UK F-35B Lost
Ah yes, but our VSO strength is the envy of most countries.
certainly in numbers - but in quality............ maybe not................
As an X Navy man most of the aircrew I met were stand up guys/gals who just wanted to get the job done but I was never sure whether to be in awe, or disgusted with at the chutzpah of some aircrew. I usually settled for an amused sigh. My one "win" on this one was with the helicopter support on a domestic flood assistance op. I was informed that the helicopter was u/s and the crew was going to stand down until a repair crew could be flown in the next day. Excellent I said all the crew can report to my PO for sand bag filling duty. Amazingly about 10 minutes later I was informed that the helicopter could do one more flight to the Air Force base for repairs. Sorry I said no can do as I talked to the OTC and he is not going to take the risk, we will wait for the repair crew tomorrow.....and thanks for helping the lads with those sandbags. 
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Below the Glidepath - not correcting
This follows the trend of many recent SIs. It's undoubtedly detailed and considers a multitude of factors, but as Sycamore says upthread, the correct engineering process or procedure for preventing aircraft operation with non-flight equipment fitted ("Red Gear" in this saga) has been available since the dawn of time. Segregating the Red Gear between each aircraft, meticulously recording fitment and removal of the complete set, and taking basic precautions to integrate complete sets (pussers string or black marker) would have prevented this and there is nothing new in any of those techniques. By filling the SI with all the distractions (or life on operations as we know it) it makes it seems like a really complex puzzle to solve, instead of saying "this was a basic but fundamental pre-flight task that was overlooked by everyone involved, resulting in the loss of the aircraft". I would also be interested to know how the security pressures versus flight safety argument played out. In this case, it looks like flight safety lost.
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I would have thought that ,particularly when `embarked` that each aircraft had a `plane captain`(engineer) for each cab,and a small crew...it was `their aircraft`,they were responsible for it ,whether it was u/s or not.And on deck,the `p-c` ran a checklist to ensure the aircraft was ready to fly.Working on a busy flightdeck is totally different from on an airfield,even dispersed.
And another thing,why launch the aircraft from so close to the ramp...it seems that ,if you launch from further back,you get better acceleration,longer run,more time to check the power/accel rate,and maybe better ability to stop.....I was always of the impression that `runway behind you is wasted`..use it`!
And another thing,why launch the aircraft from so close to the ramp...it seems that ,if you launch from further back,you get better acceleration,longer run,more time to check the power/accel rate,and maybe better ability to stop.....I was always of the impression that `runway behind you is wasted`..use it`!
Yep, we got the thing back but it must have been tempting to fling the security folk over the ramp to guard it.
The RN Officer cadre used to have a good reputation at the people stuff. Now we have captains who think a mass service on the flight deck at 40ºC plus, on a deck surface known for scorching temperatures, is a good idea. Only 20 or so casualties, so that's ok. Got to keep morale up eh.
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That accident report is up there in the most tortuous use of language applied to a report in recent times. Are the authors native English speakers?
The fact that this item was fished out of the still floating soon to be reef probably explains why the fleet was not grounded immediately.
This has to be the most expensive engine blank in history. (Homer would add, "the most expensive engine blank in history... yet!")
The nonsense applied in the interests of security appear to not concern themselves with the consequential risks that arise from those very security processes.
If the engineers task processes are to be achieved reliably, then need to work without interruption to work flow. None of that happened, there were known breaks in continuity, and there was no mitigation strategy in place, something, like, I dunno... start again from the beginning or similar. At least the pilot should have been able to identify that the LH blank was still in place, assuming that any walk around was actually conducted, after all, secrecy and all that, was he permitted to be aware that the aircraft was actually there? No observer was able to detect the blank was still in place, as there are no observers, (refer security).
The description of the cage for the stowage of the "Red Gear" items conjures a chaotic stowage of items that are known to be critical for flight safety if missed, and yet... it appears to all be bundled into a pile. Sad that there was no shadow board in use that all items fitted needed to be accounted for before the pilot goes walking out to the bird to not do an effective walk around of. That might be a revolutionary idea, after all, we have only been doing that for about a century for aircraft engineering.
The blanks on the tailpipe were reported in this short snapshot of operations to have been variously, dislodged and found on the deck or, noted to be lost at sea... at what point do the guys stop and think about the subject in a holistic manner, as it appears this has issues at both ends of the bird. the intake blanks had no streamers on them, even the words had been removed of "REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT" as they were being dislodged, and were considered a FOD hazard, but the blank itself was not?
Even with the redactions that appear to be random, but which include the actual event itself, this is a depressing report.
Sometimes you just have to be embarrassed to be in the same business.
But, at least the important stuff got done, the canopy transparencies were nicely free of salt spray, all the way until the plane got tossed into the Mediterranean.
The Security officers went a long way to not show the intakes, far enough to result in the plane being tossed into the water, and then the powers that be do the report, declassify the report and show a close up of the very intake that the SSO was so damned concerned over. Rest easy though, the intake design is pretty much exactly what would be expected with a design that has a need for LO, and has to work around a vertical plenum chamber right where you don't want it to be. That of course makes for fun flow control, which has a limited number of solutions due to the LO requirement, and so should not be seen, as indeed, they are not. The F-35 is not the first aircraft to have an air intake... not even the first LO air intake, but at least, the red gear stopped some long range photos from some AGI or fisherman's iPhone, at the cost of a 2 year recovery program and a CAT-5 bird.
That there had been at least 4 other events prior to this on the F-35A, B and C models that did not cause an accident seems to suggest that there is room for better information flow across the program so that others may learn and not have to repeat a failure that has been done many times before. The preceding B model event was the 3rd occasion that engine runs had been conducted by the same aircraft with the blank in the intake.
The report shows clearly that if the pip pins were not holding correctly, a blank could be dislodged and enter the engine intake and become hidden inside the intake, behind the lift fan plenum. That information was not known prior to the event, in spite of multiple events across the other operators fleets with having blanks still in the engine. It makes it imperative to have obvious configuration control in place for all matters before an accident shows that it is necessary. The operators take care for gear pins and seat pins etc, but all of these have come along after the event, as this one now does too.
The fact that this item was fished out of the still floating soon to be reef probably explains why the fleet was not grounded immediately.
This has to be the most expensive engine blank in history. (Homer would add, "the most expensive engine blank in history... yet!")
The nonsense applied in the interests of security appear to not concern themselves with the consequential risks that arise from those very security processes.
If the engineers task processes are to be achieved reliably, then need to work without interruption to work flow. None of that happened, there were known breaks in continuity, and there was no mitigation strategy in place, something, like, I dunno... start again from the beginning or similar. At least the pilot should have been able to identify that the LH blank was still in place, assuming that any walk around was actually conducted, after all, secrecy and all that, was he permitted to be aware that the aircraft was actually there? No observer was able to detect the blank was still in place, as there are no observers, (refer security).
The description of the cage for the stowage of the "Red Gear" items conjures a chaotic stowage of items that are known to be critical for flight safety if missed, and yet... it appears to all be bundled into a pile. Sad that there was no shadow board in use that all items fitted needed to be accounted for before the pilot goes walking out to the bird to not do an effective walk around of. That might be a revolutionary idea, after all, we have only been doing that for about a century for aircraft engineering.
The blanks on the tailpipe were reported in this short snapshot of operations to have been variously, dislodged and found on the deck or, noted to be lost at sea... at what point do the guys stop and think about the subject in a holistic manner, as it appears this has issues at both ends of the bird. the intake blanks had no streamers on them, even the words had been removed of "REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT" as they were being dislodged, and were considered a FOD hazard, but the blank itself was not?
Even with the redactions that appear to be random, but which include the actual event itself, this is a depressing report.
Sometimes you just have to be embarrassed to be in the same business.
But, at least the important stuff got done, the canopy transparencies were nicely free of salt spray, all the way until the plane got tossed into the Mediterranean.
The Security officers went a long way to not show the intakes, far enough to result in the plane being tossed into the water, and then the powers that be do the report, declassify the report and show a close up of the very intake that the SSO was so damned concerned over. Rest easy though, the intake design is pretty much exactly what would be expected with a design that has a need for LO, and has to work around a vertical plenum chamber right where you don't want it to be. That of course makes for fun flow control, which has a limited number of solutions due to the LO requirement, and so should not be seen, as indeed, they are not. The F-35 is not the first aircraft to have an air intake... not even the first LO air intake, but at least, the red gear stopped some long range photos from some AGI or fisherman's iPhone, at the cost of a 2 year recovery program and a CAT-5 bird.
That there had been at least 4 other events prior to this on the F-35A, B and C models that did not cause an accident seems to suggest that there is room for better information flow across the program so that others may learn and not have to repeat a failure that has been done many times before. The preceding B model event was the 3rd occasion that engine runs had been conducted by the same aircraft with the blank in the intake.
The report shows clearly that if the pip pins were not holding correctly, a blank could be dislodged and enter the engine intake and become hidden inside the intake, behind the lift fan plenum. That information was not known prior to the event, in spite of multiple events across the other operators fleets with having blanks still in the engine. It makes it imperative to have obvious configuration control in place for all matters before an accident shows that it is necessary. The operators take care for gear pins and seat pins etc, but all of these have come along after the event, as this one now does too.
Last edited by fdr; 13th Aug 2023 at 03:32.
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fdr, one does have to smile that a device designed to prevent the ingress of fod does itself become fod. Still, not alone, company Huey had a piece of the installed metal fod screen fail due fatigue and cause an engine out ditching.
the blank must be the lowest cost, simplest bit of the whole shooting match and yet they didn't have a way to ensure it stayed in place or remain visible..... it's unbelievable - but it happened..................
and that report.........
and that report.........
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I’ve yet to see such a badly-written SI report.
This is apparent from the very first sentence written by the board which says that the aircraft ‘ditched’. The MRP doesn't appear to have a definition of ditching, but the CAA say:
Ditching is a deliberate emergency landing on water, it is not an uncontrolled impact. Ditching events beyond coastal waters are rare, but experience suggests that if the aircraft impacts the water under control, the chance of survival is high.
The aircraft was unoccupied and uncontrolled when it hit the sea. In aviation terms that are widely used and understood, this accident was a crash not a ditching, After opening with such fundamental error, I suppose that the poor quality of the rest of the report should come as no surprise.
This is apparent from the very first sentence written by the board which says that the aircraft ‘ditched’. The MRP doesn't appear to have a definition of ditching, but the CAA say:
Ditching is a deliberate emergency landing on water, it is not an uncontrolled impact. Ditching events beyond coastal waters are rare, but experience suggests that if the aircraft impacts the water under control, the chance of survival is high.
The aircraft was unoccupied and uncontrolled when it hit the sea. In aviation terms that are widely used and understood, this accident was a crash not a ditching, After opening with such fundamental error, I suppose that the poor quality of the rest of the report should come as no surprise.
Got the impression they were tying themselves in knots to avoid saying anything clear.................. and of course there is a no blame requirement
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"Sad that there was no shadow board in use that all items fitted needed to be accounted for before the pilot goes walking out to the bird to not do an effective walk around of. That might be a revolutionary idea, after all, we have only been doing that for about a century for aircraft engineering."
Yup - you see it in your local machine shop and garage but on a multi Bn $ carrier - no........
Yup - you see it in your local machine shop and garage but on a multi Bn $ carrier - no........
I am still non plussed by the redactions... there be redactin' happenin', and then the data that indicates what was central to the block o' black shows up in a photo or a graph, like the thrust output from the engine. Was there a time limit on this going out the door for the powers that be? It is a most peculiar report, written by they/those riters.
FYI, I feel for the troops involved, the whole effort seemed a circus, a sit down and briefing upwards from the troops to their bosses might have gone a long way to avoiding the expensive lesson that was learnt herein, and yet, I fear that the systemic issues that arise in this case are not taken on board by the powers that be. Within a system that is a goal oriented focus, where it is not acceptable to say no, devolution is the most probable outcome. Yes, there are reporting systems, but at what point do they result in interdicting a process that is throwing out flags with abandon?
The safety equipment issues raise further concern IMHO, half a life jacket even when not required should raise eyebrows, and that is following other recent matters of the same flavour on the Hawk. The RH arm restraint failing, this is stuff that there needs to be a fair level of confidence in, and while credit is given for identifying the failures, how about working on why there are failures in systems that should not fail.
There are smart people in the mob, reasonable solutions can be made to protect the machine, RAM finishes, pilot, and the engineers if there is a will to do so.
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I suppose one of the things it severely challenges is the fantasy that is the F35 routine operating model - the lack of sustained SQEP in embarked operations is writ large.
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Two things struck me about the report
1) The impact manning instability had on F 35 operations. This is become real issue for many if not most of the Western militaries. Recruiting shortfalls and previous decisions to outsource and right size staffing to save money are coming home to roost in a myriad of bad ways.
2) The report said the pilot found and removed the gear pins on his walk around. This rather basic part of preparing the aircraft for flight appeared to have been missed by the ground crew. I wonder if this is anther indication of the issue I raised at point 1
Flight safety needs the right people in the right places with the training, time, and tools to do their job. It would seem, at least on this cruise the RN was Ohh for Three
1) The impact manning instability had on F 35 operations. This is become real issue for many if not most of the Western militaries. Recruiting shortfalls and previous decisions to outsource and right size staffing to save money are coming home to roost in a myriad of bad ways.
2) The report said the pilot found and removed the gear pins on his walk around. This rather basic part of preparing the aircraft for flight appeared to have been missed by the ground crew. I wonder if this is anther indication of the issue I raised at point 1
Flight safety needs the right people in the right places with the training, time, and tools to do their job. It would seem, at least on this cruise the RN was Ohh for Three
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But the extraordianary incompetence and amateurishness of the 617 squadron engineering organisation that is the primary cause of this accident beggars belief. It is hard not to conclude that a major factor behind this sorry tale is the split responsibility between the two services. Naval aviation is best done by those with the experience and understanding to do it properly.
Last edited by idle bystander; 13th Aug 2023 at 17:14.
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But the extraordianary incompetence and amateurishness of the 617 squadron engineering organisation that is the primary cause of this accident beggars belief. It is hard not to conclude that a major factor behind this sorry tale is the split responsibility between the two services. Naval aviation is best done by those with the experience and understanding to do it properly.
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One hopes that similar importance was given to equality and diversity requirements. After all, airworthiness is only one facet of today's RAF.
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