What UTTER balls. What the hell has Afghanistan got to do with all this?

To my mind, it is a disservice to 'our people' to pin the blame on them for an accident with totally inadequate evidence. No CVR evidence, no idea of the human factors stress being suffered by the pilots on the day through being ordered to fly a non-airworthy, immature aircraft.

No-one knows 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' what caused the accident - and Dalton's drivel just perpetuates the MoD's clear desire to stick to their untenable position.

Given Boscombe's advice was consistent, over a long period before Release to Service, why on earth "factor in" the implications arising from a statement that the software was "positively dangerous".


All the airworthiness and safety management regulations demand that you RESOLVE the problem/risk/hazard on a safety critical system. See the Nimrod thread and the discussions over ALARP.

Do you think the risk was ALARP when, in June 94, Boscombe grounded their PE Fleet? Surely, if the risk mitigation was already "factored in", they (Boscombe) would have been party to the necessary trials/testing and drafting of changes to the documentation and would have no good reason to stop flying?

Frankly, this is a far more clear cut case than either C130 or Nimrod.

Dalton is, in effect, admitting MoD breached their own mandated regulations.

What utter rubbish from CAS - he's only spouting the same party line as everyone else before him. I thought he had more 'nous' and 'cahunas'. Obviously not, it appears! Perhaps he's been got at by the mandarins?

CAS's statment is bollox because:


1.This is disingenuous, as the AAIB said that evidence of a control restriction/jam 'could not be discounted' but the BOI did not address this. Furthermore, the AAIB report indicated a massive bootful of yaw bar (rudder) at impact - 77% - an unheard of amount. Also bear in mind that there is recorded evidence that faults produced by FADEC left no trace. This proves that just because there was no evidence of a FADEC fault, that cannot mean ther had not been one. The AAIB were not made aware of this and neither did the BOI address these issues. So, to say that the BoI was a , is demonstrably flawed in so very many ways. In fairness to the BOI members, FADECs were relatively new to the military and the board were no experts - either on the FADEC, the HC2 itself nor wrt to accident investigations. This underlines some of the shortcomings of the military accident investigation process - which were very far from thorough.


2.This is also misleading and "too low, too fast and in illegal viz" is a line used by Day and Wratten.
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.


3. One cannot use the excuse of since the crash as evidence that the ac was ok at the time - utter tripe! The airworthiness regs clearly state this is no proof of ac safety. And if any critical components of the HC2 have been modified since the crash, you would have to argue that maybe the ac was not as safe as CAS suggests? Hmmm...!


4. There is no record of the BOI, FAI, PAC or HoL inquiries addressing the concept of airworthiness. Therefore, by definition, the airworthiness issue is new evidence. Never mind the operational issues of the crash, the Chinook HC2 should not have been allowed to fly operationally, never mind on a passenger/trg sortie in such an immature state of development. Quite simply, it was definitively unairworthy.


5. A very cheap shot indeed by CAS and not a little small-minded. (He should change his script-writer, methinks!)
Having served in Afghanistan, I am more than a little aware that ac are brought down by people who mean our crews harm. Therefore, it is imperative that the small number of aircraft we have left are properly airworthy and fit-for-purpose.
To fail to do so is doing the enemy's job for him.

Those who continue to serve deserve and receive our total respect.

6. As the crew of ZD576 had already asked for a HC1 for the 'training sortie' to INV, the only people who

were the senior officers who allowed this sortie to go ahead in an aircraft that was demonstrably NOT AIRWORTHY at the time. Included in this are the people who signed the CA Release and the Release to Service against the advice and the pleadings of A&AEE, Boscombe Down and in contravention of regulations, did not record their decision process. This action, no matter how operationally driven it was, might amount to gross negligence should it ever come to court. It is interesting to note that some these people also were the convening authority and reviewing officers of the BOI - make up your own mind as to who let whom down.

flipster

- somewhere I heard (TV or radio) that 'modifications' had been made to the FADEC since the crash - which actually denies the claim that 'since the a/c has operated safely since there could not have been a problem'.

Correct. (pprune tells me this is too short, so "correct" again).

I would be as delighted as anyone to see the crew of ZD576 cleared of gross negligence. However, the more I read the thread, the less sure I am of what people are expecting would follow if that should happen.

As I understand it, the majority of contributors believe that if it can be shown that FADEC software (or other failures) could conceivably have contributed to the accident even if there was no evidence that it did, then the extreme verdict of gross negligence (absolutely no doubt at all) is unsustainable.

It gives me no pleasure to make the point but if there are no facts to prove the verdict, by the same logic, there are no facts to show that the crew was not responsible which must remain at least a possibility.

May I ask what happens if the verdict should be over-turned? Please, no heated demands for what it ought to be but simply some facts about what course the law might then be required to pursue or indeed if it needs to pursue any course at all.

That is a very good point from Boslandew. What would happen if tomorrow someone turned round and stated that the crew were "not" guilty of Gross negligence? Would then, the families of the passengers be able to sue the families of the crew? That may make matters worse.

When the wholly unjustified verdict is quashed and a verdict along the lines of 'Cause not positively determined' is brought, then the reputations of the two pilots will be reinstated.

Whether the families of the deceased passengers should choose to pursue an action against the MoD for insisting that they flew in a knowingly non-airworthy aircraft will be a an entirely different matter.

Boslandew - absolutely, but the principle on which Miltary B of Is have been based is that blame has not been apportioned to dead people. Of course, I'm sure we all accept that it remains a possibility that there was negligence, but it cannot be proven. The revised finding may well reflect that and personally I would have no issue with that finding.

I think that any change in the finding would be incidental to the issues of 'law' to which you refer. I believe that such issues are running a separate course now to the cause of Brian and others and neither are dependent on each other.

Post 5904 by Robin Clark

I was expecting some reaction from the regular contributors.

Would you all be happy with a verdict of Pilot Error?

No!






.

bast0n,
there is only one verdict that would sum up this whole tragedy sufficiently:
Cause not positively determined.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

flipster
 

Congratulations on a beautifully constructed and devastating riposte to the tired old rubbish spouted by the new CAS.

Sooner or later, the ill-considered "finding" of gross negligence will have to be reversed. Keep up the good work, chaps. I sense that the pressure might just be starting to build.

When Brown is forced out, anything can happen!

How the CAS can hide behind remarks like:
when the safety regulation of the organisation he heads has been savaged by the Haddon Cave Inquiry I find difficult to imagine. It shows that they have learned nothing from H-C at all.

Vertico,

Very kind of you to say so. It just goes to disprove the saying that you should not write anything in anger - as I was spitting mad when I saw Dalton's very poor statement in the papers! He had seemed a very bright bloke and one who could have been above regurgitating the same tired, trite and lame MoD line. C'est la vie.

Flipster

Which bit of "there is no need for new evidence, just correctly assess the evidence you've always had" do they not get?

I'm disappointed in Dalton as I always had strong respect for the man. His letter doesn't appear to have a new man's spin on things - it is as if his PSO has just dusted-off one of the previous 3*+ responses and top-'n-tailed it.

Beagle

With respect, you have given your opinion of what you think ought to happen.

BOAC

I should perhaps have made things clearer by saying "RAF legal procedures" sooner than law. You suggest that it is generally accepted that the crew may have been responsible and that any new verdict might reflect that possibility.
My query was really about what alternative verdicts are possible given that a successful review might not completely exonerate the crew. A very difficult question, but would a new verdict of any level that did not completely exonerate the crew be acceptable to the Campaign leaders. Perhaps Brian Dixon could comment.

Hi- can anyone provide a link to the original AAIB report? I have tried the AAIB site but don't seem able to find it, and the search function isn't working. Can't find it on the parliamentary site either.
FWIW, I don't see how with so little actual facts to go on, the RAF feel they have reached the level of absolute certainty required to find negligence. I suppose the interesting question here is why are they intent on defending what seems to be indefensible?

A not unsurprising response from Mr Dalton.

Love to know what his 'private' thoughts were/are about the XIII Sqn Tornado crew that were killed in similar circumstances i.e. alledgedly perfectly serviceable aircraft flies into the ground for which no evidence can be found as to the reason why, but which, IIRC, was classified NPD. He was, of course, officer commanding XIII sqn at the time ....

I doubt CAS is even allowed to think for himself, never mind issue a press release/give an interview/write a letter without an MoD "Moderator" giving the strict line. What a shame, thought he might be someone to break the mould, obviously not...

He now looks as foolish and as self-serving as the rest.

Those, like me, who see the Mull Tragedy as the cause celebre of the fight to get a truly independent MAA should draw encouragement from this pathetic letter from the Chief of the Air Staff. This aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy because of, not despite, the machinations of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority, AKA The Ministry of Defence. Whether 29 lives were lost wholly or partly because of that we don't know and is beside the point. The Airworthiness Authority has never admitted that the RTS was illegal, ie in direct confliction with its own Regulations. Well it wouldn't would it? The Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry never found that the aircraft, together with the entire Mk2 fleet, was unairworthy. Well it wouldn't would it? That is the scandal that the CAS is trying to obscure, that Airworthiness Provision and Accident Investigation under his command was, is and will remain dysfunctional until there is established a truly independent MAA, that includes full RTS authority, and a truly independent MAAIB. The fudge outlined by the SoS in response to the Nimrod Review, and the Review itself for that matter, is a turkey and will not fly. In resisting the very measured and reasonable calls by Brian and his campaign over the years to simply have W & D's wretched "finding" struck off to be replaced with "Cause not Positively Determined" their Airships have shone a light into a scandal that will rock the MOD. The CAS is merely trying to delay the inevitable. He will not even manage that.

CAS hasn't the power to change the decision, he is a relative "tea boy" in the decision making chain, way too much politics involved now for a military officer to officially change anything. That said, he could tell us all what he really thinks and help correct a terrible wrong.

Go back to making the tea Air Marshal, in my view you are not worthy of your rank.

Brian

Hummm - I think that there are one or two pointers as to what happened. It was by all accounts a serviceable if not technically airworthy aircraft was it not?

And did it fly itself into the ground...........?

Gosh - this goes round and round.....................

I hesitate to rekindle your 'circles', Baston, but what of post 5931 - did that aircraft fly itself into the ground, perchance? Was the crash possibly caused by pilot error?

I'm not a campaign leader, but...

In my opinion "Cause not known" is the only sensible, fair, logical and correct verdict, as per other accident reports where the cause is not known.

Sqn Ldr Burke (RAF Rtd) was pretty forthright this am on BBC radio 4 with his opinion of the CAS's 'letter'. Basically, he had the balls to say that in his opinion 'the CAS was wrong'. We need a few more of him. I'd still be interested to know where the 'stop order' for him at Odiham/AAIB originated

Baston would you care to answer BOACs post about the Tornado that speared in? Or should we confront Dalton with it direct?

Nothing quite like double standards in High Office..

BOAC

Error of judgement perchance...............?

Dalton is not doing very well is he.......

If you are so indifferent to safety, what airworthiness components would you be happy for MoD to ignore?

- a chink of daylight?

Chinook
 

I thought I heard Sqn Ldr Burke on the radio this morning at 0730 or so saying that if the crew had turned 12 degrees to port, then they would have flown along the coast (I am willing to accept that I have not quoted him precisely). I was itching for the interview to ask "Why then did they not do so?" but he failed to press this obvious point. JP

S/L Burke, never one to mince his words would almost certainly have answered "I don't know".

Now if only a couple of senior folk at the heart of all this had been able to grasp that quite simplistic notion.

Best Summary Yet
 

I am coming late to the detail of this thread and this may have been aired before.

There is a very good summary of the accident, the various enquiries and investigations and a postulation of the cause, in a book called "Chinook Crash" by Steuart Campbell.

I realise that the views of both the supporters and opponents of the official line are probably too polarised now but, nonetheless, I found the book extremely well written and objectively presented. I have recommeded it to many people who have asked me about the accident and my copy has been loaned out more times than I care to remember.

As a PPL with no helicopter or military experience perhaps I shouldn't be asking a question on this thread but I find most flying incidents have some relevance to general flying. The question I'm struggling with is as follows. Is the implication that the Chinook was cruising along and may have entered misty conditions which took the crew by surprise or off course so they went for a correction in heading and/or power setting which the allegedly faulty software couldn't cope with? I hope this isn't too naive and I'm not suggesting any fault on the part of the crew but why otherwise would the software be relevant to the crash?

VG - don't 'struggle'!

The software is not definitively 'relevant' to this crash. The questionable suitability of an apparently 'unairworthy' aircraft is.

The truth is no-one knows for sure what happened (probably the root message in this whole series of threads) - it is all guesswork, claimed as 'deduction'. It would be of benefit to you to absorb all the messages here if you have time.

For others - I gather a MkI was 'not available' on request. Two questions please:

1) What handicap would a MkI have introduced for the detail?
2) I begin to wonder if there is a possibility that someone was just trying to 'show off' the 'new' MkII by sticking all those important and most unfortunate folk on it?

Speculation and Guilt
 

For once I can agree with something that JP has said - why indeed having made the waypoint change and taken the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse (WP1) off the system did they not turn - even MOD has confirmed in writing that a waypoint change would normally be coincident with a course change. So, did they deliberately continue to fly towards the Mull (which they certainly knew was there), did something distract them (comment from Stn Cdr Odiham in his remarks about accepted Release to Service problems such as false engine fail warnings) or did they lose control of one of the engines or even suffer a control restriction (both problems with this very aircraft over the previous few days). JP doesn't know, I certainly don't know, I am pretty sure Robert would have said that he doesn't know and even, wait for it, the two senior reviewing officers don't know!

I remind you of what ACM Wratten said:

1. Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact. What does emerge from the Inquiry however, is that there is no evidence whatever of any combination of possible minor problems, or of any major difficulty, which would have so taxed the skills of the crew that they had no option other than to keep flying towards high ground at speed at low level in deteriorating conditions of cloud and visibility. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue. What they should have done and what they were trained to do is succinctly described by the AOC. Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know. What we do know however, and what the two pilots would also have known, is that of all the hazards inherent, in aviation, hitting the ground without intending or expecting to carries the lowest likelihood of survival and consequently the risk of this occurring must be avoided at ail costs. This was the pre-eminent responsibility of the two pilots and there is not even a hint of any circumstances which would have been beyond their professional skills to accommodate, or which would have justified them taking the risk of proceeding as they did. Lamentably, all the evidence points towards them having ignored one of the most basic tenets of airmanship, which is never to attempt to fly visually below safety altitude unless the weather conditions are unambiguously suitable for operating under Visual Flight Rules.

2. I therefore agree with the AOC's summary, in particular that the actions of the two pilots were the direct cause of this crash. I also conclude that this amounted to gross negligence.

Everything after the sentence I have outlined in bold is based on speculative opinions not facts - something that the HofL Select Committee (with I suggest somewhat more eminent legal quailifications than CAS) did not accept when the senior reviewing officers were able to make their case to them at length. Speculation is not compatible with Gross Negligence and, as CAS has conveniently ignored, was not allowed by the RAF's own rules of the time. As Malcolm Rifkind (another eminent legal brain) pointed out this non fact supported verdict (effectively a finding of manslaughter) based on an incomplete investigation by the BOI and opinions and speculative decisions by senior officers in the Command Chain, and with no possibility for the dead pilots (or their families) to defend themselves would not stand up in any Court in the land.

Someone asked if the families would now accept a verdict of pilot error - presumably a "balance of probabilities - pilot error" rather than NPD. I can't speak for the families, but I wouldn't now that we know just how much of the "available" (good word that - saves the word "new" coming into the equation) evidence was either not seen or not considered by the BoI. Incidentally this same evidence was not, if the MOD's own request of October 1995 for legal opinion is correct, made available to the MOD's legal team for the FAI either - funny that - like the question on why they did not change course I could only speculate - but I won't!

JB

Another letter supporting the CAS in the Telegraph today (sorry can't find a link) from ACM's Graydon(CAS at the time) and Alcock (Chief Engineer at the time) so no self interest there then.

Seems very weak.

"In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.

This conclusion stems from evidence which is absoloutely clear to the open minded."

Then:

"Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself if there was the slightest possibility that a technical fault might have been responsible?"

Because that same RAF should not have allowed an unairworthy aeroplane to be used in the first place.

If their leadership was as weak as their arguments in this letter I am not surprised that the safety regulation of the RAF has got into the state it has.

Here it is. (Scroll down about a third of a screen).

Quote:

---

Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.

You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?

As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.

Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.

This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.

Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?

You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1

---

Maybe someone needs to write the following:

Graydon Letter
 

I must have missed something somewhere - how did the RAF blame itself? I believe it accused, and without any defence, found guilty of Gross Negligence, two relatively junior pilots - a verdict based on opinion and speculation. This is not, I suggest, a case of the RAF blaming itself - it is a case of the RAF diverting the blame from itself. If the BoI or even the review process had properly looked at the reasons why a technical or airworthiness issue might have come about and obtained satisfactory answers then maybe Graydon and Alcock's letter might be credible - however as we now know those answers would almost certainly have been far from satisfactory, particularly as far as the RAF bringing the Mk2 into service was concerned. As it is I am more than "gobsmacked" that as Chief Engineer Alcock thought the BoI had done anything like a thorough investigation, and that he should support Graydon's letter. I am even more "gobsmacked" at the inconsistency of RAF senior management thinking and the dispensing of justice between the Chinook verdict where there was no ADR/CVR and that on Tornado crash in Glen Ogle when the ADR/CVR showed exactly what happened.

JB