39 years
XX377 Gazelle AH1 656 Sqn AAC
Volans et videns
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
- Poor Communication between Services
- IFF turned off because Rapier was not being able to cope with IFF emissions
- Assumption
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
Thread Starter
Hi Beags,
2 basic modes; slaved to the radar and boresight. In both modes, you could "wrist out" to provide a circular search of varying diameter. (Can't remember how many mils)
Falk Loft 82 software (flown down to Ascension in a Burberry pocket!) added a Superscan mode where the missile performed an oblong search pattern left, right, above and below LFD (once again, details lost in the mists of time.).
The idea was that you could acquire a target which was too far above LFD to get the boresight on. It worked a treat in Harry doggers except for the fact that in the two-week development timescale * (!!) they didn't realise that it was ground stabilised; so in a hard right turn, it scanned out of your left ear! The Loft bit worked very well though.
* Kids today, they wouldn't believe it!
Mog
2 basic modes; slaved to the radar and boresight. In both modes, you could "wrist out" to provide a circular search of varying diameter. (Can't remember how many mils)
Falk Loft 82 software (flown down to Ascension in a Burberry pocket!) added a Superscan mode where the missile performed an oblong search pattern left, right, above and below LFD (once again, details lost in the mists of time.).
The idea was that you could acquire a target which was too far above LFD to get the boresight on. It worked a treat in Harry doggers except for the fact that in the two-week development timescale * (!!) they didn't realise that it was ground stabilised; so in a hard right turn, it scanned out of your left ear! The Loft bit worked very well though.
* Kids today, they wouldn't believe it!
Mog
Volans et videns
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
- Poor Communication between Services
- IFF turned off because Rapier was not being able to cope with IFF emissions
- Assumption
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
Argentine 35 mm Oerlikon GDF air defense shot down 2 Argentine Air Force aircraft.
The first one was on May 1st. A Mirage IIIEA was trying to land in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino airport, but there was a red alert at that moment, and it was shot down. The pilot, Captain Gustavo Argentino Garcia Cuerva, couldn’t eject.
The second one was on May 12th, an MD A-4B flight was escaping after attacking British ships and overflew Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, and First Lieutenant Fausto Gavazzi was taken by the air defenses, he couldn´t eject either.
He was shot down by an Argentine Army air defense, another 35 mm Oerlikon.
39 years ago today, I led a 3-ship Harrier GR3 attack against AAA that was being used in direct fire against the 2 Para attack on Goose Green.
The attack using CBU's and 2" rockets was successful and put the guns out of action. I am told that it helped to de-moralise the Argentinians, and bolstered the morale of the attacking Paras. So it helped.
We were held at cockpit readiness on the deck of HERMES at first light the next day to go to do a "firepower demo" in the same area if the Argentinians didn't surrender - they did, so I went elsewhere.
Given the importance of that first major battle after the landings, the successful surrender at Goose Green set the scene for the next few weeks and the final surrender.
The attack using CBU's and 2" rockets was successful and put the guns out of action. I am told that it helped to de-moralise the Argentinians, and bolstered the morale of the attacking Paras. So it helped.
We were held at cockpit readiness on the deck of HERMES at first light the next day to go to do a "firepower demo" in the same area if the Argentinians didn't surrender - they did, so I went elsewhere.
Given the importance of that first major battle after the landings, the successful surrender at Goose Green set the scene for the next few weeks and the final surrender.
sandiego89.......
The GR3 with the 330 gal ferry tanks was a bit of a dog - but it flew OK as long as you were gentle with it. It was very "g" limited (2.5g rings a bell in my tired old brain). The biggest problem with the tanks was that they could be unreliable and fuel transfer could be a problem. The plus side is that if they worked, they worked - if they didn't, you generally found out in time to turn round and go back home.
I did the 9 hours UK to Ascension - we then unloaded the tanks for the short flight to VL on Atlantic Conveyor. I suspect that the flights to which you refer were the four flown from Ascension direct to HERMES - by then, Atlantic Conveyor was on the bottom. The four pilots that flew those 9 hour flights did a terrific job and had never before landed on a boat. They had to jettison the 330 gal tanks before they could VL on HERMES - and they carried outboard 100 gal tanks (empty - the outboard pylons were not "wet") to augment the ones we had on HERMES, some of which had a few holes in them from small arms or shrapnel. Plus a couple had been jettisoned into the sea. We had lost 4 of the 6 GR3's we took down, and the replacement 4 GR3's needed the 100 gal tanks to replace the 330 tanks that they had had to jettison before they could land. The 100 gal tanks were necessary because of the distance the carrier was from the Islands.
Hope that makes sense...............
The GR3 with the 330 gal ferry tanks was a bit of a dog - but it flew OK as long as you were gentle with it. It was very "g" limited (2.5g rings a bell in my tired old brain). The biggest problem with the tanks was that they could be unreliable and fuel transfer could be a problem. The plus side is that if they worked, they worked - if they didn't, you generally found out in time to turn round and go back home.
I did the 9 hours UK to Ascension - we then unloaded the tanks for the short flight to VL on Atlantic Conveyor. I suspect that the flights to which you refer were the four flown from Ascension direct to HERMES - by then, Atlantic Conveyor was on the bottom. The four pilots that flew those 9 hour flights did a terrific job and had never before landed on a boat. They had to jettison the 330 gal tanks before they could VL on HERMES - and they carried outboard 100 gal tanks (empty - the outboard pylons were not "wet") to augment the ones we had on HERMES, some of which had a few holes in them from small arms or shrapnel. Plus a couple had been jettisoned into the sea. We had lost 4 of the 6 GR3's we took down, and the replacement 4 GR3's needed the 100 gal tanks to replace the 330 tanks that they had had to jettison before they could land. The 100 gal tanks were necessary because of the distance the carrier was from the Islands.
Hope that makes sense...............
Thread Starter
8th June marked the last air-to-air engagement when two of us bounced four Skyhawks as they attacked a small landing craft near Lively Island. A previous raid had severely damaged two landing craft in Port Pleasant, with large loss of life.
I fired two AIM9Ls a few seconds apart and downed two of the A4s which were flying less than 50' above the sea. I then emptied my guns at a third (gun sight had dumped at this stage), achieving one hit on the port flap. This aircraft was then downed by my wingman with a L at max range and very low level (below 20').
We then returned to Hermes on fumes, landing with less than 90 seconds worth of gas, in the dark, for our first ever night deck landing. Luckily they kept the bar open for us!
Mog
I fired two AIM9Ls a few seconds apart and downed two of the A4s which were flying less than 50' above the sea. I then emptied my guns at a third (gun sight had dumped at this stage), achieving one hit on the port flap. This aircraft was then downed by my wingman with a L at max range and very low level (below 20').
We then returned to Hermes on fumes, landing with less than 90 seconds worth of gas, in the dark, for our first ever night deck landing. Luckily they kept the bar open for us!
Mog
Mog stories on here are but a snippet of the extended version from his book, also found a copy of 809 book by Rowland in a charity shop very near RNAS Yeovilton to compliment my Kindle version.Also worth a read
Q other than Sharkeys any other crew write a book about their times in the South Atlantic?
Q other than Sharkeys any other crew write a book about their times in the South Atlantic?
Mog stories on here are but a snippet of the extended version from his book, also found a copy of 809 book by Rowland in a charity shop very near RNAS Yeovilton to compliment my Kindle version.Also worth a read
Q other than Sharkeys any other crew write a book about their times in the South Atlantic?
Q other than Sharkeys any other crew write a book about their times in the South Atlantic?
Well worth a read.
sandiego89.......
The GR3 with the 330 gal ferry tanks was a bit of a dog - but it flew OK as long as you were gentle with it. It was very "g" limited (2.5g rings a bell in my tired old brain). The biggest problem with the tanks was that they could be unreliable and fuel transfer could be a problem. The plus side is that if they worked, they worked - if they didn't, you generally found out in time to turn round and go back home.
I did the 9 hours UK to Ascension - we then unloaded the tanks for the short flight to VL on Atlantic Conveyor. I suspect that the flights to which you refer were the four flown from Ascension direct to HERMES - by then, Atlantic Conveyor was on the bottom. The four pilots that flew those 9 hour flights did a terrific job and had never before landed on a boat. They had to jettison the 330 gal tanks before they could VL on HERMES - and they carried outboard 100 gal tanks (empty - the outboard pylons were not "wet") to augment the ones we had on HERMES, some of which had a few holes in them from small arms or shrapnel. Plus a couple had been jettisoned into the sea. We had lost 4 of the 6 GR3's we took down, and the replacement 4 GR3's needed the 100 gal tanks to replace the 330 tanks that they had had to jettison before they could land. The 100 gal tanks were necessary because of the distance the carrier was from the Islands.
Hope that makes sense...............
The GR3 with the 330 gal ferry tanks was a bit of a dog - but it flew OK as long as you were gentle with it. It was very "g" limited (2.5g rings a bell in my tired old brain). The biggest problem with the tanks was that they could be unreliable and fuel transfer could be a problem. The plus side is that if they worked, they worked - if they didn't, you generally found out in time to turn round and go back home.
I did the 9 hours UK to Ascension - we then unloaded the tanks for the short flight to VL on Atlantic Conveyor. I suspect that the flights to which you refer were the four flown from Ascension direct to HERMES - by then, Atlantic Conveyor was on the bottom. The four pilots that flew those 9 hour flights did a terrific job and had never before landed on a boat. They had to jettison the 330 gal tanks before they could VL on HERMES - and they carried outboard 100 gal tanks (empty - the outboard pylons were not "wet") to augment the ones we had on HERMES, some of which had a few holes in them from small arms or shrapnel. Plus a couple had been jettisoned into the sea. We had lost 4 of the 6 GR3's we took down, and the replacement 4 GR3's needed the 100 gal tanks to replace the 330 tanks that they had had to jettison before they could land. The 100 gal tanks were necessary because of the distance the carrier was from the Islands.
Hope that makes sense...............
As I understand it the Harrier had limited capability to move fuel around. How many plugs did you have to do on the long ferry flight? and how many pounds would you take on each fill? I assume the feed would drain from the ferry tanks first. Hope I'm not a bother with questions. Thank you.
SD89
Briefly - not to bore PPRuNers.......
The GR3 could balance fuel, but not "move it around".
I think we did 4/5 plugs on the UK -ASI flight. I seem to recall that they might have done a few more on the ASI-HERMES flights. Always topping up rather than going from empty to full - probably about 4/5000lbs per plug. Keeping diversion fuel was the key, plus the tankers had their own need to refuel each other and give away before going home or going to a friendly airfield - Spain was not "friendly" for the UK-ASI flights. Yes, the fuel used came from the drops before internal.
Briefly - not to bore PPRuNers.......
The GR3 could balance fuel, but not "move it around".
I think we did 4/5 plugs on the UK -ASI flight. I seem to recall that they might have done a few more on the ASI-HERMES flights. Always topping up rather than going from empty to full - probably about 4/5000lbs per plug. Keeping diversion fuel was the key, plus the tankers had their own need to refuel each other and give away before going home or going to a friendly airfield - Spain was not "friendly" for the UK-ASI flights. Yes, the fuel used came from the drops before internal.
Last edited by ex-fast-jets; 9th Jun 2021 at 07:19.
Mogwi, I've just finished reading your book, well written sir!
What left me hanging is when did you learn that you had dived in the middle of the formation of A4's? You had three in front but I reckon you heard of the fourth much later?
What left me hanging is when did you learn that you had dived in the middle of the formation of A4's? You had three in front but I reckon you heard of the fourth much later?
39 years ago - today...............
I was over the Falklands in a GR3 with two LGB's destined for artillery on Sapper Hill, the last high ground before Stanley.
I took the FAC brief and was about to run in to loft the bombs against the target, when the FAC told me to stop and hold off.....
The white flags had gone up, and the Argentinians were streaming back into Stanley. Our ground troops had gone "Guns Tight" - I was told to return to HERMES.
The LGB kits had been air-dropped to us, so some considerable effort had gone into getting them down to us. I didn't know if fighting would resume that day or the next, and I was reluctant to jettison them into the sea in case they were needed again. I worked out that if I jettisoned fuel and then burnt off to not a lot, I could VL with them onboard. So that is what I did. When I got out of the cockpit, I was told that the Captain wanted to see me, so I went to the bridge, where he proceeded to bollock me for landing on his boat with my bombs on. I explained why I had done so - at which point he stopped bollocking me, told me to "wait there" and disappeared, returning with Adm Woodward. "Tell him what you have just told me" he said - so I did.
I was, effectively, the carrier pigeon that gave the TF Commander the news that he wanted - that it was all over.
ENDEX
I was over the Falklands in a GR3 with two LGB's destined for artillery on Sapper Hill, the last high ground before Stanley.
I took the FAC brief and was about to run in to loft the bombs against the target, when the FAC told me to stop and hold off.....
The white flags had gone up, and the Argentinians were streaming back into Stanley. Our ground troops had gone "Guns Tight" - I was told to return to HERMES.
The LGB kits had been air-dropped to us, so some considerable effort had gone into getting them down to us. I didn't know if fighting would resume that day or the next, and I was reluctant to jettison them into the sea in case they were needed again. I worked out that if I jettisoned fuel and then burnt off to not a lot, I could VL with them onboard. So that is what I did. When I got out of the cockpit, I was told that the Captain wanted to see me, so I went to the bridge, where he proceeded to bollock me for landing on his boat with my bombs on. I explained why I had done so - at which point he stopped bollocking me, told me to "wait there" and disappeared, returning with Adm Woodward. "Tell him what you have just told me" he said - so I did.
I was, effectively, the carrier pigeon that gave the TF Commander the news that he wanted - that it was all over.
ENDEX
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Thanks for that, Ex-FJ, a superb recollection.
It’s threads like this that make the forum still worth being on. Let’s hope that planning is in progress for a proper commemoration of next year’s 40th.
I found your risk assessment for landing back on with the LGBs very interesting especially given the post - Haddon Cave RAF’s requirement to make everything ALARP!
It’s threads like this that make the forum still worth being on. Let’s hope that planning is in progress for a proper commemoration of next year’s 40th.
I found your risk assessment for landing back on with the LGBs very interesting especially given the post - Haddon Cave RAF’s requirement to make everything ALARP!
Ex-fast-jets
A large print of this event called ''Last Launch of the Falklands'' (or similar) hung in my late mother-in-law's Devon cottage.
She always said that if I ever got in contact with the pilots I had to say 'Thank you' from her.
So from the late Jean Elizabeth . "thank you sir."
A large print of this event called ''Last Launch of the Falklands'' (or similar) hung in my late mother-in-law's Devon cottage.
She always said that if I ever got in contact with the pilots I had to say 'Thank you' from her.
So from the late Jean Elizabeth . "thank you sir."
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Thread Starter
1993, when I met the No4, Hector Sanchez. Loss of SA due to adrenalin, low light levels and annoyance! I was lucky that he was stretched and his guns jammed.
Mog
