emergov

HPT

Emergov

Like I said, I can accept the argument that "ok it's a lemon but it's what we have got, so let's make the best of it and get on with the job". That is probably a widely held view by many involved. You are correct that negativity for it's own sake is unhelpful but "the truth will set you free".

What I find impossible to understand is that, with all that has happened and what we now know about the limitations and problems with this aircraft, how anybody can still defend the decision to purchase it in the first place or even praise it. To say that it will eventually be proven to be a good buy is very optimistic to say the least. I am trying hard to think of another ADF major procurement project that started so badly but eventually proved to be a success, perhaps someone can enlighten me??? Even if you can think of one, anybody could name another 10 that went from bad to worse.

In my personal experience with B/F helicopters, easier, simple, reliable normally always means better.

The late F111

AFG,

Collins Class
Leopard
Black hawk
LPA and subsequent upgrade.
Nomad (OK, I'll give you that one).

If you cast your mind back 20 years, pretty much the same things happened with Black Hawk, and lots of people said the same things you are saying now. BR 71 is still saying them.

HPT, don't forget Melchett also said "Crevice is a positively disgusting word". He was indeed a prophet.

Emergov,

that you started that list with Collins Class tells me all I need to know. How many of those are operational at the moment? How many hundreds of millions are still being poured into that black hole to salvage some sort of capability? Next you will be telling me that Sea Sprite was a winner. Poor old Navy are unfortunately a great example of ADF procurement failures. That they managed to make the LPA workable was only the result of political embarrassment and many millions of dollars. At least now they look likely to buy Sea Hawk so they will have something that works (as long as they don't go for a new avionics setup).

Were you involved with BH in the early days? Not to many of the operators or end users had a bad thing to say about it. In fact, it was to many of us, awe inspiring. The only thing that was a real problem was the lack of spares (underfunding). The cracking came much later and probably only as a result of our continued use of the external fuel tanks. But that it was perfect for it's role was never in doubt for one second.

Can't comment on the intro of Leopard except to say Leopard 2 is still rated the number 1 MBT in the world so we probably should have stuck with it. I guess the Germans are to tanks what the yanks are to helicopters.

As I see it, and as somebody has already stated on this thread, the only recent successes have been off-the-shelf. How many failures does it take, how much money will be wasted, and sadly how many lives will be lost (due to lack of capability) before the ADF and the government admit that we are too small to take developmental risk on large projects? We have been rated as one of the worst amongst developed countries for the capability delivered per defence dollar spent. Gosh. Really!!!

That you continue to defend this woeful record makes you, Sir, part of the problem. A problem can only be resolved after it first becomes recognised as being problem.

You are almost right. The only recent successes have actually been FMS. There is a difference between FMS and off the shelf.

There is no intent to take development risk - never has been. Hindsight is the vision of arseholes.

You wouldn't be the first person to suggest we should just buy FMS and thereby reduce our risk. The only problem with FMS is that you don't get exactly what you want. MH60R cannot be fitted with floats, for example, and CH-47F has no rotor brake. If we modify those acft, we take development risk, and assume an AW oversight for the life of type.

It's not easy. If it was easy, we would be there by now.

As Edmund Blackadder said "They may go up diddy up up, but they're still gits"

My thoughts,

90% of a proven capability is always better than 100% of an unproven dream of a hanger queen.

When you buy something that does not have proven operational in service history in sufficient numbers then you are taking on developmental risk. It's not hindsight and it's not rocket science. There were voices saying this before the decision was made.

It doesn't need to be perfect, it just needs to be reliable and capable.

Not probaby, but fact. The RAAF repeatedly warned AAvn of the potential problem of leaving the external tanks fitted, and like virtually all other advice from the RAAF, it was totally ignored. In those early days after the Army takeover, you could be forgiven for thinking that if the RAAF did it one way, the Army went out of their way to do it the other way. Ask any of the small number of RAAF pilots who transferred to the Army. Sidelined and ignored would be a kind description of the way they were treated. ("Arf", are you reading this? I'd love to have you share some of the tales you told me with everyone here - or at least the ones you could tell.)

My main memory of those days is anecdotal, involving an exercise where a detachment of four Blackhawks was based on an exposed beach for two weeks. At the end of the exercise, all the BH groundcrew were tasked to wash down all the Landrovers and then sent on two weeks' post-exercise leave. Their helicopters were left, salt-encrusted, for two weeks before they were given the same attantion as the Landrovers received immediately after the exercise.

As I said, it's anecdotal and might not have happened. However, I can assure you that the person who told me, who was there, was insistent that it did.

Andu, you are exactly right. The Army maintainers were on a big learning curve when BH was introduced and many mistakes were made. Also, the C&C of Engineering support was completely screwed up and caused me personally immense frustration. The TST's were not under command of the Sqn OC's and quite often had different priorities. Having said that, BH spares were not given a high priority by the RAAF so there was plenty of blame to be shared around.

We probably share some friends by the sounds of it. Let me assure you that their experience and skill was appreciated by many of us but unfortunately not always listened to by those running the show at the time.

I still maintain though that it was a great buy only we should have just stuck with bog standard UH60's. Even when we buy something good, for some reason we still have to "Australianise it" which you could also describe as "f.....g it up".

Seems some of us have gone very quiet on the MRH-90 "engine problems". Doesn't seem we can blame NH Industries, they only manufacture the airframe, not the engines. Can't blame Eurocopter either, they only assemble some of the aircraft. Can't blame Australian Aerospace either, they only assemble the Australian variants. Can't really blame RR/TM as it appears that they do have a correct procedure for engine starting, hot, cold or otherwise. The "problem" doesn't seem to have affected the other operators very much. Anyone care to comment?

Back to the thread title without any mention of museum pieces.

Pedals etc
 

MTOW:
"A question for the AAVN drivers: does the mix of European (clockwise rotation) and American (counterclockwise rotation) cause any problems in training and switching between types? Probably not a big deal for experienced crews, but I would have thought it might be one extra dimension ("which foot do I use today?") that less experienced pilots could do without."

Nope. First time it caught me out. Second time the brain was pretty much right to go. Aircraft helps as well.

MRH 90 flight restrictions should be lifted this week or early next.:ok:

Not buying into the argument, but perhaps the Army had their reasons. Navy Hueys flew with drop tanks and accepted the fatigue (cracking) that was the outcome. Never saw a RAAF Huey with drop tanks, and no doubt they had their reasons, just as the Navy had for fitting them.

FA 18

So, changed pilots assessed servicable then:E



Sorry, couldn't resist it, personally I think what's his name from Eurocopter is talking cr#p.

Sighted MRH-90 over Amberley today. Back in the skies.
Huey would've been better!:cool:

RAAF UH-1B Hueys flown for SAR had external tanks....Navy Hueys were B/C models...

MRH90 Recommencement of Flying Operations


(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued July 22, 2010)




The MRH90 helicopters operated by the Australian Defence Force are back in the air after having been grounded because of engine-related incidents. (Eurocopter photo)The Australian Defence Force (ADF) today announced that Multi Role Helicopters (MRH90s) will recommence flying operations later this week.

This follows an incident north of Adelaide in April this year where an MRH90 suffered an engine failure in one of its two main engines.

The Defence Materiel Organisation's (DMO) Head Helicopter Systems Division, Rear Admiral Mark Campbell, stated that media reports alleging pilot error being a factor in the engine failure were incorrect.

"There is no suggestion of pilot error as alleged in one UK report," Rear Admiral Campbell said.

Eurocopter CEO, Dr Lutz Bertling, has also written to the Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, Greg Combet to directly refute any suggestion that engine damage was caused by improper handling of the aircraft by ADF pilots.

Rear Admiral Campbell also said an inspection regime and preventative measures have been developed to lift the current flying suspension.

"I can confirm flying operations will commence shortly following approval by Defence's Operational Airworthiness Authority.

"Extensive work has been conducted by Rolls Royce Turbomeca and our Industry partners with support from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to identify the cause of the engine failure.

"We are advised the failure resulted from compressor blade fracture due to contact with the engine casing." The impact of the engine failure combined with the workload to address some technical issues with this very capable but highly complex digital aircraft will delay the first flight at sea for Navy, which is now expected to occur in mid 2011.

The first Army capability objective of one deployable MRH90 troop will also be delayed.

Of the 46 MRH90 helicopters ordered for the Australian Navy and Army, 11 have been accepted and are being used for training and testing which contributes to the development of operational capability over the next few years.


(EDITOR’S NOTE: The four engine incidents experienced by Australian MRH90 (Australian designation for the NH90) helicopters were due to “improper procedures for hot starts [which causes] damage to bearings and sealants,” Eurocopter CEO Lutz Bertling told reporters July 17 during an EADS media seminar in London. He added that the engine management software had been modified to prevent reoccurrence of this problem.)

Iroquois Auxiliary Fuel
 

BA; re your post #137.

RAAF UH-1B at some SAR detachment locations were fitted with external droptanks to enable quick filling if extended range was required.

The UH-1H (and ergo Huey II) is plumbed for fitment of auxiliary fuel, either in externally mounted droptanks or much larger capacity inside cabin collapsible quad (quarter) tanks positioned in one or both of the rear crew stations. These tanks enable very long range ferry or carriage of some additional auxiliary fuel depending on payload availablility when configured for widely varying roles. They were often used by Air Force during operations throughout the northern archipelago such as support for Army Survey Corps.

There is a very wide range of optional equipment fits presently available for the Iroquois family, including state of the art avionics and multiple certified bolt-on weapon systems as seen with UH-1N, UH-1Y versions. The external hardpoint attachments on later model Iroquois are stronger than on the UH-1B and I don't recall there being any fatigue or cracking of mounts for aircraft configured as Bushranger gunships, although there was some tailboom cracking in Vietnam due to sustained high AUW operations. Tailbooms were pretty easily repaired or replaced as appropriate.

Thanks Bushranger. TBM, for historical accuracy the Navy Hueys were all B models, no C. The only C's produced went to the US Army, and 6 to Spain. The C had a different tail boom and rotor system than the B. The Navy did have one odd child though, an aircraft with a C type forward fuselage (bigger fuel tank than the B) and a B model tail boom and rotor system. The production run lists that particular aircraft as a B, and I don't know how even official RAAF and Navy sources refer to C models. One RAAF source states the Navy as having 3XB and 4XC.

According to "US Military Aircraft Designations and Serials" by J M Andrade, pg.125.

UH-1B c/n 881/883 ex 63-12953/12955 [became N9-881/883]
UH-1C c/n 3101/3104, ex 64-17621,22,23, and 65-12846 [became N9-3101/3104]

"UH-1C late production UH-1B but modified rotor and increased fuel capacity."

I believe you can visually distinguish between the two by the air vents on the roof around the rotor shaft?