Risk Aversion & the Command Structure.
 

IIRC, during WWII, over 90% of all officers over the rank of Lt Col had been moved sideways into non-combat posts by 1941, and replaced by those who had seen combat.

An Officer and a Creative Man

As President Obama and his advisers planned their new approach to the Afghan war, the quality of Afghanistan’s security forces received unprecedented scrutiny, and rightly so. Far less attention, however, has been paid to the quality of American troops there. Of course, American forces don’t demand bribes from civilians at gunpoint or go absent for days, as Afghans have often done. But they face serious issues of their own, demanding prompt action.

The American corporals and privates who traverse the Afghan countryside today are not at issue. They risk life and limb every day, with little self-pity. Despite the strains of successive combat deployments, they keep re-enlisting at high rates.

The problems lie, rather, in the leadership ranks. Although many Army and Marine officers in Afghanistan are performing well, a significant portion are not demonstrating the vital leadership attributes of creativity, flexibility and initiative. In 2008, to better pinpoint these deficits, I surveyed 131 Army and Marine officers who had served in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan or both, asking them each 42 questions about leadership in their services.

The results were striking. Many respondents said that field commanders relied too much on methods that worked in another place at another time but often did not work well now. Officers at higher levels are stifling the initiative of junior officers through micromanagement and policies to reduce risk. Onerous requirements for armored vehicles on patrols, for instance, are preventing the quick action needed for effective counterinsurgency. Of the Army veterans I surveyed, only 28 percent said that their service encouraged them to take risks, while a shocking 41 percent said that the Army discouraged it.

The climate of risk aversion begins in American society at large, which puts a higher premium on minimizing casualties than on defeating the enemy. It continues with American politicians and other elites who focus on the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Haditha in Iraq, but rarely point out the far more numerous instances of American valor.

It doesn’t need to be this way in the Army. After all, the Marine Corps has succeeded in inducing its officers to operate independently. More than twice as many Marine survey respondents as Army respondents — 58 percent — said that their service encouraged risk-taking. Marine culture is different because the career Marine officers who shape it are, on average, less risk-averse than career Army officers.

Researchers have found that the leadership ranks of big organizations are dominated by either “sensing-judging” or “intuitive thinking” personality types. Those in the former category rely primarily on the five senses to tell them about the world; they prefer structure and standardization, doing things by the book and maintaining tight control.

In the late 20th century, the Army gravitated toward standardization, as peacetime militaries often do, and consequently rewarded the sensing-judging officers who are now the Army’s generals and colonels. But this personality type functions less well in activities that change frequently or demand regular risk-taking, like technological development or counterinsurgency. Organizations that thrive under such conditions are most often led by people with intuitive-thinking personalities. These people are quick to identify the need for change and to solve problems by venturing outside the box.

Today, the Army has more intuitive-thinking people among its lieutenants and captains than at the upper levels. Too many of these junior officers continue to leave the service out of disillusionment with its rigidity and risk aversion. To their credit, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, have been trying to fix this problem, directing promotion boards to value creativity and initiative. But more drastic treatment is required.

The military should incorporate personality test results into military personnel files, and promotion boards should be required to select higher percentages of those who fall into the intuitive-thinking group. Many highly successful businesses factor personality testing into promotion decisions; the military, with far more at stake, should be no less savvy.

More immediately, our generals should repeatedly visit the colonels who command brigades and battalions to see if they are encouraging subordinates to innovate and take risks. Commanders who refuse to stop micromanaging should be relieved. The change may be disruptive and painful, but in the long run it will save lives and shorten wars.

Mark Moyar is a professor of national security affairs at Marine Corps University and the author of “A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq.”

Isn't there another strand to this, implied by the aphorism that the military is always geared up to fight the last war?

Permissive /restrictive ROE
 

I had this explained to me by a former A-6 Sqn commander who said that the USAF worked to "if it hasn't been specifically authorised, it's forbidden" whereas the USN worked to "if it hasn't been specifically forbidden, use your judgement and be prepared to give it a go".

He cited escorting a badly damaged B-52 which was leaking vital fluids all over the place back from a raid over N. Vietnam and trying to persuade the young man driving it to follow him back to his base. The lad said he couldn't divert to that base because he hadn't been authorised to go there. The long and the short of it was the B-52 crashed with the loss of all on board trying to make his authorised destination. My informant was vitriolic in his condemnation of the USAF system controlled from SAC by as he put it "Monday morning quarter-backs left over from Korea"

The Ancient Mariner

Happens here too in any sphere.

Command should be devolved to the lowest levels.

Instead even a demand for a minor T&S subsistence has to be approved by a Lt Col. :*

It’s called empowerment and is a significant leadership tool. I have seen young airmen that I have empowered, deliver such impressive results when left to their own initiative and not micromanaged. Unfortunately, for a commander to empower subordinates he must take a risk and this is where problems arise. As the services continue to reduce in size and with less and less posts to be promoted into, taking risk is a risk in itself. Much better, surely, to tweak with the ‘long screwdriver’ to be certain of an outcome. I recognise how I too have become a product of the leadership that I have served under and can honestly say that I struggle to not reach for that screwdriver too. I also recognise that I too was close to leaving due to the rigidity and risk aversion shown by senior officers that I served under. It’s a very interesting debate about how we develop intuitive-thinking people that can take the initiative and balance risk. Invariably when I empower my subordinates then my contemporaries tell me that I’m taking a risk – that to me is a start.

In my day, when we did leadership and thought that management was for retailers, we called it delegation. And a good leader understood that what you delegate is authority and that you retain responsibility. So if you delegated to a numpty who cocked things up, your boss, quite rightly, questioned your judgement as a leader.

It was, of course, a long long time ago and well before the the loyalty flow pipe was fitted with a non-return valve.

"It’s called empowerment and is a significant leadership tool. I have seen young airmen that I have empowered, deliver such impressive results when left to their own initiative and not micromanaged"

The exact opposite of the current trend for more and more supervision in the Authorisation chain.
Nobody senior likes self auth anymore

In my opinion the RAF is no different. We are so bound by bureaucracy and possible litigation that no-one is prepared to go out on a limb anymore and take risks. Risk taking is/should be endemic to military operations and we have strayed very far from on the spot decision making to get the job done versus on the spot decision making in line with AP/JSP/QR or worse, political correctness/equality and diversity/health and safety.

Our higher echelons are more concerned about their careers and how they are perceived as individuals by their poilitical masters than man managing a talented group of individuals and letting them get on with it. Unfortunately this mindset is, in my opinion, filtering down through the ranks ie ' well if the boss doesn't like it for these reasons and wouldn't sanction it then why should I ?'.

Not good.

Long since held the opinion that Afg is nothing more than an informal staff college for the legions of SO2's in acting rank out there. That goes for all 3 services.

Try " The Gamble " by Thomas Ricks.

Describes Patreaus' surge into Iraq 2006 - 08. He worked out pretty quickly that leadership was shot to pot in the US Army and that things needed to be changed.

Ya'll need to read Sean Naylor's book...."Not A Good Day To Die....Chaos and Courage in the Mountains of Aghanistan"!

It is the analysis of the Operation Anaconda fiasco prompted by risk aversion, remote commanders ignoring on-scene commanders.....and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel engaged in close combat.

Brave men fought and died.....some needlessly...due to a complete meddling in someone else's business.

As the story unfolds.....you just cannot help but shake your head knowing what is going to happen despite the best efforts of the commanders on scene to prevail over the command structure, ROE's, and decisions that placed the troops in the field in great jeapordy and ultimately cost lives.

It was an eye opener!

Ya'll need to read Sean Naylor's book...."Not A Good Day To Die....Chaos and Courage in the Mountains of Aghanistan"!

Audacity, Audacity, Audacity. At least one guy knew what he was doing. Good book.

I will third that book :ok:

I would venture to suggest it was not a fallacy but a charlie uniform. A 4-star general should be able to lead and use his experts subordinates. He should then represent their expert views to his Command Authority. It would appear the wrong man was selected.

So, you don't have to be a fast jet pilot or even aircrew to make CAS anymore? After all, it seems there are nearly as many Rock squadrons rotating on Ops out there as fast jet sqns, and facing danger more regularly these days.

No, we just need someone with a spine who knows the difference between management and leadership:{

Roger that Crab!

The situation described in the book where the Ranger QRF had secured the top of Takr Ghur and had taken numerous killed and wounded, some who were in urgent need of care, being denied a Medavac flight until several hours after dark, just makes one willing to strangle (read that...choke the life out of a useless piece of sh@t while gazing into his dying eyes!). The whole time that was going on....some Recce guys from a separate location was confirming what the Ranger commander was saying by means of a different chain of command. A young USAF PJ bled out and died as a result of the decision.

The Air Force General called his next higher and was supported in that decision....all by Tele Conference between Bahrain and the USA. It must be a comforting thought to be in a fierce firefight with superior numbers of the enemy, freezing on a mountain top in Afghanistan, with dead and wounded all around you, and know some General tens of thousands of miles away has your best interests at heart.....all the while ignoring your assessment of the situation.

We owe this generation of Warriors much better than what they have gotten from their commanders!

This is the reality of RAF circa 2009. Everybody likes to think that we have faith in the youth and that empowerment exists, but it does not, and when the brown stuff hits the fan, commanders run for cover and I am afraid that the old, old, story of poo rolling downhill is the order of the day. It may well be that the said commanders have a chat behind closed doors but the system is punishing those who when faced with decisions to make, have the morale courage to go ahead and make a decision.
I know of an ongoing disciplinary case that should never have seen the light of day. Ironically the individual concerned has had enough and is now leaving the service, and leaving a service that gave him no support, so you cannot really blame him. In fact it was dissapointing to watch how many war dodgers were happy to put the boot in whilst the man was down, thriving on their own self importance.

Whatever happened to "Praise in public / bollock in private", but get the job done to the best of your ability, and if your in the quano make sure the boss knows so the deflecters can be raised.

It is indecision and the selfishness of self centred individuals that are surviving. IMHO this means that it will get worse in the future as traditional military leadership and ethos decline.