Harrier Falklands Conundrum
Blue Fox was ARI 5982. (Airborne Radio Installation). At the time, 4 digits beginning with 5 meant Intellectual Property Rights resided mostly with MoD. Malvern and Farnborough would often do the initial R&D, develop and prove concepts, and prepare the specification. Industry would take these and apply (and often improve) the science for a specific requirement, e.g. a radar for Sea Harrier. As our R&D was run down, this applied more to designs funded by MoD, but wholly carried out by industry. MoD had very few UK-sourced radars whose IPR sat with industry.
This manifests itself in ‘Commercial Exploitation Rates’, whereby the Treasury (not MoD) gets a percentage of any non-MoD sales. As the Design Authority develops modifications or enhancements under private funding, the CER is updated (reduced). So, the Treasury probably got a wedge when Blue Fox was sold to India.
The demise of RRE/RSRE/DRA/DERA and creation of QinetiQ was probably the single biggest stealth defence budget cut ever. But that's another subject.
I thought I'd read all there was t op be read on the Falklands Air War but this thread has been a goldmine of new information
Well done & thanks!!
Well done & thanks!!
I mentioned Jeremy Moore's IWM aural history which is good.
An even more insightful one is Julian Thompon's.
An even more insightful one is Julian Thompon's.
Thanks for the pointer to Thompson's recordings. Absolutely fascinating stuff - his complete RM history with lots of insights into campaigns that he was involved in prior to the Falklands - Cyprus, Aden, Borneo, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, etc. as well as comments about his various staff and training postings.
I'm binge listening! I'm about half-way through (~15 hours!) and am now hearing his reminiscences about his time in Bandit Country in South Armagh. I particularly liked his anecdote about his marines who were tasked to patrol the railway. They were known as "the Railway Children"!
Here's the link: https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80030363
If you scroll down the page, you will see an unformatted summary of the contents of each tape. The Northern Ireland section begins at Reel 30 and the Falklands at Reel 40.
The tapes are unedited and there is a good deal of unexplained military jargon, so brush up on your TLAs.
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Sharky Ward was locked up by a 909 radar coming back from a raid when I was airborne on a sortie, he called in clear on the ASW A frequency to "turn the bloody thing off, I authenticate Sharky".
India Four Two,
Many thanks for the link, fascinating stuff!
Many thanks for the link, fascinating stuff!
Thoroughly agree with Alfred - the First Sea Lord of the day appoints seagoing Flag Officers on the basis of their perceived overall ability to exercise command at sea, irrespective of their original branch, coupled with their suitability for further promotion. Of the some 14 officers who held the appointment of Flag Officer First Flotilla, Sandy Woodward's appointment at the time concerned, all but one went on to at least Vice Admiral, five went on to Admiral, and one to Admiral of the Fleet. Four, including Admiral Woodward, were submariners.
Jack
Jack
There was to use India Four Two's phrase 'a more "air minded" officer available' in Vice Admiral Derek Reffell who was FOF3 (responsible for CVs and LPDs), and both a former “Commando Carrier” Captain and a former Commodore Amphibious Warfare (probably more relevant)' he was seen as the obvious choice by some (especially his subordinates). However, as (submariner) Rear Admiral John (Sandy) Woodward (FOF1) was at Gibraltar for Exercise Springtrain ’82 he could get down south with a task group, which he was already commanding, much more quickly. More importantly, he clearly had the confidence of CINCFLEET (and overall Task Force Commander) Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse who was observing the exercise. Before returning to the UK he gave Woodward the order, face to face, that he was to set sail south on 1 April (the day before the Argentine invasion). According to Woodward’s book Fieldhouse later told him he was determined he should command.
Thanks to Whinging Tinny, I have been listening to Linley Middleton's IWM tapes(.../collections/item/object/80032610 tapes 7 and 8). To expand on what WT said, he is complimentary about the effectiveness of 1(F) Squadron's contribution (though he thought they were late to the party and that Jerry Pook should have accepted that the sh1tty end of the stick was their lot in life). It's also clear his relationship with Woodward was dysfunctional, he expected Hermes to receive orders by written signal and not verbally through the 'old boys' network' as he says happened. He thought Woodward struggled to understand aviation, what it could and couldn't do and how best to ensure aircraft availability. Conversely, he (LM) seems to have had a real problem with the usefulness submarines and senior submariners. He also pointed out Hermes had effectively been at sea for a year by the end of the war and had a long defects list, something I was previously unaware of. I'm sure the stress resulting from these and other factors must have contributed to atmosphere BomberH and his squadron mates experienced. The negotiations he reports with RAF staff over 3rd line maintenance to allow the purchase of SHARs can't have helped his attitude to the light blue.
This thread prompted me to buy Chris Parry's Down South which I am in the process of reading and enjoying. He says that there was friction between Antrim's captain Brian Young (another aviator) and Sandy Woodward and his staff but that Woodward he got on well with those he knew like Glamorgan's captain Mike Barrow to whose ship the staff transferred. As langleybaston says in the RAF intelligence thread he was clearly a marmite personality.
In all this I think a phrase quoted by Chris Parry is particularly apposite 'On the actual day of battle, naked truths may be had for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms.'
Written with my historian's cap on - no criticism of those with direct experience or knowledge intended. Assuming State 2 Condition Yankee.
I Repeat Myself
I have said this before in various publications/media, but I feel the need to say it again............
I was airborne in a GR3 from HERMES with two Laser Guided Bombs on a mission on 14 June 82.
I was just about to run in to deliver them on a target on Sapper Hill when I was told by the FAC to abort because the white flags were up and the ground forces were retreating into Stanley, and they did not want a couple of bombs dropped onto them that might make them change their minds and turn around.
The Laser guidance kits for the bombs I was carrying had been air-dropped into the sea to us by Herc from Ascension, so some serious effort had been made to get the kits to us. So I decided that jettisoning them into the sea was not the right thing to do, not knowing if this really was the end, or if it might start again the next day. I worked out that with minimum fuel I could do a vertical landing onto the boat with the bombs still on.
So I did.
Before I got out of the cockpit after landing, an over-excited two and a half stripe staff officer arrived to tell me that the Captain wanted to see me now - so off I meandered to the Bridge, where I was shouted at by LM asking me what I thought I was doing landing on his boat with bombs still aboard. I explained that I considered them to be valuable items, and that I had been told that the white flags were up over Stanley, so that was why I had made my decision, not knowing if they might be needed again tomorrow. He stopped bo**ocking me, and told me to stay there, while he went to get Woodward. I then became the carrier pigeon who told Woodward that the land war was effectively over - and I was then allowed to get back to my Squadron and tell them.
Middleton's style of leadership is not one I enjoyed or would advocate.
Woodward seemed fairly relaxed about the information - but it must have been what he had dreamed of!!
I was airborne in a GR3 from HERMES with two Laser Guided Bombs on a mission on 14 June 82.
I was just about to run in to deliver them on a target on Sapper Hill when I was told by the FAC to abort because the white flags were up and the ground forces were retreating into Stanley, and they did not want a couple of bombs dropped onto them that might make them change their minds and turn around.
The Laser guidance kits for the bombs I was carrying had been air-dropped into the sea to us by Herc from Ascension, so some serious effort had been made to get the kits to us. So I decided that jettisoning them into the sea was not the right thing to do, not knowing if this really was the end, or if it might start again the next day. I worked out that with minimum fuel I could do a vertical landing onto the boat with the bombs still on.
So I did.
Before I got out of the cockpit after landing, an over-excited two and a half stripe staff officer arrived to tell me that the Captain wanted to see me now - so off I meandered to the Bridge, where I was shouted at by LM asking me what I thought I was doing landing on his boat with bombs still aboard. I explained that I considered them to be valuable items, and that I had been told that the white flags were up over Stanley, so that was why I had made my decision, not knowing if they might be needed again tomorrow. He stopped bo**ocking me, and told me to stay there, while he went to get Woodward. I then became the carrier pigeon who told Woodward that the land war was effectively over - and I was then allowed to get back to my Squadron and tell them.
Middleton's style of leadership is not one I enjoyed or would advocate.
Woodward seemed fairly relaxed about the information - but it must have been what he had dreamed of!!
Last edited by ex-fast-jets; 10th May 2020 at 19:39.
I have said this before in various publications/media, but I feel the need to say it again............
I was airborne in a GR3 from HERMES with two Laser Guided Bombs on a mission on 14 June 82.
I was just about to run in to deliver them on a target on Sapper Hill when I was told by the FAC to abort because the white flags were up and the ground forces were retreating into Stanley, and they did not want a couple of bombs dropped onto them that might make them change their minds and turn around.
The Laser guidance kits for the bombs I was carrying had been air-dropped into the sea to us by Herc from Ascension, so some serious effort had been made to get the kits to us. So I decided that jettisoning them into the sea was not the right thing to do, not knowing if this really was the end, or if it might start again the next day. I worked out that with minimum fuel I could do a vertical landing onto the boat with the bombs still on.
So I did.
I was airborne in a GR3 from HERMES with two Laser Guided Bombs on a mission on 14 June 82.
I was just about to run in to deliver them on a target on Sapper Hill when I was told by the FAC to abort because the white flags were up and the ground forces were retreating into Stanley, and they did not want a couple of bombs dropped onto them that might make them change their minds and turn around.
The Laser guidance kits for the bombs I was carrying had been air-dropped into the sea to us by Herc from Ascension, so some serious effort had been made to get the kits to us. So I decided that jettisoning them into the sea was not the right thing to do, not knowing if this really was the end, or if it might start again the next day. I worked out that with minimum fuel I could do a vertical landing onto the boat with the bombs still on.
So I did.
Before I got out of the cockpit after landing, an over-excited two and a half stripe staff officer arrived to tell me that the Captain wanted to see me now - so off I meandered to the Bridge, where I was shouted at by LM asking me what I thought I was doing landing on his boat with bombs still aboard. I explained that I considered them to be valuable items, and that I had been told that the white flags were up over Stanley, so that was why I had made my decision, not knowing if they might be needed again tomorrow. He stopped bo**ocking me, and told me to stay there, while he went to get Woodward. I then became the carrier pigeon who told Woodward that the land war was effectively over - and I was then allowed to get back to my Squadron and tell them.
Middleton's style of leadership is not one I enjoyed or would advocate.
Woodward seemed fairly relaxed about the information - but it must have been what he had dreamed of!!
Jack
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It had certainly become a stupid situation when, during an air attack men armed themselves and went on upper desk to shoot at the A/C in preference to being down below, where they could only wait, not fire back and might well suffer shrapnel damage from the cone of the blast on detonation.
I hasten to say I do not feel in any way guilty or cowardly in recommending this - I do feel that the Group must complement each others systems and not have the first threat to the Argentinean Air force to be close range weapons systems - this to me is a singular admission of failure and total lack of grip of the Aim to provide adequate air defence to the Amphibious Forces. Coventry today by simply turning her fire control radar on the Mirage raids made them turn away and indeed go home for they do not have much fuel to manoeuvre so far from home.
Despite the appalling and unnecessary losses and damage to our frigates we have made a major inroad into the Argentinean Air force capability. They still have a lot of Skyhawk A/C and so there is certainly a need for us to do more yet but, with the logic of "taking the war to the Enemy" we can easily do this. It does require T42's and the Cap A/C to be more up threat however.
There is one major advantage to the separation of Captain Black (Invincible) and the Admiral (Hermes) for they have to talk on covered voice communications and we can all "listen in". Black is a most sensible man and I have agreed with everything he has said and proposed. In my view, it is a pity he is not commanding the forces here. One can certainly sense his frustration as he repeatedly tries to get his v. good ideas through to this "submarine idiot" whose prize remarks about, "Were learning all the time" is certainly getting though to me - He should already have known - I attribute the loss of Sheffield to him for stupid and unnecessary stationing and force positioning within known Etendard / Exocet range.
The frigate losses are also his by his paranoia of defending the Carriers with T42's which should be up-threat defending the AOA! He really can't have it both ways, he either keeps the Carriers well out of range or brings them closer to better use his A/C with good defence in depth by T42 escorts - he can't (with conviction!?) be both out of range and keep all the T42's!!
I hasten to say I do not feel in any way guilty or cowardly in recommending this - I do feel that the Group must complement each others systems and not have the first threat to the Argentinean Air force to be close range weapons systems - this to me is a singular admission of failure and total lack of grip of the Aim to provide adequate air defence to the Amphibious Forces. Coventry today by simply turning her fire control radar on the Mirage raids made them turn away and indeed go home for they do not have much fuel to manoeuvre so far from home.
Despite the appalling and unnecessary losses and damage to our frigates we have made a major inroad into the Argentinean Air force capability. They still have a lot of Skyhawk A/C and so there is certainly a need for us to do more yet but, with the logic of "taking the war to the Enemy" we can easily do this. It does require T42's and the Cap A/C to be more up threat however.
There is one major advantage to the separation of Captain Black (Invincible) and the Admiral (Hermes) for they have to talk on covered voice communications and we can all "listen in". Black is a most sensible man and I have agreed with everything he has said and proposed. In my view, it is a pity he is not commanding the forces here. One can certainly sense his frustration as he repeatedly tries to get his v. good ideas through to this "submarine idiot" whose prize remarks about, "Were learning all the time" is certainly getting though to me - He should already have known - I attribute the loss of Sheffield to him for stupid and unnecessary stationing and force positioning within known Etendard / Exocet range.
The frigate losses are also his by his paranoia of defending the Carriers with T42's which should be up-threat defending the AOA! He really can't have it both ways, he either keeps the Carriers well out of range or brings them closer to better use his A/C with good defence in depth by T42 escorts - he can't (with conviction!?) be both out of range and keep all the T42's!!
It may be helpful to indicate that this is an extract from one of the then Lieutenant Commander Hulme's entries in https://www.hmsbrilliant.com/content/dsection6.html. It would have been particularly interesting to know what his own Captain's views on the the allocation of resources were, not least recalling that, like Admiral Woodward, he too was a very highly regarded submariner and certainly not in my view a "submarine idiot".
Jack
Jack
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Atlantic Conveyor. Our weapon systems locked onto both the missiles and tracked them all the way in but they were unable to engage them because they were out of range. She was on fire within minutes of being hit and it was getting dark we were told to get in as close as we could and pick up people in liferafts. We picked up a life raft with about 24 in while we were doing this about five floated past, they looked dead a couple had put there survival suits on wrong and were floating feet up.
Hmmmm..... When my mates arrived back off the Conveyor they told me that they had been told / briefed when boarding to put their survival suits over their lifevests and they thought this was wrong and decided to put the vest over the suit, I do now wonder reading that, if that is what happened to those poor souls, my mates all made it back..
Jack
Captain Coward's views
It would have been particularly interesting to know what his own Captain's views on the the allocation of resources were, not least recalling that, like Admiral Woodward, he too was a very highly regarded submariner and certainly not in my view a "submarine idiot".
Jack
Jack
Just been ‘dipping’ in One Hundred Days and confirmed a suspicion the date of Vice-Admiral Coward’s first command raised. He was a student on Sandy Woodward’s first Perisher as Teacher. He (JFC) is mentioned frequently in the book. Woodward couldn’t recall ’a more canny submariner among all those who followed him’. He calls him ‘pretty sound’ and states ‘I knew Coward well, his courage and his competence’. Woodward himself may give us the answer as he wrote that during the planning for the landings:
Coward was inclined to station the two Type 42s Glasgow and Coventry well forward (west of West Falkland!) with combat air patrols flying forward of them … the carriers … should bring up the rear some fifty miles back.
The Skipper page on the Brilliant site is interesting in itself. Among other things he throws a light on the limitations of Seawolf, especially early on. Its shooting down of the Mirages on May 12 was outside the expected performance as, at that time, it was only supposed to target missiles, aircraft should have been rejected as producing too large returns.
He also draws attention to Laon Hulme’s application of his training as a fighter controller and ‘D’ in San Carlos/Falkland Sound, which earned him an MID, when there were no AAW ships in range.
"Coward was inclined to station the two Type 42s Glasgow and Coventry well forward (west of West Falkland!) with combat air patrols flying forward of them … the carriers … should bring up the rear some fifty miles back."
I'd have thought it was more logical to put the T42's forward so they could fire away at anything without worrying about the CAP - put the CAP in between the T42's and the carriers to clean up anyone coming through?
I seem to remember reading that the forward positioning of the T42's was thought about but the stats on what happened to USN radar pickets in WW2 showed that for it to work you needed a lot more ships than the RN could provide in the Falklands. Casualties would have been high
I'd have thought it was more logical to put the T42's forward so they could fire away at anything without worrying about the CAP - put the CAP in between the T42's and the carriers to clean up anyone coming through?
I seem to remember reading that the forward positioning of the T42's was thought about but the stats on what happened to USN radar pickets in WW2 showed that for it to work you needed a lot more ships than the RN could provide in the Falklands. Casualties would have been high
Well, the Type 64s (Type 42 + Type 22 combo) were stationed up threat in order to provide radar early warning (and a MEZ) several times. Coventry was sunk in that kind of mission.
"Coward was inclined to station the two Type 42s Glasgow and Coventry well forward (west of West Falkland!) with combat air patrols flying forward of them … the carriers … should bring up the rear some fifty miles back."
I'd have thought it was more logical to put the T42's forward so they could fire away at anything without worrying about the CAP - put the CAP in between the T42's and the carriers to clean up anyone coming through?
I seem to remember reading that the forward positioning of the T42's was thought about but the stats on what happened to USN radar pickets in WW2 showed that for it to work you needed a lot more ships than the RN could provide in the Falklands. Casualties would have been high
I'd have thought it was more logical to put the T42's forward so they could fire away at anything without worrying about the CAP - put the CAP in between the T42's and the carriers to clean up anyone coming through?
I seem to remember reading that the forward positioning of the T42's was thought about but the stats on what happened to USN radar pickets in WW2 showed that for it to work you needed a lot more ships than the RN could provide in the Falklands. Casualties would have been high
Jack
Sad news..
Fair winds and following seas, Sir!
Fair winds and following seas, Sir!