NGAD and F/A-XX
Srsly, Dassault did a pretty good job on the Rafale, in terms of balancing cost-driving differences (different parts assembled in different structures) against leaving carrier-related "scar weight" in the landbased airplane. The challenge of optimizing the design with a lot if iterations on a reasonable time period was one reason that they developed CATIA, which has also done well in terms of keeping the Dassault family off the breadline.
It also definitely helped that the AdlA had a tradition of relatively light and efficient fighters.
In the case of NGAD and F/A-XX, a check of public sources indicates that the mission requirements are very different. What we don't know is the extent to which the Pentagon has managed to ensure that both new programs (and the F-35 upgrades) use common technology, but given the classification levels I'm not optimistic.
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There is a practical limit to how big and heavy and aircraft can get and still be viably carrier based. Not just takeoff and landing, but fitting into the hanger deck. That's what really killed the naval variant F-111.
The Air Force doesn't have a similar concern - if they need to make it bigger to carry a certain weapon system or radar, so be it.
What does make sense is developing common systems and avionics - especially now days where such a huge amount of money goes into the electronics. That's basically what Boeing did with the 757/767 - different aircraft but with a common flightdeck and systems.
Of course, that requires a high level of cooperation between the different services, which is far easier said than done.
The Air Force doesn't have a similar concern - if they need to make it bigger to carry a certain weapon system or radar, so be it.
What does make sense is developing common systems and avionics - especially now days where such a huge amount of money goes into the electronics. That's basically what Boeing did with the 757/767 - different aircraft but with a common flightdeck and systems.
Of course, that requires a high level of cooperation between the different services, which is far easier said than done.
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There is a practical limit to how big and heavy and aircraft can get and still be viably carrier based. Not just takeoff and landing, but fitting into the hanger deck. That's what really killed the naval variant F-111.
The Air Force doesn't have a similar concern - if they need to make it bigger to carry a certain weapon system or radar, so be it.
What does make sense is developing common systems and avionics - especially now days where such a huge amount of money goes into the electronics. That's basically what Boeing did with the 757/767 - different aircraft but with a common flightdeck and systems.
Of course, that requires a high level of cooperation between the different services, which is far easier said than done.
The Air Force doesn't have a similar concern - if they need to make it bigger to carry a certain weapon system or radar, so be it.
What does make sense is developing common systems and avionics - especially now days where such a huge amount of money goes into the electronics. That's basically what Boeing did with the 757/767 - different aircraft but with a common flightdeck and systems.
Of course, that requires a high level of cooperation between the different services, which is far easier said than done.
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But it also worth pointing out that the F-4, A-4, Buccaneer and F/A-18 (and A-7 and E-2) were designed for naval carrier operations, not as joint programs. They just so happened to be of utility, and good all around aircraft, for some land based air forces. The USAF and Royal Air Force had little to no input on their original specifications (the F/A-18 did have some heritage from the YF-17). Had they been forced as joint programs the planes likely would have been further compromised from their original Naval requirements. The Rafale does get credit from starting with both requirements.
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Using the common air wing model with 2 fleet air defense squadron/fighter squadrons with 12 twelve aircraft each, or even with just one heavy Fleet Air Defense squadron with @12 aircraft, the 12 (or 24) F-111B's would have taken up a tremendous amount of real estate. This would impact the number of other aircraft the airwing could carry. The ultimate replacement the F-14 also had a large spotting factor, but could do just about everything (except loiter time) much better than a F-111B.
"Size" also implies weight, and the F-111B had significant weight issues.
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The thing that surprised me is the degree of sway influential Chief Designers had in times past.
Maybe they still do.
I'm trying to remember where I read it - but there was an anecdote of a very senior military officer being openly threatened by a very well known designer during the procurement process for a particular platform - essentially "...you need to consider doing what I say or it could impact your career..."
Maybe they still do.
I'm trying to remember where I read it - but there was an anecdote of a very senior military officer being openly threatened by a very well known designer during the procurement process for a particular platform - essentially "...you need to consider doing what I say or it could impact your career..."
