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SASless although written in the wake of the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 (for which read desparate money saving measures) this commentary written for RUSI in 2011 addresses the problems that were likely to arise in the 'capability gap' between the cancellation and destruction of Nimrod MR4 and the arrival of the UK's P-8s. It also assumes a Merlin HM fleet of 40 not 30 (less the ones fitted for the ASACS role at any particular time).
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-res...are-capability Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Layered CapabilityDeveloping an effective ASW capability requires the inter-weaving of several layers of capability. Each layer fulfils a particular function, making a particular contribution to the overall effectiveness of the ASW web. Yet, with the submarine threat to the UK much reduced since the Cold War and with the UK now focused elsewhere, some argue that the ASW requirement has also reduced. Certainly, the UK's ASW capability has dwindled in terms of significance as well as systems and skills sets.The UK's ASW layers have thus been steadily eroded. The Nimrod decision, however, has highlighted quite starkly and suddenly the consequences of this. Despite MoD statements that Nimrod's roles will be covered by other assets, no other assets deliver its specific capabilities. The UK's ASW web hence has a particular, and significant, hole in it. |
well we banged on on here for years about that disgraceful abdication of a key role - then they finally decided to fill it
But only 9 airframes - makes you weep TBH |
Well it would appear that things are going well south if this report by the Mail on Sunday is accurate.
POW for Scrap? Britain's £3.2 billion aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales has been reduced to acting as a scrap-yard. Essential pieces of equipment are being ripped out of the stricken warship, a move that raises questions over its long-term future. The UK's second carrier has been in dry dock since breaking down off Portsmouth in August 2022. Now Navy top brass have begun stripping the carrier – a process known as 'cannibalisation' – which will render HMS Prince of Wales inoperable for much longer. Lift chains, which allow fighter jets to be raised from below deck, electrical systems and sections of the ship's gas turbines have been taken out. These parts, without which it cannot function fully, are being fitted to her sister ship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, as replacements for parts that have aged or malfunctioned. HMS Prince of Wales broke down due to issues with her starboard propeller, which is being replaced as part of a £25million refit – the cost has risen by £5million in the past month. The Mail on Sunday can report for the first time today that the warship's port propeller also needs to be replaced as it is suffering from the same issues. HMS Prince of Wales – launched in 2017 – is expected to spend at least a year in dock due to the additional workload. According to insiders, the Navy is also spending millions on replacement fuel pumps for both carriers. Last night, a Navy source said: 'It is one disaster after another. To lose both propellers so soon into her lifespan is ridiculous. As she's out of action, inevitably her good parts are being stripped off to support HMS Queen Elizabeth. 'Whatever the bosses need to keep the first carrier afloat and operational, they take from the second. HMS Prince of Wales is being mothballed, unofficially at least.' Both ships cost £6 billion – before a single fighter jet was purchased. The decision to build two carriers is being questioned inside the cash-strapped Ministry of Defence. An inquiry into issues suffered by HMS Prince of Wales has uncovered evidence the second carrier was rushed into service, seemingly to serve a political agenda. Last night, the Royal Navy said: 'We remain committed to ensuring HMS Prince of Wales commences her operational programme, as planned, in August 2023. 'It is not unusual for equipment to be transferred between ships to ensure operational availability and to avoid delays.' |
Reminds me of the "Bristol"
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If I were to hazard a wild guess:
Further proof that, IMO, we only have 2/3 of a carrier capability.:E |
Originally Posted by SLXOwft
(Post 11424546)
If I were to hazard a wild guess:
Further proof that, IMO, we only have 2/3 of a carrier capability.:E |
It's the Mail FFS.
They also seem to be using the gobby steward from Chris Terrill's series as their "naval source". "Both propellers" indeed..... Definitely someone has an agenda. A more accurate view can be found in MinDPs letter to the HCDC on their website.... |
hmm - now there's a tough choice
who is more likely to tell the truth - the Mail or the MoD? I'll tick "none of the above" I think - lets see how it pans out in August.:( |
Originally Posted by Asturias56
(Post 11424632)
hmm - now there's a tough choice
who is more likely to tell the truth - the Mail or the MoD? I'll tick "none of the above" I think - lets see how it pans out in August.:( |
To aid further understanding here are some extracts from and a link to the minister's letter.
The causal factor identified in this instance was that PWLS starboard shaft was misaligned from build, and that the incorrect installation of key components resulted in the defect suffered. Several contributory factors lead to the misalignment and the subsequent incorrect assessment that the starboard shaft and couplings would perform as required. Following reviews of the impact of the shaft misalignment, a decision was made that PWLS should proceed to sea for trials and that further monitoring would be conducted. During PWLS’ sea trials, both shafts were extensively tested over several weeks and thousands of nautical miles in the Northern North Sea and UK South Coast Exercise Areas. Vibration readings remained within limits at all times. Accordingly, no issues, conditions of class or actionable items were transferred into service from the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (ACA) to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2019 at Vessel Acceptance. (...) Thereafter, during PWLS’ subsequent operational time at sea, which included exercising and NATO tasking in the Mediterranean in June 2022, no abnormalities associated with either shaft were reported. Following the coupling failure in August 2022, an alignment issue was also identified with her port shaft. Rectification work was initiated and is expected to be completed in time for PWLS to commence her operational programme, as planned, this autumn. PWLS was always scheduled to be alongside and undergo upgrade work for the majority of 2023 in preparation for taking over as the UK Very High Readiness Strike Carrier in 2024. Such work includes updates to the flight deck to expand F35 operations upgrades to communications and information systems and upgrades to combat management systems architectures. Consequently, over this period capability upgrades have been conducted in parallel to the shaft repairs to ensure efficiency and value for money. (...) The financial cost is estimated to be approximately £25 million. Responsibility for payment has not yet been established therefore it would be inappropriate to comment further at this stage. |
"The causal factor identified in this instance was that PWLS starboard shaft was misaligned from build,"
well it only seem s to affect the one vessel................................. |
Following the coupling failure in August 2022, an alignment issue was also identified with her port shaft. Rectification work was initiated and is expected to be completed in time for PWLS to commence her operational programme, as planned, this autumn. So the causal factor was in both shafts. IG |
The paragraph following '...value for money.' is:
I can confirm that the defects with PWLS shafts are not a Class issue and HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (QNLZ) installation alignment readings have been checked and no abnormalities have been detected. Causal factor of the coupling failure I assume. |
Originally Posted by SLXOwft
(Post 11425251)
The paragraph following '...value for money.' is:
Causal factor of the coupling failure I assume. |
Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 11425282)
How could it happen in the first place ? If not "by design" then is is a fairly major execution issue ?
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Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 11425282)
How could it happen in the first place ? If not "by design" then is is a fairly major execution issue ?
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and there were insufficient checks as the pressure was in the get it all finished
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Originally Posted by Asturias56
(Post 11425575)
and there were insufficient checks as the pressure was in the get it all finished
The facts are that the shaft misalignment was identified prior to vessel acceptance and a fair bit of work done to determine what the impact might be - including monitoring during acceptance sea trials - none of which identified any significant effects. What caused the coupling failure is going to be down to a number of.things that were not foreseen. I'd be very interested in the actual material failure mode of the coupling for example.... |
I have been in a similar position - the thing is ready to go and then - oh oh. You do a study that says you're probably going to be OK and able to carry on - but it's a serious worry. If there were any safety/environmental problems likely to result I'd say it was a no-no. Otherwise it's a judgement call - in this case the problem manifested itself sooner rather than later
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Originally Posted by Asturias56
(Post 11425862)
I have been in a similar position - the thing is ready to go and then - oh oh. You do a study that says you're probably going to be OK and able to carry on - but it's a serious worry. If there were any safety/environmental problems likely to result I'd say it was a no-no. Otherwise it's a judgement call - in this case the problem manifested itself sooner rather than later
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