The Warship: Tour of Duty
That is what FOST is for.
Flag Officer Sea Training organisation renamed (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
"FOST certifies crews and vessels as being sufficiently prepared for any eventuality through rigorous exercises and readiness inspections."
Flag Officer Sea Training organisation renamed (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
"FOST certifies crews and vessels as being sufficiently prepared for any eventuality through rigorous exercises and readiness inspections."
That is what FOST is for.
Flag Officer Sea Training organisation renamed (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
"FOST certifies crews and vessels as being sufficiently prepared for any eventuality through rigorous exercises and readiness inspections."
Flag Officer Sea Training organisation renamed (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
"FOST certifies crews and vessels as being sufficiently prepared for any eventuality through rigorous exercises and readiness inspections."
So presumably then before every 'mission' to the high seas ....the ship has to be re certified by the FOST team if crews are in constant rotation?
...sorry for the questions, but just interested!
If I heard correctly the F35 pilot landed right on the front edge of the ramp and his parachute caught on a light bracket that was due to be removed! I hope he bought a beer for the deck 'handlers'!
mmitch.
mmitch.
...They should have dunked him first ....he could claim membership of the the Goldfish club as well then!
Glad he was ok though, says alot that he was able to just walk of the deck like he did (once pulled up!) with just very minor MDC related injuries.
Glad he was ok though, says alot that he was able to just walk of the deck like he did (once pulled up!) with just very minor MDC related injuries.
Imagine if he hadn't hung up like that, he have been under the ship and likely drowned. Is that a design flaw, having the ramp off the front, rather than at an angle like traditional carriers with catapults?
The following 3 users liked this post by pasta:
If the very impressive Lieutenant "Hux's" parachute had not snagged on that light fitting on the starboard forrard corner of the ski ramp, it would indeed have been a very different story as 932 feet and 65000 tons of ship were the only other option.
I thought that his interviews, pre and especially post, the accident were two of the very best in the series, and as a result of the accident I now understand why he was only referred to by his moniker rather than his full name. Good to know that he is flying again - and , whilst getting into the Caterpillar Club, he won't remotely care about not getting membership of the Goldfish Club!
Jack
Now why does the expression "Apples and oranges" come so readily to mind!
If the very impressive Lieutenant "Hux's" parachute had not snagged on that light fitting on the starboard forrard corner of the ski ramp, it would indeed have been a very different story as 932 feet and 65000 tons of ship were the only other option.
I thought that his interviews, pre and especially post, the accident were two of the very best in the series, and as a result of the accident I now understand why he was only referred to by his moniker rather than his full name. Good to know that he is flying again - and , whilst getting into the Caterpillar Club, he won't remotely care about not getting membership of the Goldfish Club!
Jack
If the very impressive Lieutenant "Hux's" parachute had not snagged on that light fitting on the starboard forrard corner of the ski ramp, it would indeed have been a very different story as 932 feet and 65000 tons of ship were the only other option.
I thought that his interviews, pre and especially post, the accident were two of the very best in the series, and as a result of the accident I now understand why he was only referred to by his moniker rather than his full name. Good to know that he is flying again - and , whilst getting into the Caterpillar Club, he won't remotely care about not getting membership of the Goldfish Club!
Jack
An interesting thought, maybe a designed set of "snaggers" around the bows rather than a fortuitous redundant light fitting should be considered as a last ditch (no pun intended) device to catch the unfortunate ejectee in the future. Carrier ops and ejecting just off the ramp will ALWAYS run that risk of being driven over by the ship. Personally it would be nice to know there was at least an attempt to help prevent that happening by design not luck.
The following users liked this post:
The question I would like to see addressed is why we built two huge aircraft carriers and prepared to send them East although we lacked the ships to screen them. Being then in production myself I cannot say I remember the last time we sent two capital ships to the Far East without any screening, but I read that it did not end happily. Maybe it's as well that one seems to have been crowned Dockyard Queen.
The following users liked this post:
What an odd argument! There was supposed to be a carrier with Force Z, but she had been damaged in an accident. Most historians believe that the presence of a carrier would have prevented the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales. The Japanese aircraft could have been intercepted at range. Also in the last few months of 1941 the first of the escort carriers was proving her value against the U boats and FW Condors in the Atlantic.
There was never any intention to include an aircraft carrier as part of Force Z. Churchill called for one to be based on Singapore but the Admiralty disagreed, and the Admiral in place, Pound, only ever envisaged one being in place by summer 1942, and that in the event of war it would have withdrawn to Ceylon.
IF a carrier had been with Force Z then the only difference in the outcome would have been the loss of a carrier as well as the other 2 capital ships.
12 Swordfish and a similar number of Fulmars would have made no difference.
The Japanese proved quite adept at sinking RN aircraft carriers, and they would have done similar to one included in Force Z, had one been planned, which it wasn’t.
There was never any intention to include an aircraft carrier as part of Force Z. Churchill called for one to be based on Singapore but the Admiralty disagreed, and the Admiral in place, Pound, only ever envisaged one being in place by summer 1942, and that in the event of war it would have withdrawn to Ceylon.
IF a carrier had been with Force Z then the only difference in the outcome would have been the loss of a carrier as well as the other 2 capital ships.
12 Swordfish and a similar number of Fulmars would have made no difference.
The Japanese proved quite adept at sinking RN aircraft carriers, and they would have done similar to one included in Force Z, had one been planned, which it wasn’t.
IF a carrier had been with Force Z then the only difference in the outcome would have been the loss of a carrier as well as the other 2 capital ships.
12 Swordfish and a similar number of Fulmars would have made no difference.
The Japanese proved quite adept at sinking RN aircraft carriers, and they would have done similar to one included in Force Z, had one been planned, which it wasn’t.
Oddly enough Fulmars were the RN's highest scoring fighter of WW2, being used to break up Italian raids in the Med to reduce their effectiveness, which may have worked in defending Force Z given the nature of the attacking force on that fateful day.
The following users liked this post:
There was never any intention to include an aircraft carrier as part of Force Z. Churchill called for one to be based on Singapore but the Admiralty disagreed, and the Admiral in place, Pound, only ever envisaged one being in place by summer 1942, and that in the event of war it would have withdrawn to Ceylon.
IF a carrier had been with Force Z then the only difference in the outcome would have been the loss of a carrier as well as the other 2 capital ships.
12 Swordfish and a similar number of Fulmars would have made no difference.
The Japanese proved quite adept at sinking RN aircraft carriers, and they would have done similar to one included in Force Z, had one been planned, which it wasn’t.
IF a carrier had been with Force Z then the only difference in the outcome would have been the loss of a carrier as well as the other 2 capital ships.
12 Swordfish and a similar number of Fulmars would have made no difference.
The Japanese proved quite adept at sinking RN aircraft carriers, and they would have done similar to one included in Force Z, had one been planned, which it wasn’t.
I was watching Forces TV the other night and it had a series called History's Greatest Blunders, and this particular episode was the about the loss of Force Z (HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales) to Japanese air attack in December 1941. They had been a carrier (Indomitable) that was meant to be part of Force Z but she ran aground in the Caribbean and needed repairs. The commander of Force Z, Vice Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, got the blame for going to sea with little air cover when amphibious landings were taking place on the Malay peninsula.
Was it really fair to blame him for trying to fight the Japanese? Moreover, even if Indomitable had been with Force Z, would she have carriers enough fighters of sufficient capability to defeat Japanese aircraft flying from Thai airfields? The Operation Pedestal escort, for instance, included no less than four carriers, whose fighters were busy.
Was it really fair to blame him for trying to fight the Japanese? Moreover, even if Indomitable had been with Force Z, would she have carriers enough fighters of sufficient capability to defeat Japanese aircraft flying from Thai airfields? The Operation Pedestal escort, for instance, included no less than four carriers, whose fighters were busy.
The Japanese air strike was launched at a range of 600nm and did not include any fighter escort. Orbat here. Japanese torpedo bombers were lightly constructed and lacked armour and self sealing tanks. The G4M Torpedo bomber was given the Allied reporting name of Betty. The Japanese nickname was the Cigar: US pilots called it the flying Zippo.
Force Z was in coastal waters and air cover could have been provided and was offered. Even a handful of F2A Brewster Buffalos would have shot down inflammable G4Ms trying to attempt a torpedo attack flying a steady course at 150 kts and 100ft altitude.
[i]Phillips did not believe that the RAF and other Allied air forces could guarantee air cover for his ships,[citation needed] as they had only limited numbers of fighters.[[i]citation needed] However, one squadron, No. 453 Squadron RAAF with 10 Brewster F2A Buffalos at RAF Sembawang, had been designated "Fleet Defence Squadron", to provide close cover for Force Z.[23] The squadron's acting CO, Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors, had been advised of the radio procedures that would used by Force Z.[24]
Despite his misgivings about the air cover available, Phillips elected to proceed. It is believed that four factors entered into his decision: he thought that Japanese planes could not operate so far from land, he believed that his ships were relatively immune from fatal damage via air attack, he was unaware of the quality of Japanese aircraft and torpedoes,[23] and like many Royal Navy officers, Phillips underestimated the fighting abilities of the Japanese...
...No. 453 Squadron RAAF, which was to provide air cover for Force Z, was not kept informed of the ships' position. No radio request for air cover was sent until one was sent by the commander of Repulse an hour after the Japanese attack began. Flight Lieutenant Vigors proposed a plan to keep six aircraft over Force Z during daylight, but this was declined by Phillips. After the war, Vigors remained bitter towards him for his failure to call for air support on time.[24] He later commented, "I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help."[29] Daytime air cover off the coast was also offered by Wing Commander Wilfred Clouston of No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, but his plan, "Operation Mobile", was also rejected.[30]wikipedia
Had Phillips accepted the RAF offer the course of the war might have been a little different. Even just six defending fighters might have cut down a dozen or more bombers and spoiled the aim of enough of the bombers to save the captial ships.
At the very least the defence of Malaya would have kicked of on a higher note.
Force Z was in coastal waters and air cover could have been provided and was offered. Even a handful of F2A Brewster Buffalos would have shot down inflammable G4Ms trying to attempt a torpedo attack flying a steady course at 150 kts and 100ft altitude.
[i]Phillips did not believe that the RAF and other Allied air forces could guarantee air cover for his ships,[citation needed] as they had only limited numbers of fighters.[[i]citation needed] However, one squadron, No. 453 Squadron RAAF with 10 Brewster F2A Buffalos at RAF Sembawang, had been designated "Fleet Defence Squadron", to provide close cover for Force Z.[23] The squadron's acting CO, Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors, had been advised of the radio procedures that would used by Force Z.[24]
Despite his misgivings about the air cover available, Phillips elected to proceed. It is believed that four factors entered into his decision: he thought that Japanese planes could not operate so far from land, he believed that his ships were relatively immune from fatal damage via air attack, he was unaware of the quality of Japanese aircraft and torpedoes,[23] and like many Royal Navy officers, Phillips underestimated the fighting abilities of the Japanese...
...No. 453 Squadron RAAF, which was to provide air cover for Force Z, was not kept informed of the ships' position. No radio request for air cover was sent until one was sent by the commander of Repulse an hour after the Japanese attack began. Flight Lieutenant Vigors proposed a plan to keep six aircraft over Force Z during daylight, but this was declined by Phillips. After the war, Vigors remained bitter towards him for his failure to call for air support on time.[24] He later commented, "I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help."[29] Daytime air cover off the coast was also offered by Wing Commander Wilfred Clouston of No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, but his plan, "Operation Mobile", was also rejected.[30]wikipedia
Had Phillips accepted the RAF offer the course of the war might have been a little different. Even just six defending fighters might have cut down a dozen or more bombers and spoiled the aim of enough of the bombers to save the captial ships.
At the very least the defence of Malaya would have kicked of on a higher note.
Later in the war RN carriers did take the war to Japan. Meanwhile, in late 1941 the first of the escort carriers, HMS Audacity, was proving her worth on convoys to Gibraltar, and a few months later the first Sea Hurricanes went to sea aboard HMS Avenger for Arctic Convoy PQ18 - both splashed a number of German aircraft.
Anyway, back to the programme by Chris Terrill:
I thought that it was pretty good, but the focus on the Chef was a bit excessive, particularly with the way things went wrong in the end. He did say he had been sorting his life out by joining the RN...
Chris Terrill filmed something like a thousand hours of footage and had to edit this down to six, so things had to be left out. In the first few days of the deployment took part in Exercise Steadfast Defender 21, a Cold War style NATO reinforcement exercise. I would have liked to have seen more flying. However we did see a fair bit of flight deck action, with the F-35B Lightnings intercepting Russians with a destroyer providing control, as well as hitting terrorist targets ashore. Later we saw a Merlin do some submarine hunting, with the initial detection by one of the frigates. We also saw the Merlins doing SAR practice and VERTREP. So much for those who claim that the carriers depend entirely on escorts for defence, and they do not contribute to the defence of the wider force.
Chris Terrill has said that the first series about HMS Queen Elizabeth featured the ME department a lot, so he opted not to feature them. As will all naval documentaries there were people sorting out gash, close range weapons being fired, and both real and practice emergencies. He was interviewed and said that seeing the jet crash was alarming, but it was impressive to see the fast responses - seaboats launched, helicopter on scene, medical personnel closing up, lookouts looking for the survivor, and chockhead spotting the pilot coming down.
Christ Terrill's first naval documentary was HMS Brilliant - filmed in 1994 and broadcast in 1995. For all the criticisms, it was about a warship deployed on operations in the Adriatic, including time near the Yugoslav coast when they were in defence watches - the first episode included air defence exercises (including with Sea Harriers from the CVS) and the third included an incident that caused the the launch the Lynx with live Sea Skua. They also were film doing more routine board and search operations, and there was filming from aboard the vessels being boarded of the boarding party at work. They did also cover some guy going to the table, but he did seem to get treated fairly.
The CO later became a Rear Admiral (and FOST I think), the First Lt also became an Admiral after several commands, the PWO is still serving and is a Cdr up in Scotland, the Lynx Observer carried on flying and had several ship commands, but left the service and command of HMS Queen Elizabeth in a hurry, the Lynx pilot was CO of 771 NAS at Culdrose not so many years ago, and the Leading Seaman who was featured a lot was in another documentary a few years later and was a Petty Officer.
Some of the RN documentaries in the following years were a bit crap - to be blunt. I think part of the problem is people talking waffle and being too self focussed.
I did notice the narrator (of this series) refer to 'sailors and aviators' - is that a reference to the RAF personnel who are now called aviators and not airman, or is it a reference to the WAFUs?
I thought that it was pretty good, but the focus on the Chef was a bit excessive, particularly with the way things went wrong in the end. He did say he had been sorting his life out by joining the RN...
Chris Terrill filmed something like a thousand hours of footage and had to edit this down to six, so things had to be left out. In the first few days of the deployment took part in Exercise Steadfast Defender 21, a Cold War style NATO reinforcement exercise. I would have liked to have seen more flying. However we did see a fair bit of flight deck action, with the F-35B Lightnings intercepting Russians with a destroyer providing control, as well as hitting terrorist targets ashore. Later we saw a Merlin do some submarine hunting, with the initial detection by one of the frigates. We also saw the Merlins doing SAR practice and VERTREP. So much for those who claim that the carriers depend entirely on escorts for defence, and they do not contribute to the defence of the wider force.
Chris Terrill has said that the first series about HMS Queen Elizabeth featured the ME department a lot, so he opted not to feature them. As will all naval documentaries there were people sorting out gash, close range weapons being fired, and both real and practice emergencies. He was interviewed and said that seeing the jet crash was alarming, but it was impressive to see the fast responses - seaboats launched, helicopter on scene, medical personnel closing up, lookouts looking for the survivor, and chockhead spotting the pilot coming down.
Christ Terrill's first naval documentary was HMS Brilliant - filmed in 1994 and broadcast in 1995. For all the criticisms, it was about a warship deployed on operations in the Adriatic, including time near the Yugoslav coast when they were in defence watches - the first episode included air defence exercises (including with Sea Harriers from the CVS) and the third included an incident that caused the the launch the Lynx with live Sea Skua. They also were film doing more routine board and search operations, and there was filming from aboard the vessels being boarded of the boarding party at work. They did also cover some guy going to the table, but he did seem to get treated fairly.
The CO later became a Rear Admiral (and FOST I think), the First Lt also became an Admiral after several commands, the PWO is still serving and is a Cdr up in Scotland, the Lynx Observer carried on flying and had several ship commands, but left the service and command of HMS Queen Elizabeth in a hurry, the Lynx pilot was CO of 771 NAS at Culdrose not so many years ago, and the Leading Seaman who was featured a lot was in another documentary a few years later and was a Petty Officer.
Some of the RN documentaries in the following years were a bit crap - to be blunt. I think part of the problem is people talking waffle and being too self focussed.
I did notice the narrator (of this series) refer to 'sailors and aviators' - is that a reference to the RAF personnel who are now called aviators and not airman, or is it a reference to the WAFUs?
VM, in your picture there are 4 catapults, two on the pointy bit and two on the port side bit of the boat. (Awaits WAFU & fish-head incoming). 
It was impressive to see how the ships and flight deck crew reacted to Hux's ejection, and hats off to Martin-Baker for the ejection seat system iirc 5 for 5?
It was impressive to see how the ships and flight deck crew reacted to Hux's ejection, and hats off to Martin-Baker for the ejection seat system iirc 5 for 5?
Sorry if this has already been mentioned, but is it unrealistic to have some form of net that instantly pops up at the end of the ramp if a pilot is pretty certain that his F-35 isn't going to be leaving the ship at flying speed? E.g. Hux radios "Catch me" as he is heading up the ramp at slower than usual speed and the net is activated by X (if not the pilot themselves) and then prevents the aircraft leaving the flight deck.
The following users liked this post:
VM, in your picture there are 4 catapults, two on the pointy bit and two on the port side bit of the boat. (Awaits WAFU & fish-head incoming).
It was impressive to see how the ships and flight deck crew reacted to Hux's ejection, and hats off to Martin-Baker for the ejection seat system iirc 5 for 5?
It was impressive to see how the ships and flight deck crew reacted to Hux's ejection, and hats off to Martin-Baker for the ejection seat system iirc 5 for 5?
I read somewhere that one of the purposes of the cancelled HMS Prince of Wales cruise was further SRVL trials, so hopefully we'll now see that happen later this year.
The following users liked this post: