Harrier Falklands Conundrum
Harrier Falklands Conundrum
So lockdown fever has lead to me to read the three tomes by Morgan, Ward and Pook. Enjoyed reading them all, all written from a very different perspective and would be interesting if they were all stitched together.
Some of the contradictory points and similarities raised has piqued my interest in further reading to understand more.
The key points seem to be
1. Views on Blue Fox seem to be massively divergent - was it that bad or was it the experience and set up that made the difference to Sharkey's team ?
2. Most view on the air leadership on Hermes seems to be that is a bit dire - is there any official after action review that reaches a view on this?
Do any of you know further reading or would be willing to share your views ?
Some of the contradictory points and similarities raised has piqued my interest in further reading to understand more.
The key points seem to be
1. Views on Blue Fox seem to be massively divergent - was it that bad or was it the experience and set up that made the difference to Sharkey's team ?
2. Most view on the air leadership on Hermes seems to be that is a bit dire - is there any official after action review that reaches a view on this?
Do any of you know further reading or would be willing to share your views ?
In the late 1970s, the RN had put all its front line radar eggs in one basket. Sea Spray for Lynx, Sea Searcher for ASW Sea King, and Blue Fox. Sea Spray slightly ahead, Sea Searcher and Blue Fox more or less in parallel.
When the Falklands kicked off, we had 8 B Models. That is, the RN had none, MoD(PE) owned the B models. They were in pairs. B1 and B2 were little more than breadboards, and very immature. B7 and B8 were near production model. You couldn’t mix LRUs or even most modules between pairs. Sea Searcher was in a similar situation, but with fewer B models, as some of the old Lightweight Radar was retained. (What was in the RAF Mk3s. They didn’t want to upgrade).
Development of both Sea Searcher and Blue Fox was stopped dead, and production launched/ramped up. B3-B8 went South along with the first production batch. There could be no expectation of full functionality, and some intended features were missing altogether. There wasn’t much soak testing.
One outcome on Blue fox, a few years later, was a blob appeared on the display tube, and gradually got bigger and obscured it completely. All at the same time. The chemical filter didn’t last as long as expected, and had to be replaced by a Hoya coloured glass one.
In short, there were rafts of production permits and concessions, and a major programme to stabilize the build standards and bring them up to spec took place from 83-on. The Sea Searcher one was never finished. Blue Fox was allowed to continue, as ILIC/Anderwave was in many respects a technology demonstrator for the next gen radars. The programme only finished a month or so before the FRS1 started going in for conversion to FRS2.
One amazing fact. The MLU contract was for ‘all’ remaining 55 systems to be upgraded. 61 turned up. The B Models were still in use, and had never needed maintenance beyond 2nd line. This was their first time back at the factory in 8 years.
Summary. Blue Fox was the dog’s bollix, and when it was replaced by Vixen other countries were queuing up to buy the remaining 55 complete systems. First in line was the RAF. They wanted something to put in Tornado to replace the Buccaneer/Blue Parrot role, and handed me a spec. The Ferranti Chief Designer laughed, and said Blue Fox is way beyond this spec, but it would need a major mod to Tornado to fit it. RAF OR said great – then asked what on earth the RN were getting if they were chucking out something beyond the RAF’s biggest wet dream. In the end, most were scrapped. Manadon got one, and Ferranti were allowed to section one for display. But much of it was at least Secret, and not permitted to be sold to any other country. (India had Blue Fox, but weren’t allowed the MLU).
Health warning. Memory fades a little.
When the Falklands kicked off, we had 8 B Models. That is, the RN had none, MoD(PE) owned the B models. They were in pairs. B1 and B2 were little more than breadboards, and very immature. B7 and B8 were near production model. You couldn’t mix LRUs or even most modules between pairs. Sea Searcher was in a similar situation, but with fewer B models, as some of the old Lightweight Radar was retained. (What was in the RAF Mk3s. They didn’t want to upgrade).
Development of both Sea Searcher and Blue Fox was stopped dead, and production launched/ramped up. B3-B8 went South along with the first production batch. There could be no expectation of full functionality, and some intended features were missing altogether. There wasn’t much soak testing.
One outcome on Blue fox, a few years later, was a blob appeared on the display tube, and gradually got bigger and obscured it completely. All at the same time. The chemical filter didn’t last as long as expected, and had to be replaced by a Hoya coloured glass one.
In short, there were rafts of production permits and concessions, and a major programme to stabilize the build standards and bring them up to spec took place from 83-on. The Sea Searcher one was never finished. Blue Fox was allowed to continue, as ILIC/Anderwave was in many respects a technology demonstrator for the next gen radars. The programme only finished a month or so before the FRS1 started going in for conversion to FRS2.
One amazing fact. The MLU contract was for ‘all’ remaining 55 systems to be upgraded. 61 turned up. The B Models were still in use, and had never needed maintenance beyond 2nd line. This was their first time back at the factory in 8 years.
Summary. Blue Fox was the dog’s bollix, and when it was replaced by Vixen other countries were queuing up to buy the remaining 55 complete systems. First in line was the RAF. They wanted something to put in Tornado to replace the Buccaneer/Blue Parrot role, and handed me a spec. The Ferranti Chief Designer laughed, and said Blue Fox is way beyond this spec, but it would need a major mod to Tornado to fit it. RAF OR said great – then asked what on earth the RN were getting if they were chucking out something beyond the RAF’s biggest wet dream. In the end, most were scrapped. Manadon got one, and Ferranti were allowed to section one for display. But much of it was at least Secret, and not permitted to be sold to any other country. (India had Blue Fox, but weren’t allowed the MLU).
Health warning. Memory fades a little.
So lockdown fever has lead to me to read the three tomes by Morgan, Ward and Pook. Enjoyed reading them all, all written from a very different perspective and would be interesting if they were all stitched together.
Some of the contradictory points and similarities raised has piqued my interest in further reading to understand more.
The key points seem to be
1. Views on Blue Fox seem to be massively divergent - was it that bad or was it the experience and set up that made the difference to Sharkey's team ?
2. Most view on the air leadership on Hermes seems to be that is a bit dire - is there any official after action review that reaches a view on this?
Do any of you know further reading or would be willing to share your views ?
Some of the contradictory points and similarities raised has piqued my interest in further reading to understand more.
The key points seem to be
1. Views on Blue Fox seem to be massively divergent - was it that bad or was it the experience and set up that made the difference to Sharkey's team ?
2. Most view on the air leadership on Hermes seems to be that is a bit dire - is there any official after action review that reaches a view on this?
Do any of you know further reading or would be willing to share your views ?
Interesting stuff Tecumseh
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
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Interesting stuff Tecumseh
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
Not necessarily 801 original tails; remember 809 got formed from a selection of airframes after the rest of the FAA Harrier contingent had departed.
Due to the fact that many bits from those tails had been used and taken south onboard ship, we had
many parts arrive " from trials" to be fitted to the 809 tails, to get them going.
The 809 tails flew to Ascension Island, then got loaded to Atlantic Conveyor for rest of trip south.
Once in theatre 809 got disbanded , and the tails redistributed between the 2 squadrons.
Ttfn
JaJ - keep on reading.
JJP (that's Jerry Pook) has written - in my opinion - an entirely real account of what went on. His comments on senior RN officer conduct - on Hermes - are, again in my opinion, totally justified.
I feel confident that others will soon comment on what you are looking for in your Point 2.
But I will commit wholesale to an appalling understanding from the hierarchy on (in) HERMES of what we (the RAF Harriers) could do - and what we could not do.
The understanding of HERMES Command was dreadful, but the fear of those working for Command to tell them that they were wrong was even worse.
That was, now, some 38 years ago.
I really hope that it would not be repeated now.
As an aside, the arrival of and departure from HERMES of Chinook BN following the attack on Atlantic Conveyor should by itself create a whole book on how things should not be done. If the hierarchy of HERMES had had their way, BN would have been thrown overboard Vietnam-style into the sea. As it was, as we all know, BN went ashore with very little support, and became a serious war effort winner.
JJP (that's Jerry Pook) has written - in my opinion - an entirely real account of what went on. His comments on senior RN officer conduct - on Hermes - are, again in my opinion, totally justified.
I feel confident that others will soon comment on what you are looking for in your Point 2.
But I will commit wholesale to an appalling understanding from the hierarchy on (in) HERMES of what we (the RAF Harriers) could do - and what we could not do.
The understanding of HERMES Command was dreadful, but the fear of those working for Command to tell them that they were wrong was even worse.
That was, now, some 38 years ago.
I really hope that it would not be repeated now.
As an aside, the arrival of and departure from HERMES of Chinook BN following the attack on Atlantic Conveyor should by itself create a whole book on how things should not be done. If the hierarchy of HERMES had had their way, BN would have been thrown overboard Vietnam-style into the sea. As it was, as we all know, BN went ashore with very little support, and became a serious war effort winner.
You would have thought that after the loss of HMS Glorious in 1940, the Navy would have learned how to use an aircraft carrier in war.
I have often wondered why a submariner was appointed as commander of the Task Force. How did that happen?
Was there a more "air minded" officer available who might have made a better commander?
Was there a more "air minded" officer available who might have made a better commander?
Interesting stuff Tecumseh
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
So did 801 on Invincible have the better sets? Also seem to recall 801 had more recent work ups from the Alloy Express exercise, and was more tasked on the Air to Air side of things. Certain airframes seemed to be better than others with 004 in 801 being recalled as one of the more trouble free airframes.
Development continued and upon return the kit was immediately upgraded with the 'jamming package' and the build standard settled down. This was related to performance under jamming, and was almost immediately the subject of an approved mid life upgrade (2 years into the service life!) termed ILIC/Anderwave. In Loop Interpretative (maybe Interactive) Control, and even better tracking in severe jamming.
The reason I recall this was the beancounters were all for suing Rank Brimar over the filters I mentioned, but I knew the history and adopted a more relaxed approach. Didn't want a p***** match that we would lose, when the aircraft were going to be without a radar in short order.
Reliability comes to mind. Blue Fox was WAY beyond any expectations. System MTBF was around five times that of Blue Parrot and the AWG series (Phantom). Different technologies of course, but indicative of the step changes that were happening at the time. But, I could never understand the RN approving a 15 year spares buy, after it started being withdrawn from service at 3 sets per month. That just used up the 'Sea Harrier radar' funding line, meaning Blue Vixen support was poor some some time.
I think the set that Ferranti kept may have been B8, as it was later used as the PDS rig. Never been to the factory since 93, so don't know if the new owners display it.
Last edited by tucumseh; 22nd Apr 2020 at 22:55.
JaJ - keep on reading.
JJP (that's Jerry Pook) has written - in my opinion - an entirely real account of what went on. His comments on senior RN officer conduct - on Hermes - are, again in my opinion, totally justified.
I feel confident that others will soon comment on what you are looking for in your Point 2.
But I will commit wholesale to an appalling understanding from the hierarchy on (in) HERMES of what we (the RAF Harriers) could do - and what we could not do.
The understanding of HERMES Command was dreadful, but the fear of those working for Command to tell them that they were wrong was even worse.
That was, now, some 38 years ago.
I really hope that it would not be repeated now.
As an aside, the arrival of and departure from HERMES of Chinook BN following the attack on Atlantic Conveyor should by itself create a whole book on how things should not be done. If the hierarchy of HERMES had had their way, BN would have been thrown overboard Vietnam-style into the sea. As it was, as we all know, BN went ashore with very little support, and became a serious war effort winner.
JJP (that's Jerry Pook) has written - in my opinion - an entirely real account of what went on. His comments on senior RN officer conduct - on Hermes - are, again in my opinion, totally justified.
I feel confident that others will soon comment on what you are looking for in your Point 2.
But I will commit wholesale to an appalling understanding from the hierarchy on (in) HERMES of what we (the RAF Harriers) could do - and what we could not do.
The understanding of HERMES Command was dreadful, but the fear of those working for Command to tell them that they were wrong was even worse.
That was, now, some 38 years ago.
I really hope that it would not be repeated now.
As an aside, the arrival of and departure from HERMES of Chinook BN following the attack on Atlantic Conveyor should by itself create a whole book on how things should not be done. If the hierarchy of HERMES had had their way, BN would have been thrown overboard Vietnam-style into the sea. As it was, as we all know, BN went ashore with very little support, and became a serious war effort winner.
yes it was an eye opener. Pook’s very short aside towards the end on the captain refusing to allow night qualification for Hermes newer SHAR pilots explained Sharkey’s complaints about illustrious carrying out so many night CAP and I guess the fatigue mentioned in Morgan’s book. The Hermes captain was South African ex Buccaneer ?
In my experience, pilots/aircrew tend to accept what they’re given. They adapt and crack on. The decision as to what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ manifests itself in the Constraints Document, which determines where money is spent. Aircrew have a direct input to that. Any Blue Fox Constraints or Limitations were leftovers from the early shutting down of development. After that, the Fire Control and Surveillance radar project team had very few problems. That’s how quality (fitness for purpose) was measured by a Service HQ.
Study each aspect of its specification, and it was beyond what would procurers call the ‘stretch’ target; defined as a target ‘which is currently out of reach, but not out of sight. Significantly more difficult than hard targets, they require breaking of previous boundaries and constraints’. (constraints with a small c). Blue Fox ate up stretch targets. There isn’t a term in the procurement handbook for what it achieved.
What do you want from kit? Availability, Reliability, Maintainability, at a fair and reasonable cost. Blue Fox had all of that. ILS is today an industry, but in a nutshell it is Ranging, Scaling, Documentation and Packaging. It's the first task you set, and everything else falls out of it. If you set up RSD&P correctly, you automatically establish through-life support correctly, right down to the safety case. Blue Fox got that right, but the HQ posts responsible for this were disbanded in 1988 without replacement. Explain a lot?
An anecdote. The Chief Designer was a wizard. When he took me round his lab in 1986, it was meant to be a sales pitch to upgrade Sea Spray. (360 degree scan, digital processor, etc, which was continually planned, agreed, and cancelled, throughout the 80s and 90s). But to him that (and Blue Fox) was old hat. I was shown Blue Vixen working, and how it should be adapted for (e.g.) AEW. (It later won the AEW Mk7 job hands down). Likewise, Blue Kestrel (Merlin) was ready for the 1989 ISD (!). ECR90 for EFA (Typhoon) was coming along nicely. But he asked me why ‘MoD’ had specified Blue Vixen to track (x) targets simultaneously, which he’d considered challenging but managed it; but later only asked for less than half that for EFA. Different Service, different expectation, never the two shall speak. Without saying anything, he’d set himself a target beyond Blue Vixen, and achieved it. The RAF came along later and asked if they could upgrade their EFA spec, and how much it would cost…..and still didn’t ask for what he’d designed until about the third change.
Blue Fox was only ever going to have a 10 year life, max. That made it unusual. Like I said, in many ways it was a technology demonstrator. There was a planned, funded and contracted upgrade path in the family of radars. That provided stability and encouraged innovation. Why was any Ferranti radar good? The design team. But also the superb radar scientists we had at RSRE Malvern, who contributed so much. Also worth mentioning is that in the 70s and early 80s many MoD(PE) project managers had been radar designers. The Fox & Vixen one was brilliant; so too the Kestrel one, who later did Apache. By end-90s, all that expertise was largely gone.
Am I a fan?
Last edited by tucumseh; 23rd Apr 2020 at 07:14.
Squire had to contend with the opposition of the Hermes captain, Linley Middleton, to his receiving lengthy signals from Britain on how to use the technology.
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. Laser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. Laser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.
Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.
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What do you want from kit? Availability, Reliability, Maintainability, at a fair and reasonable cost
It was very good for surface search (given its pedigree is should have been) but it wasn't particularly good in the air to air environment. Sure, it had excellent integration with the weapons aiming computer and, after a lot of practice, could produce a semi-useful track-while-scan model but it was susceptible to weather and chaff and had really quite poor performance as far as pick-ups were concerned. Medium level you'd get a Harrier coming towards you at around 18nm but look at the SIZE of those intakes. Hawk etc, you'd be lucky to get outside of 8nm. Low level, just turn it off because all it would do is warn someone you were coming. There were some clever gizmos in it and enough to get the boffins excited but these didn't really add anything to pilots trying to defeat superior platforms in the air-to-air environment.
It was better than nothing but I have no idea where these reports of it being the dogs bollox come from. Now, Blue Vixen was a completely different kettle of fish
My dear Tuc, what a fascinating insight into the Blue Fox. I do not think any of us had an inkling of those facts; we just got on with using the kit as best we could.
The main drawback was the high workload looking down over land, where the ground returns could obliterate the target. This meant that we had to "dangle the lobe" just above ground at the desired range to have any chance of getting a discrete return. At medium and high level, the kit worked well but the lack of automation meant that the workload was still high.
The Falklands engagements (stand fast day one and a few other exceptions) were mainly fought at extremely low level (below 100') where the radar was of no use at all. There was definitely more expertise on 801 NAS and my personal training never did get completed and I am afraid that I used the radar as a mark 3 eyeball! I am sure that this is how the Blue Fox acquired its derogatory nick-name of Cloth C*ck - as in as much use as....
When Blue Vixen came along it was a complete game-changer. A JP was sent to act as Red air for a tornado AWI course and he wiped the floor against an attack package at low level. So embarrassed were they, that he was sent home before the debrief!
The boys used to jest that you could fire against 4 discrete targets and be back in the coffee bar before you heard the bangs. At its untimely demise, the FA2 was regarded as possibly the best weapons system in the air.
Mog
The main drawback was the high workload looking down over land, where the ground returns could obliterate the target. This meant that we had to "dangle the lobe" just above ground at the desired range to have any chance of getting a discrete return. At medium and high level, the kit worked well but the lack of automation meant that the workload was still high.
The Falklands engagements (stand fast day one and a few other exceptions) were mainly fought at extremely low level (below 100') where the radar was of no use at all. There was definitely more expertise on 801 NAS and my personal training never did get completed and I am afraid that I used the radar as a mark 3 eyeball! I am sure that this is how the Blue Fox acquired its derogatory nick-name of Cloth C*ck - as in as much use as....
When Blue Vixen came along it was a complete game-changer. A JP was sent to act as Red air for a tornado AWI course and he wiped the floor against an attack package at low level. So embarrassed were they, that he was sent home before the debrief!
The boys used to jest that you could fire against 4 discrete targets and be back in the coffee bar before you heard the bangs. At its untimely demise, the FA2 was regarded as possibly the best weapons system in the air.
Mog
Experienced people like Engines will be able to give first hand thoughts, but I imagine the Hermes Captain had a lot on his plate, not least being uncertain how his mixed bag of immature aircraft were going to perform; and very aware that he had no AEW.
I’m not sure how long it went on, but there used to an annual ‘Exercise Hardy Crab’ whereby the RAF deployed on CVSs. One of the things we in RN HQ had to ensure was the RAF Harriers were loaned the radar enhancement transponders that were routinely fitted to FAA aircraft. For some reason, RAF HQ didn’t buy any, and we would never get them back! Probably flogged on the German black market. (The Army bought their own for Lx AH1).
The trouble was, shelf stock had to be exercised every 6 months, which used to be done at RNARW Copenacre until the Naval Air Radio Stores Integration in 1986, when AMSO took over. Also, first line had to check the frequency every 100 hours, using test equipment only the RN had, mostly at sea. None of this was carried out to the loaned kit, they fell into disrepair, and there was a constant stream of contracts to buy replacements. I would staff the Board Submissions for ‘Transponders’ and the MoD(PE) project manager would add ‘Sets’, boosting the value of the contract with feeders, looms, antennae, controllers we didn’t need. He always insisted he thought I’d just forgotten. For some extraordinary reason, he was offered a job by the company when he retired.
Operating from a CVS without them was a significant risk. Perhaps Middleton was thinking of little details like that?
I’m not sure how long it went on, but there used to an annual ‘Exercise Hardy Crab’ whereby the RAF deployed on CVSs. One of the things we in RN HQ had to ensure was the RAF Harriers were loaned the radar enhancement transponders that were routinely fitted to FAA aircraft. For some reason, RAF HQ didn’t buy any, and we would never get them back! Probably flogged on the German black market. (The Army bought their own for Lx AH1).
The trouble was, shelf stock had to be exercised every 6 months, which used to be done at RNARW Copenacre until the Naval Air Radio Stores Integration in 1986, when AMSO took over. Also, first line had to check the frequency every 100 hours, using test equipment only the RN had, mostly at sea. None of this was carried out to the loaned kit, they fell into disrepair, and there was a constant stream of contracts to buy replacements. I would staff the Board Submissions for ‘Transponders’ and the MoD(PE) project manager would add ‘Sets’, boosting the value of the contract with feeders, looms, antennae, controllers we didn’t need. He always insisted he thought I’d just forgotten. For some extraordinary reason, he was offered a job by the company when he retired.
Operating from a CVS without them was a significant risk. Perhaps Middleton was thinking of little details like that?