|
I felt that it was important to be honest with the board as the fact needed to come out, and if that upset the captain and FE then so be it. It's people not speaking out that ended up with the famous B52 incident where all those onboard died.... I was also subject of a BOI many moons ago involving a ruptured bowser, a major spillage and a driver pointing a finger in my direction....... they are neither nice nor wanted, but speaking out and telling the truth is the only way it ensures lessons are learnt as the next time the outcome may be different. I was exonerated for what it is worth. |
I've just realised that I had a typo in there, it should read "captain and FE" - I've amended the original post.
The captain never spoke to me again after I gave my evidence. I wasn't too bothered, to be honest, because my conscience was clear. His behaviour and that of the FE could have killed us all (and bloody nearly did). Still, all those hours practicing emergencies in the sim paid off that night! |
Good for you Moggie. Especially correcting the FE /GE differential.
S41 |
''I always thought that colour scheme on the shiny fleet was the best ever. Fairly simple but just looked right. In my opinion never beaten by any military or civil paint job since.''
It looks very similar to the CNAC 707 parked next to it. And Air China (what CNAC became) still have a very similar paint scheme. |
And all women are biologically similar but........................some are beautiful and some are not.
|
Colour scheme
bingofuel,
I and many more agree with you. The simplicity of the blue cheat line between the white and grey always looked the business on whichever TC aircraft it was applied. Sad when the 'Transport Command' was removed. I also remember when 809 had four engines. |
As I remember it. The GE involved ran the desk for sometime and then finished with us. I think I am correct in saying he was honestly thinking of binning the RAF for that treatment but he did stay in and the last I heard, which was many moons ago, he got his commission and was a Flt Lt :ok:
|
Originally Posted by Truck2005
(Post 5736411)
he did stay in and the last I heard, which was many moons ago, he got his commission and was a Flt Lt :ok:
There is a bit more to the story of the captain and FE but I'm afraid that's not for public viewing. |
Yes a good guy and as the award of his commission showed he was blameless. The previous poster has alluded to the other two members of the crew having more history and as I worked with both can second that
|
I was a passenger in a rushed then aborted takeoff in a VC-10 one dark night out of (nearly) Dulles, bound for Belize. A bit of a c**k-up all round, from what I learned later from a Phanton pilot Sqn Ldr who had been given the "benefit" of the jump seat. Crew turned up late (they had put us on the aircraft once then taken us off again in those awful mobile lounge things) then failed to properly configure the aircraft for takeoff. We had apparently very nearly gone off the end of the runway, to the extent that they couldn't get a tow truck in front of the nose gear. It became an even longer dark night. :(
|
That's why they had reverse thrust, to back up a bit :)
|
Still overheated the brakes though. Took hours to sort out.
|
re post 49.
My recollection is that an inconfigured A/C will give a warning when the power levers are about one third open, generally before brake release. If a rolling T.O. was intended full thrust was used much earlier in the Take-Off run and a warning would thus be early.....that used to be the procedure. Either way it should not occasion the full-blown abort the poster indicates. Is my memory wrong? |
Don't know about your memory, but mine's OK.
|
An interesting thread that seems to indicate:-
That the VC-10 was/is an excellent aircraft, but like all aircraft vulnerable to bad airmanship. Even then it could save itself and those within it from the consequences of their own actions/inactions. Also that the unsung heroes of the RAF were as ever its groundcrews, often working in intolerable conditions yet maintaining the highest professional standards. Finally, that any aircraft that finishes its service in one piece, only to be then taken to pieces as is the case for the subject aircraft, is a tribute to those who built it, maintained it, and operated it. This is how all aircraft should end up (unless being preserved for posterity), and not as a hole in the ground of its own making. |
That must be a record in itself, I cannot think of another type the RAF operated that hasn't had at least one end up as a smoking hole in the ground, true there have been a few ground based incidents, but not one RAF Ten went in...
|
Many moons ago I was at what is now a former Buccaneer base in Suffolk when a 10 turned left at the end of the landing roll at the 27 threshold instead of right and ended up at the HAS site gates. VAS had no tow bar and there was not one on the aircraft. The aircraft had to reverse about a hundred yards before being able to turn round in what I think was probably a former V bomber dispersal narrowly missing a lighting trolley in the process. This is the one and only time I have ever seen a 10 reverse under its own power. After getting the steps in when the aircraft finaly got to the main ASP we were greeted with a tray of Tea & stickies!
Air Canada regularly use to reverse thrust their 727's off the stands at Calgary but that was also a long time ago. |
The reason I asked for verification of my post #52 is because I’ve flown as an F/E on many other A/C (B707; L1011; B747) since my tour on 10Sqn’s early VC10s, then later as a VC10 F/E Simulator Instructor.
My recollection of the VC10 is if the crew ‘inadvertently’ position the controls wrongly the take-off configuration warning horn (TOCW) will sound as soon as the thrust levers are advanced, thus obviating a full abort. That's why the quote in post #49 “crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off” then aborted and overran the runway; jumped out at me and tested my memory. Anything can occur before V1, where the TOCW will activate, thus the crew may abort at high speed. For example….vibration may cause the speed brake lever to rise from detent, the variable tail angle switches malfunction, or similarly, the flap/slat switches trigger incorrectly……but, imo, those faults can hardly be blamed on the crew. thanks to Beagle....Edit.....I got CTOW and TOCW arse about face! Also that Conways used N3 %RPM for thrust settings...I'd used RB211 EPR for so long I'd forgotten. Standards keep changing .....I was on Bristol engined Hastings when they switched from Lbs Boost to Ins Mg. Should have bought shares in the instrument manufacturer. |
If the correct take-off configuration is not set, the TOCW will indeed sound as soon as the thrust levers are moved above a value corresponding to about 80% HP RPM, if I recall correctly. But above a throttle angle corresponding to about 96% HP, TOCW is inhibited.
There must have been another reason for what sound to have been a high speed rejected take-off - but it will not have been that 'the crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off' unless part of that 'configuration' was to obtain take-off clearance. Later in the RAF VC10's life, some bright FE decided that 93% would be sufficient to use for take-off, provided of course that the calculated P7 value was obtained (until then we had a min. HP RPM limit of 96% for take-off). But this requires a throttle angle less than that corresponding to TOCW inhibit, something he obviously forgot when this new SOP was introduced. One day I was doing such a take-off at Brize when at around 90 KIAS the TOCW suddenly sounded - causing me to abort the take-off. Subsequent investigation revealed a fault in the horn interrupter unit - there had been nothing wrong with the aircraft. But what really annoyed me was the fact that a few other crews had experienced the same thing, but hadn't bothered to report it....:mad: |
If I remember correctly, there were about 7 things that had to be set correctly to avoid setting off the TOCW:
Aileron upset armed Tail trim in the takeoff range Spoilers retracted Flaps at Takeoff and then some other stuff that I've forgotten......... |
Smokin' Holes!
Don't think we lost any Dominies due to Ac/ Ground interface. Only when they were 'consolidated' by mixing the best wings and fuselages did the fleet shrink and then as they were taken out of service and finally sold off or scrapped.
Maybe it was because it also had a T- tail ? I'm sure we never lost a Belfast or 146 either. CNN:ok: |
I'm sure we never lost a Belfast or 146 either. |
Reading the above from Moggiee I was reminded of the very useful item in the old Air Clues titled 'I Learned about Flying from That'!
I think most of us will have been there, pressured by more experienced people, and I'm sure it still goes on. Until it goes wrong that is! |
I certainly learned a lot. My new found assertiveness had a detrimental effect on my career though - my boss didn't take kindly to my more "frank" approach to dealing with senior officers
|
I was at Brize then and 109 was being ferried from Fields,Casle D. after a rewire. I know you said where you were but 109 hadn't been anyway near Brize for months. Did this happen twice?
|
Who?
They all went through and Fields offered to put in the tanker wiring for free, it was turned down as on a different contract. Last one out lost the panels out of the U/C bay.. Didn't note which was which as I see so many air raft it's like looking at car number plates, you don't unless the bugger is mowing you down. |
Question about the tanker version. I had a couple of trips on these with ATC cadets in the 1980s and was interested in the escape hatch which was originally intended to be used for crew abandonment (just aft of the flight deck on the port side). I think the idea was binned fairly early on when it was realised that getting a crew of four out was one thing, but a crew of four and a dozen odd pax was something else again.
Anyone know what sort of trials were done on this escape hatch and how it worked? I think there was some sort of extending slide to take escapees clear of the aircraft, but as it was all welded up by that time, I'm not sure about that. I take it even at the development stage nobody ever actually jumped out of a VC10 :eek: |
A Belfast over ran the runway at Brize 73 ish and crossed the Bampton road.
|
This was the C.MK.1 rewire contract 1992.
|
Question about the tanker version. I had a couple of trips on these with ATC cadets in the 1980s and was interested in the escape hatch which was originally intended to be used for crew abandonment (just aft of the flight deck on the port side). I think the idea was binned fairly early on when it was realised that getting a crew of four out was one thing, but a crew of four and a dozen odd pax was something else again. Anyone know what sort of trials were done on this escape hatch and how it worked? I think there was some sort of extending slide to take escapees clear of the aircraft, but as it was all welded up by that time, I'm not sure about that. I take it even at the development stage nobody ever actually jumped out of a VC10 . |
Vc10617
After the rewire at C Don they then went down to Bournemouth to get the wiring and tanker refuelling points installed, though cannot remember if it went straight away. |
Nutloose
Could have done, the 1st C.1K conversion,XV101, flew mid 1992.The re wire was running at the same time. I remember I needed engine stills for four Conways but there was a shortage. Fields had at least four as did FRA and maybe some at Filton on the K.4 conversion. It took a while for someone to eventually get them to us. |
Originally Posted by vc10617
(Post 8082479)
I was at Brize then and 109 was being ferried from Fields,Casle D. after a rewire. I know you said where you were but 109 hadn't been anyway near Brize for months. Did this happen twice?
I'm sure that the re-wire at EMA was later - I think that I delivered at least one myself. My logbook says that we did a 1 way trip to EMA in XV108 on 3rd July 1989. |
Thanks Nutloose, that clears that up.
We rear crew had an escape hatch on the Victor, of course. It was called the door. Success rates in abandoning the Victor were very poor - not sure if there ever was a 100% successful abandonment. Sounds like it was a good plan to forget the whole thing - after all you got a £1m bin bag holder out of it! And in the event, because of the ten's 100% record, thankfully it would never have been needed. |
The Ten one used the forward pax door, it's a long time ago, says on VC10. Net
The left front entrance door was converted to enable crew members to exit the aircraft by parachute in case of emergency. Because of this the right front service door would from now on be the main entrance door. The escape chute was extensively tested, but later on in the service life of the tankers a decision was made to block off the system as there was no need for it. The Tanker Conversions Though the prototype escape chute on the very first one dropped out underneath and that said Testing and early days to Escape from a VC10 The first three aircraft had escape hatches for the flight test crew and one of my jobs was to help the photographer with his high speed cine-film photographs of simulated escapes from a model in the 13' x 9' tunnel. I pulled the string which released a model man who was then photographed, something that we did for various speeds and attitudes. All was well except for one particular combination and one hatch (the one forward on the side), when the man flew into the engine. We did that test again and he hit the tailplane. At the third attempt he just caught the wing downwash and went safely below the engines. Some time later I asked the photographer what the flight test crew said when they saw the film. He told me that he had cut that bit out and only showed the safe exit as he didn't want to worry them! I never did find out whether he was pulling my leg or whether he really did edit the film." Well, things could have been worse! On the subject of escape hatches I couldn't resist adding the following lines from Brian Trubshaw's 1998 autobiography 'Test Pilot'. In these lines Brian Trubshaw recalls one of the stall tests that he carried out with the prototype G-ARTA when things didn't go as planned. There is also some information about this flight on the Incidents and Accidents page, including some comments from an ex-Vickers ground crew member. "The last day of 1963 nearly brought the stalling programme to an abrupt end. I was just recovering from a clean stall when at about 250 Kts all hell broke loose as G-ARTA started shaking violently. There was a shout from the Senior Observer, Chris Mullen, who was looking at the tail through his periscope, 'Right inner elevator'. I was quite certain that G-ARTA was going to come apart and it nearly did, so I fired the escape hatch door and ordered the crew to bale out. The flight engineer, Roy Mole, could not get out of his seat and the same applied to the co-pilot Captain Peter Cane of BOAC, while the crew in the back could not hear me above the general racket. I managed to reduce speed to about 160 Kts which put me very close to a pre-stall buffet, whereupon the violent vibrations and oscillations calmed down to a smaller amount. The escape hatch chute which went through the front forward hold had collapsed and gone out when the door was jettisoned, so it was as well nobody tried to use it and only a jangled bunch of metal remained. I made a very gentle return towards Wisley under Mayday conditions and soon realized that I had lost half the aircraft services. However, the split system principle worked very well but I had to free-fall the right landing gear. After flight inspection revealed that the two right-hand engines had rotated 2 inch and in doing so pulled off hydraulic pipes and air-conditioning pipes. The right inner elevator had broken its attachment bracket which had set up flutter of that surface. Two fin attachment bolts were severed. In fact poor G-ARTA with whom I had developed a great bond of affection was in a sorry state. I think that we had done about 2,300 stalls together." The type of escape hatch discussed above was fitted to both the VC10 and also to the BAC 1-11 (and perhaps other types of aircraft but I'm not sure about that). They consisted of a metal tunnel (the escape chute) that slid down through the forward freight hold to extend down below the aircraft through the freight hold door aperture after the door was removed using explosive bolts. Whether this would have provided a safe exit for the flight crew is a debatable issue, especially when the stories above are taken into account. The BAC 1-11 prototype G-ASHG was lost in October 1963 - just months before the incident with G-ARTA - when it got itself into a stable stalled condition and the flight crew did not have enough elevator authority left to regain control. The escape system was fired but the aircraft hit the ground shortly after the freight hold door was explosively removed. The flight test crew of seven did not survive the accident. |
One extra bonus of the design of the VC10 - the primary flight controls were not powered by the main hydraulic system but by individual electro-hydraulic PFCUs. This means that even if both hydraulic systems are lost then the full range of primary flight controls are still available - and conversely, the physical separation of a primary control surface (elevator, aileron, rudder) from the airframe would not cause a loss of hydraulic services.
|
The 'million pound dustbin' was a complete and utter waste of time and money.
It replaced the front door and was supposed to be extended into the airflow to enable a controlled abandonment. We were told that only one flight was ever made with the device extended, but that the noise and buffeting were so extreme that the aircraft landed early. We were taught how to use it on #3 VC10K course, but refused to waste any time on it. It worked as follows: 1. The decision was made to off-load all available fuel to receivers and the low-level override system was selected on. 2. The aircraft was then depressurised. Or rather, the pressurisation was turned off and the cabin allowed to climb until the min. diff. pressure for chute deployment was reached. This could take several minutes. 3. Individual crew members were then supposed to use walk-round Mk4 oxygen bottles, before going into the cabin to don parachutes and oxygen systems as the flight deck seats weren't modified to allow for parachute packs. Pilots would take it in turns, but it was physically impossible to sit in any crew seat wearing the emergency AEA. 4. When the diff. pressure gauge suggested it was 'safe' to do so, the escape chute was deployed by pulling a large lever. The first item in the sequence was for the external door seal to be severed; however BWoS suggested that this would be ingested by the left engines, causing an uncontained failure of at least one engine..... 3 of the 4 crew might get out, but the last pilot was supposed to fly the thing by leaning over the seat to hold the control column in order to maintain at least wings-level flight, then let go, turn round, make his way back to the chute and jump out - probably to join his colleagues in the remains of the left engines. Eventually common sense prevailed and the stupid system was removed. But the K2 and K3 were left with just the starboard service door. There was never any proposal to enable the system to be used by passengers. One legacy of the system was that the squadron had a large room allocated for immersion suit storage. In later days this became the 'new' Duffy's bar! I recall being asked by some visiting multi-starred personage what I thought of the system. So I did so....:uhoh: I pretended that I didn't know that he was the idiot who had approved it! |
There was never any proposal to enable the system to be used by passengers. Not surprised the system was abandoned. How many stars did said personage acquire, I wonder. Doubt if he loses any sleep as he collects his not inconsiderable pension :* |
I must admit when I first saw the thing I thought someone had a nut loose to design it and it wasn't me. I struck me as a system that was based on a lot of If's having to all fall in place for it ever to have worked. Still one supposes anything was better than nothing.
|
I have to admit to having read these last posts in some amazement. What was the perceived need to have an escape system on the new Ks after the multiple hours they had flown without, and some 15 years of C Mk1 ops ditto? Is there a history of tankers having to be abandoned after in-flight incidents? Did/do the KC-135s have some such system? I ask in the spirit of genuine enquiry for the absurdity that Beagle mentions seems so obvious to me, yet clearly did not to a number of folk who must have been involved in the specification.
|
| All times are GMT. The time now is 14:07. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.