Canadian Forces Snowbirds CT-114 down in British Columbia
cncpc
Please re read what you wrote. You said “I understand she was not aircrew but she was a pilot”.
Those two statements are mutually exclusive.
Capt Casey was the PRO. She had no formal flying training and could not have been expected to contribute in any way to the operation of the aircraft.
It’s a tangent I know but don’t make untrue statements or assumptions.
BV
Those two statements are mutually exclusive.
Capt Casey was the PRO. She had no formal flying training and could not have been expected to contribute in any way to the operation of the aircraft.
It’s a tangent I know but don’t make untrue statements or assumptions.
BV
Please re read what you wrote. You said “I understand she was not aircrew but she was a pilot”.
Those two statements are mutually exclusive.
Capt Casey was the PRO. She had no formal flying training and could not have been expected to contribute in any way to the operation of the aircraft.
It’s a tangent I know but don’t make untrue statements or assumptions.
BV
Those two statements are mutually exclusive.
Capt Casey was the PRO. She had no formal flying training and could not have been expected to contribute in any way to the operation of the aircraft.
It’s a tangent I know but don’t make untrue statements or assumptions.
BV
I don't knowingly make untrue statements or assumptions. If you think passengers don't let you know when they think something is wrong, you've never flown with BC Forest Service folks in the other seat, or anywhere they can see the instruments.
In this case, the pilot would know either from seeing the bird, hearing the bang, or both.
As to the statements being mutually exclusive, they obviously aren't. She wasn't a Snowbird pilot, true. I'm a pilot, and when I fly on Westjet, I'm not aircrew, but I'm still a pilot.
Last edited by cncpc; 3rd Jun 2020 at 19:46. Reason: adding something after reading Bob's post
Grizzled, do you have a link to that video. It seems to be taken by someone positioned at the end of the runway, on the road transiting to south side at Kamloops.
The object near the aircraft video.
The object near the aircraft video.
Last edited by cncpc; 3rd Jun 2020 at 23:34.
cncpc
I think your definition of aircrew and mine differ somewhat. In the military aircrew are defined as those that are employed in a role undertaken onboard aircraft. You are therefore considered aircrew when you are walking down the street or buying a pint of milk. She was not aircrew. Experienced passenger yes, but not aircrew.
I have over 20 years (and counting) experience flying military jets. I have flown quite a few passengers. Yes, I would expect them to say if they saw anything out of the ordinary. But the chances of any passenger noticing an anomaly on engine gauges before either a warning chime or me hearing something unusual I’d say are zero. Even if I was flying a formation take off.
I can’t keep banging on about it because it’s not really relevant to the conversation but you seem to think you know best when, in fact, you may not.
BV
I have over 20 years (and counting) experience flying military jets. I have flown quite a few passengers. Yes, I would expect them to say if they saw anything out of the ordinary. But the chances of any passenger noticing an anomaly on engine gauges before either a warning chime or me hearing something unusual I’d say are zero. Even if I was flying a formation take off.
I can’t keep banging on about it because it’s not really relevant to the conversation but you seem to think you know best when, in fact, you may not.
BV
I think your definition of aircrew and mine differ somewhat. In the military aircrew are defined as those that are employed in a role undertaken onboard aircraft. You are therefore considered aircrew when you are walking down the street or buying a pint of milk. She was not aircrew. Experienced passenger yes, but not aircrew.
...........
I can’t keep banging on about it because it’s not really relevant to the conversation but you seem to think you know best when, in fact, you may not.
BV
...........
I can’t keep banging on about it because it’s not really relevant to the conversation but you seem to think you know best when, in fact, you may not.
BV
I was exactly the same before I left the Mil to fly commercially. I was a Spanners in the Mob, but also had a PPL and was a glidist. I was never aircrew so, if people asked, I simply said "I'm not a pilot in the Mil but I do have a PPL". That fact also got me lots of stick time when on jollies for which I'm really grateful to all those kind aircrew who invited me to have a go! Flying a Hunter low-level towards a ship? I could not believe my luck - so my thanks to the Hunter jock who I was fortunate to fly with. Clearly he liked my efforts at GH while in the transit a bit earlier.
Whenever I was fortunate enough to bag a trip, and being someone of a curious nature, I was definitely taking a great interest in what went on just for my own education. So while poor Capt Casey may not be expected to be looking at things, if she was anything like me she may well have had a go flying the things quite a few times (assuming std dual-stick config) and, on hearing a bang on climb-out, is quite likely to have been starting, informally, to work out what it was.
I was once sat goofing out a window in a Sea King when I noticed sparks suddenly starting to appear from above and ahead. I got as far as saying "Gents (there being no ladies on board) I think we have a problem....." when there was an almighty BANG! After the boys got established in the single-engined cruise one of the back-seaters laughed and said "Tell you what, I've never seen Spanners move so fast!!!". It was about 1.0005 seconds from me kneeling looking out the window to me being strapped into a seat near a door just in case we'd had to do an Auto into a field if it was more than just a donk giving up on us.
So I was never aircrew but I sure took a keen interest in what was going on, particularly if I thought it affected my health and wellbeing!
Oh, and the views were out of this world!!!
Cheers, H 'n' H
Hot n high
Maybe I’m guilty of not understanding cncpc’s point entirely.
However, as someone who has flown over 3000 fast jet sorties and flown multiple passengers (many of whom have been experienced aviators in their own right), I would be truly gobsmacked if the first the pilot knew of an engine failure was his passenger pointing it out to him. That is not to say a passenger cannot have something to offer in certain circumstances.
I think that is the point I have been trying to make all along. And it is still largely irrelevant to the wider topic, for which I apologise.
BV
However, as someone who has flown over 3000 fast jet sorties and flown multiple passengers (many of whom have been experienced aviators in their own right), I would be truly gobsmacked if the first the pilot knew of an engine failure was his passenger pointing it out to him. That is not to say a passenger cannot have something to offer in certain circumstances.
I think that is the point I have been trying to make all along. And it is still largely irrelevant to the wider topic, for which I apologise.
BV
While there has been a fair amount of speculation here about 'turning back' I am surprised there has been little discussion but rather only acceptance of the training "Zoom, restart, eject."
I am reliably informed, as several RCAF vets have mentioned, that the training at Moose Jaw is 'Zoom, attempt restart and if fail, eject.' There was no training aimed at turning back. As my kids tell me, (three of them have recently flown Harvards at MJ) there are standing instructions in all sorts of situations to eject rather than attempt to save the aircraft.
I get the reasons for Zoom. There is, if I recall my early principles of flight at Kidlington, the square of the resistance with increasing speed and therefore lowering the speed as quickly as possible will conserve considerable energy which in turn allows more time to make choices. It also increases the height for ejecting, allows for a better situation awareness with regard to terrain, (and in GA for choosing a field, hopefully,)
However, on the other hand it decreases speed (and kinetic energy) far more quickly. It leaves the aircraft close or at least closer, to stalling at the top of zoom and puts in in a state where almost any control input except elevator down can cause a spin. All this in a moment where the pilot is trying a restart, assessing the situation, checking the terrain and deciding if he needs to eject. If the aircraft does level out he does then have more time but if levelling fails you have shortened the 'action time' dramatically.
I counted (roughly) tow, maybe three seconds of zoom and maybe 1 second after the wing went down to ejection. How much longer would the crew have had in a steady climb, level off at 90 knots and glide before reaching, say, the height at which the engine failed and ejecting?
If the "zoom" was a continuation of the climb you would lose more total energy due to drag but you would have more time for assessment and restart attempt, you would have a controllable aircraft and a steady platform for ejection.
I am persuaded by this incident that attitude is at least as important for ejection at low level as height bearing in mind that even this fifty year old seat is 0/60.
My kids all went on to fly helicopters so I have no idea what training they do on fast jets but, bearing in mind that this pilot came from transport I wonder if there is discussion, sim training and briefing for Snowbird pilots but it is accepted that pilots are competent in "Zoom" and there is no further actual practice in pulling out of formation and zooming in EFATO. Maybe an ex Snowbird can tell us.
I could be way off the mark here but it seems a sensible question compared to some of the other theories put forward and " the word handed down through the ages" should be questioned on a regular basis.
I am reliably informed, as several RCAF vets have mentioned, that the training at Moose Jaw is 'Zoom, attempt restart and if fail, eject.' There was no training aimed at turning back. As my kids tell me, (three of them have recently flown Harvards at MJ) there are standing instructions in all sorts of situations to eject rather than attempt to save the aircraft.
I get the reasons for Zoom. There is, if I recall my early principles of flight at Kidlington, the square of the resistance with increasing speed and therefore lowering the speed as quickly as possible will conserve considerable energy which in turn allows more time to make choices. It also increases the height for ejecting, allows for a better situation awareness with regard to terrain, (and in GA for choosing a field, hopefully,)
However, on the other hand it decreases speed (and kinetic energy) far more quickly. It leaves the aircraft close or at least closer, to stalling at the top of zoom and puts in in a state where almost any control input except elevator down can cause a spin. All this in a moment where the pilot is trying a restart, assessing the situation, checking the terrain and deciding if he needs to eject. If the aircraft does level out he does then have more time but if levelling fails you have shortened the 'action time' dramatically.
I counted (roughly) tow, maybe three seconds of zoom and maybe 1 second after the wing went down to ejection. How much longer would the crew have had in a steady climb, level off at 90 knots and glide before reaching, say, the height at which the engine failed and ejecting?
If the "zoom" was a continuation of the climb you would lose more total energy due to drag but you would have more time for assessment and restart attempt, you would have a controllable aircraft and a steady platform for ejection.
I am persuaded by this incident that attitude is at least as important for ejection at low level as height bearing in mind that even this fifty year old seat is 0/60.
My kids all went on to fly helicopters so I have no idea what training they do on fast jets but, bearing in mind that this pilot came from transport I wonder if there is discussion, sim training and briefing for Snowbird pilots but it is accepted that pilots are competent in "Zoom" and there is no further actual practice in pulling out of formation and zooming in EFATO. Maybe an ex Snowbird can tell us.
I could be way off the mark here but it seems a sensible question compared to some of the other theories put forward and " the word handed down through the ages" should be questioned on a regular basis.
ChrisVJ
With a single-engine jet you do not have much time if the engine fails on take-off. Unless it has taken a bird or surged for some other reason such as ingestion of efflux from another aircraft, engines do not tend to just stop working without a mechanical issue or major interruption to fuel flow, in which case relights/restarts are very unlikely to be successful. You might have one shot at a relight depending on your height and speed at the time, but the presumption is for an ejection. This is true whether you are in the Snowbirds, Red Arrows or Thunderbirds - they will clear the formation first because a collision is the most immediate threat, and all the teams have planned and practiced formation escape routes for just this reason.
The zoom provides height (separation from the ground) and more importantly a positive vector for the seat, the time and airspeed elements are secondary. The critical factor in escape is the overall seat vector. Ejections from the same height, attitude and airspeed but with different vectors will have different outcomes in terms of apex and chute deployment. You are correct that attitude plays a big part at lower levels and there is no need for persuasion - an inverted ejection from 100ft is not likely to succeed whereas an upright wings-level at same height will. In this accident, ejections within a few seconds of the power loss would probably have succeeded, but we will never know for sure.
Some years ago an instructor on the Jet Provost had a birdstrike and engine failure but spent so long trying to re-light and making his MAYDAY call that the combination of height and rate of descent were insufficient when he actually ejected. He hit the ground in his seat and survived, but broke his neck when the seat tumbled across the field and was rendered quadriplegic. That accident was used to reinforce the teaching on 'zoom and boom' unless you had made the gate of 600 ft or 160 kts.
With a single-engine jet you do not have much time if the engine fails on take-off. Unless it has taken a bird or surged for some other reason such as ingestion of efflux from another aircraft, engines do not tend to just stop working without a mechanical issue or major interruption to fuel flow, in which case relights/restarts are very unlikely to be successful. You might have one shot at a relight depending on your height and speed at the time, but the presumption is for an ejection. This is true whether you are in the Snowbirds, Red Arrows or Thunderbirds - they will clear the formation first because a collision is the most immediate threat, and all the teams have planned and practiced formation escape routes for just this reason.
The zoom provides height (separation from the ground) and more importantly a positive vector for the seat, the time and airspeed elements are secondary. The critical factor in escape is the overall seat vector. Ejections from the same height, attitude and airspeed but with different vectors will have different outcomes in terms of apex and chute deployment. You are correct that attitude plays a big part at lower levels and there is no need for persuasion - an inverted ejection from 100ft is not likely to succeed whereas an upright wings-level at same height will. In this accident, ejections within a few seconds of the power loss would probably have succeeded, but we will never know for sure.
Some years ago an instructor on the Jet Provost had a birdstrike and engine failure but spent so long trying to re-light and making his MAYDAY call that the combination of height and rate of descent were insufficient when he actually ejected. He hit the ground in his seat and survived, but broke his neck when the seat tumbled across the field and was rendered quadriplegic. That accident was used to reinforce the teaching on 'zoom and boom' unless you had made the gate of 600 ft or 160 kts.
Things certainly appear to have changed since I trained and later instructed on the JP. I certainly have no recollection of being taught, or instructing, to try a relight following a low level flameout just after take off, no time. How long does it take to get a failed or flamed out engine up to idle and then accelerate it to useful, questionably reliable, thrust? Too long, I would suggest, and all the time you are compromising the safety of an ejection. Can one depend on an engine which has just failed, for whatever reason?
Zoom and boom following EFATO at low level as in the Snowbird accident, certainly looks to me, 57 years after my ejection, to offer the most likely safe outcome.
Even now, if the engine failed in my Warrior and I set it up for a forced landing but I can restart the engine, I would probably continue with the forced landing if it was looking good. If the engine WERE to restart but then failed again after throwing the forced landing away. it the may well have compromised a successful forced landing.
A jet with an ejection seat is not dissimilar in that after a failed or partial restart one may be faced with a low level ejection from a descending aircraft. Valuable height wasted, perhaps taking you out of safe ejection parameters. .
Zoom and boom following EFATO at low level as in the Snowbird accident, certainly looks to me, 57 years after my ejection, to offer the most likely safe outcome.
Even now, if the engine failed in my Warrior and I set it up for a forced landing but I can restart the engine, I would probably continue with the forced landing if it was looking good. If the engine WERE to restart but then failed again after throwing the forced landing away. it the may well have compromised a successful forced landing.
A jet with an ejection seat is not dissimilar in that after a failed or partial restart one may be faced with a low level ejection from a descending aircraft. Valuable height wasted, perhaps taking you out of safe ejection parameters. .
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: Outside the Fence
Age: 71
Posts: 373
Likes: 0
Received 5 Likes
on
4 Posts
1974 I was a student on 3 Sqn at No 4FTS Valley flying the Hunter. We had just started the formation phase when I was confronted by a similar incident.
By no means do I claim that what happened was correct but sometimes luck does play a part in the outcome.
We were Number 3 flying in Vic formation in a Hunter T7. As student I was flying in the left hand seat with my QFI in the right. He was demonstrating a formation approach and overshoot (go round in modern terms). As we were on the left of the formation I had to look across my QFI and so the picture was more difficult to assimilate. There was a lot of movement of the flight controls and rapid throttle inputs. All went well until the overshoot. Just after the gear was retracted we started to drop back. I glanced at my QFI and then to the engine gauges. Rpm decreasing (despite my QFI having full throttle selected) and decreasing JPT - Flame Out.
As my QFI lowered the nose I selected the Relight ON (only available to the pilot in the left seat) and watched. We were pointing directly at the 18th at the Rhosniegr Golf Course, 180kts and descending through xxxft. Almost immediately the engine relit and the JPT rose. My QFI mutter something which I cannot recall apart from "Arr, its OK now" as the engine wound up through 7000 rpm.
It was only after the incident the I realised that we had MAYBE pressed on to a position that was outside the seat limits. On reflection we should have ejected at 180kts/200ft.
There is no doubt that the first indication of the flame out was the lack of thrust causing us to drop back. This should have been more obvious to the flying! The second indication was the gauges. Although only a student I had it hammered into me how to recognise flame outs, surges/stalls and mechanical failures and their differences. Indeed, it was not unknown for any of these to occur on both the JP and the Hunter if flown aggressively. I agree that Capt Casey was not trained to be able to assimilate this kind of information. Her brief would have been to do as told by her pilot.
By no means do I claim that what happened was correct but sometimes luck does play a part in the outcome.
We were Number 3 flying in Vic formation in a Hunter T7. As student I was flying in the left hand seat with my QFI in the right. He was demonstrating a formation approach and overshoot (go round in modern terms). As we were on the left of the formation I had to look across my QFI and so the picture was more difficult to assimilate. There was a lot of movement of the flight controls and rapid throttle inputs. All went well until the overshoot. Just after the gear was retracted we started to drop back. I glanced at my QFI and then to the engine gauges. Rpm decreasing (despite my QFI having full throttle selected) and decreasing JPT - Flame Out.
As my QFI lowered the nose I selected the Relight ON (only available to the pilot in the left seat) and watched. We were pointing directly at the 18th at the Rhosniegr Golf Course, 180kts and descending through xxxft. Almost immediately the engine relit and the JPT rose. My QFI mutter something which I cannot recall apart from "Arr, its OK now" as the engine wound up through 7000 rpm.
It was only after the incident the I realised that we had MAYBE pressed on to a position that was outside the seat limits. On reflection we should have ejected at 180kts/200ft.
There is no doubt that the first indication of the flame out was the lack of thrust causing us to drop back. This should have been more obvious to the flying! The second indication was the gauges. Although only a student I had it hammered into me how to recognise flame outs, surges/stalls and mechanical failures and their differences. Indeed, it was not unknown for any of these to occur on both the JP and the Hunter if flown aggressively. I agree that Capt Casey was not trained to be able to assimilate this kind of information. Her brief would have been to do as told by her pilot.
"Retired BA/BY: Even now, if the engine failed in my Warrior and I set it up for a forced landing but I can restart the engine, I would probably continue with the forced landing if it was looking good. If the engine WERE to restart but then failed again after throwing the forced landing away. it the may well have compromised a successful forced landing."
Absolutely!
On bad weather days, I would send PPL students off to look through the AAIB reports, looking for where in survivable accidents anyone had been hurt - there were almost none beyond the odd broken bone.
If you do not lose control of the aircraft, you stand a very, very good chance of surviving, along with your passengers / crew.
lsh
Absolutely!
On bad weather days, I would send PPL students off to look through the AAIB reports, looking for where in survivable accidents anyone had been hurt - there were almost none beyond the odd broken bone.
If you do not lose control of the aircraft, you stand a very, very good chance of surviving, along with your passengers / crew.
lsh
....However, as someone who has flown over 3000 fast jet sorties and flown multiple passengers (many of whom have been experienced aviators in their own right), I would be truly gobsmacked if the first the pilot knew of an engine failure was his passenger pointing it out to him. That is not to say a passenger cannot have something to offer in certain circumstances........
Retired BA/BY - "Even now, if the engine failed in my Warrior and I set it up for a forced landing but I can restart the engine, I would probably continue with the forced landing if it was looking good. If the engine WERE to restart but then failed again after throwing the forced landing away. it the may well have compromised a successful forced landing."
I had almost exactly that a while ago at the start of a Ferry. On climbout the engine started to stutter and lose power at 600-700 ft. Nose down, pick my field, quick engine check with concurrent Mayday ... but then, just as I was about to shut it down the engine then started to recover all by itself!!!!! It wasn't well but I could slowly climb now but I didn't trust it one bit. Rats!!!!! Decision time! However, as I knew the area very well after a lot of time in the circuit as an Instructor (I always study fields with an obsession - it goes back to my gliding days!) I knew I could "field hop" a not-quite direct track (I could follow the fields I knew were OK and avoid the rubbish ones) back into the overhead, all the while actively planning a succession of Forced Landings for each field as it appeared in sequence ending up planning the last one into the airfield itself. It was an almost flat calm day so I knew wind was not an issue WRT landing direction. Once in the overhead I then started breathing again and, effectively, did an engine-off landing back onto the active. Had I been somewhere strange or had no options - I'd have done what you suggest - shutting it down fully in case it ran up at just the wrong moment and screwed up the forced landing! ATC were funny after I landed. "G-YZ, welcome back! You didn't half give us a fright with your Mayday!". My reply was "You? Frightened? You should have been up here in the plane, Sunshine!!!!!!".
Back to the Snowbirds though. Actually, my sympathy goes to Capt. MacDougall who will, undoubtely, for every day for the rest of his life go "If only I'd done....". We've probably all had moments when we did something thinking it was for the best in the heat of the moment, only to realise that, once on the ground (or even in the air after the event) we could have done things better. I've always been lucky in that I've always had at least one slice of cheese left across the hole(s) I've inadvertantly opened up. Sadly, this seems to be a case where an aircraft has demonstrated a lack of tollerance to inadvertant pilot distraction and rapidly bitten back - unless there was another tech issue which made the outcome inevitable. I'll leave the debate about the seat alone - but that did not help. A very sad outcome.....
Cheers, H 'n' H
Last edited by Hot 'n' High; 4th Jun 2020 at 11:40.
While there has been a fair amount of speculation here about 'turning back' I am surprised there has been little discussion but rather only acceptance of the training "Zoom, restart, eject."
I am reliably informed, as several RCAF vets have mentioned, that the training at Moose Jaw is 'Zoom, attempt restart and if fail, eject.' There was no training aimed at turning back. As my kids tell me, (three of them have recently flown Harvards at MJ) there are standing instructions in all sorts of situations to eject rather than attempt to save the aircraft.
I get the reasons for Zoom. There is, if I recall my early principles of flight at Kidlington, the square of the resistance with increasing speed and therefore lowering the speed as quickly as possible will conserve considerable energy which in turn allows more time to make choices. It also increases the height for ejecting, allows for a better situation awareness with regard to terrain, (and in GA for choosing a field, hopefully,)
However, on the other hand it decreases speed (and kinetic energy) far more quickly. It leaves the aircraft close or at least closer, to stalling at the top of zoom and puts in in a state where almost any control input except elevator down can cause a spin. All this in a moment where the pilot is trying a restart, assessing the situation, checking the terrain and deciding if he needs to eject. If the aircraft does level out he does then have more time but if levelling fails you have shortened the 'action time' dramatically.
I counted (roughly) tow, maybe three seconds of zoom and maybe 1 second after the wing went down to ejection. How much longer would the crew have had in a steady climb, level off at 90 knots and glide before reaching, say, the height at which the engine failed and ejecting?
If the "zoom" was a continuation of the climb you would lose more total energy due to drag but you would have more time for assessment and restart attempt, you would have a controllable aircraft and a steady platform for ejection.
I am persuaded by this incident that attitude is at least as important for ejection at low level as height bearing in mind that even this fifty year old seat is 0/60.
My kids all went on to fly helicopters so I have no idea what training they do on fast jets but, bearing in mind that this pilot came from transport I wonder if there is discussion, sim training and briefing for Snowbird pilots but it is accepted that pilots are competent in "Zoom" and there is no further actual practice in pulling out of formation and zooming in EFATO. Maybe an ex Snowbird can tell us.
I could be way off the mark here but it seems a sensible question compared to some of the other theories put forward and " the word handed down through the ages" should be questioned on a regular basis.
I am reliably informed, as several RCAF vets have mentioned, that the training at Moose Jaw is 'Zoom, attempt restart and if fail, eject.' There was no training aimed at turning back. As my kids tell me, (three of them have recently flown Harvards at MJ) there are standing instructions in all sorts of situations to eject rather than attempt to save the aircraft.
I get the reasons for Zoom. There is, if I recall my early principles of flight at Kidlington, the square of the resistance with increasing speed and therefore lowering the speed as quickly as possible will conserve considerable energy which in turn allows more time to make choices. It also increases the height for ejecting, allows for a better situation awareness with regard to terrain, (and in GA for choosing a field, hopefully,)
However, on the other hand it decreases speed (and kinetic energy) far more quickly. It leaves the aircraft close or at least closer, to stalling at the top of zoom and puts in in a state where almost any control input except elevator down can cause a spin. All this in a moment where the pilot is trying a restart, assessing the situation, checking the terrain and deciding if he needs to eject. If the aircraft does level out he does then have more time but if levelling fails you have shortened the 'action time' dramatically.
I counted (roughly) tow, maybe three seconds of zoom and maybe 1 second after the wing went down to ejection. How much longer would the crew have had in a steady climb, level off at 90 knots and glide before reaching, say, the height at which the engine failed and ejecting?
If the "zoom" was a continuation of the climb you would lose more total energy due to drag but you would have more time for assessment and restart attempt, you would have a controllable aircraft and a steady platform for ejection.
I am persuaded by this incident that attitude is at least as important for ejection at low level as height bearing in mind that even this fifty year old seat is 0/60.
My kids all went on to fly helicopters so I have no idea what training they do on fast jets but, bearing in mind that this pilot came from transport I wonder if there is discussion, sim training and briefing for Snowbird pilots but it is accepted that pilots are competent in "Zoom" and there is no further actual practice in pulling out of formation and zooming in EFATO. Maybe an ex Snowbird can tell us.
I could be way off the mark here but it seems a sensible question compared to some of the other theories put forward and " the word handed down through the ages" should be questioned on a regular basis.
To Chris above...this is the time sequence between events, with the bang being zero.
Bang 0 secs.
Climb: 1 sec
Turn evident: 5 secs
30 deg bank: 7 seconds
Start of spin: 10 secs
Eject: 16 secs
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Manitoba Canada
Age: 72
Posts: 223
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is off-topic as far as the Snowbird accident but may interest folks who want a glimpse of the historical first ejection seat tests in Britain 1946 to 1947 ..... I found it interesting ..... notice the design (at the time) was pull eject handle above and behind behind pilots head ..... which also brought down a fabric curtain to protect his face ..... then eject rocket ignites ..... drogue chute pops ..... then full chute on the seat assembly .... then the pilot unbuckles himself from the seat , departs , and opens his personal parachute.
About a hundred years ago, give or take, I read a book, or maybe it was an article, by a man who was the 'guinea pig' for the early MB ejection seats. It was very interesting and explained how the techniques for sequencing were tested, including actual human ejections from jet aircraft. (IIRC it was a Canberra.)
About a hundred years ago, give or take, I read a book, or maybe it was an article, by a man who was the 'guinea pig' for the early MB ejection seats. It was very interesting and explained how the techniques for sequencing were tested, including actual human ejections from jet aircraft. (IIRC it was a Canberra.)
‘Man in the hot seat’ by Doddy Hay perchance?
There are many who owe their safe and injury-free ejections to people like Doddy Hay. He would no doubt have been made redundant on health and safety grounds today.
Gnome de PPRuNe
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Too close to Croydon for comfort
Age: 60
Posts: 12,601
Received 279 Likes
on
154 Posts
He wasn't ejecting ne'er-do-wells was he?