All Hawk T1s will be gone by 31 March 2022
Back when I was vaguely interesting, HHA cold called me offering some affil in the North Sea.
“Do you have a decent A-A radar / replicator and can you go supersonic in your Hunters so that you can represent a realistic threat?” Asked I.
“No, but we can fly in Block 4…”
They always struck me as a bunch of old blokes who wanted somebody to pay for their fuel while they had a hooly in their 1950s terror jets.
“Do you have a decent A-A radar / replicator and can you go supersonic in your Hunters so that you can represent a realistic threat?” Asked I.
“No, but we can fly in Block 4…”
They always struck me as a bunch of old blokes who wanted somebody to pay for their fuel while they had a hooly in their 1950s terror jets.
I think the training will remain the same for those on the boats (yes I said boat for a ship…), it’s how that training will be facilitated. Banshee and Rattler really are quite a game changer and I’d guess that’s what will worry those at Draken.
I don’t know but I’d guess that there’s still quite a bit of trade for the Draken base oooop North for the AD work.
I don’t know but I’d guess that there’s still quite a bit of trade for the Draken base oooop North for the AD work.
I am sure that the Hawk also has a dissimilar air combat training role?
It isn't, the trial launches from PoW were 'recovered to land via parachute'; parachute is the normal recovery method. (It's bit too small and light for the planned new barrier arrest system)
Drones launched from HMS Prince of Wales during landmark demonstration
Drones launched from HMS Prince of Wales during landmark demonstration
The demonstration with HMS Prince of Wales looked at how the drone and associated support equipment, including launcher, can be integrated within a busy ship and flight deck.
It also looked at installing sub-systems on board and procedures for moving and setting up the drone and kit on the flight deck, which has been a hive of activity as the ship trains with F-35B Lightning jets and participates in the largest military exercise in the UK, Joint Warrior, off the Scottish coast.
Flight Test Engineers and operators from QinetiQ, which owns and operates the Banshee, flew three of the air vehicles from the drone’s launcher on the Hebrides range off the northwest coast of Scotland.
The Banshee launched from the ship and recovered to land via parachute.
The demonstration is showcasing just one of the options as part of Royal Navy Develop Directorate’s Project Vampire, which is looking at lightweight, fixed-wing carrier-borne crewless autonomous systems.
The project forms part of a series of demonstrations that will help define Royal Navy aviation of the future through the Future Maritime Aviation Force, which looks at how the Fleet Air Arm will operate in the years to come.
“It aims to capitalise on the best that industry has to offer working alongside established aviation systems already used across the globe,” added Cdr (Rob) Taylor (lead for Royal Navy Air Test and Evaluation).
“The programme will look at rotary wing and fixed wing drones to fulfil a number of tasks to increase mass on the carriers and allow crewed aircraft to maximise their capacity.
“The Banshee demonstration is just the start of the un-crewed autonomous systems programme of work for the Royal Navy.
It also looked at installing sub-systems on board and procedures for moving and setting up the drone and kit on the flight deck, which has been a hive of activity as the ship trains with F-35B Lightning jets and participates in the largest military exercise in the UK, Joint Warrior, off the Scottish coast.
Flight Test Engineers and operators from QinetiQ, which owns and operates the Banshee, flew three of the air vehicles from the drone’s launcher on the Hebrides range off the northwest coast of Scotland.
The Banshee launched from the ship and recovered to land via parachute.
The demonstration is showcasing just one of the options as part of Royal Navy Develop Directorate’s Project Vampire, which is looking at lightweight, fixed-wing carrier-borne crewless autonomous systems.
The project forms part of a series of demonstrations that will help define Royal Navy aviation of the future through the Future Maritime Aviation Force, which looks at how the Fleet Air Arm will operate in the years to come.
“It aims to capitalise on the best that industry has to offer working alongside established aviation systems already used across the globe,” added Cdr (Rob) Taylor (lead for Royal Navy Air Test and Evaluation).
“The programme will look at rotary wing and fixed wing drones to fulfil a number of tasks to increase mass on the carriers and allow crewed aircraft to maximise their capacity.
“The Banshee demonstration is just the start of the un-crewed autonomous systems programme of work for the Royal Navy.
Anyone know if 736 NAS are still due to disband tomorrow, or are the Eagles going to continue training their young until 31 MAR 22 given the Hawk OSD?
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Guess we'll see next week now that JW 21-2 has finished. Most of the main evolutions for the RN are now complete with PoW having completed her operational generation.
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What you have to understand is that funding for Hawk T1 and Draken Europe's MSASS contract comes from within the Air TLB. If Hawk T1 is to be replaced in part, assuming Air has any money, then I would expect three possible options depending on the fiscal position of the Air (and Navy) TLBs and how competent their capability areas are:
- Do nothing and accept a capability gap until 1 January 2025 when, assuming Air Capability has sorted its proverbial out, the live element of NGOT service delivery commences. ZERO chance NGOT will occur given the schedule even if most deterministic! They've not even held a formal industry engagement day.
- A bridging contract to cover an element of Hawk T1 until Air Capability sorts its proverbial out, aligns its live and synthetic programmes based on technology maturity levels in a road map (in consultation with industry), and actually has a coherent and funded plan. Again, I won't hold my breath here.
- Adjust an extant contract in some way via a contract change vehicle. Again, hugely difficult for many reasons, expect a legal challenge.
Subsonic
Apache - L-39.
ARES - MB339CE.
Air USA - Hawk mk67.
Draken - L-159E.
HHA - Hunter mk58.
Top Aces - Alpha Jet 1B+ (the first two, if not more, are completing overhaul in Charleroi).
Supersonic
ARES - Mirage 2000.
ATAC - Mirage F1CR/CT.
Draken - Mirage F1, Cheetah C/D, F-16A/B Block 20 MLU.
Procor - Mirage 2000.
Tactical Air Support - F-5E/F, CF-5D (has acquired a further 55).
Top Aces - F-16A/B Block 10.
So, 10 years after Sean Cunningham died, when it was obvious any safety case could not be valid, and it was later admitted one couldn't be found, we've progressed to it's a bag of nails. Does anyone in MoD see the link to the demise of the ATC gliders, managed by the same people?
Or the parallels with Nimrod MRA4, where it too didn't have a valid safety case; and when the task was eventually resurrected it was discovered that the warnings of 1995 were correct - it could never be valid?
How could the Hawk and Glider teams, or anyone remotely connected with them, have passed supposedly robust MAA audits since 2010?
Yet another fleet being scrapped, or perhaps given away to someone who knows how to do the job, yet no-one seems answerable. Am I alone in suspecting the money 'saved' is earmarked for other aircraft fleets which have similar problems and are deemed more important?
Or the parallels with Nimrod MRA4, where it too didn't have a valid safety case; and when the task was eventually resurrected it was discovered that the warnings of 1995 were correct - it could never be valid?
How could the Hawk and Glider teams, or anyone remotely connected with them, have passed supposedly robust MAA audits since 2010?
Yet another fleet being scrapped, or perhaps given away to someone who knows how to do the job, yet no-one seems answerable. Am I alone in suspecting the money 'saved' is earmarked for other aircraft fleets which have similar problems and are deemed more important?
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You'd think someone would write a book about it, wouldn't you?. Oh, wait! They already have, several in fact.
So yes FL, it does matter, it matters a lot.
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Well yes, FL, it does matter, it matters a lot. Airworthiness Related Fatal Accident threads litter this Forum, Red5 included, like a spreading canker. It is more a question now of which fleets are airworthy, and how is that to be determined? No such reassurance comes from the MAA, in fact nothing comes from the MAA. Hardly surprising of course as it is merely a department of the operator, the MOD. Until it is fully independent of the MOD it remains its puppet and ditto all that as regards Military Air Accident Investigation too. Any Air Force that seeks Command of the Air must have airworthy aircraft at the very least. It is the foundation upon which its aircraft, systems, and aircrew training are built. Without airworthiness an Air Force cannot prevail against an equivalent one that understands and values the need to ensure and maintain airworthiness. The system that ensured UK Military Airworthiness was deliberately and malevolently subverted by RAF VSOs to raid Air Safety ring fenced monies for short term financial gain. That illegal act has been the subject of cover up ever since. A cover up that means reform of UK Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation is obstructed. Hence avoidable Airworthiness Related Air Accidents continue to cost lives and treasure, and all to protect the reputations of some old men!
You'd think someone would write a book about it, wouldn't you?. Oh, wait! They already have, several in fact.
So yes FL, it does matter, it matters a lot.
You'd think someone would write a book about it, wouldn't you?. Oh, wait! They already have, several in fact.
So yes FL, it does matter, it matters a lot.
Chugalug
You will feel gratified and vindicated by the replies you have just received. Seldom have I seen seen such a complete lack of understanding of the subject.
I suspect you know the answer to your question!
MC
You will feel gratified and vindicated by the replies you have just received. Seldom have I seen seen such a complete lack of understanding of the subject.
I suspect you know the answer to your question!
MC
I see it’s quite an emotive subject for you and some others. I agree that in some respects the MAA not being independent of the operator could be an issue. Your grievance by the looks of things pertains to RAF VSOs meddling. I still take it back to my original point. On this particular issue, does it really matter as the Hawk T1 is going out of service. Case solved for this airframe.
The words coffee and smell come to mind. Wake up. Now!
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The logic of your post is that you would go on making the same point as fleet after fleet disappears from the Military Register due to 'costs'. Case solved for every tree until the whole wood is gone? Classic stove-pipe mentality that would lead inexorably to no UK Military Aviation at all. Clearly a nonsense, so instead the core front line fleets are kept but still subject to the same problem, their airworthiness cannot be assured. It isn't money that will slowly turn that around but regulatory and investigative independence.
The words coffee and smell come to mind. Wake up. Now!
The words coffee and smell come to mind. Wake up. Now!
Can you prove to me now that the current FL fleet are not airworthy?
Foghorn
Apologies for butting in again, but perhaps you could tell us how the Hawk safety case is progressing? Or are we both being unfair, because it is for the RAF to prove the aircraft IS airworthy? Chugalug has cited a publication ("Red 5") explaining the background. Would MoD not ask for it to be withdrawn or corrected if it were wrong?
MC
Apologies for butting in again, but perhaps you could tell us how the Hawk safety case is progressing? Or are we both being unfair, because it is for the RAF to prove the aircraft IS airworthy? Chugalug has cited a publication ("Red 5") explaining the background. Would MoD not ask for it to be withdrawn or corrected if it were wrong?
MC
To coin an old long forgotten piece of cold war mantra, "Flight Safety Concerns You!". That means you, FL.
Chugalug
I am not criticising your passion and I don’t doubt your intentions.
You may wish to consider your method of presentation though.
I’m afraid that, whether you realise it or not, you do come across a little zealot-like in your approach.
Maybe Foghorn has a problem understanding your point and maybe you need to present it better?
We fly the aircraft daily and our concern is ‘are they serviceable and safe to fly?’.
FL (and myself if I’m brutally honest) do not fully understand how a bunch of paperwork makes the aircraft safer.
If we look at GR4 with its lack of CAS or the Hercules without ESF or the Nimrod with its faulty fuel system we understand how and why it is unacceptable for the aircraft we operate to be given to us in an unacceptable state and that we may not be aware of that.
The problem is that ranting on about safety cases ad nauseam doesn’t necessarily present the issue in bite sized chunks to the masses.
How exactly are we supposed to operate highly complex machinery in an operational environment without all the time and money in the world to make sure all the paperwork has all the i’s and t’s dotted and crossed?
Of course the correct answer is to wait until it’s done. The reality is that we have a job to do.
Also how do we, the pilots at the shop floor, do anything about it? Go on strike?
As for how mother nations handle it I can vouch for the fact that many of them do not wrap themselves around the axle about paperwork in quite such a spectacular fashion.
This has obvious benefits and obvious drawbacks. I’ll leave it to you to work out what they may be.
BV
You may wish to consider your method of presentation though.
I’m afraid that, whether you realise it or not, you do come across a little zealot-like in your approach.
Maybe Foghorn has a problem understanding your point and maybe you need to present it better?
We fly the aircraft daily and our concern is ‘are they serviceable and safe to fly?’.
FL (and myself if I’m brutally honest) do not fully understand how a bunch of paperwork makes the aircraft safer.
If we look at GR4 with its lack of CAS or the Hercules without ESF or the Nimrod with its faulty fuel system we understand how and why it is unacceptable for the aircraft we operate to be given to us in an unacceptable state and that we may not be aware of that.
The problem is that ranting on about safety cases ad nauseam doesn’t necessarily present the issue in bite sized chunks to the masses.
How exactly are we supposed to operate highly complex machinery in an operational environment without all the time and money in the world to make sure all the paperwork has all the i’s and t’s dotted and crossed?
Of course the correct answer is to wait until it’s done. The reality is that we have a job to do.
Also how do we, the pilots at the shop floor, do anything about it? Go on strike?
As for how mother nations handle it I can vouch for the fact that many of them do not wrap themselves around the axle about paperwork in quite such a spectacular fashion.
This has obvious benefits and obvious drawbacks. I’ll leave it to you to work out what they may be.
BV
Inexplicably MOD have never asked for these safer seats to be modded/fitted to Hawk Mk1's in spite of the fact that MB offered to fit to Hawks and that the Tornado Fleet was updated to gas operated top sear type seats.
Bob,
If I come across as zealot like, then guilty as charged I guess. You've told me before that if you had any concerns about the safety of your aircraft you wouldn't fly it (or words to that effect). I pointed out that you should be concerned, even though the aircraft was presented to you as serviceable via the F700, because you would not know if it was airworthy (or words to that effect). You, and I in my time, have to rely on faceless dedicated engineers (and increasingly non-engineers) who assure that airworthiness for you. So what as aircrew can you do about it to be the better informed and hopefully re-assured? My advice then remains the same now, read the book (books indeed!). In your case (and FL's) I would start with Red 5. Though it centres on the slices of cheese that sealed Sean Cunningham's fate it acts as a primer on how the system protecting your backsides is supposed to work, how it used to work, how it was subverted by RAF VSOs who ordered the suborning of your bits of paper to sign the Regs off as complied with when they weren't, and most devastatingly of all, to dismiss the faceless dedicated engineers who would not comply, and with them their experience and knowledge base. They were replaced by non-engineers with none of those attributes. The system has never recovered. I am but a spear carrier in this campaign. Like you, a mere driver airframe never told of those who strove daily to protect my sorry arse or even told about airworthiness. What I know about it I have learned in this forum. The good news is that you do not have to read through the PPRuNe archives to get an understanding of the dire state of UK Military Air Safety. Red 5 is available down that mighty tropical river :-
A mere £3.99 to download, and newly updated. You can read it on your PC if without a Kindle with the Kindle for PC app. I can guarantee that if you didn't have concerns before you will when you have read it. Further books by David Hill can be found down the same river. I would recommend them all, unreservedly.
As to bits of paper protecting you and others, I'm loath to use the motoring analogy so beloved of in this forum, but isn't that exactly what an MOT certificate does? Prove a vehicle was roadworthy on test (but not later, as you will no doubt say to prove the weakness of the analogy. Point taken!) ? Airworthiness is proved, or disproved, by a continuous process of audit. Everything that is done to the aircraft or its systems is recorded and certified as IAW the Regulations. Falsify that, or merely disregard the need for the mandated process, and airworthiness cannot be proven and is hence absent. If a simple airframe such as a glider can thus be rendered unairworthy, what hope for more complex aircraft and systems?
As to seeking comfort in the actions/inactions of other nations, did any one of them seek to actively destroy their own Air Safety systems? I suspect we are a world leader in that regard, and will continue to retain that dubious honour until the cover up ends and true reform enacted.
There you go, Bob, more ranting. Just to prove your point.
If I come across as zealot like, then guilty as charged I guess. You've told me before that if you had any concerns about the safety of your aircraft you wouldn't fly it (or words to that effect). I pointed out that you should be concerned, even though the aircraft was presented to you as serviceable via the F700, because you would not know if it was airworthy (or words to that effect). You, and I in my time, have to rely on faceless dedicated engineers (and increasingly non-engineers) who assure that airworthiness for you. So what as aircrew can you do about it to be the better informed and hopefully re-assured? My advice then remains the same now, read the book (books indeed!). In your case (and FL's) I would start with Red 5. Though it centres on the slices of cheese that sealed Sean Cunningham's fate it acts as a primer on how the system protecting your backsides is supposed to work, how it used to work, how it was subverted by RAF VSOs who ordered the suborning of your bits of paper to sign the Regs off as complied with when they weren't, and most devastatingly of all, to dismiss the faceless dedicated engineers who would not comply, and with them their experience and knowledge base. They were replaced by non-engineers with none of those attributes. The system has never recovered. I am but a spear carrier in this campaign. Like you, a mere driver airframe never told of those who strove daily to protect my sorry arse or even told about airworthiness. What I know about it I have learned in this forum. The good news is that you do not have to read through the PPRuNe archives to get an understanding of the dire state of UK Military Air Safety. Red 5 is available down that mighty tropical river :-
A mere £3.99 to download, and newly updated. You can read it on your PC if without a Kindle with the Kindle for PC app. I can guarantee that if you didn't have concerns before you will when you have read it. Further books by David Hill can be found down the same river. I would recommend them all, unreservedly.
As to bits of paper protecting you and others, I'm loath to use the motoring analogy so beloved of in this forum, but isn't that exactly what an MOT certificate does? Prove a vehicle was roadworthy on test (but not later, as you will no doubt say to prove the weakness of the analogy. Point taken!) ? Airworthiness is proved, or disproved, by a continuous process of audit. Everything that is done to the aircraft or its systems is recorded and certified as IAW the Regulations. Falsify that, or merely disregard the need for the mandated process, and airworthiness cannot be proven and is hence absent. If a simple airframe such as a glider can thus be rendered unairworthy, what hope for more complex aircraft and systems?
As to seeking comfort in the actions/inactions of other nations, did any one of them seek to actively destroy their own Air Safety systems? I suspect we are a world leader in that regard, and will continue to retain that dubious honour until the cover up ends and true reform enacted.
There you go, Bob, more ranting. Just to prove your point.
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I am not criticising your passion and I don’t doubt your intentions.
You may wish to consider your method of presentation though.
I’m afraid that, whether you realise it or not, you do come across a little zealot-like in your approach.
Maybe Foghorn has a problem understanding your point and maybe you need to present it better?
We fly the aircraft daily and our concern is ‘are they serviceable and safe to fly?’.
FL (and myself if I’m brutally honest) do not fully understand how a bunch of paperwork makes the aircraft safer.
If we look at GR4 with its lack of CAS or the Hercules without ESF or the Nimrod with its faulty fuel system we understand how and why it is unacceptable for the aircraft we operate to be given to us in an unacceptable state and that we may not be aware of that.
The problem is that ranting on about safety cases ad nauseam doesn’t necessarily present the issue in bite sized chunks to the masses.
How exactly are we supposed to operate highly complex machinery in an operational environment without all the time and money in the world to make sure all the paperwork has all the i’s and t’s dotted and crossed?
Of course the correct answer is to wait until it’s done. The reality is that we have a job to do.
Also how do we, the pilots at the shop floor, do anything about it? Go on strike?
As for how mother nations handle it I can vouch for the fact that many of them do not wrap themselves around the axle about paperwork in quite such a spectacular fashion.
This has obvious benefits and obvious drawbacks. I’ll leave it to you to work out what they may be.
BV
You may wish to consider your method of presentation though.
I’m afraid that, whether you realise it or not, you do come across a little zealot-like in your approach.
Maybe Foghorn has a problem understanding your point and maybe you need to present it better?
We fly the aircraft daily and our concern is ‘are they serviceable and safe to fly?’.
FL (and myself if I’m brutally honest) do not fully understand how a bunch of paperwork makes the aircraft safer.
If we look at GR4 with its lack of CAS or the Hercules without ESF or the Nimrod with its faulty fuel system we understand how and why it is unacceptable for the aircraft we operate to be given to us in an unacceptable state and that we may not be aware of that.
The problem is that ranting on about safety cases ad nauseam doesn’t necessarily present the issue in bite sized chunks to the masses.
How exactly are we supposed to operate highly complex machinery in an operational environment without all the time and money in the world to make sure all the paperwork has all the i’s and t’s dotted and crossed?
Of course the correct answer is to wait until it’s done. The reality is that we have a job to do.
Also how do we, the pilots at the shop floor, do anything about it? Go on strike?
As for how mother nations handle it I can vouch for the fact that many of them do not wrap themselves around the axle about paperwork in quite such a spectacular fashion.
This has obvious benefits and obvious drawbacks. I’ll leave it to you to work out what they may be.
BV