VC10 quickie
West Coast, we often practised 2-eng failures in the simulator - the first at V1 and the second (on the same side) a little later. This was at MOTW and provided that the double engine failure drill and subsequent clean up were carried out correctly, a positive rate of climb could be achieved. Once at a safe speed, the loss of systems actions were briefed and the plan for return was made, with the co-pilot flying for much of the pattern using the serviceable autopilot, then the captain took over for the approach. The aircraft flew just fine and the exercise often included a 2-eng go-around. Before we had a decent simulator, the procedure was practised in the aircraft, but not at MTOW! At least we just retarded the throttles to idle, unlike BOAC whose instructors would close the HP cocks!
All student captains flew a 2-eng approach and go-around plus a 2-eng visual circuit and landing during conversion training, but only with an instructor and at relatively light weight. I don't recall any of my students having any problems - in fact the aircraft was much easier to fly on 2 engines than was the simulator.
I can only recall a couple of actual RAF 2-eng landings, one* of which was in the early days of the VC10K3. The nacelle stub wing drain holes on one side had been blocked and the stub wing had filled with water; in a descent from high level the engine control linkages on that side froze up. So the approach was flown with 2 engines stuck at idle, but the other 2 working OK, which meant no loss of systems.
The other was perhaps the XV109 incident in 1988, although I'm not sure whether they lost 2 engines. Despite the groundcrews' loudly voiced concerns, the crew elected to fly back to Brize with a damaged tyre. Which subsequently blew up, taking out an hydraulic system, as well as causing a 15000 lb fuel leak and other damage. The Captain and Air Eng were entirely at fault and later tried to claim that the tyre had been OK. Their pressonitis nearly lost the RAF a VC10. The BoI found that they'd bullied the GE and had then lied to try and cover their sorry arses.
*flown by the late 'Lord Percy' RIP.
All student captains flew a 2-eng approach and go-around plus a 2-eng visual circuit and landing during conversion training, but only with an instructor and at relatively light weight. I don't recall any of my students having any problems - in fact the aircraft was much easier to fly on 2 engines than was the simulator.
I can only recall a couple of actual RAF 2-eng landings, one* of which was in the early days of the VC10K3. The nacelle stub wing drain holes on one side had been blocked and the stub wing had filled with water; in a descent from high level the engine control linkages on that side froze up. So the approach was flown with 2 engines stuck at idle, but the other 2 working OK, which meant no loss of systems.
The other was perhaps the XV109 incident in 1988, although I'm not sure whether they lost 2 engines. Despite the groundcrews' loudly voiced concerns, the crew elected to fly back to Brize with a damaged tyre. Which subsequently blew up, taking out an hydraulic system, as well as causing a 15000 lb fuel leak and other damage. The Captain and Air Eng were entirely at fault and later tried to claim that the tyre had been OK. Their pressonitis nearly lost the RAF a VC10. The BoI found that they'd bullied the GE and had then lied to try and cover their sorry arses.
*flown by the late 'Lord Percy' RIP.
Last edited by BEagle; 1st Apr 2020 at 06:00.
When I was a training captain on VC10s back in 1976, new captains were required to practise a double engine failure on take-off followed by a two engine approach, go-around and landing. We never closed the HP cock in my day. The procedure, if I remember correctly, was to close one throttle just after V1, followed by the other on the same side at around 100ft. I always thought the first part to be a bit hairy and so was very cautious. As the trainer in the RHS, I would close No. 4 first, followed by No. 3 and I always kept my hand on that throttle until I knew the trainee had it all under control and climbing safely away.
We always did it at a light weight and, by keeping my hand on the No. 3 throttle, I could always add a little power if the initial climb performance looked a bit too marginal. Thereafter, round the circuit and for the approach, go-around and landing, it was all straightforward. It was never done as a 'surprise test'; always as a confidence building demonstration.
There were two genuine double engine failure incidents during route flying. This one at Heathrow Incidents and Accidents
Also, another in the US, I think out of New York, followed by a safe landing. Perhaps Jelle Hieminger has the details. I seem to recall that the captain elected to keep one of the engines running for a while, even though it had a fire warning, until he had everything sorted out. After the event, he was criticised for this (most unfairly) even though it proved to be absolutely the correct decision.
We always did it at a light weight and, by keeping my hand on the No. 3 throttle, I could always add a little power if the initial climb performance looked a bit too marginal. Thereafter, round the circuit and for the approach, go-around and landing, it was all straightforward. It was never done as a 'surprise test'; always as a confidence building demonstration.
There were two genuine double engine failure incidents during route flying. This one at Heathrow Incidents and Accidents
Also, another in the US, I think out of New York, followed by a safe landing. Perhaps Jelle Hieminger has the details. I seem to recall that the captain elected to keep one of the engines running for a while, even though it had a fire warning, until he had everything sorted out. After the event, he was criticised for this (most unfairly) even though it proved to be absolutely the correct decision.
Indeed we did, Dan! It was when we took ZA144 on its last flight to be scrapped. I seem to recall that there was some limitation on the southern taxiway, so a short landing was preferable. Your prompt spoilers, idle then full reverse certainly helped us to stop - whilst I was getting drenched in some water which had gathered in the roof panel or whatever!
A 20 min flight, followed by a slow trip home in an uncomfortable white van along the M4 via Swindon....
A 20 min flight, followed by a slow trip home in an uncomfortable white van along the M4 via Swindon....
I often wonder about a "Super Super VC10" with 2 RB211s..especially when they were reborn as tankers...
It would have been far more fuel efficient, maybe not as fast, but a quiet VC10? Nah...the lovely noise of those 4 RR Conways were part of the attraction!
When I wason holidayat Ascension, an engineer told me that a VC10 had a similar fuel burn to the Tristars just coming into service, but the Tristar could carry a lot more payload!
I can still remember waking up in the middle of the night in Crawley, hearing the ghostly howl of the British Caledonian VC10s winding down... Luvverly!
It would have been far more fuel efficient, maybe not as fast, but a quiet VC10? Nah...the lovely noise of those 4 RR Conways were part of the attraction!
When I was
I can still remember waking up in the middle of the night in Crawley, hearing the ghostly howl of the British Caledonian VC10s winding down... Luvverly!
I was the one who flew the Sultan of Oman's Royal Flight VC10 A4O-AB into the Brooklands Museum in July 1987. The runway gets shorter every time I'm asked to tell the tale about how long the Brooklands runway actually was!
SHJ, Well done sir!
(Edit) This one: https://buy.myonlinebooking.co.uk/br...catid=9&id=421
Last edited by Jhieminga; 1st Apr 2020 at 11:35.
When I lived in Kenya I used to
live on the opposite side of Nairobi to Embakasi, the main airport at the time. On a quiet African night we could hear the East African VC-10s taking off for London at around 2300. I could never quite reconcile that volume of noise with the comparative hush in the cabin. Wasn't the advertising slogan something like "Swift, Silent , Serene"? Although maybe that was BOAC not EAA.
live on the opposite side of Nairobi to Embakasi, the main airport at the time. On a quiet African night we could hear the East African VC-10s taking off for London at around 2300. I could never quite reconcile that volume of noise with the comparative hush in the cabin. Wasn't the advertising slogan something like "Swift, Silent , Serene"? Although maybe that was BOAC not EAA.
The abundance of power in the VC10 was great to have up your sleeve in a possible emergency.
During the days of BOAC VC10 ops out of Nairobi, (5300ft.) we even had an emergency clean up procedure to cope with the unlikely event of a double engine failure, shortly after take off, Northbound to Europe.
Practiced in the Sim, I don’t recall it happening for real. I can’t remember the exact details, but it involved splitting the flap/ LE slat lever, ( They normally retracted together) and at a suitable speed firstly retracting the flaps and after further acceleration, the slats
This procedure was combined with an emergency terrain avoidance routing too, which continued with the early B747-100, which didn’t climb that well after an engine failure out of Nairobi, at the heavy weights departing Northbound.
During the days of BOAC VC10 ops out of Nairobi, (5300ft.) we even had an emergency clean up procedure to cope with the unlikely event of a double engine failure, shortly after take off, Northbound to Europe.
Practiced in the Sim, I don’t recall it happening for real. I can’t remember the exact details, but it involved splitting the flap/ LE slat lever, ( They normally retracted together) and at a suitable speed firstly retracting the flaps and after further acceleration, the slats
This procedure was combined with an emergency terrain avoidance routing too, which continued with the early B747-100, which didn’t climb that well after an engine failure out of Nairobi, at the heavy weights departing Northbound.
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I went to do some work on it along with others from Brize LSS before I left, we treated the paintwork with some special coating to stave of the inevitable.
As for crews doing stupid things, there was the fuel leak they discovered in Hong Kong on a wing, the skin was actually cracked, but they decided to fly it back to Brize anyway, IIRC the thing with the Tens wing skins etc was they were rolled. so could have cracked open like a zip..
Originally Posted by BEagle;10735046....The other was perhaps the XV109 incident in 1988, although I'm not sure whether they lost 2 engines. Despite the groundcrews' loudly voiced concerns, the crew elected to fly back to Brize with a damaged tyre. Which subsequently blew up, taking out an hydraulic system, as well as causing a 15000 lb fuel leak and other damage. The Captain and Air Eng were entirely at fault and later tried to claim that the tyre had been OK. Their pressonitis nearly lost the RAF a VC10. The BoI found that they'd bullied the GE and had then lied to try and cover their sorry arses.
*[i
*[i
flown by the late 'Lord Percy' RIP.
NutLoose, when was that? In the late 90s there was a regular 'washing party' that came over once a year or so. I can't recall any special coatings then, was this later perhaps?
I have seen photos of the aftermath, basically no.3 engine spat out a disc through the bottom of the nacelle, with the associated collateral damage and lightly singed edges. No.4 engine doesn't appear to have been damaged, at least the outside of the nacelle did not show it, but the compressor stall on no.3 could have influenced the airflow into no.4 of course.
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It could be this one: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.a...id=46459&key=0 although they don't mention the involvement of a second engine.
I have seen photos of the aftermath, basically no.3 engine spat out a disc through the bottom of the nacelle, with the associated collateral damage and lightly singed edges. No.4 engine doesn't appear to have been damaged, at least the outside of the nacelle did not show it, but the compressor stall on no.3 could have influenced the airflow into no.4 of course.
I have seen photos of the aftermath, basically no.3 engine spat out a disc through the bottom of the nacelle, with the associated collateral damage and lightly singed edges. No.4 engine doesn't appear to have been damaged, at least the outside of the nacelle did not show it, but the compressor stall on no.3 could have influenced the airflow into no.4 of course.
We also spat the arse end out of No 2 ( I think) on the detuner at Brize, I was in that one lol.
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6500 feet for a VC 10, no problem , even at MLW 107, 500 kg ( if IRCC) even with only two reversers.
......and NO Beagle, BOAC instructors did NOT close the HP cocks for engine failure simulation, at least not in my time.
We learned the folly of that after the Meteor bloodbath at Driffied back in 50 s .
RW 23 at LHR was just about 6,500 feet.( yes I know it was used when the xwind on 29 was strong !)
......and NO Beagle, BOAC instructors did NOT close the HP cocks for engine failure simulation, at least not in my time.
We learned the folly of that after the Meteor bloodbath at Driffied back in 50 s .
RW 23 at LHR was just about 6,500 feet.( yes I know it was used when the xwind on 29 was strong !)