Harrier Falklands Conundrum
Pontius/Mogwi
I of course accept what you say. My first job on Blue Fox was the ARM bit. At that point, you have to accept that the Service Customer (OR, who is at least 4 steps removed from pilots) had accepted that the radar met its spec (a progressive process, ideally witnessed by a pilot and maintainer on the development rigs); but in early 1982 would not have been expecting it fully in-service for another 18 months (?), by which time many ‘problems’ would be ironed out.
As I said, there was a planned development path, and the limitations you speak of were reasonably well understood. There was a cunning plan and it was executed well. The alternative would have been to skip Blue Fox and be without a radar in SHAR until 1987-88; and Blue Vixen would probably have had the limitations. Which would you want?
Also, it isn’t clear what aircrew were told to expect. If you saw the spec before 1982, I’ve explained why that wasn’t what turned up. I know the Sea King ASW guys were expecting a Track While Scan capability in Mk5 (Sea Searcher), and right in front of their nose was a big TWS button. For years they complained it didn’t seem to work. I went to Culdrose in 86, unscrewed a front panel, and showed them there was no wiring to the switch. Development was cut short so quickly in 82, there was no time to fit even a blanking plate, and it was way down the list when we were trying to catch up.
I appreciate we have different perceptions. I kind of knew yours, as they were aired at the annual Contraints Working Groups and Capability Asessment Groups. The process is relatively simple. 1. Aircrew and maintainers set out their problems, in priority order, for each aircraft Mark. 2. OR, but often delegated to FONAC, 'sentence' them at the CAG as Constraints or Limitations. The latter are then forgotten, as you can work around them.
Constraints are tagged Critical, Major or Minor; with a safety caveat if appropriate. This establishes OR's workload for the following 12 months. His primary role is to clear Criticals and Safetys; that is, start the process of persuading the Gods to give him money. In practice, he picks away at Majors in slow time, as they are unlikely to attract funding. Minors - forget about it, unless it can be subsumed in a Critical or Major a little cost. (Typically apllies to software patches). 18 months later, it would get back to Service HQ, who staff the Admiralty Board Submission. (The very first one I did, in August 1985, was the first major upgrade to AEW Searchwater LAST. INS and G8 autotrack. Main Building said that took priority over ANY other radar or sonics requirement). You'd maybe get the capability 2 or 3 years after that.
I can tell you exactly what each FAA CWG and CAG said, as I had to attend and answer questions. If your Sqn CO, AEO , SPLOT (and SOBS for ASW/AEW) complained about what you've said here, my answer HAD to be 'Blue Vixen fixes it'. It was up to the Customer (OR/FONAC) to then say if he wanted Blue Fox to be 'fixed', or if he was happy to wait for Blue Vixen.
In turn, he was bound by strict policy (as was I), which the Treasury lived by. The 'Five Year Rule'. Anything we sought money for had to have a 5 year 'useful life'. I did this in 85-87 as the DGA(N) HQ desk officer, and the 5 years was measured from the notional In-Service Date of any (Blue Fox) modification, to the STATED In Service Date of Blue Vixen. No-one present could say it would meet the criteria, when the next item on the agenda was confirmation that Blue Vixen was on schedule, and half the people there had seen it working and confirmed it cleared the Constraint. A year later, we'd be told the aircraft (FRS2) had slipped a year, but so too the clock started again on your five available years.
You can see that in this sense all of FRS1 support suffered because it was difficult to justify any mod, because the 5 year rule kicked in very quickly after the ISD. I recall one of the main Constraints in my next job, about 1989, was HUDWAC/MADGE integration. Approval was granted and I paid for the equipment mods, but the aircraft office then refused to mod HUDWAC as a higher priority arose, and you never got it. That is very common, and very frustrating.
Hope this helps.
I of course accept what you say. My first job on Blue Fox was the ARM bit. At that point, you have to accept that the Service Customer (OR, who is at least 4 steps removed from pilots) had accepted that the radar met its spec (a progressive process, ideally witnessed by a pilot and maintainer on the development rigs); but in early 1982 would not have been expecting it fully in-service for another 18 months (?), by which time many ‘problems’ would be ironed out.
As I said, there was a planned development path, and the limitations you speak of were reasonably well understood. There was a cunning plan and it was executed well. The alternative would have been to skip Blue Fox and be without a radar in SHAR until 1987-88; and Blue Vixen would probably have had the limitations. Which would you want?
Also, it isn’t clear what aircrew were told to expect. If you saw the spec before 1982, I’ve explained why that wasn’t what turned up. I know the Sea King ASW guys were expecting a Track While Scan capability in Mk5 (Sea Searcher), and right in front of their nose was a big TWS button. For years they complained it didn’t seem to work. I went to Culdrose in 86, unscrewed a front panel, and showed them there was no wiring to the switch. Development was cut short so quickly in 82, there was no time to fit even a blanking plate, and it was way down the list when we were trying to catch up.
I appreciate we have different perceptions. I kind of knew yours, as they were aired at the annual Contraints Working Groups and Capability Asessment Groups. The process is relatively simple. 1. Aircrew and maintainers set out their problems, in priority order, for each aircraft Mark. 2. OR, but often delegated to FONAC, 'sentence' them at the CAG as Constraints or Limitations. The latter are then forgotten, as you can work around them.
Constraints are tagged Critical, Major or Minor; with a safety caveat if appropriate. This establishes OR's workload for the following 12 months. His primary role is to clear Criticals and Safetys; that is, start the process of persuading the Gods to give him money. In practice, he picks away at Majors in slow time, as they are unlikely to attract funding. Minors - forget about it, unless it can be subsumed in a Critical or Major a little cost. (Typically apllies to software patches). 18 months later, it would get back to Service HQ, who staff the Admiralty Board Submission. (The very first one I did, in August 1985, was the first major upgrade to AEW Searchwater LAST. INS and G8 autotrack. Main Building said that took priority over ANY other radar or sonics requirement). You'd maybe get the capability 2 or 3 years after that.
I can tell you exactly what each FAA CWG and CAG said, as I had to attend and answer questions. If your Sqn CO, AEO , SPLOT (and SOBS for ASW/AEW) complained about what you've said here, my answer HAD to be 'Blue Vixen fixes it'. It was up to the Customer (OR/FONAC) to then say if he wanted Blue Fox to be 'fixed', or if he was happy to wait for Blue Vixen.
In turn, he was bound by strict policy (as was I), which the Treasury lived by. The 'Five Year Rule'. Anything we sought money for had to have a 5 year 'useful life'. I did this in 85-87 as the DGA(N) HQ desk officer, and the 5 years was measured from the notional In-Service Date of any (Blue Fox) modification, to the STATED In Service Date of Blue Vixen. No-one present could say it would meet the criteria, when the next item on the agenda was confirmation that Blue Vixen was on schedule, and half the people there had seen it working and confirmed it cleared the Constraint. A year later, we'd be told the aircraft (FRS2) had slipped a year, but so too the clock started again on your five available years.
You can see that in this sense all of FRS1 support suffered because it was difficult to justify any mod, because the 5 year rule kicked in very quickly after the ISD. I recall one of the main Constraints in my next job, about 1989, was HUDWAC/MADGE integration. Approval was granted and I paid for the equipment mods, but the aircraft office then refused to mod HUDWAC as a higher priority arose, and you never got it. That is very common, and very frustrating.
Hope this helps.
Squire had to contend with the opposition of the Hermes captain, Linley Middleton, to his receiving lengthy signals from Britain on how to use the technology.
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".
Jack
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Jack
And frankly whilst air attack was plentiful, a successful SSK attack by the Argentianians would have been far worse.
Squire had to contend with the opposition of the Hermes captain, Linley Middleton, to his receiving lengthy signals from Britain on how to use the technology.
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".
Jack
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".
Jack
The common thread from all three books regarding leadership on Hermes, seems to be a mindset of aircrew planning jollies, seriously destructive interservice or inter ship rivalry, micromanagement or not understanding the capabilities or impact of deicision ( e.g. the photo interpretation example in Pook's book and the risk highlighted in Ward's book - regarding supposed fast jets on the Stanley runway )
Ultimately was this simply a stress reaction in the situation or a common leadership failure. I was surprised given the risk of so many lives that this was not picked up in after action review as the impact was pretty clear in the books, so must have been common knowledge?
Last edited by dagenham; 23rd Apr 2020 at 13:55. Reason: key pigs
Jack
Blimey, tuc, if this is your level of recall after "memory fade" and some 40 years in amongst all your many Projects you've PM'd that is scary! I hardly remember what day it is let alone what was happening all them years ago! I had no idea Blue Fox was so immature when we went South - OK, as others went South - I was having too much fun building/installing a load of UORs for those down there at the time to go myself! But what a fascinating insight/reminder of just how difficult it was to get anything into Service - it's a bit like the pitfalls faced by a salmon getting back to it's spawning ground - only the lucky survive!! Pontius, I'm sure you'd agree the system was way off "just giving you something that worked" given some of the "interesting" decisions/characters involved along they way who often put a very different spin on requirements/tradeoffs which left normal RMs/Engineers going "WTF?????!!!!". Yep, them fish had one hell of a battle to get there! 
As an aside, one thing I never did really grasp (having never been involved myself) were the advent of Software Support Cells so that some in-service development work (at lead Air Station level rather than the Malvern-type input you mention) could be carried out. I always wondered what this did to config control of such systems as I assume, if changes were made "in service", it would have to be via the SM route. I understood the desire was to do what Pontius wanted but I always wondered how effective they were/are.
As an end-note, even today, when I see some amazing bit of kit whizzing around, setting off car alarms and generally flying amazing routines, it's not the aerodynamics which amaze me ..... it's just the fact it ever managed to get built in the first place which is the truly awesome thing to realise!
As an aside, one thing I never did really grasp (having never been involved myself) were the advent of Software Support Cells so that some in-service development work (at lead Air Station level rather than the Malvern-type input you mention) could be carried out. I always wondered what this did to config control of such systems as I assume, if changes were made "in service", it would have to be via the SM route. I understood the desire was to do what Pontius wanted but I always wondered how effective they were/are.
As an end-note, even today, when I see some amazing bit of kit whizzing around, setting off car alarms and generally flying amazing routines, it's not the aerodynamics which amaze me ..... it's just the fact it ever managed to get built in the first place which is the truly awesome thing to realise!
The common thread from all three books regarding leadership on Hermes, seems to be a mindset of aircrew planning jollies, seriously destructive interservice or inter ship rivalry, micromanagement or not understanding the capabilities or impact of decision ( e.g. the photo interpretation example in Pook's book and the risk highlighted in Ward's book - regarding supposed fast jets on the Stanley runway )
Ultimately was this simply a stress reaction in the situation or a common leadership failure. I was surprised given the risk of so many lives that this was not picked up in after action review as the impact was pretty clear in the books, so must have been common knowledge?
Ultimately was this simply a stress reaction in the situation or a common leadership failure. I was surprised given the risk of so many lives that this was not picked up in after action review as the impact was pretty clear in the books, so must have been common knowledge?
It really saddened me during my time in - but it's the same in all walks of life as I've now discovered (slow learner??!!) - humans are humans and, while most are decent/honourable, there are quite a large number who are the complete opposite.
Opps, I think H 'n' H just got H 'n' H on his soapbox! I'll just hop back down!!!!
Interesting stuff Tecumseh
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
As an aside, one thing I never did really grasp (having never been involved myself) were the advent of Software Support Cells so that some in-service development work (at lead Air Station level rather than the Malvern-type input you mention) could be carried out. I always wondered what this did to config control of such systems as I assume, if changes were made "in service", it would have to be via the SM route.
Blue Fox was only ever going to have a 10 year life, max. That made it unusual. Like I said, in many ways it was a technology demonstrator. There was a planned, funded and contracted upgrade path in the family of radars. That provided stability and encouraged innovation. Why was any Ferranti radar good? The design team. But also the superb radar scientists we had at RSRE Malvern, who contributed so much. Also worth mentioning is that in the 70s and early 80s many MoD(PE) project managers had been radar designers. The Fox & Vixen one was brilliant; so too the Kestrel one, who later did Apache. By end-90s, all that expertise was largely gone.
A good example of how radar developments can go wrong. Type 996 - an air surveillance radar for the RN - was a procurement to forget. No one had put in the spec that it had to be mounted on the top of the mast of ship that would actually go to sea. I mean, why would you?
The result was that the antenna motors kept failing - they weren't waterproof. And the first time a ship with one got struck by lightning the gold plated fibre glass waveguide they'd used blew up. The reason why older radars had had massive lumps of brass for the rotating joints and waveguide was because they made good lightning conductors. You couldn't make it up. The problems were all put right in due course, but they were pretty pathetic problems to have in the first place.
Squire had to contend with the opposition of the Hermes captain, Linley Middleton, to his receiving lengthy signals from Britain on how to use the technology.
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".
Jack
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".
Jack
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Guys,
I've held off posting to this thread for a bit, as I wanted to wait until more issues were raised and useful points made, especially by people with operational experience like Mogwi. However, as a participant in 1982 (I was the Deputy Air Engineer Officer on 820 Squadron in Invincible) I think I can add a couple of observations that people might find mildly interesting.
It quickly became known that CO Hermes was not an easy person to serve under. By the way, that doesn't mean he was necessarily a bad operational CO. But, and it's important, ships work better when they're 'happy'. Anyone who has served in the RN at sea will know the difference between a 'happy' ship and an 'unhappy' one. It's complicated, but (in my view) it boils down to whether people do what's required because they want to (happy ship), or because they've been told to do it (unhappy ship). Hermes was, from what we were hearing on Invincible, an unhappy ship. Invincible was an extremely happy one. I'd caveat that remark by saying that inter ship rivalry was (and I'd bet still is) very common, and you often got rumours going round about 'what Captain X said' or similar. However, I did have first hand experience of how CO Hermes did his business, which I can now share here. I apologise for this 'dit' not being shorter.
It actually was a dark and stormy night (around 0200 I think) in May when a Sea King from 826 Squadron on Hermes suddenly arrived on our flight deck, requesting an AEO come out and look at a problem. I was on duty, and it didn't take long to establish that the aircraft (which was still rotors running) had serious issues with both engines, No.1 in particular showing no oil pressure. There was also a strong smell of burning oil in the cabin. My (easy) decision was that No. 1 engine was shot and the aircraft was U/S. Hermes was around 70 miles away and opening, and the night was absolutely foul, with winds of around 50 knots, rain and thick cloud, and heavy seas. I rapidly concluded that this aircraft was going nowhere. Within 5 minutes of my report to Flyco, the aircraft was folded, shut down, and sent down to the hangar. (We had run out of spare engines on board at that point). About two minutes later, I was called down to the Ops Room 'at the rush', and after the required sprint through and down the ship I was told to speak to 'Hermes'. Our CO (Captain J J Black) was listening in.
I was asked, somewhat testily, why I'd 'grounded' their aircraft. While I was explaining my decision, CO Hermes came on the line and ordered me to 'sign the aircraft off for one flight only, single engine' and get it back on the flight deck so it could 'immediately' launch for Hermes. ( I should explain that 'one flight only single engine' clearances were occasionally used to get Wessex 5s back home, but only on land, over short distances, at low weights and in good weather. ) This order from CO Hermes was 'barking', so I took a pause and refused.
CO Hermes went ballistic. He repeated his order to me in no uncertain terms, pointing out our relative ranks and my duty to carry out orders from a superior officer. At that point, Captain Black came into the conversation, and calmly told CO Hermes that the aircraft was staying down, Hermes needed to get an engine and a change team over here, and that the decision to strike the aircraft down had been made by 'an AEO that I trust absolutely'. He hung up, looked at me for a moment and then said that I was carrying out my duties to his entire satisfaction, and that I was to carry on doing so. That was definitely what some people call 'a life moment'.
I've bored you all with this to back up what Hot'n'High said. In all walks of life you get nice people and not nice people. If you are lucky, you get to work with nice people, like JJ Black and Peter Squire. Or you get people like CO Hermes. The more senior nice and not nice people get, the bigger the effect they have. You make the best of it the best way you can, and on a ship that means working as a team to take care of each other and get the job done. 1(F) did that on Hermes, and they deserve huge credit for it. As did every team and every person that took part in those strange days in 1982.
Best regards as ever to all those in all three services today who do the best they can with what they get, and the bosses they have. We all owe them so much.
Engines
I've held off posting to this thread for a bit, as I wanted to wait until more issues were raised and useful points made, especially by people with operational experience like Mogwi. However, as a participant in 1982 (I was the Deputy Air Engineer Officer on 820 Squadron in Invincible) I think I can add a couple of observations that people might find mildly interesting.
It quickly became known that CO Hermes was not an easy person to serve under. By the way, that doesn't mean he was necessarily a bad operational CO. But, and it's important, ships work better when they're 'happy'. Anyone who has served in the RN at sea will know the difference between a 'happy' ship and an 'unhappy' one. It's complicated, but (in my view) it boils down to whether people do what's required because they want to (happy ship), or because they've been told to do it (unhappy ship). Hermes was, from what we were hearing on Invincible, an unhappy ship. Invincible was an extremely happy one. I'd caveat that remark by saying that inter ship rivalry was (and I'd bet still is) very common, and you often got rumours going round about 'what Captain X said' or similar. However, I did have first hand experience of how CO Hermes did his business, which I can now share here. I apologise for this 'dit' not being shorter.
It actually was a dark and stormy night (around 0200 I think) in May when a Sea King from 826 Squadron on Hermes suddenly arrived on our flight deck, requesting an AEO come out and look at a problem. I was on duty, and it didn't take long to establish that the aircraft (which was still rotors running) had serious issues with both engines, No.1 in particular showing no oil pressure. There was also a strong smell of burning oil in the cabin. My (easy) decision was that No. 1 engine was shot and the aircraft was U/S. Hermes was around 70 miles away and opening, and the night was absolutely foul, with winds of around 50 knots, rain and thick cloud, and heavy seas. I rapidly concluded that this aircraft was going nowhere. Within 5 minutes of my report to Flyco, the aircraft was folded, shut down, and sent down to the hangar. (We had run out of spare engines on board at that point). About two minutes later, I was called down to the Ops Room 'at the rush', and after the required sprint through and down the ship I was told to speak to 'Hermes'. Our CO (Captain J J Black) was listening in.
I was asked, somewhat testily, why I'd 'grounded' their aircraft. While I was explaining my decision, CO Hermes came on the line and ordered me to 'sign the aircraft off for one flight only, single engine' and get it back on the flight deck so it could 'immediately' launch for Hermes. ( I should explain that 'one flight only single engine' clearances were occasionally used to get Wessex 5s back home, but only on land, over short distances, at low weights and in good weather. ) This order from CO Hermes was 'barking', so I took a pause and refused.
CO Hermes went ballistic. He repeated his order to me in no uncertain terms, pointing out our relative ranks and my duty to carry out orders from a superior officer. At that point, Captain Black came into the conversation, and calmly told CO Hermes that the aircraft was staying down, Hermes needed to get an engine and a change team over here, and that the decision to strike the aircraft down had been made by 'an AEO that I trust absolutely'. He hung up, looked at me for a moment and then said that I was carrying out my duties to his entire satisfaction, and that I was to carry on doing so. That was definitely what some people call 'a life moment'.
I've bored you all with this to back up what Hot'n'High said. In all walks of life you get nice people and not nice people. If you are lucky, you get to work with nice people, like JJ Black and Peter Squire. Or you get people like CO Hermes. The more senior nice and not nice people get, the bigger the effect they have. You make the best of it the best way you can, and on a ship that means working as a team to take care of each other and get the job done. 1(F) did that on Hermes, and they deserve huge credit for it. As did every team and every person that took part in those strange days in 1982.
Best regards as ever to all those in all three services today who do the best they can with what they get, and the bosses they have. We all owe them so much.
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 24th Apr 2020 at 15:39.
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To emphasise Engines' remarks above I thought I would add a little dit. I was a student on the jet in 2003 when the late Sir Peter was coming to the end of his tenure as CAS. I don't know why and I don't care but it was decided he would fly the jet again solo before he retired. He came to the OCU for a 3 week period to get worked up and have one last solo Harrier experience. He was given a private office next to the students crew room for his normal work but when free would just walk next door into the students office for a chat. His reasoning was he was no different to us, a student on a demanding course. He was totally engaging and a pure gentleman. He did finally achieve his solo in a GR7, the one and only time he ever flew it. When I asked him how it was he just smiled and said "You know and I now remember more vividly than ever, fantastic!". A wonderful leader and a humble gentleman to the end. RIP Sir.
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Guys,
Following up another aspect raised in this thread, that of the issues arising when the GR3s arrived on Hermes - which wasn't until 18th May, by which time quite a bit of stuff had gone on.
It's my conclusion that the GR3 force was not ready to embark in a warship for ops in early April, when they were tasked. This despite the fact that they were declared in this role, and the annual 'Hardy Crab' exercises were supposed to prove that they were. In the event, they needed not only the I Band transponders Tuc mentions, but a rack of other mods. There was also a rapid effort to develop the 'Finrae' trolley to allow their nav platforms to be aligned on board. On top of that, it was decided that they should be able to carry out an air to air role, which required a rapid Sidewinder mod. The fact that they got to the ship by 18th May having done that lot is quite amazing. The inherent genius and flexibility of the Harrier was a major part of making it work at all.
But.....Tuc makes a good point with regard to the reception the GR3 team got when he says that CO Hermes had quite a few things on his plate. I'm guessing, but having had the GR3s embark to be told that they now needed to consume considerable radio traffic capacity to resolve issues with the LGB capability must have not been welcome. He would have expected that they wouldn't have been sent unless they were fully ready to do the job. (By the way, everybody had to work around very limited comms back then down there - we were under amazingly strict EMCON all the time, and we were required to make decisions with the data we had). I'm not having a go at 1(F) - I've made it clear many times that I had a great respect for them. But try looking at it from another viewpoint.
The extract from the obituary gives a hint of how some viewed the situation. Yes, 1(F) were 'uncomfortably quartered'. Everybody on that ship was. Get over it. I would take a bet that the CO in his tiny sea cabin was not much better 'quartered' than anyone else. My younger brother was a Sea Harrier pilot on 800 and was sleeping on a camp bed in the wardroom bar area. 1(F) were using 'old fashioned map and stopwatch navigation methods' only because nobody in the RAF had seriously considered how their aircraft's navigation systems might operate from a moving ship. They were declared in the role - why hadn't they done that?
Sadly, lessons weren't learned in some quarters. Fast forward to 2001. JFH was trying to 'do its thing' - one day I was told that Strike HQ was 'requiring' that the next GR7 detachment be supported by a 'portable' RAF satellite terminal to allow them to plug directly into the RAF air stores system and not to have to use the RN's ship's stores system interface. My RAF manned GR7 staff said it was a stupid idea, I agreed, but we were overridden by the HQ loggies. So... the 'portable' stores satcom station arrives at the jetty, and requires a crane to lift it on to the flight deck. It's about the size of a large American fridge. Much angst as to where it's going to be located as the RAF team realise that: (a) there's not much spare deck space anywhere, and: (b) there are one or two high power transmitting systems on the ship. The ship helps as much as it can, giving the RAF guys a full list of the ship's systems, and working out when the RAF system can transmit and receive. A location is selected, and power supplies are arranged.
The RAF system is switched on, and after a short time establishes a good link. Celebrations ensue. The ship then sails, and soon afterwards the link is lost. The reason is discovered - the RAF system is designed for land use, and the antenna is manually aligned and set up on fixed angles. As soon as the ship made its first turn, the system was f****d. It was switched off and landed at the first chance.
A few days later, I got an email from the Strike HQ logs staff deploring the fact that we hadn't told them that ships change course frequently (I honestly got this email) and requesting that in future the carriers commit to spending a minimum of 10 minutes per hour on an agreed course so that the system could be used. I didn't even bother responding. By that time, I had a quite excellent RAF Sqn Ldr on my team who had a strong logs background - he worked out how the GR7 detachments could use the RN onboard stores system (actually pretty much like the RN had been doing) , documented it, and briefed it out to the GR7 teams.
I understand that people don't get that operating aircraft from ships is a challenge. I understand that people still refer to aircraft carriers as 'floating airfields', when they are plainly not. I understand that for many aviators, this doesn't really matter. But what is essential now is that everyone involved in getting the nation's new strike capability to sea takes the time and effort to learn what naval aviation involves and to make sure we're properly ready next time. Encouragingly, it looks as if the new generation are doing a much better job than we ever did.
Best regards as ever to everyone, of all services, doing their best at to fly safely at sea today.
Engines
Following up another aspect raised in this thread, that of the issues arising when the GR3s arrived on Hermes - which wasn't until 18th May, by which time quite a bit of stuff had gone on.
It's my conclusion that the GR3 force was not ready to embark in a warship for ops in early April, when they were tasked. This despite the fact that they were declared in this role, and the annual 'Hardy Crab' exercises were supposed to prove that they were. In the event, they needed not only the I Band transponders Tuc mentions, but a rack of other mods. There was also a rapid effort to develop the 'Finrae' trolley to allow their nav platforms to be aligned on board. On top of that, it was decided that they should be able to carry out an air to air role, which required a rapid Sidewinder mod. The fact that they got to the ship by 18th May having done that lot is quite amazing. The inherent genius and flexibility of the Harrier was a major part of making it work at all.
But.....Tuc makes a good point with regard to the reception the GR3 team got when he says that CO Hermes had quite a few things on his plate. I'm guessing, but having had the GR3s embark to be told that they now needed to consume considerable radio traffic capacity to resolve issues with the LGB capability must have not been welcome. He would have expected that they wouldn't have been sent unless they were fully ready to do the job. (By the way, everybody had to work around very limited comms back then down there - we were under amazingly strict EMCON all the time, and we were required to make decisions with the data we had). I'm not having a go at 1(F) - I've made it clear many times that I had a great respect for them. But try looking at it from another viewpoint.
The extract from the obituary gives a hint of how some viewed the situation. Yes, 1(F) were 'uncomfortably quartered'. Everybody on that ship was. Get over it. I would take a bet that the CO in his tiny sea cabin was not much better 'quartered' than anyone else. My younger brother was a Sea Harrier pilot on 800 and was sleeping on a camp bed in the wardroom bar area. 1(F) were using 'old fashioned map and stopwatch navigation methods' only because nobody in the RAF had seriously considered how their aircraft's navigation systems might operate from a moving ship. They were declared in the role - why hadn't they done that?
Sadly, lessons weren't learned in some quarters. Fast forward to 2001. JFH was trying to 'do its thing' - one day I was told that Strike HQ was 'requiring' that the next GR7 detachment be supported by a 'portable' RAF satellite terminal to allow them to plug directly into the RAF air stores system and not to have to use the RN's ship's stores system interface. My RAF manned GR7 staff said it was a stupid idea, I agreed, but we were overridden by the HQ loggies. So... the 'portable' stores satcom station arrives at the jetty, and requires a crane to lift it on to the flight deck. It's about the size of a large American fridge. Much angst as to where it's going to be located as the RAF team realise that: (a) there's not much spare deck space anywhere, and: (b) there are one or two high power transmitting systems on the ship. The ship helps as much as it can, giving the RAF guys a full list of the ship's systems, and working out when the RAF system can transmit and receive. A location is selected, and power supplies are arranged.
The RAF system is switched on, and after a short time establishes a good link. Celebrations ensue. The ship then sails, and soon afterwards the link is lost. The reason is discovered - the RAF system is designed for land use, and the antenna is manually aligned and set up on fixed angles. As soon as the ship made its first turn, the system was f****d. It was switched off and landed at the first chance.
A few days later, I got an email from the Strike HQ logs staff deploring the fact that we hadn't told them that ships change course frequently (I honestly got this email) and requesting that in future the carriers commit to spending a minimum of 10 minutes per hour on an agreed course so that the system could be used. I didn't even bother responding. By that time, I had a quite excellent RAF Sqn Ldr on my team who had a strong logs background - he worked out how the GR7 detachments could use the RN onboard stores system (actually pretty much like the RN had been doing) , documented it, and briefed it out to the GR7 teams.
I understand that people don't get that operating aircraft from ships is a challenge. I understand that people still refer to aircraft carriers as 'floating airfields', when they are plainly not. I understand that for many aviators, this doesn't really matter. But what is essential now is that everyone involved in getting the nation's new strike capability to sea takes the time and effort to learn what naval aviation involves and to make sure we're properly ready next time. Encouragingly, it looks as if the new generation are doing a much better job than we ever did.
Best regards as ever to everyone, of all services, doing their best at to fly safely at sea today.
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 24th Apr 2020 at 15:42.
Guys,
It's my conclusion that the GR3 force was not ready to embark in a warship for ops in early April, when they were tasked. This despite the fact that they were declared in this role, and the annual 'Hardy Crab' exercises were supposed to prove that they were.
Engines
It's my conclusion that the GR3 force was not ready to embark in a warship for ops in early April, when they were tasked. This despite the fact that they were declared in this role, and the annual 'Hardy Crab' exercises were supposed to prove that they were.
Engines
Best I can recall is that a single development Harrier GR1 took part in a ship trial, pre-ski jump, as part of the nascent SHAR programme in the early '70s.
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JTO,
Good question, well put. I suppose the reasons that I thought that the GR3s were declared and required to operate from ships were:
1. The fact that they had been running detachments to the CVS every year since about 1979 (these were called 'Hardy Crab'), and involved landing on and taking off from the ship. Quite a lot of them, actually.
2. The fact that the crews embarking in 'Hardy Crab' told us that they were required to be able to embark in the CVS for ops.
3. The fact that there was a substantial series of mods to the aircraft specifically designed to enable embarked ops, including not only I band transponders, as Tuc describes, but also extra tie down points, and modifications to the landing gear.
And so on.
My point was that, clearly, 'Hardy Crab' had not been sufficient to make the GR3 force fully operationally capable, hence the need for 'FINRAE' development (important because navigation over the sea is always a bit of a challenge) and the difficulties in getting the LGB capability full on line. However, I think I was careful to give credit to 1(F) and specifically their CO, Peter Squire. I only ever met him twice. Once in Port Stanley in 1982, when he took the time to ask me whether there was anything else his team could do to help me recover a U/S Sea King parked not far from their base. The second time was in 2001 at HQ Strike Command at the Battle of Britain Reception, when I was asked to come over and speak to CAS. I didn't recognise him, but he recognised me. He then lowered his voice and said how sad he was that my late brother (who served with him in Hermes in 1982) wasn't able to be there and how much he missed him. He was, in the view of this retired Naval officer, a true gentleman and a fine officer.
I have only the highest respect for anyone who strapped a Harrier on their a**e and went to war. But with that goes an expectation that all the Services need to work together and deliver the best effect for the nation. It hasn't always happened, sometimes for the worst of reasons. When they don't (and I care not a whit which one drops the ball) lessons need to be learned and the issues fixed.
Again, I am filled with optimism when I talk to the next generation (RAF and RN) who are getting the F-35B force ready to go to sea. A bright future beckons.
Best Regards as ever to all those young people showing us old f***s how it's done,
Engines
Good question, well put. I suppose the reasons that I thought that the GR3s were declared and required to operate from ships were:
1. The fact that they had been running detachments to the CVS every year since about 1979 (these were called 'Hardy Crab'), and involved landing on and taking off from the ship. Quite a lot of them, actually.
2. The fact that the crews embarking in 'Hardy Crab' told us that they were required to be able to embark in the CVS for ops.
3. The fact that there was a substantial series of mods to the aircraft specifically designed to enable embarked ops, including not only I band transponders, as Tuc describes, but also extra tie down points, and modifications to the landing gear.
And so on.
My point was that, clearly, 'Hardy Crab' had not been sufficient to make the GR3 force fully operationally capable, hence the need for 'FINRAE' development (important because navigation over the sea is always a bit of a challenge) and the difficulties in getting the LGB capability full on line. However, I think I was careful to give credit to 1(F) and specifically their CO, Peter Squire. I only ever met him twice. Once in Port Stanley in 1982, when he took the time to ask me whether there was anything else his team could do to help me recover a U/S Sea King parked not far from their base. The second time was in 2001 at HQ Strike Command at the Battle of Britain Reception, when I was asked to come over and speak to CAS. I didn't recognise him, but he recognised me. He then lowered his voice and said how sad he was that my late brother (who served with him in Hermes in 1982) wasn't able to be there and how much he missed him. He was, in the view of this retired Naval officer, a true gentleman and a fine officer.
I have only the highest respect for anyone who strapped a Harrier on their a**e and went to war. But with that goes an expectation that all the Services need to work together and deliver the best effect for the nation. It hasn't always happened, sometimes for the worst of reasons. When they don't (and I care not a whit which one drops the ball) lessons need to be learned and the issues fixed.
Again, I am filled with optimism when I talk to the next generation (RAF and RN) who are getting the F-35B force ready to go to sea. A bright future beckons.
Best Regards as ever to all those young people showing us old f***s how it's done,
Engines
Engines
I think that your last offering might just be a decade out.
I returned from a 3-year exchange with the USN in 1981, and along with Bob Iveson was, I think, the only involved 1(F) Sqn guy to have previously landed on a boat. My previous experience with the USN was cat and trap rather than Harrier, but Bob had, I think, done some AV-8A stuff.
But anyway - unless my memory has completely gone - all of the GR3 folk involved - including the 4 who did those remarkable Ascension to HERMES flights - apart from Bob & I - had never before landed on a boat.
I think that the "Hardy Crab" events that you refer to came much later, and most certainly after 82.
Certainly FINRAE was a HERMES/82 event that had its moments, despite some sterling efforts from those involved.
Thank you for your previous comment about the difficulties you had over an unserviceable Sea King reflecting some of the difficulties we had on HERMES. I am not at all surprised by your story, but also not at all surprised by the support you received from your Captain.
Just to finish - Tecumseh - we had the necessary transponders on our GR3s which we used in proximity to the carrier - so I doubt that the Captain was concerned about that aspect of our operations.
As an old f***wit, I feel the need to correct misunderstandings!!
I think that your last offering might just be a decade out.
I returned from a 3-year exchange with the USN in 1981, and along with Bob Iveson was, I think, the only involved 1(F) Sqn guy to have previously landed on a boat. My previous experience with the USN was cat and trap rather than Harrier, but Bob had, I think, done some AV-8A stuff.
But anyway - unless my memory has completely gone - all of the GR3 folk involved - including the 4 who did those remarkable Ascension to HERMES flights - apart from Bob & I - had never before landed on a boat.
I think that the "Hardy Crab" events that you refer to came much later, and most certainly after 82.
Certainly FINRAE was a HERMES/82 event that had its moments, despite some sterling efforts from those involved.
Thank you for your previous comment about the difficulties you had over an unserviceable Sea King reflecting some of the difficulties we had on HERMES. I am not at all surprised by your story, but also not at all surprised by the support you received from your Captain.
Just to finish - Tecumseh - we had the necessary transponders on our GR3s which we used in proximity to the carrier - so I doubt that the Captain was concerned about that aspect of our operations.
As an old f***wit, I feel the need to correct misunderstandings!!
Last edited by ex-fast-jets; 24th Apr 2020 at 20:40.
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Greetings.
My apologies for a small FI thread drift. Like others, I have done some enforced reading and greatly enjoyed "The RN and the Falklands War" David Brown (sic 1987-sorry don't have the book on me at this moment). It reminded me of numerous air and Joint things from my time. It also made me aware for the first time of the positively huge logistics challenges. As has already been mention, leadership traits come in many forms and I have seen this personally on operational and training flight decks. Mostly from excellent types but a few others.
What was interesting in the book was a claim that late in the war the Type 42/Canberra shoot-down may have been associated with a new ASM using another aircrafts targeting (the book speculated that it was an Israeli Gabriel ASM (possibly EO and not radar guided) using a Canberra as the launch platform and a Mirage III radar for targeting) against HMS Penelope (all recall here is subject to old age and G&T illusions). The Argentine Air Force and Navy, whilst limited in some respects had also shown adaptability in other areas such as Strategic Recce (707s), Long Range Anti-ship (C130 bombers), Land Anti-ship (navy Exocets at Stanley), Decoy and diversion missions (Learjets using the Stanley radar for SHAR warnings), Air Mobility into the FI (C130s in particular) etc.
Has anyone any additional details on this Gabriel ASM speculation?
Finally, I had the privilege as a rather drunk FLTLT to hear CAS Sir Peter at a Dining-In Night mid 90's. God knows how our truckie base got him as the guest speaker but he came across as a true gent.
Happy ANZAC Day!
My apologies for a small FI thread drift. Like others, I have done some enforced reading and greatly enjoyed "The RN and the Falklands War" David Brown (sic 1987-sorry don't have the book on me at this moment). It reminded me of numerous air and Joint things from my time. It also made me aware for the first time of the positively huge logistics challenges. As has already been mention, leadership traits come in many forms and I have seen this personally on operational and training flight decks. Mostly from excellent types but a few others.
What was interesting in the book was a claim that late in the war the Type 42/Canberra shoot-down may have been associated with a new ASM using another aircrafts targeting (the book speculated that it was an Israeli Gabriel ASM (possibly EO and not radar guided) using a Canberra as the launch platform and a Mirage III radar for targeting) against HMS Penelope (all recall here is subject to old age and G&T illusions). The Argentine Air Force and Navy, whilst limited in some respects had also shown adaptability in other areas such as Strategic Recce (707s), Long Range Anti-ship (C130 bombers), Land Anti-ship (navy Exocets at Stanley), Decoy and diversion missions (Learjets using the Stanley radar for SHAR warnings), Air Mobility into the FI (C130s in particular) etc.
Has anyone any additional details on this Gabriel ASM speculation?
Finally, I had the privilege as a rather drunk FLTLT to hear CAS Sir Peter at a Dining-In Night mid 90's. God knows how our truckie base got him as the guest speaker but he came across as a true gent.
Happy ANZAC Day!
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JTO,
I think you are right and I was wrong. My sincere and unreserved apologies. This getting old is a right swine. By the way, my abbreviation was for 'old farts', not 'old f***wits' - that's not a term I'd use for aircrew, unless I was severely provoked (come to think of it, I did use it once on an RN Shar pilot who cost us four days of technical investigations before admitting that his drop tank hadn't 'just fallen off' but had been mistakenly jettisoned.)
I'd just repeat my professional admiration for the way 1(F) got things together and got down south when they did. In Invincible, the RAF aircrew with 801 were similarly excellent.
Best regards as ever to the very, very many people whose memories are better than mine.
Engines
I think you are right and I was wrong. My sincere and unreserved apologies. This getting old is a right swine. By the way, my abbreviation was for 'old farts', not 'old f***wits' - that's not a term I'd use for aircrew, unless I was severely provoked (come to think of it, I did use it once on an RN Shar pilot who cost us four days of technical investigations before admitting that his drop tank hadn't 'just fallen off' but had been mistakenly jettisoned.)
I'd just repeat my professional admiration for the way 1(F) got things together and got down south when they did. In Invincible, the RAF aircrew with 801 were similarly excellent.
Best regards as ever to the very, very many people whose memories are better than mine.
Engines