Chinook
 

Seldom. In the lines you correctly quote. I offered the only two hypothese about the view from the cockpit; ie, the crew could see the hill ahead or they could not. I cannot understand why you have such difficulty with the two possibilities. They were hypothese only, and not an indication of doubt about the cause of the crash, as you choose to suppose. And in either case, as I said, the crew should have turned away. Now please tell us which hypothesis you support . Regards. JP

JP,

There you go again with the old assumption thing.

Why are they the only two possibilities?

You have freely admitted you have no idea what was visible from the flight deck windows so surely there must be other possibilities?

But of the two possibilities you propose which one do you think is correct and how certain are you the other possibility can be discounted?

Chinook
 

Seldom. Now were are getting somewhere; they could see the granite ahead, or they could not. Please tell us what the other possibilities were, or are we on different planets?. Regards. JP

Well as you freely accept the notion that there are other possibilities what about a combination of VMC and what Meadowbank suggests with regards the previous Chinook UFCM..............or have you conclusive and irrefutable proof that that cannot be the case?

Chinook
 

Seldom. We were having a reasonably intelligent exchange about what the crew could or could not see ahead;but since you now choose to introduce other factors - such as I suppose - technical faults, let us agree to disagree and stop wasting space here. Regards. JP

And as soon as the questions get difficult................

Lets try an easy one then, you have offered us two possibilities as to what the crew could see out of the flight deck windows, considering of course this is sheer speculation, completely lacking any proof technical or otherwise .

Which is right and which is wrong and why?

The weather in the immediate vicinity of the Mull and the lighthouse just minutes before the crash can be clearly seen on the video taken by the holidaymakers. The evidence of the lighthouse keeper clearly confirms that conditions deteriorated in the time from the video to the crash occurring with visibility at the lighthouse estimated at 15 to 20 metres.
The only option in prudent airmanship would have been to turn away when visibility was less than 1km. They did not and then some 600m from land made the waypoint change.
They failed to do something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would not do or would do differently. They were negligent before the waypoint change.

Perhaps it would pay to reflect on the previously unpublished comments of the Stn Cdr at Odiham in his covering note to Day on his comments on the BOI:
"I have coo0nsulted the Officer Copmmanding No 7 Squadron and senior members of both No 7 Squadron's Special Forces Flight and No 27(R) Squadron. You may wish to know that there is a unanimous and strongly held view that the Board's most probable cause is incredible. Moreover, there is general agreement, that the crew, in some unknown way, 'got it wrong'".

Crawford was careful not to go the whole distance in his formal comments but clearly he and colleagues were of the view that this was human failings.

Or climb to above the SALT. They were foolish and displayed bad airmanship. But they were not negligent...

AC/JP

Very nice post but please excuse the pedant in me as I attempt to poke a hole or to in the flawed logic in it. However it does not really address the extremely easy question I posed, excuse the repetition

"Lets try an easy one then, you have offered us two possibilities as to what the crew could see out of the flight deck windows, considering of course this is sheer speculation, completely lacking any proof technical or otherwise .

Which is right and which is wrong and why?"

Whilst you consider that could you also consider the couple of problems I have with your last post

The only option in prudent airmanship would have been to turn away when visibility was less than 1km......If no one knows what was seen from the flt deck windows at what point did the vis drop below 1Km?

From OC RAF Odihams unpublished comments you state
Moreover, there is general agreement, that the crew, in some unknown way, 'got it wrong'". How does " in some unknown way" satisfy the verdict in this case?

You also assert that "Crawford was careful not to go the whole distance in his formal comments but clearly he and colleagues were of the view that this was human failings."

which if you spin it about a bit could also read as

"Despite his and his colleagues view that this accident may well have been caused by human failings Crawford quite rightly kept his council as the investigation would only deal with factual evidence, not supposition"

Another simple question for you to ponder

If no one alive actually knows exactly what happened that day how does that satisfy the verdict conditons in this case?

spheroid

If you read the Comments of the Stn Cdr Odiham in the BOI you will note that he found that Flt Lt Tapper as Captain had a "Duty of Care " in respect of his Passengers and that Flt Lt Tapper had failed in that Duty. My copy of Chambers Dictionary defines "Negligence" as "omission of duty, especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."

SFFP

Troops were first deployed in support of the Civil Power in NI on 14 August 1969 - I know that because I was the person who received the message that the request had been made and passed it to Mr Callaghan; the then Home Secretary. My first task to Aldergrove was 30 Sep - 2 Oct 1969 to take the then CAS to see his Son, an Officer in the Life Guards, who had been severely wounded by a negligent discharge fom the rifle of one of his Troopers. My 329th (and final) task to Aldergrove was on 23 Feb 1995 - not once did we fail to get in flight meals and other rations delivered to the aircraft when requested.

In flight meals are supplied to augment or replace meals supplied on the ground. Not one piece of testimony to the BOI involved the crew eating meals prior to the departure (or requesting in flight meals) and they had another 4 or 5 hrs duty ahead of them - or more (depending on refuelling time at Kinloss, which in my experience could take 2 hrs or more).

PS If Flt Lt T had taken Breakfast then both Pilots could have gone to the Met Office together for Met Briefing.

PPS The Stn Cdr Odiham found negligence, AOC 1Gp found negligence, AOC in C found negligence, CAS reviewed the whole before publication and did not find any reason to disagree with the findings.

Caz,

I gave you a very simplistic explanation with regards to the SH version of in flight catering and asked you a very simple question

" In summary there was a shed load of food and it was available 24/7 and whilst there may be a suggestion that breakfast in the mess was missed is there a shred of conclusive evidence to say that the 4 crew members did not eat, at some stage during the day, in the crewroom?"

Do you think you have answered it?

JP

I like your reasoned posts and fail to see why Seldom seldom sees the point you are making. I always, what ever kit I had on board did a DR calculation and pressed the stopwatch on the dashboard. When my DR time was up, and it had a safety margin put in by me, I reacted. Coming into Norweigan fiords from the sea at night and in poor vis needed this bit of very basic airmanship that I was taught as a safety net very early on in my career. I do hope that modern day pilots are not so engrossed in amazing kit that they forget the basics. It can kill you. DB

SFFP

Sorry, but it is up to you to prove that they did.

Flt Lt Tapper did not have breakfast in the Mess and went to the Met Office alone. If he and Flt Lt Cook had breakfasted together then they could both have gone to Met Brief - in accordance with standard procedure.

If I had been programmed to carry out a Standardisation, Categorisation or Instrument Rating Test with a crew where only one of the Pilots went to Met prior to a 6+ hour sortie for which no in-flight meals were ordered then there would have been only one outcome and that would have been followed (I would expect) by a one sided interview for that flightdeck crew with someone with 3 or 4 rings on their sleeve.

Incidentally, has anyone asked Lt K exactly what the turning point was - the Lighthouse or the Helicopter Landing Site?

cazatou, forgive me, I'm a bit puzzled. I bow to your status as a VIP trapper, but are you suggesting that the lack of evidence of dietary intake on Flt Lt Tapper's part that day is evidence of gross negligence?

airsound

airsound

It was a requirement for aircrew to partake of breakfast before flying - though I can't, 15 years later, be specific as to whether that requirement was in STCASI's or 1 Gp ASO's.

I do recall that some 2 -3 weeks after the crash that breakfast arrangements at Northolt for those crews departing on tasks between 08 -0930 hrs were completely revised and a cooked breakfast was provided by in-flight catering after the crew had completed pre-flight planning.

That would have been just after the BOI had presented their initial findings to the AOC.

I would consider that ignoring Orders or Instructions that you sign as having read and understood each month would be deemed to be negligence - as does my copy of Chambers Dictionary.

Breakfast
 

cazatou

Many years ago, there was a Flight Safety poster bearing the words "Very few people are eaten by alligators: most are nibbled to death by ducks". In other words, very few aircraft accidents have one single, catastrophic failure as the direct cause. Most are the end result of an accumulation of minor (sometimes trivial) events which ultimately end in a fatal accident. Makes no difference whether that result is a heap of smoking wreckage on a cloud-covered Mull, or the remains of a Nimrod strewn across the Afghan bundu.

Whether we are discussing waypoint changes, possible intended landings outside the tasked flight or the crew's eating patterns, these all fall into the "nibbled to death by ducks" category. Why? Because there is simply no evidence that any of these is or was responsible for the catastrophe.

Ergo, we simply cannot allow the intolerable verdict of gross negligence to stand. Solid evidence, not speculation, is required to support that finding. As the evidence does not appear to exist, the finding must be overturned.

That is the sole purpose of this thread, so will you and the others please stop floating red herrings across the stream.

Chinook
 

bastOn. Thankyou. As I seem to recall having said before, as far as those who continue to insist that the crew did nothing wrong, their arguments produce more smoke than Krakatoa, offer more mirrors than the Great Hall of Versialles, and fish up more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler. Do come off it, some of you. The crew breached the basic rules of airmanship when faced by IMC weather over high ground. With all good wishes as always. JP

Caz,

The great thing about real time experience is it gives one the ability to give a slightly more accurate and more representative spin on things. I acknowledge your 329 missions into Belfast Aldergrove but ask you to consider the following.

From Jan 92 to the end of 94 I was on 230 Sqn at Aldergrove. I worked a 21 day on and 7 day off shift pattern, factor in leave and I reckon I was available for flying duties for about 7 months or so each year so imagine how many approaches and departures to Aldergrove, Bessbrook, Dunganon etc etc do you reckon I would have been on board for in that time?

The above is not any sort of willy waving exercise it simply to show that I like so many others flew quite a bit in that theatre of Op's and I cannot recall one occasion in all that time where I got airborne with in flight rations on board, the odd choc bar or bag of crisps but in flight rations no, as at that time SH didn't work that way.

We also didn't need to take in flight as everywhere we went there was normally food of some sorts available and as previously described the was enough food to stock a small supermarket in the 230 Sqn crewroom.

For the last 11 years I have been a Herc ALM and know full well that not providing in flight for MCT is a hanging crime let alone not providing food for the 5000 on a route but SH was different so please, just this one time, be told.

JP/AC

If you get a moment could you cast your eyes over post #4055 and #4058 and let me have your thoughts.

Chinook
 

Seldom. I have tracked back, and you offer absolutely nothing new to the discussion. JP.