Well, absolutely, I'm sure heads will roll.

The question it begs to me is why there'd ever be any need to load them on an aircraft in the first place. I presume there's dummy versions to train with - unless it's just the easiest, safest way to transport them, or something like that. But even then, why move them around unnecessarily - and why would it be necessary to move them?

Phil

Makes all those White House press releases about "Letting some Middle East madmen loose with nuclear weapons they have no control over" seem somewhat prophetic, when Leroy and Cletus up at Minot AFB seem to have been able to undermine 60 years of Nuclear Safeguard Protocols, in between Gopher hunting and and chewin' tobacco.

Makes the serious nature of this in to a joke when people post crap like you did.

Makes the serious nature of this into a joke when people makes mistakes like they did .....

ups
 

glad rag

don't think ups would have carried them. They won't carry anything they think is DG here and i work for an airline, on the ground.:uhoh:

I have a suspicion that this relaxation of special transport rules had occured many times before the gaff was blown.

I don't....................

The missles were part of a batch of 400 ALCMs being moved to Barksdale for disposal. I am presuming that means conversion into AGM-86C/Ds rather than destruction). Flying them there is the easiest, safest and quickest means of getting them there.

The warheads should have been removed at Minot before the missiles were loaded. But they weren't. Which is why 70 people have been sacked and/or decertified from being allowed access to nuclear weapons handling in future.

Nuke-Related Sackings
 

Didn't a well known and, at the time, recently ex-Laarbruch sqn suffer a similar swathe of 'management turbulence' after a far less dangerous but equally unforgiveable documentation problem in the early 90s? Something related to 2 sets of the same paperwork:=?

Dunno, you sound like an expert do tell................

> The warheads should have been removed at Minot before the missiles were
> loaded. But they weren't.

Right. That, to me, is the kicker. That turns it from a "what are you, blind?" into a slightly more understandable mistake.

Still, oops, though!

Phil

Mike, I think the fact that the Nuclear Weapon carriage system worked as advertised means that NOTHING was going to happen.:E

Remember Rule Two of internet forums applies.:}:}

When iiiiiiii was a lad, before i started flying, i worked on strike load teams for about 3 years loading nukes onto Buccs and Tornados. The protocols we had in place were unbelievable, and we had to rehearse and rehearse. At any one time, somebody had legal ownership of the weapons. Either the SNCO from the dump, the police, the SNCO of the load team or the Captain of the aircraft. Ownership of the weapon was a very serious business and the 'handover' was a formal script bound procedure lasting about 5 mins, which had to be word perfect (there must be some Tornado bods on here from the 80's who remember this). The weapon went nowhere without the 'owners' consent (because his b******s were on the line. My understanding of the US system was it was equally as stringent, particularly the guarding. I can understand why the aircraft in question can sit on the pan unguarded (because nobody seemed aware of the payload), but I can't work out how the question of ownership has been bypassed prior to the weapons being loaded. It is a monumental c**k up, and luckily it has happened, as it seems to me this could easily have been reorchestrated, and the US would have ended up with 'Broken Arrow'. I don't think it will happen again somehow!

Good thing you took such good care of the Tigs2. Weren't at Bruggen were you.... :}

.....Newly declassified documents obtained by New Scientist magazine detail the incidents in which the weapons were dropped or damaged while they were being moved.

The first accident happened on May 2, 1984, at the RAF base at Brüggen, Germany. A nuclear warhead was damaged in transit when its container slid off a wet trailer as it cornered. The warhead, still in its container, rolled on to the tarmac and was dented.

Brüggen base was shut down while the bomb was partially dismantled and scientists were flown from Britain to X-ray the warhead. It was eventually taken back to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermas-ton, Berkshire, to be decommissioned.

An MoD board of inquiry at the time concluded that the accident was caused by the “wrongful act” of failing to attach the bomb container to the trailer. It recommended that six ser-vicemen be disciplined.

The documents, obtained under freedom of information law, show that a regulation requiring bomb containers to be secured when being moved had been routinely ignored since October 1981. Brüggen’s commander at the time, whose name has been removed from the released report, admitted that the breach had become almost a standard operating procedure, despite being an “outrageously high-risk practice”.

1961 A B-52 was carrying two 20 megaton nuclear bombs. The plane crashed and five of the six safeties on the bomb failed. The crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. One bomb was lost.

Suppose all you can say is its a good job it didnt just have 5 safeties!

ORAC

No wasn't at Bruggen:ok: The guys there in the dump had lets say a casual approach to something they did day in day out. As i said in my post, I do not know how they can have bypassed the ownership issue of the weapon.

He had me at 'hello,' or at least to this point:

That wacky George B. trying to sneak out some 'nukler' firecrackers for his personal use..................

Great journalism; dust off a guy from the 1970s (!) and get his 'insider's' view of how things are done today. Heck, I'd have gone for an interview with Gen Tibbet's on how things were done on the Enola Gay......

But it does not negate the fact that a lot of folks were complacent and that this was easily avoidable, self-inflicted USAF buffoonery.

And may I ask that more recent knowledge about weapons handling be treated a bit more circumspectly in an open forum?

(Ok, I'll be going now...........)

edited to add: "World Socialist Web?" You do get around, sir......

engoal,

The JEngO was on my EOT2. Made the session on "What you did on your first tour" a little more interesting.

As he was obviously never going to go far in the RAF because of it, he left, joined the RN and did somewhat better.

As regards the ones rolling off the trailer, I heard on my UCO course that a smiley face had been painted on the nose. That didn't go down well either.

sw

So after reading all that it was no more than a practice bomb (on steroids) that was released..hell we do that all the time!!:ooh::ooh::ooh:

Apart from the administrative failings this was a non event.

Thankfully.


Glad Rag. rule 2 still applies BTW.:}:}

"Apart from the administrative failings this was a non event."

Oh yeah, and if it had crashed somewhere, spilling radiation all over the place, how many fire crews/locals would have been exposed before the paperwork caught up?

I believe that there is also the issue of international treaties about the aerial carriage of nuclear weapons, and while it was inadvertent, it might be that the US just violated one, or more.

JT

DefenseNews article detailing the failures which allowed the incident to occur.

The weapons have been called INERT. If they were warshot complete with warhead they were not inert. Safe maybe but not inert.

An inert weapon is one that will not explode and is effectively your typical lump of concrete. A 1000lb bomb with an inert (concrete) filling is an Inert Bomb.

A nuclear weapon with its high explosive trigger and a nuclear core is a LIVE weapon.

Now if the weapon is accidentally released, as in a crash, or jettisoned deliberately it is said to be single point safe. This means that it might go bang but the worst that will happen is an HE detonation (unlucky if you are very close - or maybe not :)) and a scattering of radioactive material (unlucky if you are nearby or downwind. It may also burn which creates further hazards. Inert it is not.

Why load live? Good question.

The Blue Steel was a live missile and fuelled with HTTP but for training a practice warhead could be loaded. Where there was force generation there would have been insufficient training rounds so real warheads would be used. The same could be true in this case.

The fitment of live warheads to the missiles, within the armament storeage area may have been a routine event to prove weapon/missile compatibility. The Charlie Uniform factor was the release of these armed missiles together with their unarmed buddies.

Now the spooky bit.

Bomber crews routinely practice weapons release procedures in flight. The weapons switching is monitored with a response simulator that will behave exactly like the real thing. The crew, inflight, will have no way of knowning that the simulated responses are from a live weapon.

Then they might have gone through an entire launch sequence down to firing the missile. The training round would not however release and fire as it was a training round. Were these armed warshot similarly safed?

I don't know enough about the US systems but once the Charlie Uniform factor starts to operate you never know what might happen.

Safeware,

Any truth to the story that when said JEngO was marched into the AOC's office and had the question "Are you Flt Lt F***nuckle, service number 1234567C" barked at him he had the immense satisfaction of replying "NO SIR!". I can only guess the AOC's response but the upshot was they'd got his service number wrong.

Then again, never let the truth get in the way of a good story.

Adlib,

I'll pass on that one, but it sounds good.

sw

Imagine the same story using a British bomber and crew.

Oh, wait.............................................:}

Try looking on the bright side, if you will, Louisiana now has six nuclear missiles!:E

By contrast, the part of the drills which never failed to interest me, was the moment when an engineer trained to suspend bombs from the underneath of a flat surface would have a face to face book (you know, the one which showed erm, the faces?) and still be able to recognise the aircrew.. dressed in AR5.

Clever stuff. :D

The US Navy also seem to have a lax culture with nuclear equipment.

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/10/22...uct/index.html

A Chernobyl / Five Mile Island at sea waiting to happen?

Mike,

I confess.

In my case it was Aberdeen when I got the Bomb on Pin light ON.

I note from the US report that the 'Instructor BN' was held to blame for not properly confirming the pylon stores.

Two things:

1. Surely 'real' nuclear weapons have an appropriate 'filling band'* in addition to the yellow HE mark. How did he not notice that?

2. More importantly, why did he check it on his own? What happened to the 2-man principle.

When 'accepting' even a dummy 'shape', we always treated it as though it was real. The 'shape' markings would be physically checked to confirm that it did NOT contain any nasty nuclear material. I cannot believe that the US doesn't have similar procedures - but if a culture of paying lip service to them has developed, then heads do indeed need to roll.




* The 'Pig and Tape' at Decci must have been the only classified scruff's pub in the world - for poking out of the wall was a dummy 28lb practice bomb painted with nuclear filling markings.....:eek:

In reply it would appear that

1. He had a quick shuftie but picked the "wrong" side.:hmm:

2. Definitely a culture of indifference at this base.:(:(

Bingo.


And it's not germaine to the event, but 'he' was a she. And she was but one who didn't do the job correctly and catch this before it became such a goatrope.


But they are not indifferent right now.................

As BEagle says, surely a real nuke is immediately recognisable as per the image below of what I assume is a real, as apposed to inert, WE177 (as declared by the red (radioactive) / yellow (HE) bands - this is according to info on www.avrovulcan.org.uk where I found / linked to this image).

http://www.avrovulcan.org.uk/nukes/we177b250.jpg

I assume the advantages of a nuke being immediately recognisable still greatly outweigh the downside that clear markings draw attention to the fact its a real nuke (if you follow my drift).

INERT marking here looks quite obvious.....

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bo...9a-dvic394.jpg

..though I assume it was one of these on the B52 in question (canister is the W80 being loaded) and it appears to have no markings......

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/...W80loading.jpg

Whilst attending the SWS course at Wittering some years ago I heard tell of a disgruntled liney managing to paint a CND mark on a live WE177 := , possibly 617 ?

Lovely idea but I doubt it.

A CND symbol or possibly an 'aceed smiley' (popular at the time) appeared over the weekend in one of the HAS's in the 80's. I do not believe anyone would have got close enough to a weapon (live or not) given the rules governing their movement. The number of people checking and double checking, combined with the need to get them in and out of sites at appropriate times would preclude such an event.

There was a spate of chinagraph graffiti at Waddington in the late 60s with the phantom's work appearing inside most unusual places - inside the rim of an angle poise light, inside the weapons panel of the said weapon, in fact inside just about anything that should not have had anything inside it.

The target for this campaign took it stoically for a while and them protested, very mildly, and eventually the whole thing fizzled out.

I think there had been the odd complaint back from industry but nothing was ever made official.

It was funny at first but soon lost its humour. OTOH the Bas Heath campaign on 201 was something else again.