Canadian Forces Snowbirds CT-114 down in British Columbia
I had wondered if the Snowbirds’ aircraft were still in Kamloops. Now I know.
https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/new...fV2YVy44vhDItc
https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/new...fV2YVy44vhDItc
According to the Kamloops This Week website the pilot is somewhat active and the article has a picture of him with family getting some fresh air. I'm thinking that the investigators have gotten an initial conversation with him. Happy to see he's on the mend.
https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/new...tal-1.24139584
https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/new...tal-1.24139584
After hanging up my flying gloves, I became a ground school instructor, part of which was teaching ab-initio students about the seat they were going to use. I used a clip from a USAF training film showing the crew leaving an F4 as the aircraft pitched up uncontrollably after liftoff. One occupant went out as the aircraft still had an upward vector, the second went out higher but the aircraft had stopped climbing, the chute of the first ejectee opened at a greater height, despite ejecting at a lower height.
Thank yous to the guys who gave references as above.
Some of the stuff went over my head as I am not an ETPS graduate, but reading them over breakfast my conclusions are :
Low level engine failures followed by turnbacks are fraught with danger and are VERY high risk manoeuvres many variables come into play as explained in these. papers and , in general, require very accurate flying and the right conditions, of cross wind, headwind and runway length etc as well as, obviously, aircraft climb and glide performance. I dont think they included what Sully called the “startle factor”
All of the papers refer to GA aircraft, but the military jet trainer has a better way out, Weber or MB, pretty much guaranteed to be succesful if initiated within the seat envelope and that Weber0/60 sounds pretty capable to me.
The Sport Aviation article, although written by a test pilot and Shuttle Commander is much simpler.
Several guys have PM ,d me for a copy. You will all get a reply later today or tomorrow. ( edit: all sent, anyone else just pm your email address)
Glad to hear the SB pilot is recovering.
Some of the stuff went over my head as I am not an ETPS graduate, but reading them over breakfast my conclusions are :
Low level engine failures followed by turnbacks are fraught with danger and are VERY high risk manoeuvres many variables come into play as explained in these. papers and , in general, require very accurate flying and the right conditions, of cross wind, headwind and runway length etc as well as, obviously, aircraft climb and glide performance. I dont think they included what Sully called the “startle factor”
All of the papers refer to GA aircraft, but the military jet trainer has a better way out, Weber or MB, pretty much guaranteed to be succesful if initiated within the seat envelope and that Weber0/60 sounds pretty capable to me.
The Sport Aviation article, although written by a test pilot and Shuttle Commander is much simpler.
Several guys have PM ,d me for a copy. You will all get a reply later today or tomorrow. ( edit: all sent, anyone else just pm your email address)
Glad to hear the SB pilot is recovering.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 25th May 2020 at 10:09.
RetiredBA/BY. The Turnback is effectively just a case of energy management. Any aeroplane, just after take-off (any given speed and height, ie energy state) transitions from a point where there is simply not enough energy to do anything other than land/crash ahead, through to the stage where you can force land back at the point of departure - even on the same as opposed to reciprocal runway. Now even Sully could possibly have got his Airbus back to LGA if he'd turned pronto (and I'm not knocking his decision making process or the possible outcome if he'd ended up parking his aircraft in a built-up area.) Arguably, if you happen to turn back towards the departure airfield from say 5000ft upwind, that's a PFL rather than a Turnback. Red 3 at Valley = PFL; not a turn back in this sense.
Take the JP/Tucano/Hawk/(and probably Tutor). They will have a minimum speed/height stipulated where one can commence a Turnback. JP was 160Kts or 600ft, Tucano 130kts and 500ft, Hawk was above 250kts. So if one had an engine failure just above these defined parameters, it meant the pilot could commence a Turnback. So if we assume you are going for the reciprocal of the runway, you have to manoeuvre the aircraft in a tear-drop. Invariably a strong crosswind would help, but the exact procedure differed for type. In the Tucano we would invariably turn with the crosswind (ie downwind to maximise displacement from the Rwy CL), before reversing the turn now the long way round onto the reciprocal Rwy (sounds complex – worked a treat!) Other types probably prefer the turn to be into the crosswind to approximately hold your position near the Rwy CL. No matter how you fly it, you are potentially very near the edge of the performance envelope. You invariably require a modest rate-of turn and a low radius, so low IAS but with enough stall-margin to maintain the turn without stalling. Again Tucano, we would instantly take Mid-flap; little drag penalty, increased stall margin and the stall warning system was activated.
The point of the Turnback was to fly a manoeuvre where you could continually assess your parameters. If all went well, you land on the reciprocal Rwy. If it didn't, you either changed the plan, or more likely level the wings, convert speed for height, and ejected. Of course if you're going to eject, you need to be within seat parameters (IAS, RoD and AoB). As has been proved, any mishandling with turning and reducing IAS invariably results in a very narrow window between looking 'okay' to fatal consequences. And perhaps none of this factors in where the now-pilotless aircraft will arrive once you’ve abandoned it.
If practiced and flown accurately, a Turnback will inevitable provide a window where a successful outcome following an EFATO is achieved. Unfortunately, the recent accidents have occurred where either the aircraft was mishandled (perhaps only marginally) followed by a fractionally late decision to eject. If the way ahead is simply to ban the Turnback as too dangerous, then so be it. But I know as a student on the JP where we were explicitly told to eject after an EFATO, many students would consider starting a turn to see how it goes. I’m sure some students on the Tucano had a similar mind-set.
Take the JP/Tucano/Hawk/(and probably Tutor). They will have a minimum speed/height stipulated where one can commence a Turnback. JP was 160Kts or 600ft, Tucano 130kts and 500ft, Hawk was above 250kts. So if one had an engine failure just above these defined parameters, it meant the pilot could commence a Turnback. So if we assume you are going for the reciprocal of the runway, you have to manoeuvre the aircraft in a tear-drop. Invariably a strong crosswind would help, but the exact procedure differed for type. In the Tucano we would invariably turn with the crosswind (ie downwind to maximise displacement from the Rwy CL), before reversing the turn now the long way round onto the reciprocal Rwy (sounds complex – worked a treat!) Other types probably prefer the turn to be into the crosswind to approximately hold your position near the Rwy CL. No matter how you fly it, you are potentially very near the edge of the performance envelope. You invariably require a modest rate-of turn and a low radius, so low IAS but with enough stall-margin to maintain the turn without stalling. Again Tucano, we would instantly take Mid-flap; little drag penalty, increased stall margin and the stall warning system was activated.
The point of the Turnback was to fly a manoeuvre where you could continually assess your parameters. If all went well, you land on the reciprocal Rwy. If it didn't, you either changed the plan, or more likely level the wings, convert speed for height, and ejected. Of course if you're going to eject, you need to be within seat parameters (IAS, RoD and AoB). As has been proved, any mishandling with turning and reducing IAS invariably results in a very narrow window between looking 'okay' to fatal consequences. And perhaps none of this factors in where the now-pilotless aircraft will arrive once you’ve abandoned it.
If practiced and flown accurately, a Turnback will inevitable provide a window where a successful outcome following an EFATO is achieved. Unfortunately, the recent accidents have occurred where either the aircraft was mishandled (perhaps only marginally) followed by a fractionally late decision to eject. If the way ahead is simply to ban the Turnback as too dangerous, then so be it. But I know as a student on the JP where we were explicitly told to eject after an EFATO, many students would consider starting a turn to see how it goes. I’m sure some students on the Tucano had a similar mind-set.
I agree with all of that, particularly as you say, its all about energy management and accurate flying. Perhaps its my age but I have no recall about 160 knots or 600 feet when a student and at CFS or at SORF when all of our students were already qualified pilots, some vey very highly qualified and competent.
However if, at an FTS, it was sop to eject in the event of an EFATO, and students were had a mindset to try a turnback, my question js WHY ?
That said, I will stick with my 500 feet and first 90 degrees of turn complete at WLAC before I try and return to the grass airfield, should that ever be necessary in the mighty Warrior ! Otherwise I have my fields chosen for a straight ahead landing !
Red 3, I will keep my opinions to myself!
However if, at an FTS, it was sop to eject in the event of an EFATO, and students were had a mindset to try a turnback, my question js WHY ?
That said, I will stick with my 500 feet and first 90 degrees of turn complete at WLAC before I try and return to the grass airfield, should that ever be necessary in the mighty Warrior ! Otherwise I have my fields chosen for a straight ahead landing !
Red 3, I will keep my opinions to myself!
Replying to H. Peacock's...
It wasn't clear in those EFATO practices how the departure was conducted and if there was a consideration of turning crosswind early to significantly reduce the amount of turn necessary to RTF after a power loss. I know that amount of bank and speed affect safety in such a low level turn, but I'd like to hear opinions on that. I think I saw something there which might have been a practice of turning crosswind, likely at 500, to better position for a failure, then when high enough, turn right to parallel a straight out if the intended direction of flight intended that. Have I correctly read that. It seems like good practice in any single engine.
Somewhat a different scenario, but in the no ejection seat world, and without the height to return to field, straight out is the only option. That often doesn't present favorable outcomes. Complicated by the impression of disaster, which can reduce performance and be self fulfilling. I have a long time friend I worked with who went on to be a very experienced TSB investigator. His view was that if you landed a powerless aircraft wings level, in the landing attitude (flare), at flare speed, and you had 25 feet or more to decelerate, you were very likely to walk away with minimal or no injuries. Obviously that applies to light single engine aircraft and stall speeds of such aircraft. Not a comment directed at you military guys, but more for people likely to be flying singles.
In Peacock's post, he/she mentions students chancing the turn back rather than the immediate eject to see how it goes. Retired BA holds that this is what happened. In this, not a student, but a very accomplished aviator. If so, that may be because the pilot felt it could be safely done and there was no need to eject. Fair enough. But surely every Tutor pilot would have it in their mind that a successful low level eject six months before in Atlanta required the pilot to overcome "...anomalies in the ejection sequence". Might that effect the outcome of almost instantaneous choices of options in these circumstances? Perhaps some of the RCAF people, Cold Lake or elsewhere, can say what those anomalies were, whether they were a once off, or whether there is something that hasn't yet been resolved. Not to say that the Tutors just kept on flying, but not resolved in the minds of pilots when they think of the Atlanta pilot's experience and having that experience themselves.
It wasn't clear in those EFATO practices how the departure was conducted and if there was a consideration of turning crosswind early to significantly reduce the amount of turn necessary to RTF after a power loss. I know that amount of bank and speed affect safety in such a low level turn, but I'd like to hear opinions on that. I think I saw something there which might have been a practice of turning crosswind, likely at 500, to better position for a failure, then when high enough, turn right to parallel a straight out if the intended direction of flight intended that. Have I correctly read that. It seems like good practice in any single engine.
Somewhat a different scenario, but in the no ejection seat world, and without the height to return to field, straight out is the only option. That often doesn't present favorable outcomes. Complicated by the impression of disaster, which can reduce performance and be self fulfilling. I have a long time friend I worked with who went on to be a very experienced TSB investigator. His view was that if you landed a powerless aircraft wings level, in the landing attitude (flare), at flare speed, and you had 25 feet or more to decelerate, you were very likely to walk away with minimal or no injuries. Obviously that applies to light single engine aircraft and stall speeds of such aircraft. Not a comment directed at you military guys, but more for people likely to be flying singles.
In Peacock's post, he/she mentions students chancing the turn back rather than the immediate eject to see how it goes. Retired BA holds that this is what happened. In this, not a student, but a very accomplished aviator. If so, that may be because the pilot felt it could be safely done and there was no need to eject. Fair enough. But surely every Tutor pilot would have it in their mind that a successful low level eject six months before in Atlanta required the pilot to overcome "...anomalies in the ejection sequence". Might that effect the outcome of almost instantaneous choices of options in these circumstances? Perhaps some of the RCAF people, Cold Lake or elsewhere, can say what those anomalies were, whether they were a once off, or whether there is something that hasn't yet been resolved. Not to say that the Tutors just kept on flying, but not resolved in the minds of pilots when they think of the Atlanta pilot's experience and having that experience themselves.
"In essence, if your aircraft glides at a steeper angle than its climb angle and you try a 180 you are NOT going to make it."
This is probably the most elegant anti-turnback argument I've ever read, because it is irrefutable.
This is probably the most elegant anti-turnback argument I've ever read, because it is irrefutable.
- as you are usually trying to make a downwind landing. So your aim point is usually much closer than the point you rotated from.
So it is also a matter of how much energy you have as you pass the downwind end of the runway - and how much you will lose in the turn.
I am sure many people here have also done it many times for real or in practice.
Just to muddy the waters a 270 onto a cross runway can be a very useful option and use less energy depending on position.
We tried Turnbacks in the Hawk. With plenty of energy and hight, sometimes they worked, but you needed to know what you are doing. But I have tried them in the Bulldog without much success. The problem being that by the time one got to 6-700 feet, off a typical GA runway (just say 1000m), one rolled out at about 300 feet with a mile or so to go. Operate of a long military runway, with a good headwind, one reached 700 feet, still over the upwind end. OK, groundspeed high on the glide back, but doable. That might work in your favour. Interestingly, with little energy in a Bulldog one still needed a 45 deg bank turn to turn back, and that lost oodles of hight and one had to push the nose way down to stop a stall in the turn. God knows what would be the case with a seized engine as apposed to a windmilling
Basically, the advice is 'in a light aircraft, don't bother, land straight ahead. Better to go into a hedge at 10 knots that spin in, trying to stretch the glide.
Basically, the advice is 'in a light aircraft, don't bother, land straight ahead. Better to go into a hedge at 10 knots that spin in, trying to stretch the glide.
The NTSB statistics quoted in the EAA article entirely endorses the above.
They state that in the 6 year study only ONE turnback was successful.
Turnbacks had a 29 % fatality rate, straight ahead landings 8 % .
Stalling during the turnback was a huge risk and resulted in a 70 % Fatality rate.
The author of the article was a shuttle commander so knows a thing or three about gliding and energy management !
Whatever you fly, the article is well worth a read.
They state that in the 6 year study only ONE turnback was successful.
Turnbacks had a 29 % fatality rate, straight ahead landings 8 % .
Stalling during the turnback was a huge risk and resulted in a 70 % Fatality rate.
The author of the article was a shuttle commander so knows a thing or three about gliding and energy management !
Whatever you fly, the article is well worth a read.
"In essence, if your aircraft glides at a steeper angle than its climb angle and you try a 180 you are NOT going to make it."
This is probably the most elegant anti-turnback argument I've ever read, because it is irrefutable."
Hmm; climb angle, best-rate, best-angle, glide for range, glide for duration. So much more complex than that Dave, and you don't appear to be considering the 'excess energy' at the point of engine failure, i.e. adding speed to height during the start of the glide (i.e. the engine stops)!
Most military hardware is taking-off and accelerating to an airspeed somewhat higher than the best-range glide speed.
This is probably the most elegant anti-turnback argument I've ever read, because it is irrefutable."
Hmm; climb angle, best-rate, best-angle, glide for range, glide for duration. So much more complex than that Dave, and you don't appear to be considering the 'excess energy' at the point of engine failure, i.e. adding speed to height during the start of the glide (i.e. the engine stops)!
Most military hardware is taking-off and accelerating to an airspeed somewhat higher than the best-range glide speed.
We had a pro-turn letter into GASCo FSM after I ran a feature on turnbacks; - this was my response.
The Editor replies “I’m afraid that I’m firmly on Captain Laming’s side regarding turn backs. Firstly, when you practice a turn back, you’re already expecting it. If the engine ever stops for real, you will lose valuable time, height and energy due to the ‘startle’ factor, as you’ll be reluctant to immediately accept that the engine has actually failed. Secondly, if you do manage to complete a swift 180° reversal before reaching the ground your problems are far from over. Not only are you significantly displaced from the runway but you may well have a considerable tailwind. Always remember that the kinetic energy possessed by the aircraft as it crashes is E=1/2mv2, or half the mass multiplied by the speed squared when you hit whatever you hit. Let’s assume your aircraft stalls at 50kt. Straight ahead into a 20kt wind means you will crash at 30kt, which is eminently survivable. Turn downwind in the same scenario and your impact speed has more than doubled. Remember E=1/2mv2? The impact forces have increased exponentially, not linearly, and the probability of survival reduced accordingly.”
Captain Scribble "A strong headwind on take off or long runway" also make a very good case to go straight ahead! Finally, I honestly believe practicing a turnback is very different from a real one. How much residual thrust is a Hawk's engine putting out at idle, for example? There must be a considerable difference between a seized jet and an idling one, no? One must be adding some thrust, the other drag Then there's the startle factor. Its very very different from 3-2-1-here we go! Finally, as a very experienced airman once told me "when practicing turnbacks it doesn't matter how many times you get it right, you'll only get it wrong once."
The Editor replies “I’m afraid that I’m firmly on Captain Laming’s side regarding turn backs. Firstly, when you practice a turn back, you’re already expecting it. If the engine ever stops for real, you will lose valuable time, height and energy due to the ‘startle’ factor, as you’ll be reluctant to immediately accept that the engine has actually failed. Secondly, if you do manage to complete a swift 180° reversal before reaching the ground your problems are far from over. Not only are you significantly displaced from the runway but you may well have a considerable tailwind. Always remember that the kinetic energy possessed by the aircraft as it crashes is E=1/2mv2, or half the mass multiplied by the speed squared when you hit whatever you hit. Let’s assume your aircraft stalls at 50kt. Straight ahead into a 20kt wind means you will crash at 30kt, which is eminently survivable. Turn downwind in the same scenario and your impact speed has more than doubled. Remember E=1/2mv2? The impact forces have increased exponentially, not linearly, and the probability of survival reduced accordingly.”
Captain Scribble "A strong headwind on take off or long runway" also make a very good case to go straight ahead! Finally, I honestly believe practicing a turnback is very different from a real one. How much residual thrust is a Hawk's engine putting out at idle, for example? There must be a considerable difference between a seized jet and an idling one, no? One must be adding some thrust, the other drag Then there's the startle factor. Its very very different from 3-2-1-here we go! Finally, as a very experienced airman once told me "when practicing turnbacks it doesn't matter how many times you get it right, you'll only get it wrong once."
We had a pro-turn letter into GASCo FSM after I ran a feature on turnbacks; - this was my response.
The Editor replies “I’m afraid that I’m firmly on Captain Laming’s side regarding turn backs. Firstly, when you practice a turn back, you’re already expecting it. If the engine ever stops for real, you will lose valuable time, height and energy due to the ‘startle’ factor, as you’ll be reluctant to immediately accept that the engine has actually failed. Secondly, if you do manage to complete a swift 180° reversal before reaching the ground your problems are far from over. Not only are you significantly displaced from the runway but you may well have a considerable tailwind. Always remember that the kinetic energy possessed by the aircraft as it crashes is E=1/2mv2, or half the mass multiplied by the speed squared when you hit whatever you hit. Let’s assume your aircraft stalls at 50kt. Straight ahead into a 20kt wind means you will crash at 30kt, which is eminently survivable. Turn downwind in the same scenario and your impact speed has more than doubled. Remember E=1/2mv2? The impact forces have increased exponentially, not linearly, and the probability of survival reduced accordingly.”
Captain Scribble "A strong headwind on take off or long runway" also make a very good case to go straight ahead! Finally, I honestly believe practicing a turnback is very different from a real one. How much residual thrust is a Hawk's engine putting out at idle, for example? There must be a considerable difference between a seized jet and an idling one, no? One must be adding some thrust, the other drag Then there's the startle factor. Its very very different from 3-2-1-here we go! Finally, as a very experienced airman once told me "when practicing turnbacks it doesn't matter how many times you get it right, you'll only get it wrong once."
The Editor replies “I’m afraid that I’m firmly on Captain Laming’s side regarding turn backs. Firstly, when you practice a turn back, you’re already expecting it. If the engine ever stops for real, you will lose valuable time, height and energy due to the ‘startle’ factor, as you’ll be reluctant to immediately accept that the engine has actually failed. Secondly, if you do manage to complete a swift 180° reversal before reaching the ground your problems are far from over. Not only are you significantly displaced from the runway but you may well have a considerable tailwind. Always remember that the kinetic energy possessed by the aircraft as it crashes is E=1/2mv2, or half the mass multiplied by the speed squared when you hit whatever you hit. Let’s assume your aircraft stalls at 50kt. Straight ahead into a 20kt wind means you will crash at 30kt, which is eminently survivable. Turn downwind in the same scenario and your impact speed has more than doubled. Remember E=1/2mv2? The impact forces have increased exponentially, not linearly, and the probability of survival reduced accordingly.”
Captain Scribble "A strong headwind on take off or long runway" also make a very good case to go straight ahead! Finally, I honestly believe practicing a turnback is very different from a real one. How much residual thrust is a Hawk's engine putting out at idle, for example? There must be a considerable difference between a seized jet and an idling one, no? One must be adding some thrust, the other drag Then there's the startle factor. Its very very different from 3-2-1-here we go! Finally, as a very experienced airman once told me "when practicing turnbacks it doesn't matter how many times you get it right, you'll only get it wrong once."
Incidently, I agree the 'startle factor' using up precious time & height. My student was flying that day & froze. I think I waited half a milli-second before taking control & turning.
Last edited by sharpend; 26th May 2020 at 19:32.
Since this thread has inevitably crept onto the subject of turn backs ( although as BV has mentioned, an engine failure has yet to be confirmed).
Its worth remembering that a reasonable number of vintage jets continue to fly. It’s increasingly difficult to keep the seats live in these aircraft so turn backs are very definitely a skill that those operating such aircraft need in their toolbox.
As has previously been mentioned a successful turn back onto the reciprocal runway could usually be achieved in a JP from 160Kts/600ft agl. It’s also important to remember that this is the “gold plated “ solution and that the ACTUAL aim of the manoeuvre is to put the aircraft anywhere on the airfield, wheels up or down since the airfield is usually more hospitable than the terrain surrounding it.
Its worth remembering that a reasonable number of vintage jets continue to fly. It’s increasingly difficult to keep the seats live in these aircraft so turn backs are very definitely a skill that those operating such aircraft need in their toolbox.
As has previously been mentioned a successful turn back onto the reciprocal runway could usually be achieved in a JP from 160Kts/600ft agl. It’s also important to remember that this is the “gold plated “ solution and that the ACTUAL aim of the manoeuvre is to put the aircraft anywhere on the airfield, wheels up or down since the airfield is usually more hospitable than the terrain surrounding it.
160 kts or 600 ft in the JP was a hard requirement during my time as an instructor. And the comments about pre-conditioning for deliberate practice are spot on - it makes it much easier. The only time I saw real startle factor was as a student on CFS when the exchange USAF QFI was flying from the left seat and decided to do the take-off as bit of personal handling practice (fair enough). What he wasn't expecting was his student QFI to throw an EFATO at him by closing the throttle once we hit turnback parameters. He just made the runway, but only after a bit of faffing, and he wasn't happy. At all.
We had a short discussion once 'safely' airborne during which he asked me what the hell I thought I was doing. I asked him in return why he thought he would get warning of an engine failure just because he was a waterfront (staff) QFI. He then agreed it had been an interesting experience for him, and I promised not to do it again...
I hope we can hear some facts from the official investigation soon. I also hope some of the excellent advice aired here about the wisdom or otherwise of turnbacks might save a life or two in the future.
We had a short discussion once 'safely' airborne during which he asked me what the hell I thought I was doing. I asked him in return why he thought he would get warning of an engine failure just because he was a waterfront (staff) QFI. He then agreed it had been an interesting experience for him, and I promised not to do it again...
I hope we can hear some facts from the official investigation soon. I also hope some of the excellent advice aired here about the wisdom or otherwise of turnbacks might save a life or two in the future.
I just got this email from a guy who has investigated hundreds of accidents for a well known government agency. But not military. While it only suggests a remote possibility, it does identify an issue that could stand to be corrected. If this did happen, it had to be starboard inlet, as we can see on the departure photo that the port side is removed. Admittedly, not likely with a marshaller staring right at it, but it is one of things that could have made the "pop" and could have resulted in at least a partial power drop. Anyways, yellow might be a better color. <br>
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Yesterday I wondered aloud if perhaps an engine inlet cover was left installed on one side that was subsequently ingested during the takeoff run.
As you can see, the engine inlet cover design is a major failure. Instead of high visual conspicuity to prevent inadvertent omission, they went the opposite route. The covers are essentially invisible, camouflaged by using the identical colour to the surrounding paint work.
Let’s see if we can guess why they did this . . . .so that the aircraft looked good in photos?
History has proven convincingly that humans are not reliable at repetitive tasks. And if something can be screwed up - it will be eventually.
This may have nothing to do with the accident but it is an opportunity to address the latent defect before it does.
home cooking near me
____________________________________________________________ ___
Yesterday I wondered aloud if perhaps an engine inlet cover was left installed on one side that was subsequently ingested during the takeoff run.
As you can see, the engine inlet cover design is a major failure. Instead of high visual conspicuity to prevent inadvertent omission, they went the opposite route. The covers are essentially invisible, camouflaged by using the identical colour to the surrounding paint work.
Let’s see if we can guess why they did this . . . .so that the aircraft looked good in photos?
History has proven convincingly that humans are not reliable at repetitive tasks. And if something can be screwed up - it will be eventually.
This may have nothing to do with the accident but it is an opportunity to address the latent defect before it does.
home cooking near me