"

Seriously.... How much longer is this train wreck of a program going to last?

Before the "hard-over" pros and cons answer you, Captain, my concern now is now if the programme survives, but weather it's what we need. I pray we don't buy a 4.5g, underpowered, range and payload-limited just because we want to be in the club.

I find it hard to see how it can be what we need.

COEIA was a new one for me

www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/weiss.pdf

I knew there was a process but not how it worked, thanks CM :ok:

Definitely time to stop and reassess our options :confused:

CM - Good point.

I have said here and elsewhere that the USAF's core requirement was for something like an F-117, but that would be (a) able to survive in daylight, (b) not limited to clear air bombing and (c) able to find and attack moving targets. The F-35A should be able to do that, if at a high price.

The USAF also wanted something that could be loaded up to do an F-16 job on "Day 2" (I am aware that is a figure of speech). But that's not as urgent because there will be lots of upgraded AESA-fitted Vipers until 2030, on current plans.

The Navy core requirement was for a stealth bomber, with the Super H/Growler doing everything else. Again. that's doable, as long as there are no nasties lurking between here and carrier qualification.

But if you want a fighter that does everything fighters do, and considering the range and payload limits of the B model, and if your budget is not bottomless...

Capt: It is remarkable how long train wrecks can continue in this business, because some of these trains are about 3000 cars long...

Courtney, you are right to be worried about raw performance of the aircraft once stealth is eroded by time. But having seen the figures I would not use he term 'underpowered' as above and especially below the transonic region the jet accelerates like a scalded cat.

I readily accept though that the acceleration from 0.8 to 1.2+ is a real shocker for AIM-120 tactics and if you start kicking the aircraft around in the transonic region it just pisses energy.

Spending so long in burner at night in a supposedly LO platform will not be fun.

Just plain awful really.

Under-powered in the sense that the aircraft today (and the revised specs) do not match the the specs used in the evaluation that showed that it met the operational requirement. I chose my words carefully.

Understood.:ok: