Meteor Accident Statistics
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the hunter incident
i read that article in air clues. apparently at the time only fighter command used the colour code so the formation wasnt get up to date on the weather, after that the colour code was brought in raf wide. on the subject of the meteor just how many marks had ejection seats?
I have just read a great book about the RAF in the 50s called Fighter Jocks and the Meteor then seemed a dream to fly but the preffered A/C seems to have been the Vampire??
shack and John Purdey - thanks so much for your confirmation of Merryfield matters!
Having grown up about 1/2 mile from the place - and having lived nearby for the following 25 or so years, I often wondered whether the stories I'd been told were true. I can remember (just) certain parts of Merryfield's history - Princess Anne's visit, the airshows of the mid-50s, the Sabres being modified by Westlands, the Royal Navy era when the squadrons moved to Merryfield whilst VLN was being prepared for the new Sea Vixen.....
There was an amazing airshow in 1958 - probably the last ever held. Everything from a Spitfire to a very low-level Vulcan, plus a Bleriot monoplane, Bristol Fighter.....
I went back down to Somerset at the end of last year to attend 'Farmer' John Steele's funeral in nearby Isle Abbotts. He'd been a 'trapper' in the 50s and had inspired me to join the mob in 1968.....but I had to go and say hello to Merryfield and was delighted to find that the aerodrome looks smarter now then ever - but no real permanent facilities except for the control tower. The Officer's Mess area had been bought by my late father and his ex-FAA business partner in the 70s. We kept 3000 pigs there (some of the old Ilton folk reckoned that improved the tone of the place....), then sold the site - and it's now a housing estate.
Other tales - of 'Flush' Kendall, 'Kipper' Smith, Pete Cornish...the vectored thrust Meteor trials (I explored the tunnels years later)...the 'bomb dump' where Army reserve units would set up their AA guns during summer camps...stories about how the RAF QFIs would race off to 'The Volunteer' in Seavington St Michael or 'The Shrubbery' in Ilminster for a few ales whenever the weather was too poor to fly...after the Borneo campaign when a whole squadron of Pioneers and Twin Pins stopped over to refuel....a Lancaster flying down from Kinloss to drop off a salmon for the OM dining-in night....a Canberra landing in the Suez crisis so that the pilot could nip off to Alec Scott's garage to fill up an off-the-ration jerrycan of petrol....
I learned to ride a bike there, learned to drive a car there, learned to fly model aeroplanes there, learned to fly a glider there.....and learned a few other things with a girlfriend in the overgrown bomb dump there. A wonderful aerodrome - long may it remain so.
...and getting back to the thread topic, I can also remember seeing most of a Meteor NF stuck in the overrun of RW09 - except for the radar nose which had cleared the road and was on the far side! Cdr Tim Kearsley RN was there wondring how on earth they were going to shift it!!
Having grown up about 1/2 mile from the place - and having lived nearby for the following 25 or so years, I often wondered whether the stories I'd been told were true. I can remember (just) certain parts of Merryfield's history - Princess Anne's visit, the airshows of the mid-50s, the Sabres being modified by Westlands, the Royal Navy era when the squadrons moved to Merryfield whilst VLN was being prepared for the new Sea Vixen.....
There was an amazing airshow in 1958 - probably the last ever held. Everything from a Spitfire to a very low-level Vulcan, plus a Bleriot monoplane, Bristol Fighter.....
I went back down to Somerset at the end of last year to attend 'Farmer' John Steele's funeral in nearby Isle Abbotts. He'd been a 'trapper' in the 50s and had inspired me to join the mob in 1968.....but I had to go and say hello to Merryfield and was delighted to find that the aerodrome looks smarter now then ever - but no real permanent facilities except for the control tower. The Officer's Mess area had been bought by my late father and his ex-FAA business partner in the 70s. We kept 3000 pigs there (some of the old Ilton folk reckoned that improved the tone of the place....), then sold the site - and it's now a housing estate.
Other tales - of 'Flush' Kendall, 'Kipper' Smith, Pete Cornish...the vectored thrust Meteor trials (I explored the tunnels years later)...the 'bomb dump' where Army reserve units would set up their AA guns during summer camps...stories about how the RAF QFIs would race off to 'The Volunteer' in Seavington St Michael or 'The Shrubbery' in Ilminster for a few ales whenever the weather was too poor to fly...after the Borneo campaign when a whole squadron of Pioneers and Twin Pins stopped over to refuel....a Lancaster flying down from Kinloss to drop off a salmon for the OM dining-in night....a Canberra landing in the Suez crisis so that the pilot could nip off to Alec Scott's garage to fill up an off-the-ration jerrycan of petrol....
I learned to ride a bike there, learned to drive a car there, learned to fly model aeroplanes there, learned to fly a glider there.....and learned a few other things with a girlfriend in the overgrown bomb dump there. A wonderful aerodrome - long may it remain so.
...and getting back to the thread topic, I can also remember seeing most of a Meteor NF stuck in the overrun of RW09 - except for the radar nose which had cleared the road and was on the far side! Cdr Tim Kearsley RN was there wondring how on earth they were going to shift it!!
Last edited by BEagle; 30th Oct 2002 at 21:31.
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An aged pilot told me he survived training on Meteors including numerous extremely dangerous practice single engined landings. Posted to an operational squadron he asked tentatively after a couple of weeks whether he ought not to do some practice SE landings to stay current. He was told, "Christ no! They are bloody lethal. We always do a power-off glide approach - that way it doesn't matter if the engine fails."
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Beagle, what a wonderful way to spend the formative years into your teens. To be soaked in all that great aviation lore from the 50s and early 60s around the Merryfield area - you ccouldn't have really done anything else but join the mob! Great stuff.
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Dear old Meatbox, what a delight to fly. I was fortunate enough to be on the last AFTS course to train on the beast at RAF Strubby in the mid-sixties. At the end of the course we delivered the aircraft to Kemble where a number of them were mothballed, and the rest scrapped.
The asymmetric flying was definitely a feat of some physical strength. We seemed to practice on one engine almost as often as on two although by then we were not allowed to shut an engine down or fly on one for practice below 4000 ft. We did still practice engine failure on take off and certainly in the T7 it was very important to remember to throttle back the live engine to ensure retention of control. This would then continue into a not quite so knee-trembling single-engine climb at 200 kts - IMC you had to fly wings level when not intending to turn but VMC you were allowed up to 5 or 10 degrees of bank towards the live engine to relieve the foot load. The most demanding exercise was to do a sinlge engine overshoot on the port engine - you had to use the hand pump to raise the gear and flaps because the hydraulic pump was on the starboard engine. Needless to say if you had to overshoot on the port engine your QFI would insist on the use of the hand pump even though the starboard engine was only throttled back!
The phantom dive could occur with one or both engines going and was indeed a result of having airbrakes out when gear was lowered. Originally, I believe, the airbrakes came out to almost 90 degrees which caused real problems, the effect was reduced by reducing the airbrake travel to only about 45 degrees but this still did not completely solve the problem.
As far as I could tell, the single-seat Meteors after the Mk4 all had bang seats, that is: F8, PR(?)9, FR10, whereas the 2 seaters were not so equipped - I know the T7 was without MB escape assistance.
Apart from the flying, my fondest memory of the Meteor was to hear one with 'big breathers' coming in for a run and break on the blue note - a sound only surpassed by the Hunter.
The asymmetric flying was definitely a feat of some physical strength. We seemed to practice on one engine almost as often as on two although by then we were not allowed to shut an engine down or fly on one for practice below 4000 ft. We did still practice engine failure on take off and certainly in the T7 it was very important to remember to throttle back the live engine to ensure retention of control. This would then continue into a not quite so knee-trembling single-engine climb at 200 kts - IMC you had to fly wings level when not intending to turn but VMC you were allowed up to 5 or 10 degrees of bank towards the live engine to relieve the foot load. The most demanding exercise was to do a sinlge engine overshoot on the port engine - you had to use the hand pump to raise the gear and flaps because the hydraulic pump was on the starboard engine. Needless to say if you had to overshoot on the port engine your QFI would insist on the use of the hand pump even though the starboard engine was only throttled back!
The phantom dive could occur with one or both engines going and was indeed a result of having airbrakes out when gear was lowered. Originally, I believe, the airbrakes came out to almost 90 degrees which caused real problems, the effect was reduced by reducing the airbrake travel to only about 45 degrees but this still did not completely solve the problem.
As far as I could tell, the single-seat Meteors after the Mk4 all had bang seats, that is: F8, PR(?)9, FR10, whereas the 2 seaters were not so equipped - I know the T7 was without MB escape assistance.
Apart from the flying, my fondest memory of the Meteor was to hear one with 'big breathers' coming in for a run and break on the blue note - a sound only surpassed by the Hunter.
Gentleman Aviator
I am too young (not a phrase I often use these days!) to have had the privilege of flying the Meatbox, but am of an age which ensures that most of my basic QFIs had flown her.
I'm sure I recall from an early "Instruments" lecture at Syerston that unforeseen acceleration error on the AH (and the ears!) was responsible for some IMC overshoot crashes in the Meteor.
Logic was thus: greater available acceleration induced a "pitch up" error in the semi circular canals, and a "roll right" error on the AH. Net result after "correcting" was a hole on the left hand side of the runway. Driffield I think was mentioned as the Station in question ... the story may be BS but it made us all remember that vital piece of information ... the direction of rotation of the AH gyro!!
Any truth in this line?
I'm sure I recall from an early "Instruments" lecture at Syerston that unforeseen acceleration error on the AH (and the ears!) was responsible for some IMC overshoot crashes in the Meteor.
Logic was thus: greater available acceleration induced a "pitch up" error in the semi circular canals, and a "roll right" error on the AH. Net result after "correcting" was a hole on the left hand side of the runway. Driffield I think was mentioned as the Station in question ... the story may be BS but it made us all remember that vital piece of information ... the direction of rotation of the AH gyro!!
Any truth in this line?
It seemed that loosing jets was a common practice in days of yore!
This apparently is a true story.
There are a few meteor ejection stories at:
www.ejectorseats.co.uk
Date: Late 1950's
Place: RAF Odiham, England.
Javelin taxiing out for take-off.
One hunter on take-off, one on finals, one on down-wind for finals.
Javelin engine fire (not unusual) but unseen by crew.
Air Traffic Controller (novice, in panic) calls 'you are on fire' or words to that effect.
Three Hunter pilots eject un-necessarily and Javelin crew taxi on oblivious until it becomes obvious, too late, that the panic applies to them, then luckily scrabble out unhurt, unfortunately the RAF are four aircraft down.
This apparently is a true story.
There are a few meteor ejection stories at:
www.ejectorseats.co.uk
Date: Late 1950's
Place: RAF Odiham, England.
Javelin taxiing out for take-off.
One hunter on take-off, one on finals, one on down-wind for finals.
Javelin engine fire (not unusual) but unseen by crew.
Air Traffic Controller (novice, in panic) calls 'you are on fire' or words to that effect.
Three Hunter pilots eject un-necessarily and Javelin crew taxi on oblivious until it becomes obvious, too late, that the panic applies to them, then luckily scrabble out unhurt, unfortunately the RAF are four aircraft down.
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Meteors etc
Ah, Beagle; I was at John Steele's funeral service too. A great character. Teeteringhead, you are right; the AH had mechanical air valves at the side, set in the same circular mode - clockwise I think - so that forward acceleration on take-off would cause one to open and the other to stay shut, giving an erroneous indication. We lost several good men because of that. John. 
JP - in which case we may have met. His younger daughter was my late father's god-daughter and we lived in the same village (Isle Abbotts) for many years.
I also recall being taught about the 'pendulous vanes' in that steam driven AH when I was a UAS student. At the same UAS of which JS had been CFI about 12 years earlier.....
I also recall being taught about the 'pendulous vanes' in that steam driven AH when I was a UAS student. At the same UAS of which JS had been CFI about 12 years earlier.....
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Talking of bang-outs various - and those mentioned thus far are so nostalgic and incredible that they would be dismissed as mythical folklore by today's generation (some of whom I like) - I recall a few years ago at Valley (c. 71-76) when Gnats were spearing in all over the place, along with the odd Hunter or two. Around 13 fatalies in total; some instructors, some studes. I recall the Gnat prangs being largely attributed to its strangely constructed FCS, whilst those of the Hunter were more varied - with a high foreign content (streuth- can I really say that in 2002).
Sad for the studes, but we lost too many good instructors in what was a time of flight safety-first ----------------
How are you Langoid, Philips, Patt, Hitch (ex-Dragons) and many others ?
Sorry - I meant Langroid ----- he of lilting voice, tales of yesteryear, and clip-you-round the ear when he'd had a couple --
Sad for the studes, but we lost too many good instructors in what was a time of flight safety-first ----------------
How are you Langoid, Philips, Patt, Hitch (ex-Dragons) and many others ?
Sorry - I meant Langroid ----- he of lilting voice, tales of yesteryear, and clip-you-round the ear when he'd had a couple --
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How about the annual I/R in the Box - remember we had to do a run at .7M at 30,000 on limited panel. Metal polish over the inside of the hood so you couldn't see out and a circular plate with a suction cup over the A/H
Am I right in thinking that the T7 crash at the Coventry airshow in 1988 was put down to phantom dive?
There was a suggestion at the time of engine failure, but I understood the official conclusion blamed a tight turn with gear down.
There was a suggestion at the time of engine failure, but I understood the official conclusion blamed a tight turn with gear down.
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Great shots on Nostalgia (or whatever somewhere around SKY 580) channel of squadron take-offs of Meteors. Looks like there are 20+ in the air.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Going back to the original post I have no reason to doubt those numbers.
Actually they struck me as low because I can remember a conversation with an RAE Farnborough test pilot about 1954/5 when he remarked that the RAF had at last reached 365 Cat 5s in one year. All types and world wide of course.
Actually they struck me as low because I can remember a conversation with an RAE Farnborough test pilot about 1954/5 when he remarked that the RAF had at last reached 365 Cat 5s in one year. All types and world wide of course.
Grandpa Aerotart
My father learned to fly in the RAF about 1950. Posted to a Meteor OCU at a time when "They were crashing left and right". Apparently many ejecties lost their legs and bled to death/died of shock.
They finally discovered that chaps over a certain height had a hip to knee measurement that precluded the knees passing behind the canopy bow.
They measured everyone and those to tall were posted to Vampires where, due to a lack of said expulsive device, no similar problem existed.
Of course this led to ernest discussion on just how you got out, with various theories expounded. The half roll and drop out seemed to harbour the fewest ways of hurting yourself...if you had that much control...and a few months later Dad had cause to fling one into the Bristol Channel late one night....to be plucked out of the water by Ark Royal next morning.
One method, which I gather was greeted somewhat derisively, was to lose the canopy and then 'jump' straight up, pass behind the engine and under the horizontal stab.
Dad recently celebrated his 70th birthday, 15 years after retiring from 25000 hours logged in many, many aircraft...DH82a, Percival Prentice, Harvard, Meteor, Vampire, Lincoln (ops Malaya 1 sqn RAAF 58/59), Canberra, C47, F27, DC4, DC6b, Lockheed Electra, B707 and B747...and that's not nearly an exhaustive list
Interesting old coot
He'll play dogfight computer games for hours but is ambivalent about flying in my Bonanza...guess he figures he's used up enough lives Now I know why
Chuck.
They finally discovered that chaps over a certain height had a hip to knee measurement that precluded the knees passing behind the canopy bow.
They measured everyone and those to tall were posted to Vampires where, due to a lack of said expulsive device, no similar problem existed.
Of course this led to ernest discussion on just how you got out, with various theories expounded. The half roll and drop out seemed to harbour the fewest ways of hurting yourself...if you had that much control...and a few months later Dad had cause to fling one into the Bristol Channel late one night....to be plucked out of the water by Ark Royal next morning.
One method, which I gather was greeted somewhat derisively, was to lose the canopy and then 'jump' straight up, pass behind the engine and under the horizontal stab.
Dad recently celebrated his 70th birthday, 15 years after retiring from 25000 hours logged in many, many aircraft...DH82a, Percival Prentice, Harvard, Meteor, Vampire, Lincoln (ops Malaya 1 sqn RAAF 58/59), Canberra, C47, F27, DC4, DC6b, Lockheed Electra, B707 and B747...and that's not nearly an exhaustive list
Interesting old coot
He'll play dogfight computer games for hours but is ambivalent about flying in my Bonanza...guess he figures he's used up enough lives
Now I know whyChuck.
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Meatbox Memories
I have been following this thread with great interest from France and struggling to concoct a contribution on a quirky (frog) keyboard. I was “creamed” to become a QFI (A2) at Middleton St George in ‘52/’53 and then did a tour on 208 (FR9/F8) from ‘54-’57. The “Meatbox” was my high-time type and I remember it with affection, whilst not pretending that it was a delight to fly compared with the Hunter. Nick Carter’s book “Meteor Eject” catches the flavour of the life and times very well, and we owe him for the immense amount of work he must have done to compile the rather grizzly “butcher’s bill” in his Annex. The accident rate was indeed appalling, eliciting some rather terse minutes from Churchill to the Air Minister of the day. In my time, OC Middleton was subpoenaed by the Darlington coroner to account for the growing RAF patch in the municipal cemetery (the staish stalled and sheltered behind the OSA). I believe, at its worst, we were having about one “fatal” a course . The reasons were, as usual, several.
First, there was a big expansion phase going on, and the pressure on the AFSs to get stus out to the OCUs was great. We flew our tails off whenever the weather was good, and more than we ought to have when it was bad. Weekends? Leave? “ Privileges, dear boy. You will have plenty of time for such luxuries when you get to your squadron.” The expansion phase also diluted the instructor force. The operational commands were unwilling to let their experienced jet pilots go to CFS, where the course was done on a strange contraption called the Prentice followed by the Harvard. Few instructors arriving at the AFSs had much jet time, and very few any multijet time. The job of turning them into competent Meteor QFIs was that of the unit Standards Flights. The asymmetric instruction I got at Driffield in the summer of ’51 was a farce (my instructor was clearly scared witless – probably by me!). It was not until I went to Middleton (after CFS) that I was properly taught. Flt Sgt (later Flt Lt) Ray Davis earned his A1 by developing the jet asymmetric sequence, which was still in use at the Vulcan OCU 20 years later.
The first thing to get across was that, however big a ****** you were, if you could hold the rudder hard against its limit stops, you could do no more. If you increased power or reduced IAS further, yaw/roll/spiral would happen very quickly. Ie, the aircraft had its own Crit Speed at full thrust on one engine – about 125kts at sl. One “big ******” at Middleton, just before I arrived, failed to hoist this simple fact aboard and tried a roller landing on one. On the runway, he applied full **** on one engine at about 90 Kt. and entered the officers’ mess through the ladies’ room wall. RIP. (He is alleged still to haunt the Hotel St George – at least the hosties will not stay in that wing !) I used to stand on the step while my stus strapped themselves in on their earlier sorties and make them adjust the rudder pedals so that, with their arse right back in the seat their knee was still slightly bent with full rudder on, then make them force their knee down so their leg was in a sort of geometric lock between the rudder and the seat back. We then used to try it in the air, with both of us on the rudder to maintain full lock, and the stu briefed to watch the “ball” like a hawk. The time between the first displacement of the ball and when the aircraft flipped was quite short. Then the student was set to find his own crit speed at full thrust, until he could no longer centre the ball, and this was usually between 130/135 kts. He was then made to explore the relationship between thrust setting, IAS and controllability. Despite greatly improved instructional techniques, there were always a few asymmetric accidents and many questioned the need to teach asymmetric at all in view of the reliability of the Derwents. Well, you know what CFS is like – if it can be done, you must teach how to do it. And there was also the range/endurance case. In the old centrifugal engines sfc reduced as rpm increased, so to loiter or squeeze for range at heights up to about 30,000 ft, it was SOP to shut down one engine and fly at increased rpm on the other. Relights were problematic on earlier marks, so a se landing was on the cards. A simple rule of thumb then prevailed ; maintain 140 kts min and 1/3 flap max until committal at 400 ft , then put it down – somewhere, anyhow.
Defensive techniques for QFIs were legendary. At least in 1952 it was usual to finish up a dual sortie with a roller landing and simulated engine failure on TO. This was done by the QFI lifting the HP cock lever , alongside his seat, at about 150 kts. You can be sure that the QFI’s boot was just behind the appropriate rudder bar! The stu then went through the engine failure drills, which included “HP cock-OFF” and “Balance Cock – OPEN”. If the QFI had shut down the starboard engine, it happened once or twice that the stu tried to pull off the Port HP cock – or else he pulled it off instead of opening the Balance Cock which was alongside it. Either way, at least one T7 at Middleton finished up in the pasture, and it became SOP for the QFI to cover the Port HP cock when shutting down the Starboard, or vice versa. Then there were the airbrakes – not only very powerful but, in the T7 and F4 and earlier, when opened in conjunction with yaw as might be induced by unbalanced asymmetric or by the undercarriage cycling, caused a breakdown of airflow over the tail and the notorious “phantom dive”. Most Meatbox drivers drilled themselves instinctively to hit the airbrake lever with the heel of their palm when going for the undercarriage lever (particularly in formation breaks when eyes had to be out of the cockpit). When the stu was flying the QFI’s hand would rest on the airbrake lever when the time came to lower the gear. Even then one stu is reputed to have said to his instructor on se finals “Sir, the airbrake handle is stuck – I can’t open them” “Effing right laddie, its stuck because I’ve got my effing hand on it!” Whereupon the stu tried the canopy latch, which was above the airbrake lever. The instructor just managed to get his elbow on that in time!
Going through Nick Carter’s Annex, it seemed to me that the biggest cause of the 430-odd total Meatbox fatals was simple “loss of control”. Some of the later AFSs (eg Worksop) had F8s for solo flying, but Driffield and Middleton had F4s. In ’52 and ’53 these aircraft, and some of the earlier T7s, had suction driven AH and DI, a magnesyn compass, and a single 10-channel VHF box.. A student sent up through cloud to do some aerobatics and briefed to call for a QGH (controlled descent) at fuel state 80/80 (gals) would have to uncage his DI initially on the little emergency “whisky” compass, while the Magnesyn continued to gyrate for a few minutes. He would almost certainly reach the “overhead” and start his outbound descent with an AH still toppled. The descent attitude of the Meatbox was quite steep and the “limited panel” scan-pattern to maintain attitude and heading was demanding enough even for green-rated instructors I am sure that a number of the accidents ascribed to “control loss” happened because the stu “lost it” at that stage and spiralled in. There were no “bang seats” in the F4 or T7, of course. The F8 and later T7s had the G4F Gyrosyn compass and electrical AHs with wider gimbal limits and the rapid re-erection button. The more trepid stus, who found weather on climb-out that they were not confident of dealing with on the let-down, simply did not do the aerobatics, and who can blame them. They may not have won the course trophy, but they did not end up in Darlington cemetery. (One flight commander used to snoop on solo stus to see what they got up to!). The lack of a navaid, apart from ground D/F (manual until ’53 when CRD/F came in) and panic about fuel-consumption contributed to pressure on the stus, a number of whom simply ran themselves out of gas. In the F4 their best option was to put the aircraft down somewhere somehow; a bale-out without a bang-seat was not a serious option.
Apologies for my verbosity. I did not have time to write anything shorter! My memories are not as clear as they were, so there may be some errors in my recall of Meatbox systems and operating speeds and limits. The sources advised by Nick Carter could not supply Pilots Notes for other than the Meteor 3. Has anyone else any ideas on where I could get them for the T7 and F8/FR9?
PS The word turned into "******" by Dan's autocensor was defined in Dr Johnson's original English Dictionary as "a term of endearment used frequently between sailors".
First, there was a big expansion phase going on, and the pressure on the AFSs to get stus out to the OCUs was great. We flew our tails off whenever the weather was good, and more than we ought to have when it was bad. Weekends? Leave? “ Privileges, dear boy. You will have plenty of time for such luxuries when you get to your squadron.” The expansion phase also diluted the instructor force. The operational commands were unwilling to let their experienced jet pilots go to CFS, where the course was done on a strange contraption called the Prentice followed by the Harvard. Few instructors arriving at the AFSs had much jet time, and very few any multijet time. The job of turning them into competent Meteor QFIs was that of the unit Standards Flights. The asymmetric instruction I got at Driffield in the summer of ’51 was a farce (my instructor was clearly scared witless – probably by me!). It was not until I went to Middleton (after CFS) that I was properly taught. Flt Sgt (later Flt Lt) Ray Davis earned his A1 by developing the jet asymmetric sequence, which was still in use at the Vulcan OCU 20 years later.
The first thing to get across was that, however big a ****** you were, if you could hold the rudder hard against its limit stops, you could do no more. If you increased power or reduced IAS further, yaw/roll/spiral would happen very quickly. Ie, the aircraft had its own Crit Speed at full thrust on one engine – about 125kts at sl. One “big ******” at Middleton, just before I arrived, failed to hoist this simple fact aboard and tried a roller landing on one. On the runway, he applied full **** on one engine at about 90 Kt. and entered the officers’ mess through the ladies’ room wall. RIP. (He is alleged still to haunt the Hotel St George – at least the hosties will not stay in that wing !) I used to stand on the step while my stus strapped themselves in on their earlier sorties and make them adjust the rudder pedals so that, with their arse right back in the seat their knee was still slightly bent with full rudder on, then make them force their knee down so their leg was in a sort of geometric lock between the rudder and the seat back. We then used to try it in the air, with both of us on the rudder to maintain full lock, and the stu briefed to watch the “ball” like a hawk. The time between the first displacement of the ball and when the aircraft flipped was quite short. Then the student was set to find his own crit speed at full thrust, until he could no longer centre the ball, and this was usually between 130/135 kts. He was then made to explore the relationship between thrust setting, IAS and controllability. Despite greatly improved instructional techniques, there were always a few asymmetric accidents and many questioned the need to teach asymmetric at all in view of the reliability of the Derwents. Well, you know what CFS is like – if it can be done, you must teach how to do it. And there was also the range/endurance case. In the old centrifugal engines sfc reduced as rpm increased, so to loiter or squeeze for range at heights up to about 30,000 ft, it was SOP to shut down one engine and fly at increased rpm on the other. Relights were problematic on earlier marks, so a se landing was on the cards. A simple rule of thumb then prevailed ; maintain 140 kts min and 1/3 flap max until committal at 400 ft , then put it down – somewhere, anyhow.
Defensive techniques for QFIs were legendary. At least in 1952 it was usual to finish up a dual sortie with a roller landing and simulated engine failure on TO. This was done by the QFI lifting the HP cock lever , alongside his seat, at about 150 kts. You can be sure that the QFI’s boot was just behind the appropriate rudder bar! The stu then went through the engine failure drills, which included “HP cock-OFF” and “Balance Cock – OPEN”. If the QFI had shut down the starboard engine, it happened once or twice that the stu tried to pull off the Port HP cock – or else he pulled it off instead of opening the Balance Cock which was alongside it. Either way, at least one T7 at Middleton finished up in the pasture, and it became SOP for the QFI to cover the Port HP cock when shutting down the Starboard, or vice versa. Then there were the airbrakes – not only very powerful but, in the T7 and F4 and earlier, when opened in conjunction with yaw as might be induced by unbalanced asymmetric or by the undercarriage cycling, caused a breakdown of airflow over the tail and the notorious “phantom dive”. Most Meatbox drivers drilled themselves instinctively to hit the airbrake lever with the heel of their palm when going for the undercarriage lever (particularly in formation breaks when eyes had to be out of the cockpit). When the stu was flying the QFI’s hand would rest on the airbrake lever when the time came to lower the gear. Even then one stu is reputed to have said to his instructor on se finals “Sir, the airbrake handle is stuck – I can’t open them” “Effing right laddie, its stuck because I’ve got my effing hand on it!” Whereupon the stu tried the canopy latch, which was above the airbrake lever. The instructor just managed to get his elbow on that in time!
Going through Nick Carter’s Annex, it seemed to me that the biggest cause of the 430-odd total Meatbox fatals was simple “loss of control”. Some of the later AFSs (eg Worksop) had F8s for solo flying, but Driffield and Middleton had F4s. In ’52 and ’53 these aircraft, and some of the earlier T7s, had suction driven AH and DI, a magnesyn compass, and a single 10-channel VHF box.. A student sent up through cloud to do some aerobatics and briefed to call for a QGH (controlled descent) at fuel state 80/80 (gals) would have to uncage his DI initially on the little emergency “whisky” compass, while the Magnesyn continued to gyrate for a few minutes. He would almost certainly reach the “overhead” and start his outbound descent with an AH still toppled. The descent attitude of the Meatbox was quite steep and the “limited panel” scan-pattern to maintain attitude and heading was demanding enough even for green-rated instructors I am sure that a number of the accidents ascribed to “control loss” happened because the stu “lost it” at that stage and spiralled in. There were no “bang seats” in the F4 or T7, of course. The F8 and later T7s had the G4F Gyrosyn compass and electrical AHs with wider gimbal limits and the rapid re-erection button. The more trepid stus, who found weather on climb-out that they were not confident of dealing with on the let-down, simply did not do the aerobatics, and who can blame them. They may not have won the course trophy, but they did not end up in Darlington cemetery. (One flight commander used to snoop on solo stus to see what they got up to!). The lack of a navaid, apart from ground D/F (manual until ’53 when CRD/F came in) and panic about fuel-consumption contributed to pressure on the stus, a number of whom simply ran themselves out of gas. In the F4 their best option was to put the aircraft down somewhere somehow; a bale-out without a bang-seat was not a serious option.
Apologies for my verbosity. I did not have time to write anything shorter! My memories are not as clear as they were, so there may be some errors in my recall of Meatbox systems and operating speeds and limits. The sources advised by Nick Carter could not supply Pilots Notes for other than the Meteor 3. Has anyone else any ideas on where I could get them for the T7 and F8/FR9?
PS The word turned into "******" by Dan's autocensor was defined in Dr Johnson's original English Dictionary as "a term of endearment used frequently between sailors".
Last edited by Flatus Veteranus; 2nd Nov 2002 at 13:21.