Tiger Grounding
 

Good to see that safety is still a focus. As we all know, this is just routine, and anybody who reads too much into this does not understand the safety culture of the ADF. I expect the Tigers will be returned to flying within a couple of days.

The recent Blackhawk grounding seems to have gone almost unoticed with limited reporting. The usable fleet is dwindling.
As for the Tiger, they have 19 delivered in final fit, with another three currently undergoing conversion. Things are looking good for FOC this year; finally! :ok:


Only thing is, this comes as the ADF is pulled out of it's major theatre of operations...

Ok it seems this debate needs a revival. Aside from the current state of ARH, the MRH project seems to be on the go slow (again). My information suggests AAVN will try to stretch the life of S-70 until the 2018-2019 timeframe. My concern is that the S-70 in its current form is becoming a basket case in itself. The GPS replacement is problematic in its current form. The genius(s) who decided to degrade the functionality (no nav database?:confused:) should try operating them; I for one have no trust in the integrity of the system after being left in the lurch right when I needed it. The mixed fleet with up to 4 cockpit configs is just a headache. Mission planning is becoming un-wieldy and ultimately degrades the end product. Duplicating everything to account for the mixed fleet is wasted effort. :ugh:

Yes, we will (and do) “suck it up”, but seriously, the “just make it work” mantra is getting old. The reality is S-70 along with Chinook will remain the backbone of the lift fleet for the foreseeable future. MRH (so we are told) will be a great platform…when it gets here. Great, bring it on and we will make it work, because that’s what we do. The reality for MRH appears to be a never ending slide to the right, with no capability to speak of.

Maybe it’s time to revisit UH60M? Or at the very least admit the S-70 needs a little more attention to see the old girl through. The customer still wants a capability; the bandaid fix will not work for another 6-7 years. It’s time to make some difficult decisions.:hmm:

BTW, I am not a one eyed fan of “mike model”. I am a fan of being able to get the job done with a bit of kit that lets us just get on with it, whatever that happens to be. :ugh:

so what is the actual status of the MRH90 with Army. I spoke to a techo the other week who told me that one "Navy" bird is in Townsville with a trashed floor undergoing major mods and that they have at least 8 delaminating tailboms. He is a Navy CPO [ex-Sea KIngs] attached to Army for amphib help etc. He also said some with Army already think they know about riding the boat and maintaing at sea. Very different ball game to the home drome...

It is very interesting to see Sweden buy M model Black Hawks for combat use and that Norway's NH90's are six years late and they are now looking at Black Hawks and cancelling their order.

Whoever bought these $hitheap$ for Australia needs to be tarred and feathered.

For a first world country with some very bright brains in it,
we sure do make a hash of buying gear for the military and
not testing or thinking ahead of potential problems
before purchase :ugh:


Re the Army, if they call it a boat, no wonder the Navy
thinks they have a long way to go !!!


Seems to be a lot of flak coming out of the investigation
into the Chinook crash. Is that going to affect how things
are done in the future and who runs them ?

They haven't mentioned the mid-air with the SASR at High Range. The culture urgently needs a change. Choppers aren't trucks and aircrew aren't grunts first either.

The US Army aviation seems to work...

Wasn't that the Howard Coalition Government?

Given the ALP's recent poor performance in Defence matters, I would have thought there'd be some political mileage to be made out of the MRH debacle by the Federal Government. The Army would be pleased to see the back of the MRH 90 'Taipan' (Carpet Python more like it) I'd reckon.

I'm not sure comparing US Army and the Australian Army is reasonable.

Are you talking about the '96 crash, and if so, do you believe that the culture has not changed? Not necessarily disagreeing with you but I'd be interested in hearing an argument rather than a throw away line.

Look at the Kanimbla accident for a recent example of undisciplined flying. My CPO friend was there and the briefed procedures were not followed. Why?

It is risky business therefore requiring an even higher level of training and discipline.

I wish them luck as there are many good boys and girls in the Corps.

They still take deliveries it seems,MRH90 N° 14 was just handed over,
Defence takes 14th MRH 90 | Australian Aviation Magazine
Also the New Zealand forces are still going ahead with their program,
http://pacificsentinel.********.be/2...sful-nh90.html

As an aside, the Tiger seems to be back on track, testing to be finished somewhere late this year.
Australian Tigers flying again after source of cockpit fumes discovered

TBM-Legend: sure - two accidents nearly 15 years apart involving a very specific capability. Probably a legitimate line of examination. With the greatest respect to your CPO mate though, I doubt he was intimately involved in the flight authorisation and AVRM process of the incident flight, particularly as it sounds as though his job is fixing them not flying them.


Are you saying that there is a wider (corps-wide) culture of 'undisciplined flying' or are you suggesting some other cultural issue? What evidence have you seen or heard of that indicates that Army Aviation treats their choppers like trucks or that aircrew think they're grunts? Once again, interested in your argument but so far you haven't made a very coherent one.

Causes of ADF helo fleet decline
 

I agree with Tibbsy (Post # 268); it is quite unrealistic to compare the huge US Army organisation with smaller forces. They arguably have a different culture than the other US 'air' arms because they have fundamentally different organisational structures.

Perhaps one dated example illustrates different thinking for Australian air elements. Soon after takeover of battlefield support helos from the RAAF in 1989, Army Aviation began operating Blackhawk with the External Stores Support System (ESSS) and drop tanks often fitted for predominantly low level operations. Air Force advised continuing the practice would substantially damage the airframe, and it did.

But the root cause of the diabolical mess that has since been created regarding functionality of the whole ADF helo fleet seems to lie in failure of the DoD organisation to maintain adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. And note the increasing emphasis by the Labor Government on the usability of many assets being acquired for disaster relief and humanitarian roles. Do we not acquire hardware primarily for military purposes and thus need to keep it combat ready?

An obsession with trying to reduce the fleet to as few as 4 types via the absurd ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP – Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) has been a major factor generating serious capability gaps and the architects of that scheme were the hierarchy of Army Aviation. The intention to ultimately shed the most vital of battlefield functions, utility helo capability (Iroquois/Blackhawk), reflects shallow combat appreciation. That capability cannot be adequately replaced by a twin-engined so-called LUH seemingly intended to be acquired downstream ostensibly as an aircrew training platform (see: http://www.defence.gov.au/publicatio...tyPlan2012.pdf, Page 68), nor will the medium lift MRH90 adequately suffice for utility helo roles and the operating costs for that platform will likely well exceed Iroquois/Blackhawk.

Tiger and MRH90 were inappropriate Howard Government acquisition decisions; but what is needed now is some bold decision-making to scrap the damaging hugely costly HSMP and restore some lost capabilities by diverting modest funding into optimising the Blackhawk, Kiowa and what remains of the Iroquois fleet. Perhaps just put the Tiger and MRH90 into storage as they are going to suck up a huge slice of Army's overall budgetary funding to the detriment of primary functions.

If DoD can find money for ships to restore run-down Navy capabilities and to donate to Customs (the Skandi Bergen), then funding can surely be recast to restore vital utility helo capacity. A burning question is though, are the Service Chiefs prepared to acknowledge the diminishing operational status of the ADF helo fleet?

Interestingly; Sikorsky-Helitech, who have been awarded a contract for further maintenance of Blackhawk/Seahawk, are also the Bell Helicopter authorised facility for Iroquois and Kiowa engineering services (see: Sikorsky - Certifications/ Approvals).

A couple of questions for those that might know re the Tiger.

Looking at how long it has taken for the Tiger to become operational,

1. Are we the only country that takes such a long time to go from delivery to being operational, especially when their seems to be a need for that exact type of capability in a current operational theatre ?

2. Was their a "hidden agenda" that the hierarchy didn't want the Tiger to be deployed to Afghanistan and so took it's time to get the Tiger up to the level required ?

Would be interested in forum members thoughts.
.

Helo support for PNG national government elections.
 

Expanding a bit on the MRH90 discussion

Recently, Australian media showed several RNZAF UH-1H Iroquois (3?) being loaded on a RAAF C-17 for airlift to PNG to provide support for national government elections. Another report mentioned ADF Blackhawks (4?) also being deployed for that purpose and presumably ferried not airlifted.

The Huey is of course readily air deployable by C-130, although Blackhawk less easily. MRH90 is only deployable by C-17 and any difficulties regarding airlift not known.

Hourly operating costs for Huey are perhaps 20 percent of Blackhawk and MRH90 is presumably higher.

So; the economics of the PNG elections exercise would be interesting. Overall cost of deploying/operating/redeploying multiple Iroquois by C-17 versus presumed cost of ferry/operating/return ferry for Blackhawk.

Once the Kiwis have unwisely forfeited their upgradable UH-1H and acquire MRH90, cost-effective helo support for regional operations will be significantly diminished.

Somebody may be able to contribute some data re the PNG elections exercise that might be illuminating.

Today's "Australian" newspaper:

But the question remains where are the MRH90's...?

TBM are you saying you believe there is a culture of complacency in Army Aviation, or are you just quoting Alf Jonas out of context because of your obvious prejudice?

I have no prejudice. I wish Army Aviation success. My point is that the Army commanders need to understand aviation a lot more. The focus in the RAAF is flying, the focus in the Navy is water [although the RAN FAA built itself on ex-RAAF aircrew initially] whereas Army is a land based activity in general with air as a support function.

I don't suggest sending air back to RAAF but rather Army lifting its game.

Criticism is not always easy to absorb by some.

Q. Where are the MRH90's????

Cop out.

You are cherry picking discreet pieces of information that reinforce your perception of Army as somehow less able to conduct flying ops than the other services. Your posts as a whole are very anti Army.

I did not see any posts from you demanding the FAA 'lift it's game' after Nias. Your bias is obvious and shallow.

The MRH90 program as a whole is clearly experiencing problems. I don't think anyone will be able to give you an answer or a date on when the acft will deliver what was promised.

I'd say quite a few RN and RAN aircrew might just have out numbered the ex RAAF spifire crews that transfed over at war's end too.

TBM-Legend Sorry mate, but your cry of innocence isn't backed up in the tone or content of your posts. Selectively quoting the opinion of Alf Jonas (not man known for his impartial and objective views on Army Aviation) and throwing around comments such as "Army Commanders need to understand aviation a lot more" and "the culture urgently needs a change" are all fine, as long as you back up your casual quips with some evidence, or at least a theory. And I don't mean the hearsay of some mate of yours who throws spanners for the Navy and might occasionally speak to the aircrew when they sign for their aircraft.

Furthermore, whilst your questions regarding the MRH-90 project are valid and important, they're hardly related to the theme of your recent posts postulating about a cultural problem within the Aviation Corps.

If you have something plausible to tell us which would support your assertions please state your case. You may even find support for your argument(s) but at the moment you're not making one, you're just making noise.