Good on ya..:D

It's people not speaking out that ended up with the famous B52 incident where all those onboard died....

I was also subject of a BOI many moons ago involving a ruptured bowser, a major spillage and a driver pointing a finger in my direction....... they are neither nice nor wanted, but speaking out and telling the truth is the only way it ensures lessons are learnt as the next time the outcome may be different. I was exonerated for what it is worth.

I've just realised that I had a typo in there, it should read "captain and FE" - I've amended the original post.

The captain never spoke to me again after I gave my evidence. I wasn't too bothered, to be honest, because my conscience was clear. His behaviour and that of the FE could have killed us all (and bloody nearly did).

Still, all those hours practicing emergencies in the sim paid off that night!

Good for you Moggie. Especially correcting the FE /GE differential.

S41

''I always thought that colour scheme on the shiny fleet was the best ever. Fairly simple but just looked right. In my opinion never beaten by any military or civil paint job since.''

It looks very similar to the CNAC 707 parked next to it. And Air China (what CNAC became) still have a very similar paint scheme.

And all women are biologically similar but........................some are beautiful and some are not.

Colour scheme
 

bingofuel,
I and many more agree with you. The simplicity of the blue cheat line between the white and grey always looked the business on whichever TC aircraft it was applied. Sad when the 'Transport Command' was removed.

I also remember when 809 had four engines.

As I remember it. The GE involved ran the desk for sometime and then finished with us. I think I am correct in saying he was honestly thinking of binning the RAF for that treatment but he did stay in and the last I heard, which was many moons ago, he got his commission and was a Flt Lt :ok:

That's good to hear - he was a good chap who was badly treated by a couple of people who should have known better.

There is a bit more to the story of the captain and FE but I'm afraid that's not for public viewing.

Yes a good guy and as the award of his commission showed he was blameless. The previous poster has alluded to the other two members of the crew having more history and as I worked with both can second that

I was a passenger in a rushed then aborted takeoff in a VC-10 one dark night out of (nearly) Dulles, bound for Belize. A bit of a c**k-up all round, from what I learned later from a Phanton pilot Sqn Ldr who had been given the "benefit" of the jump seat. Crew turned up late (they had put us on the aircraft once then taken us off again in those awful mobile lounge things) then failed to properly configure the aircraft for takeoff. We had apparently very nearly gone off the end of the runway, to the extent that they couldn't get a tow truck in front of the nose gear. It became an even longer dark night. :(

That's why they had reverse thrust, to back up a bit :)

Still overheated the brakes though. Took hours to sort out.

re post 49.

My recollection is that an inconfigured A/C will give a warning when the power levers are about one third open, generally before brake release.
If a rolling T.O. was intended full thrust was used much earlier in the Take-Off run and a warning would thus be early.....that used to be the procedure.
Either way it should not occasion the full-blown abort the poster indicates.

Is my memory wrong?

Don't know about your memory, but mine's OK.

An interesting thread that seems to indicate:-

That the VC-10 was/is an excellent aircraft, but like all aircraft vulnerable to bad airmanship. Even then it could save itself and those within it from the consequences of their own actions/inactions.

Also that the unsung heroes of the RAF were as ever its groundcrews, often working in intolerable conditions yet maintaining the highest professional standards.

Finally, that any aircraft that finishes its service in one piece, only to be then taken to pieces as is the case for the subject aircraft, is a tribute to those who built it, maintained it, and operated it. This is how all aircraft should end up (unless being preserved for posterity), and not as a hole in the ground of its own making.

That must be a record in itself, I cannot think of another type the RAF operated that hasn't had at least one end up as a smoking hole in the ground, true there have been a few ground based incidents, but not one RAF Ten went in...

Many moons ago I was at what is now a former Buccaneer base in Suffolk when a 10 turned left at the end of the landing roll at the 27 threshold instead of right and ended up at the HAS site gates. VAS had no tow bar and there was not one on the aircraft. The aircraft had to reverse about a hundred yards before being able to turn round in what I think was probably a former V bomber dispersal narrowly missing a lighting trolley in the process. This is the one and only time I have ever seen a 10 reverse under its own power. After getting the steps in when the aircraft finaly got to the main ASP we were greeted with a tray of Tea & stickies!

Air Canada regularly use to reverse thrust their 727's off the stands at Calgary but that was also a long time ago.

The reason I asked for verification of my post #52 is because I’ve flown as an F/E on many other A/C (B707; L1011; B747) since my tour on 10Sqn’s early VC10s, then later as a VC10 F/E Simulator Instructor.
My recollection of the VC10 is if the crew ‘inadvertently’ position the controls wrongly the take-off configuration warning horn (TOCW) will sound as soon as the thrust levers are advanced, thus obviating a full abort.
That's why the quote in post #49 “crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off” then aborted and overran the runway; jumped out at me and tested my memory.
Anything can occur before V1, where the TOCW will activate, thus the crew may abort at high speed. For example….vibration may cause the speed brake lever to rise from detent, the variable tail angle switches malfunction, or similarly, the flap/slat switches trigger incorrectly……but, imo, those faults can hardly be blamed on the crew.

thanks to Beagle....Edit.....I got CTOW and TOCW arse about face!
Also that Conways used N3 %RPM for thrust settings...I'd used RB211 EPR for so long I'd forgotten. Standards keep changing .....I was on Bristol engined Hastings when they switched from Lbs Boost to Ins Mg. Should have bought shares in the instrument manufacturer.

If the correct take-off configuration is not set, the TOCW will indeed sound as soon as the thrust levers are moved above a value corresponding to about 80% HP RPM, if I recall correctly. But above a throttle angle corresponding to about 96% HP, TOCW is inhibited.

There must have been another reason for what sound to have been a high speed rejected take-off - but it will not have been that 'the crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off' unless part of that 'configuration' was to obtain take-off clearance.

Later in the RAF VC10's life, some bright FE decided that 93% would be sufficient to use for take-off, provided of course that the calculated P7 value was obtained (until then we had a min. HP RPM limit of 96% for take-off). But this requires a throttle angle less than that corresponding to TOCW inhibit, something he obviously forgot when this new SOP was introduced. One day I was doing such a take-off at Brize when at around 90 KIAS the TOCW suddenly sounded - causing me to abort the take-off. Subsequent investigation revealed a fault in the horn interrupter unit - there had been nothing wrong with the aircraft. But what really annoyed me was the fact that a few other crews had experienced the same thing, but hadn't bothered to report it....:mad:

If I remember correctly, there were about 7 things that had to be set correctly to avoid setting off the TOCW:

Aileron upset armed
Tail trim in the takeoff range
Spoilers retracted
Flaps at Takeoff

and then some other stuff that I've forgotten.........