So - did the Chinooks stop flying when the OAT went past 45deg? NO!

Did the Chinook engineers have to do 4 MRGB changes? NO!

JunglyAEO you are absolutely right - we have needed a Sea King/Puma replacement for years and the SH Merlin is most definitely not it; but are the MOD ever going to address the lack of helicopter lift capability or are they still going to blah on about BLUH (a Lynx by any other name) or SABR (a Merlin or my c*cks a kipper)?

It is nice to see them Navy guys (bless 'em) sticking up for the 'King, it has proved a very valuable and useful platform.... done much mare than it was ever designed for... However, the one unarguable fact is that the poor old girl needs to be put out to pasture soon, or else have a very extensive update package. The reliability is not what it once was, and the change in the FRC's so as circuit breakers can now no longer be reset, for fear of it causing a fire, are, quite frankly, shocking.

That being said, I love the cab!!! :ok:

[email protected]

Hi. I'd argue that SK airframes are not all "shagged". Their (conservative) design life equates to over 30 flying years and there have been many production runs from the late 60s (Mk1s) to the 90s (RAF Mk 3a and RN Mk6). True, some are nearing an honourable retirement, but very many have another 15-20 years left. Some of the "new" AEWs are 1st production run Mk1s and they will easily last until the replacement arrives with the new carriers. The RAF's Mk3/3As much longer.

Also true is that the Mk4 can't carry a full load, but that is largely down to it being fully equipped with a self protection suite which, historically, makes it perhaps the best protected aircraft in service. As for high/hot/dry, the rest seem to manage for aircraft bought to hover in the dip.

Criticisms? MGB drip tray access in ASW variants. Station 490. Aft avionics bay cooling/airflow convention. (Why can the Indians get it right and we don't? But the corona discharge used to make it entertaining). Er, that's about it.

This is not to say the Chinook doesn't have merits. It was bought to fulfil a specific role, which it does admirably. However, that their expansive roles now overlap demonstrates the sheer versatility of the SK.

All the best

Slightly offthread I know but do you SH crabs still play the 'crew duty hours' card or do you now work as hard as the Junglies and stick around until the jobs done?!
Memories of Otterburn years ago when Chinooks all bu****ed off to the pub and left the Junglies to finish off the job! On the other hand........!:hmm:

Weren't some or all of the first tranche of Junglie SKs acquired when HMG fell out with the country had ordered them (was it Egypt?), and so the Navy was told to buy them to keep Westland sweet.

Having been both a grunt and a driver, airframe I have to say that I don't give a t*ss whether it has one beater or two, and is dark blue or light blue, so long as it arrives at the correct RV on time. FAA 100% reliable, in my experience.

Are the Chinooks still equipped for static line parachuting? Did three jumps in 90 minutes one morning at Everleigh!

tucumseh - I fly the 'newest' Sea Kings - the Mk 3A and whilst the airframes are not old in age terms (95/96), they are still the same 50s/60s design and technology beset with the same problems of fatigue (stn 290 still cracks like a bast*rd), vibration, low vmax, water leaking, horrendously hot cockpits etc.etc. Our Mk 3s are very tired and, coupled with the sad old avionics fit, really isn't an aircraft that should be asked to do what it does and go where it goes. The latest plan is to fly them until 2015 when they will doubtless be in the same sorry state that the Wessex was when we finally took it out of service 20 years too late.
The SK needs a lot of maintenance man hours to keep it going (witness 4 mrgb changes in Iraq) and it's only going to get worse until someone gets a grip and procures something better (and I don't mean waiting for Westlands to produce something that isn't fit for the job but props them up for another few years)

[email protected]

Yes, I agree with all you say - I just offer a different perspective which is perhaps hidden from guys at the sharp end.

The Mk3A programme was beset with cuts from day one. You ended up with a third of the original quantity. The RAF insisted on providing the project manager so that their best interests were represented. He, and others, fought long and hard for a decent avionics fit (and a concurrent upgrade to the Mk3s) but were knocked back. The radar is the best example. It's touted as modern, but you kept the old 60's Tx/Rx and scanner (even though the RN offered surplus SK6 versions which would have given longer range and halved the blind arc, not to mention reduced support costs because of commonality and extant facilities/spares/TE) and the "new" processor / display dates from the early 80s. At first, the company didn't want to sell it in this form as it was a backward step. You ended up with a hybrid which is neither here nor there.

Many of the ills you discuss are not the fault of the Sea King (or Westlands who, contrary to popular opinion, are the dogs b***ocks - at least in the Sea King, Puma, Gazelle directorate). Industry only delivers what the MoD signs a contract for. Many are support issues, funding and general politics. It remains a fine piece of engineering. Ideally it shouldn't be asked to do what it does but, importantly, it can, safely. And that allows scarce funds to be allocated elsewhere (Chinook Mk3, Nimrod, Eurofighter and other fine examples of non-Westlands products). Take care.

Some interesting background tucumseh, thanks for that - whoever let the beancounters force a 'fleet within a fleet' that we have with the Mk3 and 3A should have been shot. We are still banging our heads against a brick wall regarding fleet commonality - they are trying to fit the FLIR/MSS turret to the Mk3 and coming up against the outdated avionics - at least the Mk3 Radops will be able to throw away their acetate overlays once they get the new TR and screens. I gather the reason that the Mk 3 wasn't fitted with the SN500 autopilot to replace the cr*p Mk31 is because the RN pulled out of modifiying their ac and we lost the upgrade on cost grounds.
I am sure that someone will defend the Mk 31 but all I will say to them is fly the Mk3A and then decide for yourself.

the SK HC4 did sterling work in the Balkans long before the Merlin deployed and in Basrah last year it was SK and chinooks that made up the support hele force. Many of my mates from both reg army and UDR who patroled the Northern Ireland Border much prefered the FAA to be moving them than the RAF who wouldn't turn up in rain mist etc but the Navy seldom let them down.Speaks volumes that. So why on earth did they give support helecopter force to the RAF to command it should have been either the Army or the Navy.
Maybe some of SK airframes are shagged despite being younger than many of the Pumas by the fact they have done more operational flying in worse conditions than the Puma?
As to replacement of SK 4/6 if the project management of the navalised chinook is as bad as the HC3 chinook god help the commando hele support. Maybe it should be a NAVAL project. And I would guess more merlins will have to be procured to replace SK/Puma despite the griping of the RAF.

It is - It's called the JHC which comes under LAND which when I last looked was commnaded by an Army 4*. At least the RAF helo force does not have a petty minded, self justifying, archaic and unjoint HQ like the AAC and less so the FAA!

That's right - It doesn't have one at all!

HPT

Hi Nurse,

"Maybe some of SK airframes are shagged despite being younger than many of the Pumas by the fact they have done more operational flying in worse conditions than the Puma?"

Perhaps you could explain how more operational flying in worse conditions affects the state of a helicopter, especially if you are a helicopter engineer? Thanks.

Or is your statement just a poorly camouflaged attempt at criticism based on what someone else told you?

Hydraulic Palm Tree


Er, so what's the Support Helicopter Force Headquarters (SHFHQ) at RAF Benson then if it's not a headquarters?

It even has a detachment at Aldergrove.

NURSE - the RAF is frequently harangued for not turning up in poor wx - that is because our lords and masters have set wx limits below which we are not supposed to fly. It is v frustrating at times, especially when a Navy cab (no min wx limits) turns up and gets on with it, something we could do but are not allowed to. However from a Flight Safety perspective, is it worth putting the ac and crew at risk just to get a stick of troops in from the rain?
The main criticism you can make of the RAF is that we have far too many layers of supervision/management with associated rule books and limitations but, when we go joint we do actually go joint rather than pretend like the AAC (what has jointery done for RAF Flight Safety?) who insist on controlling the joint HQ and still retain all their own hierarchy.

Hi ShyTorque & Nurse

For what it’s worth, I could offer a holistic view.

All support funding in the MoD is based on number of aircraft, their flying rate, where they fly (e.g. temperate climate), attrition rate and pipeline time to effect any given repair. These figures/rates are dictated at God +1 level, and inform support contract and funding requirements. All things being equal, this is simple for consumables and components such as engines and rotor heads, which are removed for maintenance before they fail. (You hope).

Things are seldom equal and in recent years it seems this notional flying rate and conditions have been exceeded in almost every respect. The basis of Nurse’s comment I think. Funding runs out early. Pressure immediately falls on repairers – engineering concessions will be sought to get something out the door which, although serviceable, may have a more limited life. Concessions or Production Permits need to be approved by a technical bod in the MoD – something they have been getting rid of for years. (Most wouldn’t know the difference). At squadron level, all AEOs will recognise this pressure. Apparent reliability reduces as the maintenance interval reduces. Routine spares reprovisioning slows down. Poor availability is confused for unreliability. Companies and their products, often unjustifiably, get a bad name.

It is more difficult for avionics as, generally, they are allowed to fail before removal, mitigated by flex-ops. Their support is based (wrongly) on historical failure rate. Another story which, if told, explains why you are often lacking kit which is lying u/s on a shelf somewhere.

A contractor will be told, often years in advance, that he should expect x units to repair or overhaul in a given year. He gears his capacity, including staff, their training and buying long lead spares, to that requirement. Increase the flying rate or change to a more hostile environment, and self evidently he gets more to repair, but doesn’t have the staff or spares. So the pipeline time goes from, say 3 months, to 12 months (often more) as it now includes production lead time of extra spares. The pressure intensifies to "make do" to permit flying, which degrades quality. Perhaps an AEO will be under pressure to effect depth C repairs which he cannot possibly verify. The natural outcome of the “just in time” policy, which is simply not applicable to a variable scenario such as that faced by the services. Importantly, much of the above is based on peace time ops. Other ops exacerbate the problem, again perhaps what Nurse is saying?

In my opinion, the balance of probability is that the additional work coupled with the above knock-on effects, do have an adverse effect on the SK (or any aircraft), especially the airframe, engines and transmission components. This is especially true of the AEW and SK4 which routinely fly heavy. Less obviously, the centre of gravity is vital to stress loading (and handling). Often it is at the aft limit, sometimes beyond. You wouldn’t believe the money the MoD HAVE to spend on this and load shedding conventions every time something changes in the a/c. (Westlands can’t find enough stress engineers for love nor money). Kit routinely operates outside its design envelope which automatically means industry is absolved of any liability for failure. This doesn’t mean the kit’s crap or wrongly specified. More often it means that squeezing an extra 10% reliability or functionality would have doubled the length of the programme and trebled the cost. Especially if the kit is commercial off-the-shelf. That the MoD do change specs and cut budgets in mid-stream explains most programme delays, which are seldom the fault of their project managers or industry. They don’t state the requirement. Almost all problems you read about are predictable and predicted.

Sorry to rabbit, but its interesting reading views from the other side. I see lots of comment on how b####y awful industry is, but there’s always another side. File this away in case you're unlucky enough to become a Requirements Manager!!

NI is an operational enviroment and if the RAF can't sort it's rules out for an operational theatre why has it been given a job it is obviously incapable of doing?
I have heard many of my friends moaning about having to walk out of patrols along the border because of the RAF's refusal to fly in inclement weather but navy or AAC have been able to collect in similar conditions. It in their opinion show's the RAF in a very poor light.

NURSE - back in the 80's when it was a real operational environment and shootings, mortar attacks, bombs were daily and commonplace occurences, we operated to the same rules and got the job done very well. If there was someone lying bleeding then the wx limits went out the window but for routine tasking/resupply we stopped flying at 1km and 100'. On one or 2 occasions I went the extra distance and launched in poor wx to recover troops who had been out all day/night and often discovered (especially with the UDR) that they had been sheltering in a barn instaed of patrolling. Some of the stunts I have heard of carried out by RN and AAC crews beggar belief and highlight very poor captaincy and a willingness to risk everything for no reason - this is a really good way to do the enemy's job for him.

If they didn't want to walk they shouldn't have joined the infantry!

interesting cause most of my mates were UDR and unless the barn was an o.p. I never heard any mention of them doing that i'm not saying it didn't happen. But I certainly heard of more than one occasion were a foot patrol had been out in difficult weather in difficult terrain and were left in the lurch by the RAF. Yep maybe you did bend the rules when there were casualties but you didn't always show up when you said you were going to. It left troops on the ground when they shouldn't have been and in some cases added risks to others tha didn't have to be taken ie puttin out CPV's to pick them up. Or them having to tab fairly long distances in bandit country therefor placing them at more risk.
I won't even mention the numerous stories of them rapidly having to move back across the border cause some aircrew can't read maps.

Nice to see that you are defending your own service by calling the rest of us cowboys by what you have heard . Feel free to stop by Yeovilton or Wallop to tell us what we are doing wrong and how the crabs are so squeaky in the Province.
I will leave it there, as should you.:mad:

(edited by jockspice because of severe anger making comments inappropriate)

NURSE - the UDR were easily the least professional troops I have ever worked with, only beaten by the part time UDR. After a day's hard patrolling in heavy persistent rain it was always amazing that the pick-up grid wasn't very far from the drop off one and that the troops were all bone-dry. As for landing at the wrong grid - I won't say it hasn't happened to me or others but more frequently it is the chalk commander who can't accept that he is in the wrong place either because he plotted the wrong grid or just can't map read.
Jockspice I'm not calling all the AAC or FAA cowboys - just those who think TANS letdowns to Crossmaglen in a 200' cloudbase and running out of fuel with a USL up the wrong estuary in ****e wx is good airmanship.
We can all hover taxi from field to field in fog - it's not difficult but it's certainly not clever (just how deep in the threat band do you want to operate) - I don't always agree with our rules and regulations but some of them have been concocted to protect us from ourselves.

Err - unless I'm much mistaken there are 2 Support Helicopter HQs. One at Benson and one at Odiham - none at Aldergrove (that is the Joint Helicopter Force HQ - I know, I have has the misfortune to work there!). The SHFHQ's are established to command operational HQ's for all battlefield helos (of all services) supporting UK forces from one (or more maybe more) locations during ops. The personnel making up these HQ's are the usual personnel associated with running an RAF Stn during peacetime, and is commanded by a Gp Capt and supplemented by additional J3/J4 personnel who ensure that we train as we fight. The RN have a similar set up at Yeovs.

These HQ's do not compare in the slightest with the behemoth of an HQ that the AAC have at Wallop. Why so big? - answers on a post card please!


HPT

PS. Pr00ne - I am convinced that you are either CAS or CinC STC, as you seem to know :mad::mad::mad::mad: all about helicopters, particularly those of the RAF.