Jay t,
It has been stated here on pprune that the Puma revamp will include the installation of anticipators.

Is this true?

Who knows? I have been out 4 years now so am clueless to current thinking. I have 2500 hours on type so feel qualified to comment on anticipators. A revamp?? We were told for years the anticipators were coming, but they never did.

It was ever thus.

Did 2 tours in RAFG on 230 with a Sqn that was always wishing that it had the experience levels that it used to have.

Most of my 2500 hrs were single pilot

We had a Plt Off pilot.

In 1990 the Gulf NVG course was 90 mins airbourne; we had no incidents.

To cover NI and Belize, anyone that had even seen a picture of a Puma was brought back without incident.

The aircraft was a delight to fly, but old then. Then toddled off and flew the C130 - now they were old, and the Sqns had all of the same problems.

Now a civvie, flying aircraft that were new - once.

The engines that were taken out of the SA Pumas (for reasons of fleet commonality, you are right, Nige) were Turmo 4C4, which do not have anticipators.

The Makila 1A1 engines due to be fitted as part of the Puma LEP do have anticipators, that is the primary reason why they are included.

Of interest, if you don't believe that journalists use this site for cheap stories, pop over to AS350nutter thread in rotorheads. The video has just appeared on Sky News.

Doing stuff is dangerous. Doing dangerous stuff is more dangerous. Taking a rough guess at how to do dangerous stuff without the supervised training or false experienced gained from stories, true or with 'exaggeration factor' added is more dangerous still. Doing it at night, tired.....well you get the picture.

This comment should be on the header and footer of all BOI reports by now - It's been appearing for at least 25 years.

Plastic Cab, thank you, my post is deleted.

I know little about the chopper world, but I thought you guys might like to know that there is an acceptance in the tactical multi-world that a high degree of risk is associated with many sorties.

I believe some of the more switched on chiefs of staff have accepted that in these circumstances, and with a level of experience much lower than in recent times things might be expected to go wrong from time to time.

This adult point of view, extends to the lack of a witch hunt afterwards.

Common sense, at last. However, I still believe the RAF is in a tailspin with regards to the exodus of personnel and the quite ridiculous pressure to reduce training budgets. This issue needs highlighting for a rear guard action to underline the importance of training.

Nige

interesting that the briefings keep referring to PVR rates being the norm, yet there is a blatant refusal to discuss the trend in experienced personnel leaving at earlier option points than in the past. Not sure if anyone has figures (that they are prepared to share), but would be hugely interesting to know...tailspin indeed...

Interesting by-product of this of course is that there is an awful lot of very young sqn ldrs out there. The 'Company' would say that this shows how good our people are, there is another view that says we are promoting people with less experience than we would like (still quality people, no suggestion otherwise).

Just to comment on the stats pointer that TD gave. Without doubt these are accurate but raw numbers belie the imcreased, or reduced, probability of numbers.

It is normal to quote accident statistics as a percentage of flying hours or sorties which therefore allows for fleet size.

Using an hours rate, for instance, would show a long range aircraft at an advantage compared with a short range aircraft with a higher sortie rate.

SB, my personal view, is that their job is to manage the decline of the RAF in the best possible way. I don't envy their job, a Sqn Ldr flight commander tour used to be a bit boring, not any more. A training risk turns into a deadly risk on a rooky tour in a theatre of war. I have huge respect for people willing to do the work on the front line. The lack of training airframes back home in the UK is a travesty in these conditions.

They might be young, but they absolutely have to stand up to the career pressures further up the CoC.

The future is grim. When people who should know better are asking for cuts in essential training budgets you just know that the Lords and Masters have yet to win the argument for more funding from the PM.

I am ashamed of what the MoD stands for nowadays, but I intend to do my bit to raise the profile of UKAF.

Not Squadron Commanders being asigned command of a squadron with a caveat to rebuild the supervisory chain then. Even I know that you do not have to rebuild something unless it is broken. Perhaps not a witch hunt applicable to specific individuals but definately a 'review' of the 'system' in place. This is indicative of a covert recognition of one mans issues, hereafter knowns as a problem by the masses.

AG, I understand your point - entirely and I also agree with it.

Try 45 years.

Jayteeto, depends how you define more training? I learnt more about the Puma from handling it during Op flying rather than the OCU (No, you weren't a QHI then!) Just like the Wessex guys before us, the routine of operating at or even above MAUM in a tactical environment enabled even the 'average' shag to become quite adept at handling the Puma safely, despite its known handling problems.

Lots of tricks were developed, including the use of a tad of right yaw during a quickstop to hold up the N1. Had to be careful due to the yaw/roll divergence, but it did help. Also, not sure that anticipators are the be-all and end-all. Any gas turbine at idle is going to take a finite time to respond to increased full flow, be it from a rapidly raised collective or a slighly later reaction to a decaying NR.

No, but we came bloody close! I can still remember some of our dreadful CRM having paired up 'single pilot' Puma guys and given them NVG and the new 252 to play with. I recall one incident when 2 very experienced Puma pilots and an AMF crewman landed back at Ras Al Gar having decended to within feet of the ground whilst all 3 were heads-in sorting the 252.

'Any gas turbine at idle is going to take a finite time to respond to increased full flow, be it from a rapidly raised collective or a slighly later reaction to a decaying NR.'

One of the checks done on Squirrels and 412s is to recover from auto (needles just joined) to max cruise power in 3 secs. Neither of these types droop at all when this is done. Try that on a Puma and you'll trip the alternators, lose the AP etc etc. Turmo IIIc 4s were, I have been told, designed for running electricity generators at constant speed rather than for helicopter use.

What role did Wastelands play in this? It would appear that the last loss was an ex- South African Puma which was way behind schedule and frought with problems. How do the handling characteristic's compare between these reworked Puma's and the older Puma's?

Gems and Gnomes are pretty good too OverTq!

IIRC when Sikorski saw the RR-engined Blackhawk, they didn't believe the lack of droop with rapid collective application ......

For the Puma engine(s), isn't it the extra inertia from the centrifugal first stage(s) that slows the response??

One of the main reasons it has taken so long to get them into service was MoD insistence that they were all turned into HC Mk1s, so the handling is identical, because they are the same ac.

Looking at my Super Puma course notes Eurocopter claim that the anticipator anticipates the governors response and in effect pumps in extra fuel the moment the collective goes up.
The end result should be a higher Nr than that prior to the input.

The cost of adding an anticpator system would be expensive as a new FCU would be required. I don't know if one was ever designed for the Turmo.

It would be better to fit the Makila as apart from the added power most of the anticipator system is built into the engine.

The only airframe parts required are a short linkage to a twin potentiometer and wiring.