It's interesting someone has mentioned airspace because, although I haven't read the report, there has been no mention of this and it reminded me of something I was party to many years ago about this particular piece of airspace.

The airspace around St Athan is not plentiful. Cardiff has a large Class D zone which it doesn't like people flying through, even if you could to the East is the city of Cardiff and above this is an airway used heavily for inbounds to BRS, to the south is mostly sea and to the north is mostly mountains. This leaves a very small tight strip of flat, ruralish area for GH flying by St Athan and local GA (not much of that any more I grant you).

I was lucky enough to spend three very happy years at St Athan flying the Bulldog. At the time I was there CWL had no western class D stub. Not ideal for IFR airline traffic. So there was a big push to get this airspace reclassified.

I remember clearly the UWAS Squadron Boss telling the ATC bods that if this Class D airspace became totally unavailable for Military GH (as it apparently has despite CWL being a virtual ghost town) there would eventually be a light aircraft incident in the very small remaining piece of airspace. Unfortunately it turns out he was spot on.

The Tutor's white airframe has been mentioned several times. My understanding is that white was selected by Grob for minimum solar heating - the composite airframe would be heated beyond safe limits if it was a darker colour.

RIP Marshy, watched Big Trouble in Little China the other day and thought of you and our Famil visit at Cranwell.

Greenedge jet says, in his knowlegable post 39, that CANOPY JETTISON IS MORE COMPLICATED than described by some in these pages. The red handle does not release the canopy, only unlocks it! you must then rotate the larger handle nearly through 180 degrees, then the inside arm has to push the frame back and up - THE PROCEDURE TAKES A GOOD FEW SECONDS TO COMPLETE. If this is true, merely touching the red handle once a month seems inadequate preparation in the event of need.

Fitter 2 reminds us that a second fatal midair involving a Tutor took place later last year. A collision with a glider. As no report has yet been issued, we don't know the details, BUT it is significant that the glider pilot was able to jettison the canopy and parachute to safety, while the two in the Tutor were not so fortunate.

It should certainly concern those using the Tutor that regardless of the original causes of the midair, it should be modified to provide a prompt exit.

On the question of colour, yes, white is preferred for composit aircraft to prevent different expansions. A Grob motor glider was imported from France tastefully decorated in two tones of blue; before the UK would give it a C of A, most of the blue colour had to be removed.
Studies have been made in using dayglow colours to make gliders more conspicuous, the effect seems to be one of camoflage, breaking up the outline, rather than making it easier to see. Remember how zigzags in contrasting colours were painted on shipping during WWII?

As for dark colours, I recollect the stealth plane is black.

It may be that FLARM is the answer, so we may learn something from the gliding people after all.

Mary,

I agree that white is a bad colour to see a moving aircraft in the sky.:eek:

Hawks and Tucanos are BLACK because trials were done to find the best colour to see these aircraft during the daytime - and despite your hint that black is not a good colour - MoD trials show differently (and yes day glow, cam and other colours were used in the tirals.). :ok:

Have you ever seen what it looks like inside a cockpit of an out of control aircraft in an advanced stage of departure? - especially with a ruptured airframe.....the assymetric and oscillitory 'G' makes movement very difficult, no matter how easy the operation of the escape mechanism is. :ouch:

Some of the AEF cadets that I have flown want Aeros on their first sortie, others do not....as a 'grown-up' I ask the passenger what he/she wants and determine if it is a good or bad idea as the situation dictates.:yuk:

Just because your knowledge of a term is not fully understood by you, please use your 3000 hrs experience to try and understand that some things are not done your way.

Other comments you make hint of your impression of ineptness by military aircrews, and their use of 'all available' methods, aids and techniques for best practice. If that is your perception, you are entitled to it, but (in my opinion) you are wrong.:eek:


...finally varifocals are NOT prescribed to Pilots in mil aircraft.:=



...LJR (7000 hrs - mostly with helmet on) AND recent ex AEF Tutor pilot

Forgive me if this seems either inappropriate or simplistic, in my defence I held Mike Blee (of earlier accident) in quite high regard....
it seems to me that you shouldn't make an aircraft colour difficult to spot in everyday use, as ultimately we rely on seeing each other to avoid collision (when all else fails). To construct aircraft from materials that dictate we then produce them in what is effectively a 'low vis' colour scheme is madness - either we have to solve the 'can only paint them white' issue, or we have to begin to accept that they cannot be made from the material we'd prefer, because the finsihed article is too hard to see.

Also, an escape mechanism that is at all difficult or complex, especially one that is taking up first time air cadets, simply has to be re-examined, as I'm not current on the aircraft in question I'll leave it at that. (I'll admit that the Chipmunk escape drills I did in 1968 probably exceeded my ability to carry them out...to be honest I was a titchy sort of air cadet and would probably have fallen through the straps anyhow).

Dave

white and heat
 

That old chestnut!

Grob will paint them any colour you like and even offered to do extensive trials in black (it's in the report) but the costs were deemed too high.

FLARM
 

A good piece of kit but being DGPS and baro based it is not infallable:

"Differential effects do not always help us because aircraft bank when flying a curve and this may produce different sky-views, so those two aircraft might base their GPS navigation solutions on non-identical sets of satellites, and the differential effect is lost"

I wonder where that quote came from? Attribution is a good habit.

If you visit the FLARM website you will find it never claims to be more than an aid - that lookout is essential.

FLARM errors?
 

As well as being a 'traffic awareness' device, FLARM is also a flight recorder. If the concerns expressed above were a real, rather than theoretical problem, then discontinuities in the recorded track would be evident. A close up view of a recent trace, with turns at 45 to 55 degrees bank in both directions
http://i50.tinypic.com/157ynpw.jpg
shows no such features, and I have never seen worrying discontinuities in many other records.

As far a white aircraft being 'madness', there is a vast difference between a white glider being 'invisible' and the colour being less than optimal. Many aircraft of non-composite construction are primarily white in colour. I have no difficulty when flying gliders in spotting other ones (possibly because I am looking for them as one aid the using the energy of the air), and apply similar techniques when power flying. In my experience, the shape of conflicting traffic is visible before its colour can be distinguished. Some colours have been shown to be optimal for being more easily seen at closer ranges, but the limited evidence (and more research would be very useful) is that colour has very little effect on the maximum range of detection.

One could argue more cogently that it is 'madness' to perform aerobatics in an area not under full traffic control, since the Lookout part of the HASSELL check is only useful for the traffic in visual range, and a good lookout is unlikely to be maintained during the manouvring period. The saving grace is that an aircraft performing aerobatics is much easier to see than one maintaining a constant heading (which also applies to gliders which in general seldom fly on a steady heading for long) and conflicting traffic more likely to avoid an airprox situation.

mary meagher

I don't doubt your expertise and experience as a glider pilot/instructor, but I'm not surprised your initial post provoked the reactions it did from those with expertise and experience in RAF flying generally, and specifically AEF flying. IMHO the responses were commendably restrained.
After giving readers the benefit of your wisdom "Midair collision happens because neither pilot saw the other in time to take evasive action" (which some might regard as a statement of the xxxxxing obvious) you asserted that "There are a lot of contributing factors involved here, not just the white colour of the Tutor." Correct again. However, first on your list was:I've read the report of the Board of Inquiry from beginning to end and there is nothing whatsoever which supports your rather unpleasant implication.

The investigators examined all available evidence including eye-witness accounts very carefully (even the account of a 9 year old child) and researched every theory. The investigation was thorough and comprehensive. I've read several hundred accident reports (Mil and civvy) in a professional capacity over the past three decades and regard it as excellent.
None of your comments in your initial or subsequent posts add anything of value to the findings and recommendations already contained in the Report.

Link to BOI


(Edit)
IMHO Recommendation 10 is unrealistic, and would have done nothing to prevent the collision, but that is a comment not a criticism.

Fitter 2, I can assure you that anybody I taught to fly did his/her HASSELL checks, commenced manoeuvering and continued to check for hazards throughout their aeros sequence or whatever they were doing. Anything less would have been dangerous and bad technique

Parachutes
 

I'm grateful to both ANONYSTUDE and WHOLIGAN for taking the trouble to respond.

It would appear from the report that :-
1.None of the four people in the two aircraft was injured in the actual mid-air collision.
2. Neither cadet made any attempt to bale out and both remained strapped in their seats - even though both wore parachutes and had just viewed an instructional video on bale-out procedure
3. Although both pilots had released their straps neither of them baled out .
4. The emergency canopy jettison handle was not activated in either aircraft

The emergency procedure for cadet flights is given in ACP34 as follows:-
"Action in an Emergency
18. Emergencies in a Tutor or any other Royal Air Force aircraft are rare.
However, even with the best-laid plans, things can go wrong. If an emergency
does arise the most important things to remember are:
* DO NOT PANIC
* DO AS YOU ARE TOLD
19. Having said that, an emergency is not the time or place for a captain to
explain what you must do in response to his orders. You must know what to do! If
the captain decides that the aircraft must be abandoned, he will give the warning
order "Check parachutes". Depending upon the time available, the captain will
already have jettisoned the canopy, or will jettison it shortly after giving the warning
order. It may be possible for you to help in jettisoning the canopy, and this will have
been explained at the pre-flight briefing. Having given the warning order, and when
it is certain that the aircraft must be abandoned, the captain will give the executive
order "Jump Jump"
20. As soon as the captain has ordered "Jump Jump", you should release the
aircraft safety harness (not your parachute harness!), stand up in the cockpit and
dive head first over the side of the aircraft, aiming to clear the trailing edge of the
wing. It is vital that you do this immediately the captain has ordered "Jump Jump".

21. Having fallen well clear of the aircraft, all you have to do is to pull the metal
handle (or "D" ring) which is attached to the rip-cord. The handle is on the right
shoulder of the parachute harness. It is large and not difficult to locate, although
you may have to look for it, rather than just feel! As the handle comes out quite a
long way, it must be held firmly and given a good pull to its fullest extent (Fig 3-4).
This releases the parachute from the pack and completes the essential part of the
bale-out procedure. A parachute landing is roughly comparable to jumping off a
wall about 3-4 metres high."

Korrol,

Not really sure of the intent behind your post, but for clarification ACP 34 is a training manual for cadet classification training. Like all of the other classification training manuals, its intent is to give the cadets an incite into aviation operations in order to pass an exam. I would no more expect cadets to be able to abandon an aircraft after reading it than I would expect them to be able to fly a helicopter after reading
Principles of Flight.

When at an AEF, as has been stated in previous posts the cadets are shown a briefing video and are questioned on abandonment drills. I agree that having a simulated cockpit and seats may help in the learning of this process, but when cadets often do not fly more than once a year, I question how effective this would be.

Personally, I would hope that abandoning the aircraft is considered by all as a last resort. Regardless of the amount of training that a cadet might realistically receive as a result of this report, I question the likelihood of even the most experienced person operating with a cool head in such a terrifying and tragic situation. Short of having a command ejection seat, I doubt that a reasonably practicable solution would be found that allows us to be confident that a young person will be able to do things correctly, in order to get out of an aircraft in the few seconds available. I would suggest that avoidance of an incident is a far more important focus.

RB

Because the seat and systems would be at the AEF and cadets would be cycled through a practical training session shortly before they flew, rather than just sitting eating crisps and watching Top Gun.

Yes, abandonment is going to be the last resort but it is no use as such if the process is too complicated (be that because of equipment, training or whatever) to actually carry out. If it is not a practical option then we should ditch the need to wear parachutes on AEF.

Parachutes and GPS errors
 

BOI has detailed info on parachutes and how they might be improved both in use and design (handle high on shoulder is mentioned). In any case there was very little time post collision to assess a/c controllability, warn crew, jettison canopy, check parachute harness, release seat harness and evacuate.

GPS: Fitter 2: The quote was from the founder of FLARM discussing GPS reliablity. Nice trace by the way! However, why would a GPS error result in track discontinuity? Your trace could be 2km off from reality throughout the measurement period.

"Since the accident, the base I was at not too long ago (with an EFT sqn and AEF) started regular demonstrations of actually jettisoning the canopy. Not sure if this is a fleet-wide implementation though."

First I have heard of it and sounds very expensive.

Greenedgejet,

The canopy jettison mechanism is tested as part of the servicing.

When the time came I regularly went to the crewroom and found instructors or students to come and "have a go".
No point in engineers pulling the red handle. Whenever possible I let aircrew pull the jettison mechanism with engineers standing by to stop the canopy being damaged.
It was not policy to give aircrew this opportunity but seemed like a good idea, and maybe will be implemented at all UAS/AEF sites.

As for how complicated the jettison is, that too needs more explanation.

Canopy normal opening is to pull the large D handle down and rearwards (90 deg), this unlocks the canopy and allows it to move rearwards. Pilots do this on every flight.

The only difference in emergency jettison is to pull the red handle, then proceed with the normal opening, IE pull the D handle down and back, this time the handle will move beyond 90 deg and unlock the canopy from the rails. If necessary then push the front of the canopy up into the airflow.

Essentially pilots carry out most of the jettison drill every flight.

I very much doubt that anyone would have had the awareness and time to complete the abandonment drill in this case.

With thought to the parachutes in the aircraft, what do you think of having the chutes (perhaps just the cadet's chute) fitted with a static line? They are put in and out of the aircraft by groundcrew so the risk of accidental deployment is low and it may simplify emergency egress.

A worthwhile point on static lines incubus.

A few years ago one was visiting the US Navy at Pensacola, and got a trip or two in their basic trainers (T34-C I think?). Although these are used more in the Tucano rather than Tutor role, they have static line 'chutes.

Also interesting in this context is that before flight, we had to practice "egress procedure", which involved actually diving from the cockpit of a (real) training airframe on a rig in a hangar, about 10 feet into a safety net! Not my most dignified nor enjoyable "procedure", but I'm sure it would have helped in the unlikely event of having to dive for the trailing edge and miss the tailplane ........

Al this talk of parachutes. I wonder whether the BOI even considered a BRS type retrofit? At very least, maybe the RAF want to consider such equipment for their next AEF/UAS aircraft.

OK - out on a major limb here and I expect to hear about this post from "official sources"!

Just to put all this talk about parachutes into perspective (in my view anyway), as I understand it, in the (approximately) 60 years of cadet flying there have been no instances of cadets jumping from an AEF training aircraft. Certainly if this is not true, then the figure involved is so miniscule that it is worth ignoring. Certainly I have found it impossible to find any record of such an event, and I was told when I took over 3 AEF that no such thing had ever happened. However, I bet someone will prove me wrong in statistical terms, but that will not change my overall views on this.

Also - and purely in my view - the chances of me deciding to get a cadet to jump from a Tutor are infinitessimally small. Under almost all circumstances I believe that it would be safer, and with a better chance of success, to put the aircraft into a field, rather than to try to get a cadet to abandon the aircraft and parachute to earth. There are only 2 occasions when it might be necessary to jump from the aircraft: if a control surface has been removed from the aircraft as a result of a collision; and if there were a raging cockpit fire. Almost certainly, if a control surface has gone, the aircraft is highly likely to be uncontrollable and doing its own - probably very violent - manouevres that would probably preclude successful abandonment. Even with a cockpit fire, I would certainly weigh the odds of me getting the aircraft into a field rapidly and then getting me and the cadet out of it, against the probability of successful airborne abandonment.

Why do I think that abandonment would be difficult even under totally controlled circumstances. This is something that I certainly would not raise officially, but in my view the majority of cadets are small and do not have the strength and agility to get out of an aircraft in an 80 plus knot "wind", and the chance of them getting the parachute release pulled successfully is very small. Why would I not raise it officially? Because the "system" would insist on "strength and agility" tests for each and every cadet that flies with AEFs. I believe that 70% plus of cadets would fail such tests and would thus be denied the experience of flying because of a perceived danger that - in reality - is pretty much non-existent. The odds of being in a situation where the chance of survival by abandonment is better than the chance of survival by forced landing in a field must tend towards zero.

That's my twopennorth and I stress that it is only MY view.

Wholigan - am completely with you. I have already made the decision that unless the a/c is uncontrollable or blazing fiercely I will not tell a cadet to jump. I trust myself and my training to land in a field more than I believe that a cadet would safely abandon.

DH

Well said!
 

Well said, Wholigan. These were precisely my own thoughts before this tragic accident occurred. Furthermore, I have discussed this issue (and others!) at length with other AEF pilots since the accidents last year, and - as you doubtless already know from speaking to your pilots on 3 AEF - there is broad consensus on this.
The limb you are out on is pretty thick, mate.

DH/Whols - I concur, the other one to add to that (particularly at St Athan) was ditching, which there was always much crewroom debate over.

The debate as to whether a cadet could find/pull their handle once out of the aircraft was also a big one. Static lines have been suggested, seems not unreasonable (but probably costly)

Well said indeed!
 

As an ex-cadet and current PPL I totally agree with Wholigan. I also very much doubt that many cadets would happily leap from a plane that was capable of landing. God knows it would take an awful lot to get me to jump.

Also to add that I remember having to pull on a strain gauge to prove I had the strength the pull the rip cord, so the system is certainly not above these types of test.

Wholigan - how many jumps were made from Bulldogs and Chipmunks in total, do you think? I know of one, on RNEFTS in 1979. The stude and his dark blue beefer (it was a joint RN/RAF QFI team) jumped after losing control under a huge Cb, and both landed safely. The beefer landed in a slurry pit...

So do these previous posts indicate that a lot of the recent extra restrictions on cadet flying are actually to enable the "lowrarchy" or "mediumarchy"" to report to the hierarchy and the ministers "look at all the things we have done to make cadet flying safer" but they are in fact just papering over the cracks, rather than addressing the 2 main issues of conspicuity and situational awareness.

Let's look at some of them.

Minimum cloudbase raised from 1000 ft to 1500 ft and cadets not to be flown below 1000 ft above ground level. This actually has some merit as it may bring an extra field or 2 into play, as opposed to flying clear of cloud below a 1000 ft cloudbase. It certainly won't affect abandonment prospects, as the minimum height for abandonment under "controlled" conditions is 1500 ft.

Minimum height to fly cadets if cloudbase permits is to be 2000 ft above ground level, in order to increase the likelihood of a successful abandonment by a cadet. See posts above. It does still have some merit, but only in as far as the "bringing more fields into play" is concerned. However, it drastically reduces the number of days when cadets can be flown. Look at the stats!

Raising of aerobatics height from 3000 ft above ground to 4000 ft. No aerobatics to be flown that may lead to the loss of control of the aircraft. Sounds laudable eh? The same reasoning about the likelihood of successful cadet abandonment applies to the raising of the height. You could raise it to 9000 ft and nothing would change as far as cadet safety is concerned. In fact, the higher you go, the less responsive is the aircraft, obviously! Therefore, the more likely you are to get into a regime where you have to be more careful how you fly the aircraft.

In fact though, the Tutor is just the most benign aircraft you could imagine. It is so benign that it is actually quite difficult to teach stalling as the aircraft is loath to stall (as pilots of other aircraft understand stalling). It is so benign that you can actually "stall" the aircraft, keep the stick fully back and turn the aircraft, using rudder, under compete control!

As far as "flying aerobatics that may lead to the loss of control of the aircraft" is concerned, see the bit about how benign it is above. You would have to be a complete imbecile, with no motor skills whatsoever, and a death wish, to fly the aircraft in such a way that you lost control. Furthermore, even if you were so useless, all you would have to do if the aircraft complained about what you were doing is to centralise the controls and you immediately have a fully "in control" aircraft again.

I fully support the aims of increasing the safety of flights with cadets, but some of the new restrictions have more to do with "look what we've done to make it safer Mr Minister (with no knowledge of aviation so we can fool you)", than actually improving safety.

Yep a_a but of course neither of them was a cadet who may be 13 years old and weighing only the minimum legal weight with its associated strength and agility implications.

Wholi - agreed - I was more interested to know how many jumps had been made from RAF/RN/AAC single-engined trainers, full stop. There can't be much info/experience on the real-life issues of doing so. Factor in the issues of 13 y/o and you are in a very dark area, I'm sure.

I agree a cadet of 13 will probably (but not always!) be light and relatively weak, suspect most of them are exceedingly agile though.

How does a Tutor compare for ease of emergency egress to a glider? I was thinking about the K21 struck by lighting about 10 years ago, and both instructor and P2 jumped safely, as did the pilot in the glider (Cirrus?) involved in a middair with another Tutor in June 2009. I also know someone else who has successfully jumped (a Kestrel I believe) following a middair in the mid 90s.

BRS the way forward?
 

I think that Cows getting Bigger may havehit the nail on the head here:

Quote:

---

"All this talk of parachutes. I wonder whether the BOI even considered a BRS type retrofit? At very least, maybe the RAF want to consider such equipment for their next AEF/UAS aircraft".

---

I also agree with Wholigans view that an outlanding would be safer than emergency egress in virtually all cases; so with that in mind, surely a last chance BRS system is more appropriate than parachutes for the statistically low mid-air collision scenario?

There are no guarantees in life but there is at least a fair chance these 4 people would have lived to tell the tale had BRS been fitted. Someone else can analyse the stats, but it is indisputable that there have been over 200 lives saved in Cirrus aircraft alone by BRS deployment.

microlightgary - serving RAF engineer/enthusiastic microlight/GA pilot and very grateful 'blagger' of AEF rides on more than one occasion...

All this talk of jumping out etc, and I haven't read the BOI report ony read through the thread, leads me to surmise that perhaps the 2 AEF pilots didn't jump because they were waiting for the cadet to go first, or, struggling to help them get out.

I don't know of any QFI, AEF pilot, who would abandon the aircraft before he made certain that his stude / cadet was out.

Tour as Bulldog QFI

OK from 1966 onwards I know of:
12 Sep 67 Chipmunks WP838 and WK610 Bristol UAS 4 x abandon
22 Jul 76 Bulldog XX618 YUAS 2 x abandon
16 Nov 79 Bulldog XX542 RNEFTS 2 x abandon
20 Feb 82 Bulldog XX662 ELUAS 2 x abandon
25 Mar 85 Bulldog XX660 OUAS 1 x abandon (1 x unsuccessful)
25 Apr 89 Bulldog XX517 RNEFTS 1 x abandon
13 Jul 95 Slingsby T67M G-BUUH JEFTS 2 x abandon

Does the jump from the Firefly (spin) count too?

There was also a LUAS student that bailed out in the early 1980s during an unrecoverable spin, which subsequently became recoverable and the instructor landed back at Woodvale!

Are Parachutes Just Placebos?
 

No one wants a mid-air collision - and certainly everything possible should be done to avoid such an eventuality. But they do happen.

......So to whom would you rather entrust your daughter?

1. An instructor who actually would order her to abandon the aircraft after a mid-air colllision and parachute to safety?
2. An instructor who wouldn't give the order because he had already decided that no cadet is physically capable of making a jump in such circumstances?.

As the outcome of the Scenario 2 is certain death, wouldn't it be worth at least attempting a jump after a mid-air- however long the odds?

As MR RIPLEY has established there are at least 12 people alive today because they did decide to - or were ordered to - jump. Surely the preflight parachute instruction and the parachute fitting has to be more than a meaningless charade - a placebo to calm nervous cadets before they fly. It must provide cadets with a realistic means of saving their own lives.

You need to take your brain for a dump.

korrol - you really don't read anything carefully do you? Or is it just that you are determined to push whatever agenda you have on this matter, regardless of what others say?

Nowhere has anybody said that they would not order a cadet to abandon the aircraft via the parachute. What has been said is that, after a collision, the aircraft is "highly likely to be uncontrollable and doing its own - probably very violent - manouevres that would probably preclude successful abandonment".

Naturally, if this is not the case, and the aircraft is under some sort of control, albeit not full control, and the cadet is deemed to be sufficiently strong to be able to exit the aircraft and pull the parachute rip cord, then it may be that it would be safer to get the cadet to abandon the aircraft rather than attempt a forced landing with some controls malfunctioning.

Also, nobody has said that "no cadet is physically capable of making a jump in such circumstances". Some cadets will not be capable of making a jump under any circumstances. And there could well be some circumstances where nobody would be capable of successfully abandoning the aircraft, cadet or pilot.

That's what we have been trained to do ... weigh the circumstances and make the correct decision.

Just as slight reality check over the likelihood/ability to abandon the aircraft issue, as a ATC Sqn Cdr, I am far mor concerned about driving them down the motorway in a minibus to get to the AEF, than whether they will be injured as a result of a flying incident.

Cadets have been injured in car crashes too, but we don't invent new safety systems specifically for them. It seems the high profile nature of this case is clouding the judgement of some on here in the decision of what is reasonably practicable in this environment.

Flying has a risk factor, it cannot be removed completely and all eventualities cannot be covered.

I agree with RB887, the risks driving to/from AEF are far greater than those associated with flying. In my Wing, their airships have decided that individual units will drive their cadets to the local AEF, presumably for budget reasons. So we shift from a regime of professional, regimented drivers to something different. I'd like to see the risk assessment on that one.

Second, the visibility issue. Surely most civilian aircraft are white, yet there seem to be few collisions reported. On my AEF the usual sortie is around 20 minutes. Back in the Bulldog days it was 40. By reducing sortie length don't you concentrate the traffic, as it can't go as far?

Finally, the discussion on do you/don't you send the cadet over the side. I've been in the ATC since 1966. In my part of the world I know of no cadet who's had to do this. When you add up the number of sorties each year, that must run into a couple of million?

Last year was a very sad time for everyone, both in the Service and the Air Cadet family. Despite this, the kids on my unit still clamour for the flying slots we have. We always have more volunteers than spaces, so what does that tell you?

On a personal note, I've been fortunate enough to frequently bag empty spaces on AEF's over that time. What impresses me the most is the enthusiasm and professionalism of the pilots I've had the privilege to fly with. I have complete and absolute trust in them. If he says go, I'll go, likewise if he stays stay. I've only got a VFR PPL, and about 200 or so hours. I'll defer to the man (or lady) in the driving seat as their training, skills and experience far outweighs mine.

Thank you to all of you on the AEF's. I've seen the faces and heard all the chatter when the kids come back after their first ever trip in a proper aircraft. I just wish I could bottle and sell it!