UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
Thread Starter
Fromthe paper ORAC quoted:-
"It is frustrating to read a paper that sets out the plan for the next 10 years of the armed forces and not be able to find any actual numbers in it. At its simplest, what does the plan look like – does the UK still plan a ‘Future Force 2030’ – is the aspiration to offer a brigade, a division or something else? What operations do we want to do as a nation – is it to deploy a division for 6 months, or sustain a brigade indefinitely?This is the problem – there is just no information on what it is Defence thinks it will be capable of actually delivering as a coherent formed force. There is lots of information on individual capabilities, but no real sense on how they all come together and form a fighting force.
In a similar vein, one is left with the impression that for all the talk of ‘tough decisions’ and ‘sunset / sunrise’ the MOD doesn’t want to tell us what will really be taken out of service, or when. The page on the Royal Navy refers to ‘retire legacy capabilities’ but doesn’t discuss what these are – is it missiles, ships, aircraft? What is a legacy capability and when does it leave service?"
"It is frustrating to read a paper that sets out the plan for the next 10 years of the armed forces and not be able to find any actual numbers in it. At its simplest, what does the plan look like – does the UK still plan a ‘Future Force 2030’ – is the aspiration to offer a brigade, a division or something else? What operations do we want to do as a nation – is it to deploy a division for 6 months, or sustain a brigade indefinitely?This is the problem – there is just no information on what it is Defence thinks it will be capable of actually delivering as a coherent formed force. There is lots of information on individual capabilities, but no real sense on how they all come together and form a fighting force.
In a similar vein, one is left with the impression that for all the talk of ‘tough decisions’ and ‘sunset / sunrise’ the MOD doesn’t want to tell us what will really be taken out of service, or when. The page on the Royal Navy refers to ‘retire legacy capabilities’ but doesn’t discuss what these are – is it missiles, ships, aircraft? What is a legacy capability and when does it leave service?"
Hywel Williams, Plaid Cymru's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson has demonstrated , with all the smugness he can muster, his ignorance of the current UK defence situation by mocking the Government for having a carrier with no aircraft to fly off it, that old rotten chestnut yet again. He sneered at the aircraft on board being from the US Marine Corps, something he'd heard I imagine. UK Defence Journal responded to his tweet about the government being "all Hat and no Cattle" with a pic depicting UK operated F-35s on board the Queen Elizabeth. Its staggering the ease with which elected MPs from small nationalist parties, speak sweepingly, clearly for political effect on matters they demonstrably haven't an interest in or a clue about.
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So what helicopters is this super heli replacing?, it mentions 4 medium types, one of which is Puma..
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Knock on effect, Marshals thinking of jobs losses with the loss of the RAF Herc fleet.
https://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/new...craps-20236725
“We are vulnerable. I’m concerned,” Wilkins said. “We have talked to the Army, they have told us WCSP is the only capability that meets all of their requirements to provide an infantry fighting vehicle with the capacity for a full section [of troops] in the back, with the main weapon being a 40 mm turret, added armored protection, and other great capabilities.”
https://www.defensenews.com/global/e...hting-vehicle/
https://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/new...craps-20236725
“We are vulnerable. I’m concerned,” Wilkins said. “We have talked to the Army, they have told us WCSP is the only capability that meets all of their requirements to provide an infantry fighting vehicle with the capacity for a full section [of troops] in the back, with the main weapon being a 40 mm turret, added armored protection, and other great capabilities.”
Some 2,000 jobs at Lockheed Martin UK and its supply chain, which is 80 percent British, are at risk as well as the future of a center of excellence in turret design the company has spent some £200 million ($280 million) developing at Ampthill, southern England, over the last ten years.
A KPMG report commissioned by Lockheed Martin said that upgrade work for an assumed 275 vehicles over the next eight years could bring about £1 billion, or $1.4 billion, gross value added (GVA) to the British economy.
A KPMG report commissioned by Lockheed Martin said that upgrade work for an assumed 275 vehicles over the next eight years could bring about £1 billion, or $1.4 billion, gross value added (GVA) to the British economy.
Last edited by NutLoose; 23rd Mar 2021 at 21:33.
Its staggering the ease with which elected MPs from small nationalist parties, speak sweepingly, clearly for political effect on matters they demonstrably haven't an interest in or a clue about.
So what helicopters is this super heli replacing?, it mentions 4 medium types, one of which is Puma..
Air Marshal Greg Bagwell, former Deputy Commander (Operations) at RAF Air Command and now the President of the Air & Space Power Association has been tweeting about the recent defence review.
https://rusi.org/commentary/requirin...-command-paper
RUSI
“It marks a real change in the positioning of the UK’s armed forces, ending the era in which they could realistically describe themselves as ‘Tier One’, ‘First in Class’ or ‘Full Spectrum’' writes Professor Peter Roberts in today's second RUSI commentary.
Bagwell continued:
This is really devastating criticism from a credible critic.
Whereas our CAS, ACM Sir Mike Wigston is tweeting:
It may well do, but Wigston will be doing that "underpinning" with a significantly smaller force at his disposal, after some significant capability holidays, and having lost some really useful assets. And while Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has criticised some of his parliamentary colleagues for wanting to “play Top Trumps with our force numbers,” there is no doubt that force size can be vitally important, and we should all perhaps remember that quantity has a quality all of its own.
“I have waited a few days to let the totality of the MoD’s Defence Command Paper sink in, and my conclusion is better described here...”
RUSI
“It marks a real change in the positioning of the UK’s armed forces, ending the era in which they could realistically describe themselves as ‘Tier One’, ‘First in Class’ or ‘Full Spectrum’' writes Professor Peter Roberts in today's second RUSI commentary.
Bagwell continued:
“Ignoring the spin and yet untold truths (which are disappointing but wholly expected in this day and age), any single issue could be argued in isolation as a logical step, but when you add them altogether you cannot form any other conclusion than UK defence will be weaker.”
“The apparent tilt to the Pacific and “tilt” to underwater threats will bend UK Defence out of shape and is as a consequence of having to double down on past (capability) commitments and a muddled (China friend or foe?) grand strategy, but without the resource to back them up.”
“Turning to AirPower specifically: the reduction (yes reduction) in air assets makes us less able to control the air (the key tenet of AirPower). Just as an example, if we knew then that we would gap and reduce our AEW capability, would we have committed to so many P8s?”
“The simple truth is that space, cyber and AI are being used as replacements to mask the losses, when they should have been seen as enhancements. Unfortunately, we have not had the resource to deliver those enhancements without getting rid of the mass we once had.”
Whereas our CAS, ACM Sir Mike Wigston is tweeting:
“Today’s Defence Command Paper is our mandate for the Royal Air Force to underpin UK sovereignty, security and prosperity into the future.”
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
From Sir Humphrey’s Thin Pinstriped Line
https://tinyurl.com/5yw9dks8
Reserved Occupation? Thoughts on the RF30 Review
The Reserve Force 30 review has been published by the MOD this week, setting out a possible vision for the future structure and operation of the British Armed Forces reserve forces component.
The paper, written by former Minister, now Lord Lancaster, puts forward a series of recommendations about how the MOD should look to transform reserve forces into a very different body, and one that is more able to reflect the modern military.
It is important to note that this paper is not final policy, it is proposals for Ministers to consider, and identify whether they wish to adopt, but it is worth considering this review in more detail and thinking about what it could mean for the future of the Reserve Forces……
https://www.gov.uk/government/public...es-review-2030
Reserve Forces Review 2030
A vision of a greater, more integral role for the Reserve Forces within the UK’s future defence and security capability is set out in a report which follows a wide-ranging review.
https://tinyurl.com/5yw9dks8
Reserved Occupation? Thoughts on the RF30 Review
The Reserve Force 30 review has been published by the MOD this week, setting out a possible vision for the future structure and operation of the British Armed Forces reserve forces component.
The paper, written by former Minister, now Lord Lancaster, puts forward a series of recommendations about how the MOD should look to transform reserve forces into a very different body, and one that is more able to reflect the modern military.
It is important to note that this paper is not final policy, it is proposals for Ministers to consider, and identify whether they wish to adopt, but it is worth considering this review in more detail and thinking about what it could mean for the future of the Reserve Forces……
https://www.gov.uk/government/public...es-review-2030
Reserve Forces Review 2030
A vision of a greater, more integral role for the Reserve Forces within the UK’s future defence and security capability is set out in a report which follows a wide-ranging review.
Thread Starter
I presume that they already knew about this when they did the Review........
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...858766.htmlThe army was forced to pause trials of its new £3.47bn fleet of tanks over design issues, which reportedly left them unable to travel safely faster than 20 miles per hour.
Problems with the new Ajax armoured fighting vehicles - which are supposed reach speeds of 40mph - also include not being able to fire cannons on the move, the Daily Telegraph reports.
The paper cited a government report saying the speed restrictions had been caused by excessive vibrations in the tanks and that crews were limited to 90 minutes inside them at a time.
The report, due to be published next month, says the tanks cannot reverse over obstacles more than 20 centimetres high, that personnel must wear noise-cancelling headphones when operating them and undergo ear tests afterwards, and that the Household Cavalry Regiment "cannot conduct effective collective training" in them. The MoD decided to bring in a new range of tanks in 2010, with 589 vehicles across a range of models ordered in 2014. But the programme has been plagued by problems and is four years behind schedule, the Telegraph said, adding only 14 of the turretless Ares model tanks, made by US firm General Dynamics, had been delivered.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...858766.htmlThe army was forced to pause trials of its new £3.47bn fleet of tanks over design issues, which reportedly left them unable to travel safely faster than 20 miles per hour.
Problems with the new Ajax armoured fighting vehicles - which are supposed reach speeds of 40mph - also include not being able to fire cannons on the move, the Daily Telegraph reports.
The paper cited a government report saying the speed restrictions had been caused by excessive vibrations in the tanks and that crews were limited to 90 minutes inside them at a time.
The report, due to be published next month, says the tanks cannot reverse over obstacles more than 20 centimetres high, that personnel must wear noise-cancelling headphones when operating them and undergo ear tests afterwards, and that the Household Cavalry Regiment "cannot conduct effective collective training" in them. The MoD decided to bring in a new range of tanks in 2010, with 589 vehicles across a range of models ordered in 2014. But the programme has been plagued by problems and is four years behind schedule, the Telegraph said, adding only 14 of the turretless Ares model tanks, made by US firm General Dynamics, had been delivered.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/n...loss-xg0q5g30l
New £3.2bn Ajax tanks withdrawn again after troops suffer hearing loss
New light tanks that have so far cost the army £3.2 billion have been withdrawn for a second time after more troops reported suffering hearing loss during trials, The Times has learnt.
All trials involving the Ajax armoured vehicle were paused in mid-June on “health and safety grounds” amid concerns that mitigation measures put in place to protect soldiers — including ear defenders — were not sufficient.
Ministers believe senior officers in the army may have hidden the extent of the problem with Ajax over recent months to prevent it being axed as part of this year’s “integrated review” of Britain’s defence and foreign policy.
Ben Wallace, the defence secretary, is said to be “distinctly unhappy” with the handling of the programme and has appointed a team to review it and find out what the army has kept “hidden” from politicians because of concerns about cuts.
Experts said the problems with Ajax were so serious that the government should consider cancelling the £5.5 billion deal to buy 589 of the vehicles — of which only 14 non-turreted variants have been delivered so far.….
The trials were initially suspended for four months to March this year after concerns about hearing loss including tinnitus were raised by troops, but they were restarted with safety measures in place.
Soldiers were given noise-cancelling ear defenders and were limited to 90 minutes inside the vehicle.
In recent weeks more soldiers have come forward to report hearing loss problems, and the trials at Millbrook Proving Ground, a vehicle testing centre in Bedfordshire, were suspended.
It is understood that it took several days for that information to reach defence ministers, who then ordered the trials across the programme at three other sites to be suspended on June 16. Sources said there had been no vehicle movement at the other three sites in the days leading up to the wider pausing of trials.….
Ministers believe that senior army officers may have covered up the extent of the problems with the programme before the “integrated review” because they did not want Ajax to be scrapped.
A senior Whitehall source said an ongoing review of the programme would look at whether the army had “suppressed” issues with the vehicle.
“What has the army hidden from ministers over the last few years because they were so worried about cuts? Once they (senior officers) get their toys, they don’t want to let go of them”, the source said….
Francis Tusa, editor of the Defence Analysis newsletter, said: “At the moment they are spending good money after bad for something that is arguably unfixable.” He described Ajax as the “army’s Nimrod (MRA4)” — the planned maritime patrol aircraft scrapped in 2010 at a cost of £4billion, without a single aircraft entering service.….
New £3.2bn Ajax tanks withdrawn again after troops suffer hearing loss
New light tanks that have so far cost the army £3.2 billion have been withdrawn for a second time after more troops reported suffering hearing loss during trials, The Times has learnt.
All trials involving the Ajax armoured vehicle were paused in mid-June on “health and safety grounds” amid concerns that mitigation measures put in place to protect soldiers — including ear defenders — were not sufficient.
Ministers believe senior officers in the army may have hidden the extent of the problem with Ajax over recent months to prevent it being axed as part of this year’s “integrated review” of Britain’s defence and foreign policy.
Ben Wallace, the defence secretary, is said to be “distinctly unhappy” with the handling of the programme and has appointed a team to review it and find out what the army has kept “hidden” from politicians because of concerns about cuts.
Experts said the problems with Ajax were so serious that the government should consider cancelling the £5.5 billion deal to buy 589 of the vehicles — of which only 14 non-turreted variants have been delivered so far.….
The trials were initially suspended for four months to March this year after concerns about hearing loss including tinnitus were raised by troops, but they were restarted with safety measures in place.
Soldiers were given noise-cancelling ear defenders and were limited to 90 minutes inside the vehicle.
In recent weeks more soldiers have come forward to report hearing loss problems, and the trials at Millbrook Proving Ground, a vehicle testing centre in Bedfordshire, were suspended.
It is understood that it took several days for that information to reach defence ministers, who then ordered the trials across the programme at three other sites to be suspended on June 16. Sources said there had been no vehicle movement at the other three sites in the days leading up to the wider pausing of trials.….
Ministers believe that senior army officers may have covered up the extent of the problems with the programme before the “integrated review” because they did not want Ajax to be scrapped.
A senior Whitehall source said an ongoing review of the programme would look at whether the army had “suppressed” issues with the vehicle.
“What has the army hidden from ministers over the last few years because they were so worried about cuts? Once they (senior officers) get their toys, they don’t want to let go of them”, the source said….
Francis Tusa, editor of the Defence Analysis newsletter, said: “At the moment they are spending good money after bad for something that is arguably unfixable.” He described Ajax as the “army’s Nimrod (MRA4)” — the planned maritime patrol aircraft scrapped in 2010 at a cost of £4billion, without a single aircraft entering service.….
Thread Starter
It's been an issue for years - bit much of Wallace t suddenly get steamed up - he must have known there were issues
Watch the full proceeding here
Transcript here
Painful viewing for a number of reasons. In no particular order :
Francois grandstanding (apparently Crowsnest should just be a simple re-run of SKAEW Mk2 and Nimrod MRA4 was a disaster related to Nimrod AEW3, or something.....)
Bollom equivocating, when he could be more explicit as to the technical and regulatory challenges faced nowadays
Williams unable to say more than a couple of words without "errrm" inserted.
What comes across in spades is that :
1. The army has a major problem with Ajax. Irrespective of whose fault it is, if they don't get it fixed, they'll never be allowed any money to buy anything again, ever.
2. While Francois' heart may be in the right place, he vastly dilutes his message through his means of delivery - grandstanding with lashings of ignorance and only gets away with it because the witnesses are politically savvy enough to realise that telling him he's rectally rambling will only cause him to try and get them later. A shame - as a suitable riposte might actually help understanding on both sides.
3. We desperately need better briefed pollies and CS that are able to convey arguments succinctly.
Transcript here
Painful viewing for a number of reasons. In no particular order :
Francois grandstanding (apparently Crowsnest should just be a simple re-run of SKAEW Mk2 and Nimrod MRA4 was a disaster related to Nimrod AEW3, or something.....)
Bollom equivocating, when he could be more explicit as to the technical and regulatory challenges faced nowadays
Williams unable to say more than a couple of words without "errrm" inserted.
What comes across in spades is that :
1. The army has a major problem with Ajax. Irrespective of whose fault it is, if they don't get it fixed, they'll never be allowed any money to buy anything again, ever.
2. While Francois' heart may be in the right place, he vastly dilutes his message through his means of delivery - grandstanding with lashings of ignorance and only gets away with it because the witnesses are politically savvy enough to realise that telling him he's rectally rambling will only cause him to try and get them later. A shame - as a suitable riposte might actually help understanding on both sides.
3. We desperately need better briefed pollies and CS that are able to convey arguments succinctly.
Thread Starter
What astounded me is that after so many years they don't know what is causing the vibration. You'd have thought taking one to Jaguar Land Rover, Nissan or one of the F! operations might be a good idea?
Thank you for the link NAB.
The Qs and As are appalling.
Crowsnest - Franscois should have drawn parallels to SKAEW7. Then asked what persuaded MoD to select such a procurement strategy. Those who did the systems integration then aren't mentioned.
At Q65 risk reduction is mentioned, and that MoD would learn. Why did it not learn from the 4-phase risk reduction contract on SKAEW7 in 1995/6? It was the foundation of the programme.
Q68 - No lessons learned. It would seem no-one read the Post Project Evaluation report on SKAEW7.
Q82 - 'The scale of the task was underestimated at the front end'. As above, SKAEW7 wasn't underestimated by those who had to do the job - again, it's all set out in the PPE report.
But it WAS underestimated by those in Main Building who wrote the original requirements. They omitted over 60% of the job. If that happened on Crowsnest, then it's entirely possible the contractor has delivered to contract, but what was delivered was not fit for purpose. That was avoided on SKAEW7 by MoD(PE) re-writing the specs and adding little things like systems integration, full mission trainer, logs support, and actually modifying the equipment and aircraft. I'd like to hear the programme manager's view on all this, because he certainly wouldn't be allowed to brief the truth to Bollom.
The Qs and As are appalling.
Crowsnest - Franscois should have drawn parallels to SKAEW7. Then asked what persuaded MoD to select such a procurement strategy. Those who did the systems integration then aren't mentioned.
At Q65 risk reduction is mentioned, and that MoD would learn. Why did it not learn from the 4-phase risk reduction contract on SKAEW7 in 1995/6? It was the foundation of the programme.
Q68 - No lessons learned. It would seem no-one read the Post Project Evaluation report on SKAEW7.
Q82 - 'The scale of the task was underestimated at the front end'. As above, SKAEW7 wasn't underestimated by those who had to do the job - again, it's all set out in the PPE report.
But it WAS underestimated by those in Main Building who wrote the original requirements. They omitted over 60% of the job. If that happened on Crowsnest, then it's entirely possible the contractor has delivered to contract, but what was delivered was not fit for purpose. That was avoided on SKAEW7 by MoD(PE) re-writing the specs and adding little things like systems integration, full mission trainer, logs support, and actually modifying the equipment and aircraft. I'd like to hear the programme manager's view on all this, because he certainly wouldn't be allowed to brief the truth to Bollom.
That's the problem with dynamics, natural frequencies and weight/inertia distribution. You can't necessarily predict that it's going to happen - or model it prior to design and build. There also seemed to be some confusion and conflation between vibration and airborne noise which are not necessarily the same thing.
They've taken it to Millbrook, which is exactly where you'd go with a problem like this - and probably where JLR, Nissan etc would go too.
The real problem they have is that they're at the back end of a catastrophic history of programme and development failures (FRES, Tracer etc) that have eaten hundreds of millions if not billions, left the army with a worn-out vehicle fleet, with Warrior CSP cancelled and Chally 3 approved by the skin of its teeth. Politically (particularly with the Tubster and Tobias Nice but Dim as ex-pongoes on the warpath) they can't afford for this to fail, but they're in a real bind. Conkers deep in terms of committed spend, later than a late thing that overslept badly and potentially with a difficult to solve problem.
Which is why turning up with an answer that came across as "ooooh I don't really know Vera" just digs them deeper. Had they put the Tubster back in his box by pointing out that :
1. Analogies with buying a car are irrelevant - you're not buying OTS where models sell in millions, you're essentially asking Bugatti to design and build you a couple of hundred Veyrons only with tracks and a turret. From scratch - which means you have to pay. (Of course whether that bespoke route was the correct choice is a different matter.....)
2. Vibration is difficult to predict and often only occurs when you do your T&E. Which is why you do your T&E.
3. They're asking the experts in the UK to sort it out.and until its diagnosed, they can't predict the fix and therefore cant predict the IOC. So don't ask stupid questions.
they might have come across better. Instead they came across as shifty and evasive.
