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Hi BB
What I was driving at is this: Since, even if what I think took place, actually took place (and I accept we'll never know for sure) would that be enough to justify the very strong 'gross negligence' charge? At that time the standard of proof required to be satisfied for such a finding, was that of 'Absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. This standard is some way beyond standards such as 'balance of probability', or even 'beyond reasonable' doubt! According to the RAF's rules, without there being 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', a finding of negligence cannot be made in circumstances in which the crew are unable to provide their version of events. Some here believe that is entirely in keeping with the concept of natural justice, and also in the highest traditions of the Royal Air Force, which seeks to offer some protection to those unable to defend themselves from serious allegations. So, in answer to your question; can the charge of gross negligence be justified? In view of the above, my position is crystal clear: Though we may all have our own 'opinions', no the charge cannot be justified. I'm hoping you may feel the same way? |
Tandem
Thanks for taking the time to explain that properly. I have to say that while my opinion of what happened remains unchanged (and unsubstantiated), I do agree that the 'gross negligence' charge is not appropriate here, as plainly there is always the possibility that they were overtaken by some unknown event. So, yup. I agree with you. It seems the Air Force made up their minds on what happened and decided that the possibility of that ''unknown event" was remote enough to be ignored. That's up to them and I offer no comment on it either way. What I did ask though, was, if their Airships were correct and the a/c was not subject to such an event, (and I agree, how could they know for sure?) would CFITing the Chinook warrant the GN charge? I'll agree, it's a hypothetical Q. as they don't know for sure what actually took place, but: Did it? (at the time). Or did it not? |
New Look......
New Look ?
After plotting all the KNOWN FACTS on a large scale contour map of the area , I think it is highly likely that the A/C hit the ground even earlier than supposed.............if they were at around 400 feet asl they would definitely have touched , at 450 feet asl , probably still clipped the ground , and at 500 feet maybe . It is entirely possible to me that the A/C made contact with the hillside shortly after commencing a left turn and over a half kilometer from the assumed first point of impact.....quite what the effect of this would be , I am unable to predict exactly , but depending if it was the fuselage or a rotor tip that touched , the A/C must have been diverted from its intended path and may have been almost uncontrollable ..... One can hardly imagine what the reaction of the crew may have been in such an event , struggling with a disabled A/C .. ..but they nearly made it..............................the subsquent point of impact some 10-15 seconds later shows they were climbing and turning....... You will recall the only evidence for a slight turn to the right after selecting waypoint 'B'.......... is the location of the main point of impact............which is slightly to the right of the previous track , and that it represents a 'turn' into wind .... my own calculations make it 2 degrees....... It is tempting to think they may have flown there directly.......but I would suggest that if you have just wacked the ground you are not too interested in headings.....and there may have been some desperate gyrations before hitting the ground again......... But how is it they were so far off course......????????.... If we go back to the start of the flight............ the first waypoint recorded (when the system was powered up?) was in a grass field TWO MILES FROM THE AIRFIELD and over halfway to the town of Antrim.......??????????????????????????......... Yes really........ .....I find it hard to believe that any NAV aid could be that bad ......but the LAT and LONG are in the report.!!!!!!.................. I bought a handheld GPS myself that summer , a Garmin GPS55 , and I was getting 100 metres accuracy even with Selective Availability still turned on (Selective Availability for civilian use was turned off in the year 2000) but military units were supposed to be ten times better ...... If I were contemplating this journey , and were aware of this error during preflight , my first thought would be disgust , being expected to use such [email protected] then.........I might consider that at least the error was on the SAFE side!!!! . Having a two mile North/East to South/West error on the box meant you could safely fly to waypoint 'A' and know you were about a mile and a half out to sea as you passed abeam the lighthouse , in case you could not see it in the poor visibility predicted there...... You could head north then to track up the coast and expect to be back in better VMC before reaching Machrihanish , then weave through the mass of small islands and turn right onto 035 to track in towards Corran ...... Waypoint 'B' ...and so on.. But at the crash site the GPS error was in the opposite sense , directing one to fly .........NOT TWO MILES SOUTH AND WEST of the true location , but 200 METRES NORTH AND EAST of the true location ............ So my interpretation of the facts....... suggests that they flew toward waypoint 'A' without being able to confirm their location visually as they approached , although they could see where the mass of land was , it was cloaked in mist and cloud . The Aldergrove TACAN accuracy is becoming diminished by the distance . Dead Reckoning is unreliable in this case (almost direct tail wind , picking the drift in the wrong direction is NOT GOOD)(would the doppler display give an indication of drift ..????..somebody must know)... So they are using the superTANS , but with no way to check the accuracy..........there is open sea visible out to port as they get close to the cloud bank.... The 30 second alert of the pending waypoint prompted them to change to waypoint 'B' and they commenced the slight turn left onto north.............they dial up a heading of 035.........then they clip the hillside and all hell breaks loose........ The high point of the cliff they are approaching is at" 58deg. 18.35N 5 deg. 48.00W " ( 58deg.18'21" N 5deg. 48'00"W ) and they would reach it only 9 or 10 seconds after crossing the shoreline.... The change in the GPS error has brought them over the obscured land , instead of being safely offshore........ I realise that there may no longer be any obvious debris trail after all this time , but it is worth a look . There may be some evidence.......... such as paint streaks on a rock .......gouges etc. If this scenario is true , then the flight crew....far from being accused of anything.........should be commended for valiant efforts to recover from an impossible situation after being badly let down by their equipment .......................and RACAL and TRIMBLE should be in the dock answering questions.......... .......... Below is a copy of the chart I used , in which the locations of Waypoint change and Waypoint 'A' have been corrected using the apparent GPS error from the last two recorded locations in the superTANS.... |
http://www.gneissrecords.com/USERIMA...llChinook2.jpg
The dark grey lines are latitude and longitude added by myself....... |
Robin Clark
No comment on the above, as I'm no navigator. However, thought you might be interested in this, from the (fabricated) CA Release and RTS, current at time of accident; 1. GPS has not yet been declared operational by the US DoD and therefore accuracy is not guaranteed to any level. Even when GPS is declared operational, accuracy of GPS could degrade substantially without any indications to the crew. For this reason SPS GPS should not be used as the sole navigation aid. 2. In addition to (1) above, the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. The "Err" (Error) figure displayed (on the RNS252), which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance is MEANINGLESS and so no indication of GPS accuracy is available to the user. The GPS suffers from an average 2 second processing delay on the displayed GPS position. Call me pedantic, but "Err" must mean something, even if it is "This system is so bloody immature only a complete prat would release it to Service before we understand how it works and can train the aircrew". Which is effectively what Boscombe said, only more forcefully. Lack of understanding constitutes a Human Factors hazard - in the same way the master caution warning relating to FADEC was not understood. In isolation they may, eventually, become understood and be deemed aceptable, but the cumulative effect at this time was, I believe, an unnacceptable risk. Interestingly, at a time when the RAF were opertating a mixed fleet (Mk1 and Mk2) there was no equivalent GPS/RNS252 warnings for Mk1. Is it any wonder that Flt Lt Tapper thought it necessary to visit Racal in a vain attempt to work out how GPS/RNS252 worked and behaved? That shows a dedication completely missing in those who were meant to ensure he had a mature aircraft. Is it not also an indication that the so-called "Mk2 conversion course" was highly premature? 4 months later the crew were still so uncertain of the aircraft maturity they asked for a Mk1? |
Originally Posted by John Purdey
(Post 5448494)
Thor Nogson. Your 6132 ..... "This thread, and to a certain degree the campaign as a whole, absolutely require contributors with a contrary viewpoint in order to survive."
Well, at least that was honest. But many Pruners did not wish to play the game because their opinions were ignored, or the authors were insulted. JP Are you suggesting that my other points, or those of other posters are dishonest? Or is it that the honesty was the only redeeming feature of the post? Kind regards, TN |
Robin Clark
The initial position entered into the kit and the first waypoint do not have to be in the same place. If the aircraft intended to lift off say, from the centre of the airfield, but exit via the light airfield, then having it as Waypoint A is quite reasonable. By itself, it gives no indication as to how good the TANS was at that point. Perhaps my definition of Waypoint and yours are different. And yes, I have seen precision aids, such as Supertans and HINS (GPS/IN) give errors of 2miles and over without any fault indications. Not only that, subsequent investigation of complete and undamaged equipment on the ground has failed to reproduce any fault. |
Mull Of Kintyre Review
I wrote the following letter to the Daily Telegraph on Sunday. It seems that they have ignored it as they have done in the past with letters from us 'Three Fellows'. As the Editor will not gives us a chance to reply, I felt it should be shared with the readers of this thread. I wrote as follows:
MULL OF KINTYRE REVIEW Five Air Chief Marshals indicated (DT 14 January – Chinook accident review) they would welcome the opportunity to, quote: “… explain precisely why it (the verdict) cannot be overturned by recourse to a hypothesis for which there is no evidence and which is revealed as wholly implausible when tested against known facts”, unquote. We welcome the Air Chief Marshals having a chance to make their points to Ministers as part of a new Inquiry provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report. The unanswered questions are, why were the pilots charged with Gross Negligence based upon pure supposition with no actual facts by the two senior reviewing officers, who overturned the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry that could not apportion blame; and why was the aircraft released to Service whilst still not fully Airworthy. We look forward with interest to hearing those responsible explain their actions. Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Captain Richard KJ Hadlow Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000 & January 2010 Addendum 4) The Macdonald Report 2000 with Addendum 4 (2010) may be found on http://www.scribd.com/share/upload/20816348/2ecf7hocouvm9wc81ngw |
Mull of Kintyre review - posted at 15:08
Attention Moderator :
Please correct a typo in the second sentence, first line, 5th word has should read have. It should read: ... Sunday. It seems that they have ignored it as they have done in the past. with my apologies Thank you Ralph Kohn Edit: No apologies necessary Ralph. I have made the change. PPP |
Ralph, first a belated but warm welcome to the thread and indeed the forum. I think that we both shared the experience of having been on the payroll of Bilbao House, a delightful experience I hope you agree. The moderation on the Military Forum is exceedingly light (well usually anyway!). You can edit your own posts merely by logging in and going to the post where you will find an edit button alongside the reply one. The post appears in the same box in which you composed it and can be altered as you see fit. You can also, if you wish, put a brief explanation for the edit in a box for that purpose and save the result back to the thread. It will then have an added note to the effect that you have edited it and when you did so.
You bring new authority and experience both to this thread and the supposed quality press. The fact that at least part of the latter spurns your offerings is a comment on them and their sense of fair play. All correspondents are theoretically equal before their eyes, but Air Marshals more so than others it would seem. Not here though! Again, welcome Sir, I look forward to reading many more of your posts. |
Yes I think you are right Fitter. I've no idea when I posted that, who it was to and in response to what, as there is no post number or link. I guess that's the idea though, so I'll take your advice as well as that of the "Troll Sticky". Cheers!
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Mull of Kintyre Review
Thank you Chugalug 2
I regret to see that some seem upset by your helpful words to me on how to correct typos, such as the one that slipped into my last post captioned Mull of Kintyre Review. I have to get used to posting memos in this new and strange on-line environment for me and I obviously need to be more careful with my one fingered typing and near-octogenarian editing. We “Three Fellows” consider it unfair to see two deceased pilots accused with Gross Negligence in the circumstances surrounding the accident. However, further research has now brought to light a number of Airworthiness factors regarding the state of the new converted from Mark 1, termed HC2 at initial certification, which are of import and that indicate that the pilots were given an immature aircraft to operate. The Macdonald report Appendix 4 – Airworthiness (2010) covers our findings in a letter sent to MoD last December. It was not acknowledged, let alone answered. You and others may find it interesting. Please refer to my previous posting on the matter for the link. We hope that our contribution will help to right a situation we consider to be wrong, that is, we do not find that deceased pilots should be accused as they have been, against the RAF’s own Regulations of No Doubt Whatsoever among other reasons. Indeed, they may have been given the wrong tool to work with which, I suggest, may point the finger in other directions regarding negligence. Please accept that we are looking for the truth and nothing more. No one really knows what happened. On that basis alone, the verdict of gross negligence should be overturned. Ralph Kohn |
Now come on guys. If you cannot debate without snide and ridiculous comments please stay away. This thread in particular has NO space for anything other than proper respect and common sense. Simple!
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Ralph, may I say how pleasant it is to read your properly constructed English prose. Regrettably, many contributors to this website are either bordering on the illiterate, or are just bone idle. Basic spelling mistakes, apostrophic abuse and grammatical 'howlers' frequently plague this site.
However, it is your neo-octogenerian enthusiasm and tenacity for which the Mull group should feel most grateful. As a quinquagenarian, I am greatly relieved to note that, if 60 is the new 40, then 80 is merely the new 50! I am appalled that your post received a rude and intemperate response. But since you've faced idiots in the past, I know that this will not have put you and your fellow Fellows off the path of justice. So many Airships seem to have become embroiled in the recent tails-over-bottoms exercise that methinks they do protest too much.... |
Mull of Kintyre Review
Ralph,
Thank you for your erudite comments. If anyone reading this thread still has the slightest belief in the validity of their Airships' finding of Gross Negligence, I can only refer them to your Macdonald Report. (Link on post 6160.) Utterly brilliant in the scope of its coverage and the depth of the analysis by you and your "Three Fellows". Justice surely cannot now be delayed much longer. Vertico |
Hi everyone,
Very good to see Ralph Kohn here on PPRuNe and making very valuable contributions to this thread. The ‘Three Fellows’ have consistently supported our view and have brought great credibility, insight and integrity to the cause. Welcome, Ralph, I hope that you, and your good lady, are well. The only difference of opinion I, and the Campaign Group, have with the Three Fellows is that I don’t believe that the five knights should be granted an audience with ministers. The reasons are quite simple – the information that these so called honourable gentlemen wish to defend is the sole evidence upon which they base their verdict of gross negligence. If they are so confident that they have refused to move from their opinion for over fifteen years, why the need, now, to stand up and defend what they, and others, have written? The Campaign Group is willing to hand every document over and let an independent Judge make a decision based upon the evidence placed before them (including the damning evidence from Boscombe Down), and accept the findings of the Judge, whether it be in our favour, or not. We are sufficiently confident in our own evidence and documentary collection to be able to do this. Why, not so the five knights? Do they have so little confidence in their own documentation? Do they now finally realise that it is clear to all that they have finally been rumbled? May I remind the honourable gentlemen that their so called ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’ evidence has already been scrutinised at a time where two Air Marshals had the opportunity to be questioned on, and defend, their opinions, and that evidence was found wanting. My question to the five knights is this – if you are so confident in your verdict, let it be examined without the need to plead its case. In addition, I challenge you to release the full Boscombe Down documentation in relation to the Chinook HC2 trials. The existence has finally been acknowledged, so put it in the public domain. Or does that seriously undermine your flimsy case further? I also realise that time has moved on since the Tornado discussion. If anyone would still like to see the words of the Station Commander, please let me know and I’ll post them here. Finally, I am pleased to let you, the MoD and the five knights know that we haven’t finished just yet! Keep those tin hats on and letters to the editors ready chaps! My best, as always. Brian “Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook |
This accident MAY have been aircrew error, MAY have been a design fault and MAY have been the first victim of what we will someday come to call the Kintyre Triangle.
There is not, never was and (I predict) never will now be revealed enough evidence to convict the crew, the company or the Kintyre Triangle of clearly and conclusively having caused this accident. In the absence of such conclusive proof, it is a fundamental of British justice to make no finding of guilt But therein lies the system's dilemma. Having found the crew guilty 'because there wasnt enough evidence to nail anybody else', if that 'verdict' is overturned then the one possible scapegoat who can never be charged again (bearing in mind double jeapordy) is the scapegoat the system first pegged out for the tigers to devour. So we will never know I doubt we will ever see a widely accepted conclusion on this one. But perhaps the legacy of those who died on board - and those on the Board when they die too - will be that we re-learn the lesson about thinking ESPECIALLY CAREFULLY before passing judgement on those, tragically, not present to defend themselves. |
It is interesting to note the various causal factors, direct or indirect, that were available to the BoI and Reviewing officers. These include;
Try as I may, I cannot find any evidence that these causal factors were properly investigated; and the RO’s most certainly didn’t want to go there as they, along with CAS’s staffs, were party to the failures in the first place. Very clearly, evidence supporting all three existed, for example, the negligence in releasing the aircraft to service against a fabricated CA Release and Release to Service. Also, the related failure to demonstrate in the Master Airworthiness Reference that installed equipment performance had been properly assessed and established (pre-requisite to determining Limitations) and, of course, the failure to provide proper FRCs (Instructions) and training. There is more, but all trails lead back to the Release process being hasty, ill-considered and premature. |
tucumseh,
the negligence in releasing the aircraft to service against a fabricated CA Release and Release to Service. Also, the related failure to demonstrate in the Master Airworthiness Reference that installed equipment performance had been properly assessed and established (pre-requisite to determining Limitations) and, of course, the failure to provide proper FRCs (Instructions) and training. There is more, but all trails lead back to the Release process being hasty, ill-considered and premature. Then the process of identifying those individuals who were, themselves, negligent - re the above - can commence. S4G |
Yes to a Judge
Thank you again Chugalug2, also Beagle, Vertico and Brian Dixon for your welcoming words following my recent arrival on this thread of the Military Aircrew forum. They were most appreciated by one who values civilised debate and exchanges of thoughts, where all are given the opportunity to speak sensibly on a given subject, be it pro or con; and without unnecessary animosity or snide comments, in the absence of logical arguments.
I totally agree with Brian about preferring to see the ACMs’ views aired before a Judge and not just having them talking to Ministers on their own as in the past, where we too can offer our findings on the matter; particularly on the Airworthiness aspects of the HC2 introduction. We would welcome the opportunity to participate in any such re-run of the inquiry. My last unpublished letter to the Telegraph tried to indicate that all the evidence we have recently uncovered with the help of our researchers, should be aired; quote: “… provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.” unquote. I should have spelt it out more clearly. So it is probably better that it was only aired on PPRuNe for the moment, thus giving me a chance to redraft my next letter to the Media in clearer terms when the time comes, indicating that we want to present our side of the Airworthiness story for consideration, at the same time the knights have their day. Ralph Kohn |
I think that we are now getting to the nub of this debate and where it should go next. I have called for the BoI to be reopened because it would be an RAF inquiry, not an MOD one. It would be a one shot opportunity for the RAF to regain the moral ground that it has lost in this disgraceful affair and for ALL the known evidence to be presented. That in turn would mean that its finding could not possibly be the same as W&D's, thus the reputations of the pilots would be restored. Also it would mean that evidence revealed could be pursued both within and without the RAF. In comparison, a hearing by the "Minister" of both pro's and con's would simply mean more of the same farrago as has added to this scandal over the decades. Ask the Mull group about the "Minister". I think they would see him, as I do, not as a solution but as part of the problem. Of course the RAF may be seen in the same way, I admit, but for those that love it and care for its reputation surely it should be given one last chance to redeem itself?
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This is not a job for an RAF BoI.
Far better that the full facts are presented before a number of high court judges. It may then be that the air marshalls and their unseen advisors come under much closer scrutiny. I wonder where then will rest the finger of blame? |
Well, it all rather depends on what "job" we are talking about, Flip. The only job that a BoI has is to determine is, if possible, the likely cause of an accident with the prime intention being to avoid possible recurrences. If, like me, they happened to believe that the grossly unairworthy state of the aircraft was a major contributing factor if not the primary cause of this accident, then the complete cycle of cause and effect will have been demonstrated. Scene: AM's office in Main Building, with entire IPT and him filling it. Script: "Ignore the Airworthiness Regulations, we can't afford the time and money that observance of them will cost, but sign them off as complied with anyway". Closing Scene: Wreckage scattered hillside where 29 people have lost their lives unnecessarily. I don't see a judge or a jury being able to demonstrate cause and effect as authoritatively as a professionally run accident investigation would. Of course they would then be involved in the subsequent legal cases and the BoI evidence and witnesses would no doubt be called upon as well. In other words a question of carts and horses?
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There is probably no more hard evidence that the airworthiness state of the HC2 was directly responsible for this accident than there is that it was caused by pilot negligence.
It seems to me what should be important is that those responsible for the gross negligent verdict were also responsible in part for an unairworthy aircraft being used for this task. This same argument applies to those airships who have recently supported this verdict in the press. When Jeremy Paxman suggested something like this to Wratten in the infamous Newsnight interview many years ago, Wratten appeared to be shocked and offended that anyone should suggest that an officer of the Royal Air Force would stoop to allowing self interest to interfere with his duty. He left Paxman lost for words but I am sure that, with access to the information we have today, it would have been a more fruitful interview. Now some of the facts are public knowledge and now Haddon Cave has made this stance of Wratten's sound so phony, I would like to see the interview repeated but replacing Paxman with a good barrister or Judge. |
Couldn't agree more with your sentiments pulse, particularly your last wish. I also agree that:
There is probably no more hard evidence that the airworthiness state of the HC2 was directly responsible for this accident than there is that it was caused by pilot negligence. |
One wonders how many hearings before judges it'll take for the MoD to right this wrong. After all, of the HoL Committee only Lord Hooson wasn't a lawyer and of the other 4, as far as I can see, Lord Bowness was the only one not to have served as a judge. Add Sir Stephen Young of the FAI and that's 4 judges to nil who have heard the case have decided against the opinions of Day and Wratten.
Really the MoD alone now stands by its Gross Negligence opinion (finding has been shown by subsequent enquiries to be far too strong a word to apply in this case). Nationally and internationally, the MoD is looking at best rather silly and at worst like a Kafkaesque bureaucracy trying (and failing) to cover its own six. Had they relented after the HoL Enquiry, that would have been an end to the matter. I suspect their prolonged pig-headedness will result in enquiries reaching the parts the MoD would would rather had not been reached. |
That is precisely why we should keep well clear of anything to do with an investigation run by MoD - serving or mandarin. If you want to know how good these people are at twisting and turning and generally being 'obfuscators par-excellence', have a read of 'Lying in State' by Tim Slessor - not just the Chinook bit but all the other examples he uses. Truly scary!
This one will keep on running. |
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New Look at the evidence....
Further thoughts...........
My understanding of Doppler radar navigation is that it has to be initialized in the same manner as INS ie. told the local time and location in latitude and longitude , and it tracks the motion of the A/C from that point .......in the case of the SuperTANS without the built in 6 channel GPS receiver .. ( a later model than that installed in ZD576 ) this would mean manually entering the position unless there is another external source , which in this case there was .... the Trimble GPS receiver ............ So the starting location would be derived from the GPS source and any comparison early in the flight would show the two sources ....GPS and Doppler , to be in close agreement......................................but we know from the data later recovered from the SuperTANS that the two sources were NOT in agreement just before the crash..... The Doppler source info. can be expected to drift as discussed previously by many contributors , due to poor returns from a flat water surface and/or wave and tide motion...... The GPS source accuracy can vary wildly depending on the motion of the satellites , the application of the encrypted algorithm to remove the deliberate corruption of the signal ( selective availability ) for military use , but mostly from the accuracy of the frequency standard inside the SuperTANS ...... Any drift on the internal clock would have a dramatic and unpredictable effect on the position error and extremes of temperature is one factor to effect the drift . Normally on powerup there will be a period when the equipment is slowly reaching a working temperature inside ....... If we assume that the GPS error changed in a linear fashion during this short flight , unlikely in practice but as an example.............. and the crew had the opportunity to compare the Doppler and GPS sources halfway across the sea , they would still have seen little difference between the two sources , ie. crosschecking would have still shown agreement........ ...but if the GPS error apparent at the crash site , were present when they were two miles from the Mull , a crosscheck would have shown a 2 or 3 degree difference , and a crosscheck at the position where the waypoints were changed would display a 10 degree difference................ Tragically , if they were navigating purely from the Doppler source it would have led them to a waypoint 'A' which was on the shoreline..... just a little south of the light house.......they would have safely overflown this part of the coast and not come close to any high ground till a little further north.............giving them much longer to assess the flying conditions along the edge of the localized cloud formation....... and quite possibly continuing the journey without incidence ............ From what I have read , the crew would have had low confidence in the SuperTANS and may have decided to check the accuracy whenever possible . One easy way to do this during pre-flight would be to pretend they wished to fly to waypoint 'H'........which was programmed into the SuperTANS....... ......using a location a few miles away from Aldergrove and at roughly right angles to their intended departure would give them a good reference to a known location whilst they were stationary.... . From the centre of Aldergrove airfield this SHOULD be a course of 331 degrees true and distance of 9.8nm .......................... but the starting location which appears to have been recorded in the SuperTANS would have given them a course of 320 degrees true and a distance of 8.7 nm ......( in my entry #6155 I pointed out the starting Lat.and Long. were halfway to the town of Antrim) ....thus it would have been possible to determine that in that present condition the SuperTANS would guide them to a waypoint 'A' which was some distance offshore of the lighthouse .................. I do NOT find it at all strange that there was information stored inside the SuperTANS................ as with a large number of devices there would be a second power source or internal batteries to save any important information in the event of a power interuption ...... .......the name for this varies with manufacturers but Non-Volatile-Storage , or NVS is a common term..............in this way the equipment can continue to function after power is restored .......... I entirely agree about the references to an immature a/c by other contibutors , in fact you could almost claim it was an experimental a/c.!. ....I found one document which says that the first 20 Chinooks converted by Boeing were all delivered with different faults present........ .........varying from loose nuts and bolts to old wiring partly disconnected but left in situ...... ...........?????????... |
Robin,
you raise an interesting point, which has nagged me for some time. RACAL did produce a report on the SUPERTANS fitted to ZD576, but I have never seen it and as far as I am aware it is not in the public domain. You may recall that the AAIB found that the there was a pre-existing fault on the doppler antenna. My poor understanding of the system is that it 'blended' the information from the doppler and the GPS to arrive at the position of the aircraft. It is yet another loose thread. EG |
Map Datums
Out of interest, can anyone state 'with no doubt whatsoever' that all Lat/Long navigation systems, plus the charts being used, were all using the same mapping datum (presumably WGS 84).
During GW1, it was discovered that some of the 1/2 mill maps had incorrect postions for things like aerodromes. I seem to recall that KKIA was nowhere near where the chart said it was, for example. Those few people who had access to GPS (usually hand-held) often found quite a difference between the chart L/L and the GPS L/L. GPS was relatively immature at the time of the Chinook crash; even when the first few VC10s were fitted with GPS/LINS, we occasionally obtained larger than expected position errors - and found that some of the GPS hadn't been delivered set to WGS 84.... I don't want to embark on another 'little green men with wacky wirelesses' wild-goose chase, but it could just be another reason for the crew to think that they were somewhere else than their actual location - especially if the GPS was confusing the STANS with mis-matching grid origins and positional information? Perhaps someone who has done the 'hard sums' course could offer an opinion? |
Can't comment on that specific example but do recollect having a significant error between chart and GPS (a matter of kms) due to an overlay error. I think the problem was because we were not using WGS84 charts; it was one of the early PfP exercises where we obtained the charts from our host nation.
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GPS was relatively immature at the time of the Chinook crash Subsequently, in 1995, there was found to be a howler of a mistake in one of the GPS specs manufacturers worked to. Bottom line was equipment using Time of Day for sync'ing would find it losing sync very quickly. |
Grunt
RACAL did produce a report on the SUPERTANS fitted to ZD576, but I have never seen it and as far as I am aware it is not in the public domain. The report is widely available. Give me time and I'll PM a link. However, Commercial-in-Confidence parts are not available. The main issue here is that Racal "tested" the remnants of the RNS252 and said "It worked". Then MoD took the extraordinary leap of faith by claiming this meant the entire Nav System was both serviceable and accurate (despite, as above, most of it having no clearance as installed performance had not been established - which means you have no baseline against which to measure ZD576's performance). They also conveniently forget that while a "black box" may be serviceable, that in no way means the indication to the pilot is correct; and, more often than not, that indicator is not part of that installation. For example, the Radar Altimeter (which in ZD576 carried both defects and faults, making a mockery of MoD's claim the Nav System was fully serviceable). . In short, the aircraft was immature, at best still in its training and development stage, and operating against a wholly fabricated RTS. |
Gents.
This thread has always been contraversial and opinionated. On the one hand are the posters who say that the a/c was plainly CFIT'd. On the other hand are the guys who say 'who knows?' and that therefore the GN charge is unwarranted. I think both are correct. It just depends on your start position. I'll expand. From a legal point of view; A lawyers', if you will, then plainly all eventualites can NOT be ruled out. Therefore the Gross negligence charge is plainly unsustainable. FADEC trouble, Nav troubles, Aurora wake turbulence issues, you pick 'em! I tend to agree with the guys who say "dismiss the GN charge" any one of the above could have happened- or something else. On the other hand, from a 'pilotty' point of view, and let's face it chaps, it's highly likely that they did what many a pilot has done before and will do again. I don't cast any scorn on these guys whatsoever. After all they are stone dead. Along with their pax. Whatever the 'real' price is for GN, they've paid it. Guilty or not. I wish you luck in overturning the GN charge but it will make no difference to the cold hard facts on the ground. In fact, what difference will it make at all? (And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice). |
BBF
"(And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice)." could just as easily read "(And let's face it. If they did not CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE NOT guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true carriage of justice)." Whilst it's very easy to re spin things the only certainty in your post is "(which we'll never know)" and that means the GN verdict cannot apply. |
Seldom.
I quite agree. As a wise man once told me there's three versions of everything. 1. Yours. (They were dealt a bad hand). 2. Mine. (They cocked it up). 3. The Truth. |
An even wiser man told me the only one that counts is the truth, without it everything else is pure conjecture :ok:
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Barbie, you are correct. The whole point must be that a burden of proof must have been satisfied. Most SH guys I have spoken with agree that the chaps may well have screwed-up. However, the rules at the time were quite clear and it remains quite clear that the burden of proof requirement was not satisfied. This case should be no different to judicial processes such as those that overturned the Birmingham Seven judgement or those where First WW deserters have subsequently been pardoned. What is done is done, but there is still a need for the system to demonstrate that it acts in a fair, reasonable and objective manner; that is democracy.
Of course, the nature of the Mull crash also (re?)opened the Pandora's Box regarding airworthiness. Airworthiness is, in many respects, a separate issue that must be pursued for the greater good, but in this specific case is a plausible explanation to demonstrate that doubt must exist. Perversely, I still work with people who had close friends/colleagues on the Chinook and many of them still have a notable degree of anger aimed at the RAF, notably the crew. I find it difficult to explain how their anger may be slightly maligned. |
CGB, I would suggest that they direct their quite justifiable anger not at the RAF but at its Higher Command. I believe that five of them wrote letters recently to the National Press suggesting that the finding by the Air Marshals W & D into this accident was perfectly justifiable and that they all stood by it. Whatever one's own personal take on this accident the one thing that seems to unite those who have posted here is that the finding was totally unjustified. Why part of the RAF High Command should choose to unite behind such an untenable position says a lot about themselves and of their military abilities. That is their business, it is the business of the Royal Air Force and especially its Senior Commanders to disassociate itself completely from such a shameful position. The RAF Provost Marshal's investigation into individuals named in the Nimrod Review should follow the evidence no matter how high up the food chain that it leads. To not do so will taint the Service forever with this scandal. Then and only then would those you speak of be justified in directing their righteous anger against the Royal Air Force as a whole.
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