Another rant from the Bearded One
Not amongst any who've read the articles - with photos - which appear in various editions of the RE Journals from 1983 and 1984...
Certain former members of the naval service need to perhaps remember the line 'I beesech thee in bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken' in their increasingly bizarre attempts to downplay the Vulcan attacks. While there's no doubt that spotters magazines, some elements of the RAF (particularly post Sea Harrier Over the Falklands) and the Rowland White book attempted to spin the effects too far the other way, there's one critical point about the raids.
Which is that they did what Admirals Leach and Fieldhouse wanted, as the various Chief of Staff documents confirm. The raid against Stanley was being discussed even before the Argentine occupation forces were fully established ashore, and the Chief of the Air Staff spent a not insignificant period of the initial planning phase advocating that the Sea Harrier be used to attack the runway rather than Vulcans. It's all there in the files at Kew. Including the fact that the difficulty of cross-cutting the runway meant that the raids were to disrupt Argentine operations rather than to guarantee knocking the runway out. ACM Beetham made clear that he'd want at least 25 and 'preferably 50' attacks to guarantee that the runway was rendered incapable of further use by anything other than helicopters.
There is also evidence - from the Argentine side - that the crater was sufficient to ensure that the C-130 resupply flights had to arrive carrying a much lighter load lest they end up going through the makeshift repair to the crater. I forget the figure off the top of my head, but the air delivered logistic requirement was significantly higher than anything that the C-130s could practically manage after 1 May. Add to that the fact that supply by ship was rather curtailed because of concern that HMS Conqueror might quietly add to its tally and the combined effect - which was what the chiefs of staff were looking for - was significant.
Much of the debate is nothing more than inter-service back-biting and assertion and fails to stand up against the array of records that exist and which are now in the public domain.
Certain former members of the naval service need to perhaps remember the line 'I beesech thee in bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken' in their increasingly bizarre attempts to downplay the Vulcan attacks. While there's no doubt that spotters magazines, some elements of the RAF (particularly post Sea Harrier Over the Falklands) and the Rowland White book attempted to spin the effects too far the other way, there's one critical point about the raids.
Which is that they did what Admirals Leach and Fieldhouse wanted, as the various Chief of Staff documents confirm. The raid against Stanley was being discussed even before the Argentine occupation forces were fully established ashore, and the Chief of the Air Staff spent a not insignificant period of the initial planning phase advocating that the Sea Harrier be used to attack the runway rather than Vulcans. It's all there in the files at Kew. Including the fact that the difficulty of cross-cutting the runway meant that the raids were to disrupt Argentine operations rather than to guarantee knocking the runway out. ACM Beetham made clear that he'd want at least 25 and 'preferably 50' attacks to guarantee that the runway was rendered incapable of further use by anything other than helicopters.
There is also evidence - from the Argentine side - that the crater was sufficient to ensure that the C-130 resupply flights had to arrive carrying a much lighter load lest they end up going through the makeshift repair to the crater. I forget the figure off the top of my head, but the air delivered logistic requirement was significantly higher than anything that the C-130s could practically manage after 1 May. Add to that the fact that supply by ship was rather curtailed because of concern that HMS Conqueror might quietly add to its tally and the combined effect - which was what the chiefs of staff were looking for - was significant.
Much of the debate is nothing more than inter-service back-biting and assertion and fails to stand up against the array of records that exist and which are now in the public domain.
The Beardy One and and Ewan S-T will end their lives bitter that they have not got their way in getting the world to believe their own, narrow view of events nigh on 40 years ago. What they don’t Seem to realise is that the rest of us have only a passing interest and then get on with own own lives, content to not really care as much as they believe we should. It’s definitely their loss.
I have deep respect for those dismissed as "charlatans" above but I think they are missing the point of BB and are being somewhat petty. Although the COAN/CANA had rejected use of Stanley following a survey, partly on the grounds of likely met conditions use in an emergency was always possible before BB1.
One night a departing C-130 clipped the BB crater and nearly didn't get airborne; it would appear MB-339 ops were impeded. I have always understood the aim was to undermine the runway so as long as it was in contact its exact point of impact was irrelevant.
This web page show repairs being made by 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers to some of the five craters including the BB1 one which was partly packed with oil filled drums
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/opera...d-raf-stanley/
Darvan - just for clarity I was referring to a locally launched attack without using ARMs or LGBs. I appear to have found an answer to my own question in that the GR3 wiring on Hermes was completed on 12 June according to Ethell and Price, only two days before the Argentinian surrender.
One night a departing C-130 clipped the BB crater and nearly didn't get airborne; it would appear MB-339 ops were impeded. I have always understood the aim was to undermine the runway so as long as it was in contact its exact point of impact was irrelevant.
This web page show repairs being made by 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers to some of the five craters including the BB1 one which was partly packed with oil filled drums
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/opera...d-raf-stanley/
Darvan - just for clarity I was referring to a locally launched attack without using ARMs or LGBs. I appear to have found an answer to my own question in that the GR3 wiring on Hermes was completed on 12 June according to Ethell and Price, only two days before the Argentinian surrender.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 20th Aug 2020 at 15:21. Reason: tidying up my typos
JTO - to me the Victor "virtual SR.2" flights, especially to South Georgia and the very long ferry flights in single-seat single-engined Harriers are remarkable and remarkably unsung feats of airmanship.
However, without wishing to be seen as Sharkey in disguise, I do feel that the feats of the crew(s) of ZA718 have greatly overshadowed the RW efforts of the CHF, 3CBAS, the AAC and the FAA ASW in the popular imagination (flown by pilots of whichever service) except perhaps the Bluff Cove rescuers.
Addenda:
1) My reference to 1(F) was to their direct support of the land campaign which seemed pertinent to Asturias's post.
2) Regarding the Argentinian AN/TPS-43 my understanding was that (apart from the spoof sites) the risk of civilian casualties was deemed to high for an air attack. I assume a ground forces attack was deemed impractical/suicidal. However, I read somewhere of GR3s being "hastily wired" to take Shrikes - can any of those PPruners directly involved enlighten us to how seriously this was taken?
However, without wishing to be seen as Sharkey in disguise, I do feel that the feats of the crew(s) of ZA718 have greatly overshadowed the RW efforts of the CHF, 3CBAS, the AAC and the FAA ASW in the popular imagination (flown by pilots of whichever service) except perhaps the Bluff Cove rescuers.
Addenda:
1) My reference to 1(F) was to their direct support of the land campaign which seemed pertinent to Asturias's post.
2) Regarding the Argentinian AN/TPS-43 my understanding was that (apart from the spoof sites) the risk of civilian casualties was deemed to high for an air attack. I assume a ground forces attack was deemed impractical/suicidal. However, I read somewhere of GR3s being "hastily wired" to take Shrikes - can any of those PPruners directly involved enlighten us to how seriously this was taken?
This Argentinian site covers the TPS-43F deployment to the Falkland and other aspects of its operation. Most of the stuff on it is in locked PDF format, so can't be cut and pasted for translation. There are diagrams showing its location (right on the south west edge of the town) and a strike plot of where the Shrikes impacted (both within 20-30 metres of the radar convoy).
Radar Malvinas
I have a translation of the section on the Black Buck missions should anyone be interested in learning the truth about BB5 and 6 from the perspective of the Argentinian radar operators. Perhaps I will post/attach it here later on.
Hello all,
I am aware of the current discussion about the runway. Quite an interesting topic. This is the report made by Grupo I Construcciones (I Group Eng) CO.
He clearly reports, that, on 1 May 1982, the aerial bombing affected the paved runway and a bomb made a crater 18 meters in diameter and 6,8 meters deep. The crater was repaired and, also, the group constructed three simulated craters.
The runway was available until the last day, because: 1) the crater was filled and 2) the runway was wide enough and just one bomb impacted there. In fact, "the side effects" of BB1 were more interesting, damaging equipment, supplies and light airplanes. Of course, I regret the loss of life.
Regards to all,
I am aware of the current discussion about the runway. Quite an interesting topic. This is the report made by Grupo I Construcciones (I Group Eng) CO.
He clearly reports, that, on 1 May 1982, the aerial bombing affected the paved runway and a bomb made a crater 18 meters in diameter and 6,8 meters deep. The crater was repaired and, also, the group constructed three simulated craters.
The runway was available until the last day, because: 1) the crater was filled and 2) the runway was wide enough and just one bomb impacted there. In fact, "the side effects" of BB1 were more interesting, damaging equipment, supplies and light airplanes. Of course, I regret the loss of life.
Regards to all,
MAINJAFAD/Darvan I have been able to select and copy from a couple of the pdfs on the Radar site and have been using g@@gŁ3 translate as my Spanish is very basic.
It's interesting the radar unit were expecting a US aircraft as the delivery system if Shrike was used. Also they considered Martel might be used - I assume either on the basis of structural commonality with Sea Eagle (the SE development SHAR was the first to be shot down IIRC) or delivery by Nimrod?
Their preparations to counter a possible attack show a great deal of ingenuity. I'd be interested to know the actual targets of the Harriers they thought were possibly targeting them. Especially the alleged attack on the Stanley water supply.
Seems they thought some of the BB Vulcans were SHARs heading to their CAP stations so were slow to react.
I love the story of using the vibration of a fire extinguisher mounting to calculate the fall of shot from NGS ships.
38 years gone by and still learning new things.
Marcantilan - interesting post - "Three simulated craters were built on the main runway in order to deceive the Enemy Forces, before the possibility of reconnaissance" (my interpretation of his statement )
I am looking forward to reading your new book, disfruté leyendo el anterior.
It's interesting the radar unit were expecting a US aircraft as the delivery system if Shrike was used. Also they considered Martel might be used - I assume either on the basis of structural commonality with Sea Eagle (the SE development SHAR was the first to be shot down IIRC) or delivery by Nimrod?
Their preparations to counter a possible attack show a great deal of ingenuity. I'd be interested to know the actual targets of the Harriers they thought were possibly targeting them. Especially the alleged attack on the Stanley water supply.
Seems they thought some of the BB Vulcans were SHARs heading to their CAP stations so were slow to react.
I love the story of using the vibration of a fire extinguisher mounting to calculate the fall of shot from NGS ships.
38 years gone by and still learning new things.
Marcantilan - interesting post - "Three simulated craters were built on the main runway in order to deceive the Enemy Forces, before the possibility of reconnaissance" (my interpretation of his statement )
I am looking forward to reading your new book, disfruté leyendo el anterior.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 20th Aug 2020 at 15:18.
What I think some of you are missing is the fact that all of us agree on the amazing logistical effort to achieve BB and skilled flying on the day. Quite amazing. What is not so good is the efforts by whomsoever in the RAF or RAF museum to alter the facts by doctoring the photographs taken at the time. It has happened before.
MAINJAFAD/Darvan I have been able to select and copy from a couple of the pdfs on the Radar site and have been using g@@gŁ3 translate as my Spanish is very basic.
It's interesting the radar unit were expecting a US aircraft as the delivery system if Shrike was used. Also they considered Martel might be used - I assume either on the basis of structural commonality with Sea Eagle (the SE development SHAR was the first to be shot down IIRC) or delivery by Nimrod?
Their preparations to counter a possible attack show a great deal of ingenuity. I'd be interested to know the actual targets of the Harriers they thought were possibly targeting them. Especially the alleged attack on the Stanley water supply.
Seems they thought some of the BB Vulcans were SHARs heading to their CAP stations so were slow to react.
I love the story of using the vibration of a fire extinguisher mounting to calculate the fall of shot from NGS ships.
38 years gone by and still learning new things.
Marcantilan - interesting post - "Three simulated craters were built on the main runway in order to deceive the Enemy Forces, before the possibility of reconnaissance" (my interpretation of his statement ).
I am looking forward to reading your new book, disfruté leyendo el anterior.
It's interesting the radar unit were expecting a US aircraft as the delivery system if Shrike was used. Also they considered Martel might be used - I assume either on the basis of structural commonality with Sea Eagle (the SE development SHAR was the first to be shot down IIRC) or delivery by Nimrod?
Their preparations to counter a possible attack show a great deal of ingenuity. I'd be interested to know the actual targets of the Harriers they thought were possibly targeting them. Especially the alleged attack on the Stanley water supply.
Seems they thought some of the BB Vulcans were SHARs heading to their CAP stations so were slow to react.
I love the story of using the vibration of a fire extinguisher mounting to calculate the fall of shot from NGS ships.
38 years gone by and still learning new things.
Marcantilan - interesting post - "Three simulated craters were built on the main runway in order to deceive the Enemy Forces, before the possibility of reconnaissance" (my interpretation of his statement ).
I am looking forward to reading your new book, disfruté leyendo el anterior.
https://www.key.aero/forum/modern-mi...s-load-2-again
However, a number of navies had shown interest in a Maritime Harrier in 1971 which was one of the main reasons full development in 1975. I suspect HSA put out documents stating AR Martel could be part of the final package if the customer wants it and can pay for it. One of the Navies Interested actually bought the SHAR, One was going to buy it along with a Carrier in 1982, which was cancelled and another had its Air forces trashed by it.
The allegedly doctored photograph appears in the 101 Squadron F540/F541 for the period Apr-Aug 1982. The file was assembled by the AHB in late 1982, with the photograph forming part of the annexes. Unless we are to believe that there was some post-facto disassembly and reassembly of the document prior to public release (which, given the position/tautness of the treasury tags holding it together would have damaged the originals) the photo must be pretty contemporaneous, and added for internal (at SECRET level) consumption.
In this photograph, which is, as far as can be ascertained, an original, the runway is neither (to quote from the Word document) fuzzy nor has it 'grown a new crater'. It is also singularly lacking the craters seen in the recce photo by Charlie Cantan taken after BB2. Furthermore, if as the Word document claims, Charlie Cantan's photo was the first one taken after BB1, how on earth could Admiral Woodward know on 2nd May what the initial photographs of the raid appeared to show?
I don't currently have access to the two RE Journal articles of which I was originally thinking, but in Maj-Gen GB Sinclair, Brigadier FG Barton & Lt LJ Kennedy, 'Military Engineering in the Falkland Islands 1982-83', Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers Pt 1, 1984, Vol 76. (Feb).
Ah, pity. Someone appears to have erroneously put a blob almost in the middle of the runway and, worse yet, has recorded it as a bomb from a Vulcan. How careless of them. And strangely enough, it appears that at least one Argentine soldier seems to remember that the bomb hit the runway - not bang in the middle, but the argument began with the bomb not hitting the runway at all to then not hitting bang in the middle.
On 1 May (UK time), C-in-C Fleet gave a verbal sitrep to No.10 (PREM 19/623) which states: 'The Vulcan cratered the middle of the run-way [sic] and the Harriers cratered either end of it'. Since the RAF couldn't have provided doctored photos to Admiral Fieldhouse and the Vulcan crew had no idea where the bomb landed, do we perhaps think that there might have been some photo-imagery or other information which suggested a bomb had landed on or near the centre?
And then, the Chiefs of Staff meeting, 17 May 1982 (FCO 7/4474)
Something may be being doctored here, but I'm beginning to think it's not the photograph.
In this photograph, which is, as far as can be ascertained, an original, the runway is neither (to quote from the Word document) fuzzy nor has it 'grown a new crater'. It is also singularly lacking the craters seen in the recce photo by Charlie Cantan taken after BB2. Furthermore, if as the Word document claims, Charlie Cantan's photo was the first one taken after BB1, how on earth could Admiral Woodward know on 2nd May what the initial photographs of the raid appeared to show?
I don't currently have access to the two RE Journal articles of which I was originally thinking, but in Maj-Gen GB Sinclair, Brigadier FG Barton & Lt LJ Kennedy, 'Military Engineering in the Falkland Islands 1982-83', Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers Pt 1, 1984, Vol 76. (Feb).
'There was a single large crater on the runway caused by a 1,000lb bomb dropped by an RAF Vulcan... A plan was devised to repair the northern half of the runway first, thus avoiding the Vulcan crater in order that [RAF] Hercules could land as early as possible.... The northern half of the runway was repaired in three days and the first Hercules landed on 24 June right on schedule. The remaining repairs to the airport runway, including the large Vulcan crater, took longer...(pp.273-274)
Anyway, as these chaps only repaired the runway, their accounts are clearly unreliable. So, let's see what the Argentine BDA map has to say, shall we?Ah, pity. Someone appears to have erroneously put a blob almost in the middle of the runway and, worse yet, has recorded it as a bomb from a Vulcan. How careless of them. And strangely enough, it appears that at least one Argentine soldier seems to remember that the bomb hit the runway - not bang in the middle, but the argument began with the bomb not hitting the runway at all to then not hitting bang in the middle.
On 1 May (UK time), C-in-C Fleet gave a verbal sitrep to No.10 (PREM 19/623) which states: 'The Vulcan cratered the middle of the run-way [sic] and the Harriers cratered either end of it'. Since the RAF couldn't have provided doctored photos to Admiral Fieldhouse and the Vulcan crew had no idea where the bomb landed, do we perhaps think that there might have been some photo-imagery or other information which suggested a bomb had landed on or near the centre?
And then, the Chiefs of Staff meeting, 17 May 1982 (FCO 7/4474)
There was considerable discussion about the exact state of Port Stanley airfield. DCDSI reported that the Vulcan raid landed one direct hit which had caused a crater of 50' in diameter. The raid on 4 May had scored no hits, but a subsequent raid by Sea Harriers had 'scarred' the runway. A further Sea Harrier attack on 16 May had caused one further crater. It appears, however, that the north edge of the runway is unharmed and that aircraft have a free run of 2000' and 1800' on either side of the main crater. [the one caused on 1 May]. This is adequate to allow a C-130 with a 12˝ ton load to land and take off. No detailed information was available about the extent of damage... nor has there been any report as to where the other 1000lb bombs landed. The Chief of the Air Staff spoke very strongly about this, saying that he could not understand why photographic reconnaissance could not provide better information, and why repeated requests for information had received no reply.
So what we have is confusion over the amount of damage, but agreement from a variety of sources that the Vulcan did put a crater in the runway somewhere where it was perceived by intelligence sources, Argentine troops and the Royal Engineers who repaired the damn thing as being reasonably near to the middle.Something may be being doctored here, but I'm beginning to think it's not the photograph.
Again, who cares? History is full of little fibs and none of them are ever going to be changed. Why try to prove a point that's unprovable? You'll drive yourself mad in doing so and the rest of the world will just get on with their lives without noticing.
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Who cares? We won and the world (especially the USSR) was amazed.
A pity when those those of us who served in the years after the Falklands War know how much better a tri-service organisation works than one pitted against each other.
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WRT to the Vulcan crater, during my safe tour there as SATCO (’summer’ of ‘83, decidedly their winter!) the AM2 in the crater area had to be lifted to enable the RE to reinforce the substrate, as the planking had sunk slightly.
You're quite right, of course, Mog.
The reason I respond to this is not, as might be thought, because of a desire to unthinkingly defend the light blue but because the last time this playground-level nonsense came up, it was seen within certain political circles as an unofficial, plausibly-deniable effort by the RN to 'win' the forthcoming defence review. And rather than help the RN, it caused the service some damage (source, university-era friend who er... was in a position to know how the government was thinking). This was why Admiral Zambellas invited those pushing these sorts of stories to shut up prior to the 2015 review.
The reason I respond to this is not, as might be thought, because of a desire to unthinkingly defend the light blue but because the last time this playground-level nonsense came up, it was seen within certain political circles as an unofficial, plausibly-deniable effort by the RN to 'win' the forthcoming defence review. And rather than help the RN, it caused the service some damage (source, university-era friend who er... was in a position to know how the government was thinking). This was why Admiral Zambellas invited those pushing these sorts of stories to shut up prior to the 2015 review.
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Towards the end of '82 the RE's were tasked with pulling up the AM2 matting in the area of the crater, back-filling it and also addressing the issue of the AM2 matting 'walking' through predominant use of RW 26; details of this amusing little exercise I recorded in another thread. (Mil Aviation - Nimrod queries post #11)
Last edited by Downwind.Maddl-Land; 22nd Aug 2020 at 09:27.