The Buccs were sent down to the Falklands shortly before the first anniversary of the Argentinian invasion.
Their remit was to fly around the islands, make as much noise as they could and generally let everybody know they were there. The thought was that word would quickly get back to the mainland. The Argentinians would know that if they tried anything on the islands again, then we had the capability to hit back at the mainland.

In 1983, Buccaneers featured in an Op Order for the reinforcement of RAF Stanley in the event of an Argentinian amphibious landing force setting sail again. There would not have been the airlift capacity to get the requisite weapons and Armament Ground Support Equipment (AGSE) down there in time. Remember this was at a time when there was just the occasional Hercules airbridge flight requiring AAR and everything else was still coming by sea (taking around 14 days).

There was also no proper Explosives Storage Area at that time - 1000-lb bombs and BL-755 were dispersed around the base in natural folds in the ground in as safe a manner as could be orchestrated. The bombs could only be accessed using a Rough Terrain Fork Lift and a 4-Ton 4x4 Armament Support Vehicle (not Land Rover + Type S trolley) - a very time consuming process. Air to air missiles were stored in ISO containers. Very few people knew were the bombs were and they were well camouflaged.

I was involved in the planning for pre-positioning MARTEL missiles which - along with all the requisite AGSE for Buccaneers - was stored in specially procured ISO containers with side opening doors.

Due to the large Net Explosive Quantity of the loaded ISOs, the only safe storage position for them had to be way off in the bondhu away from RAF Stanley beyond the as yet uncleared minefields and it was accepted that that the ISOs would have to be underslung load lifted on base by Chinook directly to aircraft when required. The nature of the boggy ground between RAF Stanley and the storage locations - routing between the minefields - made it inaccessible by vehicle for equipment transport purposes. You could make it in a Unimog driving through mud almost to the top of the wheels !

Fun times when ingenuity and initiative was encouraged to meet operational requirements without interference from on-base H&S jobsworths or too much long-handled screwdrivering from HQ STC due to sparse strategic rear link comms [1 x ASMA in Ops or signal !].

LOM, re the 1000 lbs trial and the F4, yes, selectively jettisoning or clearing the aircraft completely with one button push of things like pylons and/or rails, tanks etc was still advertised as being possible in the AD days.

(Apologys to the Bucc purists for F4ing this thread again )

Lomcevak, whatever were they thinking of doing to the F-4 so late in its life to warrant an increase in MTOW?

Was this some armchair strategists plan to replace the normal 2500 lb Fletcher underwing tanks with 4000 lb tanks as carried on the centreline, presumably freeing up the centreline to carry the gun?

Or perhaps to allow for the weight of the bits of old railway line and/or battleship armour being nailed on to compensate for the ageing structure? There was a rumour about a LERX proposal in around 1982, but I guess nothing ever came of it.

Ah - the good old MoD obsession with event anniversaries! Mind you, the auth sheet must have looked good - "Wire the cr@p out of anything you see, not above 100' MSD" or similar.

Would auth'ing anything different have stopped the 'kin hooligans?:ok:

CG

BEagle,

The problem was that over the life of the F4 the addition of mods had increased the basic weight of some airframes to the extent that in 'D' fit (3 tanks) plus 8 missiles the aircraft were greater than the 58 000 lb limit. Therefore, the trial was to enable all airframes to be generated in the standard QRA D fit.

We did a similar clearance for the Tornado GR1 for Op Granby but due to the gear strength we took off with the 2250l tanks empty then tanked to full to get the maximum overload weight in flight.

Apologies for the thread drift but I was a Bucc pilot during the time period being discussed so does that count?!

Hi Wiggy,

The strafe profile did seem a little exposed, but firing 1200 rounds of HEI in three passes was definitely " the best fun you could have with your trousers on" as OC B used to say. I wish they had left some fuel in the Pucaras.

T+9

In the interests of correctness:
There are a number of adverse comments against Tornado earlier in this post.
It is important to point out that in 1982, the GR1 was very early in its service life whereas the Buccaneer and F4 were mature if not approaching the end of their life cycle. It is correct that the engine had an oil consumption issue associated with the gearbox breather and there was of course a concern with that.
In an earlier post a comment was made that the Falklands was not a Tornado type war.
The events of the last 35+ years has shown that this aircraft is perfectly capable of operations in wars quite different to that it was designed for. Moreover the F3 was based at MPA for many years showing it was routinely was able to make that required long range flight. 1982 was just a little early for it to decimate the runway.

...... and not to mention the long-range air drops to the Fleet by the Hercules. My longest flight 26 hrs and 5 mins with 2 gulps on the way out and nothing on the way back - in the dark. Two sunrises and a sunset. :zzz:

I recall one of the previous threads on this being quite informative - mainly due to Argentinian veterans contributing which was fascinating. IIRC we all agreed that the raids were a staggering effort and there was evidence to suggest that the Shrike raids did get a ‘shut off’ reaction. I think there was some evidence that the raids caused a shuffling of the Argentine DCA at on the mainland but less that this detracted from the units fragged with strike or sweep of the islands.
I’ve always harboured my own suspicion that the ‘wider effects of BB’ are arrived at by assuming the enemy reacted how we would have - without actually checking that they did - hence I found the evidence very interesting.
Incidentally - Vulcan 607 says that the attack run was made at 10,000 ft. I’ve carried 1000 lb weapons twice as high as that in a SHAR - whoever it was saying something (bogus) about weapon delivery and impact angle. Naturally the load was incomparable to the Vulcan’s but let’s stick to facts eh?
Repeat my first point. Staggering effort, hats off to striker, AAR and MPA crews involved.

They would have been operating from Stanley at that point, I think that the weapons had been shipped down.

Whoops just caught up with RAFEngos informative post, his memory is better than mine. We were getting ready for the Key West trip that had been cancelled the previous year.

I can confirm as I was the FA at Boulmer during the incident. The aircraft had launched as D44+8 and, after the incident, it reported that the aircraft was RTB as C44+8. The subsequent series of telephone calls I received during their recovery escalated to the Stn Cdr. IIRC a subsequent investigation revealed they were in the only aircraft where the wiring had not been cut as specified in the mod.

Of interest the hysterical conversation between the crew, including pressing the transit button rather than intercom, including the suggestion they eject and claim they had a different problem before senses cleared.

ORAC wrote: Really? D44+8....:\

Blimey, says a lot for the safety culture in those days that these guys thought to eject and write off an aircraft rather than return home and face the music. I’d always thought the RAF was a pioneer of in flight safety and just culture/learning from its mistakes?

Don't take it too seriously....I rather suspect we are talking about "banter" and flippant remark under stress here, rather than it being a serious comment. I think most of us here would have rather have faced the certain anger of a Group Captain/Air Commodore/ AVM or above, at a tea and biscuits interview without the tea and biscuits rather than face the uncertainties of a M-B exit and subsequent let down into the North Atlantic.......

P.S. Busta, if you are still here - not going to be able make the annual do next week, PM on way shortly

Buster 15 #108

The other day whilst searching for some historic paperwork amongst some
junk (sorry, treasured memorabilia), I came across an AAR plan I was asked to produce for a Staff College presentation by someone who later became my Sqn Boss. The plan was for a Black Buck style attack on MPA by 2 Tornado GR1s with JP233. The plan was to use Tristar Tankers for simplicity(?). The man provided me with the planning figures (given to him by a Tornado mate) that he wanted me to use. The plan required the Tristars to be stripped of all seats, pallets etc to achieve a very low Zero Fuel Weight and a fuel uplift of 135 Tonnes each. It also assumed that Tristar/Tristar AAR was possible. At the time the Tristar AAR probes had been removed and there were no crews current, but that would not be a problem as that was the situation for the Nimrod fleet at the start of Op Corporate, and easily sorted!!!

The plan used 3 Tristars for the outbound leg, with a Tristar/Tristar bracket up to MTOW between Tristars 2 & 3 some 6 hours downroute. That Tristar then completed Brackets 5 & 6 after Tristar 1 had completed Brackets 1-4.
The last Bracket was completed 250 miles from MPA and the Tristar loitered there whilst the GR1s destroyed the runway after 9hrs 45 mins airborne!!

After Post Strike RV with Tristar 3, the GR1s took 2 more Brackets before he RTBd and was relieved by Tristar 4 for the final 2 Brackets. If Tristar/Tristar AAR was not possible it required 6 Tristars(we only ever had a maximum of 6 Tristar Tankers). It also assumed that the Tristars had NO
HOLD or DIVERSION CAPABILITY at ASI.

The GR1 crews would land at ASI, for a well earned beer, after a total of 17:30, with all but about 3 hours where they had NO diversion capability if the AAR had failed. See Black Buck One to see what could happen.

The VC10 force would have been busy with the Nimrod SAR ( Rescue?)

The plan had a few other holes in it. It is highly likely that the GR1s would have run out of Engine Oil and O2 before or shortly after the attack. I also now know that the Fuel Figures I was given (pre GW1) were, shall we say, a tad optimistic.

I was not involved in the Bucc (one way at a time only) Deployment as I was busy flying the Brize-ASI airbridge in shiny white VC10s as the much better hemp coloured ones had yet to be delivered.

Yes the F3s did it (one way - on the limit of engine oil) on several occasions, but not lugging JP233 with the Drag Co-efficient of an aircraft hangar.

To answer the OP original question - Yes the Bucc would have had better performance (without dragging JP233 around), but the duration of the flight, the loss of an aircraft and crew or two if AAR had failed, and the issue of engine oli and O2 would still have precluded any sensible person from authorizing it.

The rationale was given in #2 by LJ.

Got the pm Wiggy, sent one back, stop calling me shortly.