Nimrod XV 256 accident (1980)
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I hope the families get to read this.
Doubtful the co-pilot was young and single. I was at his funeral and spoke to his parents who will be long gone by now, as you have chosen an accident from 40 years ago to advance your cause (whatever it is, I'm not sure). The pilot (Captain) was an Australian exchange officer, and just in case any of his family do read this (unlikely) in my humble opinion his flying skills under extreme duress saved a lot of lives. Worth mentioning I think, since this thread has gathered some traction.
Posters of course have freedom to do whatever the site mods allow - its the internet and all sorts of folk inhabit it. Calling out RAF aircrew because they differ in their interpretation of what does and does not consitute operational acceptable risk seems a little odd on a professional military aviators forum, but whatever, to each their own. As far as the vagaries of law are concerned...beyond both my IQ and my interest level I'm afraid. If you're telling me the UK justice system is a total ****fest, I could not agree more, but for me anyway, it is what it is...not something to keep me awake at night. Again to each their own, but I tend think there would better places to have a legal discussion like this...with perhaps a more receptive audience. Just saying.
However for the sake of accuracy lets put the seabird discussion to bed shall we, it was seagulls, not geese, as any number of folk who were there at the time can testify. And while on the subject guy who got away with a broken leg was an AEOp (Flight Sergeant or a Master, I know his name, but I am not posting it) not the Flight Engineer. (There were two flight engineers onboard, as it was Nimrod Mark Two Conversion Sortie and the NCF (Nimrod Conversion Flight) was onboard in addition to the usual crew.) The second flight eng was standing on the flight deck and simply ducked behind the bulkhead and crouched on the floor prior to impact (the aircraft was only airborne for a few seconds). The impact was so soft the emergency lights did not trigger (less than 2g I think) and some of the crew initially thought they were down in Findhorn Bay (quite a few extra bodies on board in the galley and in the pax seat who were probably not paying to much attention to the departure details at that point). It was also pitch black and as anyone who ever lived at Kinloss know, the Geese transit to and from the bay at dusk and dawn, not during the dark.
Anything else you guys would like to know?
I actually don't mind discussing this particular accident as I think it highly unlikely that any relation to the deceased would be reading it and in any event the actions of the pilots on the day were exemplary, and probably heroic, in every respect.
Doubtful the co-pilot was young and single. I was at his funeral and spoke to his parents who will be long gone by now, as you have chosen an accident from 40 years ago to advance your cause (whatever it is, I'm not sure). The pilot (Captain) was an Australian exchange officer, and just in case any of his family do read this (unlikely) in my humble opinion his flying skills under extreme duress saved a lot of lives. Worth mentioning I think, since this thread has gathered some traction.
Posters of course have freedom to do whatever the site mods allow - its the internet and all sorts of folk inhabit it. Calling out RAF aircrew because they differ in their interpretation of what does and does not consitute operational acceptable risk seems a little odd on a professional military aviators forum, but whatever, to each their own. As far as the vagaries of law are concerned...beyond both my IQ and my interest level I'm afraid. If you're telling me the UK justice system is a total ****fest, I could not agree more, but for me anyway, it is what it is...not something to keep me awake at night. Again to each their own, but I tend think there would better places to have a legal discussion like this...with perhaps a more receptive audience. Just saying.
However for the sake of accuracy lets put the seabird discussion to bed shall we, it was seagulls, not geese, as any number of folk who were there at the time can testify. And while on the subject guy who got away with a broken leg was an AEOp (Flight Sergeant or a Master, I know his name, but I am not posting it) not the Flight Engineer. (There were two flight engineers onboard, as it was Nimrod Mark Two Conversion Sortie and the NCF (Nimrod Conversion Flight) was onboard in addition to the usual crew.) The second flight eng was standing on the flight deck and simply ducked behind the bulkhead and crouched on the floor prior to impact (the aircraft was only airborne for a few seconds). The impact was so soft the emergency lights did not trigger (less than 2g I think) and some of the crew initially thought they were down in Findhorn Bay (quite a few extra bodies on board in the galley and in the pax seat who were probably not paying to much attention to the departure details at that point). It was also pitch black and as anyone who ever lived at Kinloss know, the Geese transit to and from the bay at dusk and dawn, not during the dark.
Anything else you guys would like to know?
I actually don't mind discussing this particular accident as I think it highly unlikely that any relation to the deceased would be reading it and in any event the actions of the pilots on the day were exemplary, and probably heroic, in every respect.
Last edited by Richard Dangle; 19th Nov 2020 at 22:00.
RD, thank you for your post. I'll defer to DV as regards any follow up info as it's his thread. You've already cleared the air and told us much of what happened. With no BoI Report seemingly in the public domain, and no FAI, the only immediate source of info would seem to be those like yourself who are prepared to recount what they remember. Let us hope that others might come forward as well to help DV in his quest.
Just to be clear, no-one is denying the need of operational risk, that is the sine qua non of military aviation. The campaign to reform UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation is to try to reduce losses other than the operational ones, so that the RAF maintains its maximum air power. The actions of its leadership have sorely affected that over the past decades.
Just to be clear, no-one is denying the need of operational risk, that is the sine qua non of military aviation. The campaign to reform UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation is to try to reduce losses other than the operational ones, so that the RAF maintains its maximum air power. The actions of its leadership have sorely affected that over the past decades.
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With no BoI Report seemingly in the public domain
Don't know if this link will work, but anyway took me about 15-20 seconds to find with my good friend Google.
MAAS, RAF Nimrod MR2, Date: 17 Nov 1980 PDF [2.2 MB]
If it does work and you can read it, it appears my memory of that fateful day is pretty accurate as it endorses much of what I wrote above. To be clear, I wrote my post first, before reading it, I only searched for it because I was under the impression that, contrary to the post above, I thought - generally speaking - publically published RAF BOE summaries (I am aware they are partially redacted summaries) are accessible through the National Archives, which it appears they are.
I applaud any campaign to improve airworthiness/flight safety military or otherwise, but since this is one of those rare accidents where the cause is clear, unambigious and beyond any reasonable doubt, and the airworthiness of the type is incidental (poor choice of word maybe, but any reasonable person will know what I mean) maybe this one can be left alone. Perhaps it is best remembered purely for the tragic loss of the pilots, who against all odds, saved the lives of their crew, through their calm professionalism in the face of mortal danger. May they rest in peace.
As to DV's "mission" - it appears his beef is with the Scottish Justice System. As we all no doubt know, military law is subservient to civilian law (in the UK) and in Scotland, Scottish Law (in most matters) holds sway. Personally I find the entire UK justice system idiosyncratic in countless ways, so I wish him best with his quest, but again it seems a niche issue for this forum and discussion of it in the context of this 1980 accident seems tenuous at best.
Finally, as regards this accident I think you could hold any number of inquiries by any number of agencies and the findings would be largely identical to that which the RAF produced at the time.
Now that this has all been brought back to the front of my grey matter, I'll raise a glass to the pilots tonight.
Per adua ad astra
Don't know if this link will work, but anyway took me about 15-20 seconds to find with my good friend Google.
MAAS, RAF Nimrod MR2, Date: 17 Nov 1980 PDF [2.2 MB]
If it does work and you can read it, it appears my memory of that fateful day is pretty accurate as it endorses much of what I wrote above. To be clear, I wrote my post first, before reading it, I only searched for it because I was under the impression that, contrary to the post above, I thought - generally speaking - publically published RAF BOE summaries (I am aware they are partially redacted summaries) are accessible through the National Archives, which it appears they are.
I applaud any campaign to improve airworthiness/flight safety military or otherwise, but since this is one of those rare accidents where the cause is clear, unambigious and beyond any reasonable doubt, and the airworthiness of the type is incidental (poor choice of word maybe, but any reasonable person will know what I mean) maybe this one can be left alone. Perhaps it is best remembered purely for the tragic loss of the pilots, who against all odds, saved the lives of their crew, through their calm professionalism in the face of mortal danger. May they rest in peace.
As to DV's "mission" - it appears his beef is with the Scottish Justice System. As we all no doubt know, military law is subservient to civilian law (in the UK) and in Scotland, Scottish Law (in most matters) holds sway. Personally I find the entire UK justice system idiosyncratic in countless ways, so I wish him best with his quest, but again it seems a niche issue for this forum and discussion of it in the context of this 1980 accident seems tenuous at best.
Finally, as regards this accident I think you could hold any number of inquiries by any number of agencies and the findings would be largely identical to that which the RAF produced at the time.
Now that this has all been brought back to the front of my grey matter, I'll raise a glass to the pilots tonight.
Per adua ad astra
Last edited by Richard Dangle; 20th Nov 2020 at 05:05.
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Afterthought.
Of one thing I am clear and uncompromising. The first job of any aircraft accident report, in any context and under any authority, is to learn lessons and to improve flight safety. Any other function they have is subservient to this requirement and any authority which demotes this primary requirement is doing a disservice to the progression of aviation safety. In this instance the only significant "lessons" revolve around bird control and I can confirm the lessons and subsequent recommendations were applied.
Nothing came from the "lightweight headgear" comment though - rightly so in my opinion.
Of one thing I am clear and uncompromising. The first job of any aircraft accident report, in any context and under any authority, is to learn lessons and to improve flight safety. Any other function they have is subservient to this requirement and any authority which demotes this primary requirement is doing a disservice to the progression of aviation safety. In this instance the only significant "lessons" revolve around bird control and I can confirm the lessons and subsequent recommendations were applied.
Nothing came from the "lightweight headgear" comment though - rightly so in my opinion.
RD, thanks again for coming back. Re the link to the BoI Summary, I think DV already has that and was attempting to resolve differences between it and other sources. The type of birds being the obvious discrepancy and which you have now confirmed.
The 80's was a decade where old school military airworthiness and accident investigation came under increasing strain until being effectively broken in the end. The result was apparent with the loss of Chinook Mk2 ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. 29 killed, and a Reviewing Officers' Finding that brought dishonour on the reputations of both pilots and of the Royal Air Force. The start of this road to hell might be seen as the agreement between the MOD and the Scottish Crown Office that as Service Personnel were not deemed 'employed', their deaths on duty in Scotland did not justify the holding of an FAI. DV exposed this cynical act, then fought and won to get it overturned. I hope this gives some idea of why a seemingly straight forward but tragic accident in 1980 is linked with later ones affected by the grossly negligent acts of RAF VSOs and their subsequent cover up to this very day.
Finally, may I join you in paying tribute to the professional skills of the pilots who ensured that their fellow crew members survived, though losing their own lives in doing so. It was indeed in the finest tradition of the Royal Air Force. Not knowing if any of their relatives might read this thread, let there be no doubt about the esteem in which they are held.
The 80's was a decade where old school military airworthiness and accident investigation came under increasing strain until being effectively broken in the end. The result was apparent with the loss of Chinook Mk2 ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. 29 killed, and a Reviewing Officers' Finding that brought dishonour on the reputations of both pilots and of the Royal Air Force. The start of this road to hell might be seen as the agreement between the MOD and the Scottish Crown Office that as Service Personnel were not deemed 'employed', their deaths on duty in Scotland did not justify the holding of an FAI. DV exposed this cynical act, then fought and won to get it overturned. I hope this gives some idea of why a seemingly straight forward but tragic accident in 1980 is linked with later ones affected by the grossly negligent acts of RAF VSOs and their subsequent cover up to this very day.
Finally, may I join you in paying tribute to the professional skills of the pilots who ensured that their fellow crew members survived, though losing their own lives in doing so. It was indeed in the finest tradition of the Royal Air Force. Not knowing if any of their relatives might read this thread, let there be no doubt about the esteem in which they are held.
Ironically, I dont disagree with the general point he is making, but dredging up this particular accident and implying that there is something to be learned or uncovered by a FAI is in my view quite wrong and distasteful.
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Er, no, it doesnt. There is nothing faintly sinister, unexplained , or covered up about the Nimrod crash, and hence it has no relevance to DVs ongoing campaign. It is rather self serving of Dv to use its anniversary as a catalyst to bang his drum. Again.
Ironically, I dont disagree with the general point he is making, but dredging up this particular accident and implying that there is something to be learned or uncovered by a FAI is in my view quite wrong and distasteful.
Ironically, I dont disagree with the general point he is making, but dredging up this particular accident and implying that there is something to be learned or uncovered by a FAI is in my view quite wrong and distasteful.
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Finally, as regards this accident I think you could hold any number of inquiries by any number of agencies and the findings would be largely identical to that which the RAF produced at the time.
In the words of Lord Philips in his Mull of Kintyre review, dated 13th July 2011, “A Board of Inquiry [now Service Inquiry] was an internal process convened for Armed Services reasons to determine how a serious incident happened and why, and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence. The Board of Inquiry was not a substitute for a legal inquiry into the cause and circumstance of death.”
In the Super Puma deliberation issued by Sheriff Principal Derek Pyle on 13th March 2014 it states, from Carmichael (the definitive textbook), that “The whole object of an impartial inquiry is to get to the truth, to expose fault where fault is proven to exist, and in all cases to see to it so far as humanly possible that the same mistake, whether it arise through fault or any other reason, is not made in the future. The public interest, in whose names inquiries are held, requires and deserves no less”. Sheriff Principal Pyle points out that “It is an opportunity for the whole circumstances of an accident to be aired in public. Witnesses are examined and cross-examined under oath and documents are considered and scrutinised. And any party interested in the circumstances is free to come to his or her own conclusion on the evidence........It is also an opportunity for an independent judge to come to his or her own conclusions on the evidence.” Service Inquiries do not determine fault and accountability.
In the case of the Nimrod XV230 accident the coroner, Mr Andrew Walker, declared “that this aircraft, like every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet, was not airworthy and never been airworthy from the first time it was released to the service nearly 40 years ago. I see no alternative but to report to the Secretary of State for Defence that the Nimrod fleet should not fly unless, and until, the ALARP standards are met.” No in-house Board of Inquiry, or Service Inquiry, would have had the resolve or power to recommend such a course of action.
Mr Walker also recommended that “consideration be given to civil aircraft investigation replacing the Board of Inquiry system (now Service Inquiry) for investigating the loss of military aircraft”. This was brought about because board members cannot be regarded as specialists in the field of aircraft accident investigations and are not independent.
So my bottom line is that the general public, those that died in the XV256 accident and their families were denied an open independent public inquiry, along with all the ‘checks and balances’ that brings. This accident marked the beginning of the ‘collusion’ between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland with regards to military accident investigation in Scotland, and that is why it is important. The root cause of that ‘collusion’ had an impact for the next 40 years and still presents an obstacle to the legal completion of 2012 Moray Firth Tornado collision inquiry.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 21st Nov 2020 at 12:54.
Well said DV.
You mentioned the Mull of Kintyre case, and that is a classic example of authorities conflating the roles of BoIs/SIs and FAIs/Inquests. There has been an Inquiry into cause of the accident, which has been set aside (in 2011) and not replaced with anything. But given the evidence that forced that decision, the obligatory Investigation into the deaths has yet to commence. Hitherto, the 'guilty' were known, they were dead, so no investigation was deemed necessary. (Itself a decision that assumed the Board had met its obligation to consider prior negligence, which it didn't).
However, the Scottish Fatalities Investigation Unit, part of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (the broad equivalent of the Crown Prosecution Service) has gone further than the police or MoD. It has identified the crime scene (Directorate of the Air Staff in Main Building) and ruled in 2016 that this means the Metropolitan Police now have primacy. Unfortunately, as you have found out on Nimrod and Tornado, this is simply their way of offloading their obligations. Nevertheless, it was a 'brave' call to make. Perhaps he knew he was leaving! Maybe his successor will meet her obligations?
You mentioned the Mull of Kintyre case, and that is a classic example of authorities conflating the roles of BoIs/SIs and FAIs/Inquests. There has been an Inquiry into cause of the accident, which has been set aside (in 2011) and not replaced with anything. But given the evidence that forced that decision, the obligatory Investigation into the deaths has yet to commence. Hitherto, the 'guilty' were known, they were dead, so no investigation was deemed necessary. (Itself a decision that assumed the Board had met its obligation to consider prior negligence, which it didn't).
However, the Scottish Fatalities Investigation Unit, part of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (the broad equivalent of the Crown Prosecution Service) has gone further than the police or MoD. It has identified the crime scene (Directorate of the Air Staff in Main Building) and ruled in 2016 that this means the Metropolitan Police now have primacy. Unfortunately, as you have found out on Nimrod and Tornado, this is simply their way of offloading their obligations. Nevertheless, it was a 'brave' call to make. Perhaps he knew he was leaving! Maybe his successor will meet her obligations?
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Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
DV
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
DV
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So my bottom line is that the general public, those that died in the XV256 accident and their families were denied an open independent public inquiry, along with all the ‘checks and balances’ that brings. This accident marked the beginning of the ‘collusion’ between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland with regards to military accident investigation in Scotland, and that is why it is important. The root cause of that ‘collusion’ had an impact for the next 40 years and still presents an obstacle to the legal completion of 2012 Moray Firth Tornado collision inquiry.
and whilst I support your cause, for me this would be a secondary platform to discuss it. All of which has already been said, just wanted to make my support clear, before I go and look like I'm contradicting it.My reasons for continuing posting are multiple. I have a connection through close friendship with the crew. I was on the Sqn. I served on the aircraft - at Kinloss - my entire career, and although I am no longer a professional aviator of any description, flight safety is in my DNA and I, along with probably 99% of all professional aviators, believe accident reports should exist primarily for the purpose of education and accident prevention (and not just in aviation). I am not naive..aircraft accident reports will of course get mixed up in legal due process in all sorts of ways, such is life. But that is not, and never should be, their primary function.
So with all that said (phew long preamble, sorry
)
Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
And of course the hazard of bird strike is just one tiny little piece of the huge jigsaw. There were any number of risks that we were fully aware with inherent in our job, and any number of which could have claimed us. I can't speak of all RAF aircrew, but I'm guessing most of us approached the risk in our chosen profession professionally and philosophically and then got on with it.
So lets be clear, RAF aircrew are not uninformed about any "visible" aspect of flight safety...ever. This accident occurred because of a hazard, that was 100% visible, well known and much discussed. Substantial risk mitigation was in place and was being continously improved. Whether or not it had been mitigated sufficiently is a valid cause for endless debate, of that I concur, but lets not forget there is only way to prevent all aircraft accidents and that is to cease flying. My point is this particular accident was transparent in every repect. The hazard was known by all. The hazard was mitigated by sensible measures. The remaining risk was accepted by those that undertook the task and the accident happened. Subsequently, lessons were learnt and applied.
Complex legal issues aside, from an aircraft accident perspective there is no "fog of war" here, and there never was. All that occurred was accurately, comprehensively and transparently known by all that needed to know at the time and ever since.
Last edited by Richard Dangle; 17th Dec 2020 at 07:18.
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I am not naive..aircraft accident reports will of course get mixed up in legal due process in all sorts of ways, such is life. But that is not, and never should be, their primary function.
For the avoidance of any doubt the points that I raised in my last posting are 'lifted' from the BOI report, they are not my interpretation of sections of the report.
DV
DV, glad to hear that you obtained a copy of the BoI that you wanted. I'd just like to make a general point here that there is a natural tendency (I experienced it myself when our squadron suffered a fatal accident at our own airfield) to 'own' such a tragedy and resent any outside intrusion. That is natural, but we are all professionals and must know that cannot be so. Every accident, especially a fatal one, has lessons for the whole aviation community and, as RD and others have already stated, those lessons have to be discovered by thorough investigation and then disseminated throughout the whole community, not only within the Service but outside of it too. This is done by BoI's/SI's and in the case of fatal accidents, Coroners' Inquests/FAI's. That the latter were ever excluded in the case of deaths of UK serving personnel was a glaring anomaly, now resolved thanks to the OP.
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Birds
I watched XV256 crash. Initially I thought, from the angle that I was watching it from, near the Med Centre, on my way to breakfast after night shift, that it had gone down near the car club. After rushing back to the line, I discovered that it was XV256 and it had gone down in the woods beyond the end of the runway with a larger number of personnel than normal. I initially thought because of the number of people on board, that it was a detachment flight, but later learned that it was a crew training flight. The previous evening, I had replaced the Aileron Trim Gearbox on XV256, so you can imagine the things that were running through my head that morning. I later learned that the runway was littered with dead gulls, not geese, which although eased my mind, did not help with the fact that we had lost two fine pilots.
I seem to remember it was the flight engineer that broke his leg, and also seem to remember he actually got back to the aircraft in a brave attempt to rescue his colleagues. I was a 19 year old JT at the time of the accident. But I remember that day so well. RIP Flt Lt Anthony & FO Belcher.
As an aside to this, I never saw myself as employed by the RAF, I served with the RAF, with many good brave men, many of whom are now gone, see you on the other side guys.
I seem to remember it was the flight engineer that broke his leg, and also seem to remember he actually got back to the aircraft in a brave attempt to rescue his colleagues. I was a 19 year old JT at the time of the accident. But I remember that day so well. RIP Flt Lt Anthony & FO Belcher.
As an aside to this, I never saw myself as employed by the RAF, I served with the RAF, with many good brave men, many of whom are now gone, see you on the other side guys.
As to the Mull of Kintyre tragedy....with the passage of time, and the passing of the buck from one body to another and the abject lack of desire of any official body to get to the most accurate determination of facts and factors resulting in all those Lives lost....any hope there shall be that determination that can be trusted with any confidence seems a very forlorn hope.
Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.
Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.
Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.
Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.
Avoid imitations
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I mentioned before that Steve Belcher, the copilot and I joined the RAF on the same day in November 1976 (although he may well have been attested prior to that due to his previous University Air Squadron membership). We lived in adjacent rooms during officer training at Henlow and although we came from very different backgrounds (his father was in the higher management of a major oil company) we became good friends. In a quiet moment, even prior to us beginning flying training, he told me that he often had premonitions that he would end up “in a smoking black hole”. I told him that he should opt out of flying training if that was how he felt. Obviously, he didn’t. I was relieved at the time that he was streamed from BFTS onto the Nimrod because it was considered to be a very safe aircraft. Little did we know; it was strange and tragic how this turned out. I often wonder how different things would have been for him had he taken my advice.
RIP Steve, you’re not forgotten.
RIP Steve, you’re not forgotten.
As to the Mull of Kintyre tragedy....with the passage of time, and the passing of the buck from one body to another and the abject lack of desire of any official body to get to the most accurate determination of facts and factors resulting in all those Lives lost....any hope there shall be that determination that can be trusted with any confidence seems a very forlorn hope.
Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.
Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.
Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.
Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.
The Mull of Kintyre Chinook accident has unresolved technical questions, however the whole operation that was being conducted at that time was itself a high risk flight path in adverse weather, and does not need the involvement of an inopportune technical event to have been hazardous. Heli ops at low level, poor visibility, and at speed are inherently elevated risk.
The RAAF recognised the efforts of the captain, however benefits were specified by existing policy and there was no unusual consequence as far as I recall. The RAAF has separately had a number of serious birdstrikes, some catastrophic, and some nearly so. An albatross impact on a P3 was probably one of the more fortunate ones, the bird penetrated the radome, took out the radar, pressure bulkhead, engine instruments, emergency shutdown handles (ESH) on a couple of engines, and bent the aft pressure bulkhead. #1 engine was already shutdown, and the ESH was pulled on one of the going engines. An F-111C was lost by a canopy strike at low level, which is not itself uncommon, but the F-111 was designed to operate in that environment, and the birds still won.
Pre and post the Kinloss accident, operations continued around the world with operations around times of elevated bird activity, and this remains the case with airlines today. The B737 arrival into Ciampino with severe dual engine damage, Sully over NYC, etc indicate that birdstrikes continue to be a hazard irrespective of engine design.
The UK MOD's death benefits is unfamiliar to me, but if the govt doesn't cover casualties in operations, then it would still seem odd that a state of the union, Scotland, should be the liable party. I'm missing the point on the rationale for this thread, might just be the Scottish accent. The birds don't read the report, and while probability is certainly higher around dawn and dusk, strikes happen at all times.
The RAAF recognised the efforts of the captain, however benefits were specified by existing policy and there was no unusual consequence as far as I recall. The RAAF has separately had a number of serious birdstrikes, some catastrophic, and some nearly so. An albatross impact on a P3 was probably one of the more fortunate ones, the bird penetrated the radome, took out the radar, pressure bulkhead, engine instruments, emergency shutdown handles (ESH) on a couple of engines, and bent the aft pressure bulkhead. #1 engine was already shutdown, and the ESH was pulled on one of the going engines. An F-111C was lost by a canopy strike at low level, which is not itself uncommon, but the F-111 was designed to operate in that environment, and the birds still won.
Pre and post the Kinloss accident, operations continued around the world with operations around times of elevated bird activity, and this remains the case with airlines today. The B737 arrival into Ciampino with severe dual engine damage, Sully over NYC, etc indicate that birdstrikes continue to be a hazard irrespective of engine design.
The UK MOD's death benefits is unfamiliar to me, but if the govt doesn't cover casualties in operations, then it would still seem odd that a state of the union, Scotland, should be the liable party. I'm missing the point on the rationale for this thread, might just be the Scottish accent. The birds don't read the report, and while probability is certainly higher around dawn and dusk, strikes happen at all times.
