UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
Thread Starter
CHug - as you know I agree with most of what you say - but the actual cuts were made by politicians - and that is the issue.
No politician feels it necessary to go in to bat for an expanded armed forces in the UK
No politician feels it necessary to go in to bat for an expanded armed forces in the UK
In the context of the cuts Chug (and myself) speak of, that is not true.
The cuts were imposed by AMSO (RAF) to compensate for, and divert attention from, the astronomical waste caused by other wasteful policies, not least that of scrapping L and C class spares that were not actually fitted to aircraft, and insisting that repair turn round times of R class go from weeks to years. The Director of Flight Safety often criticised the effect this had on front line.
This policy was dubbed 'savings at the expense of safety', and it was confirmed (not uncovered) by Haddon-Cave. However, he dated it at 1998, not 1987, despite being given the promulgation notice and various supporting correspondence from June and November 1987. (The AMSO of the day used to post on here, and claimed the policy was promulgated by his successor in 1988). H-C exacerbated the lie by tying his 1998 date to the demise of the RAF Chief Engineer post, when in fact the Chief Engineer from 1991-96 was also Air Member Logistics (new name for AMSO) from 1994, under whom the waste/cuts were perpetuated at the rate of 25-28% a year. (Depending on domain). This was entirely separate from the concurrent, and more minor cuts under Options for Change; and, for example, the RN's Hallifax Savings of 1988. The 'political' cuts he mentioned were a mere 4% a year for 5 years, commencing later.
To place this in context, in a contemporary ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (a retired Vice Admiral), and later Ministers, upheld that it is a routine expectation of any project manager to make 33% savings on a project, while delivering early and to a better specification, and without affecting operational capability or effectiveness. Perhaps, instead of arbitrarily chopping the Defence budget, this could be put to the test and measured against projects that have achieved it?
The reason for H-C's deliberate error is clear. Had he reported the truth, he would not have been able to name and shame those that he did, especially General Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Malcolm Pledger. Instead, he would have had to criticise those whom he praised, including the said Chief Engineer. At the time, the major headache for the RAF was Mull of Kintyre. The truth would immediately be recognised as exculpatory evidence in that case, as the effect of the policy could be seen in the mandate placed upon the Air Staff that the aircraft was not to be flown. (See Mull of Kintyre Review). The same names cropped up.
Hope this clarifies matters a little and adds a little context.
The cuts were imposed by AMSO (RAF) to compensate for, and divert attention from, the astronomical waste caused by other wasteful policies, not least that of scrapping L and C class spares that were not actually fitted to aircraft, and insisting that repair turn round times of R class go from weeks to years. The Director of Flight Safety often criticised the effect this had on front line.
This policy was dubbed 'savings at the expense of safety', and it was confirmed (not uncovered) by Haddon-Cave. However, he dated it at 1998, not 1987, despite being given the promulgation notice and various supporting correspondence from June and November 1987. (The AMSO of the day used to post on here, and claimed the policy was promulgated by his successor in 1988). H-C exacerbated the lie by tying his 1998 date to the demise of the RAF Chief Engineer post, when in fact the Chief Engineer from 1991-96 was also Air Member Logistics (new name for AMSO) from 1994, under whom the waste/cuts were perpetuated at the rate of 25-28% a year. (Depending on domain). This was entirely separate from the concurrent, and more minor cuts under Options for Change; and, for example, the RN's Hallifax Savings of 1988. The 'political' cuts he mentioned were a mere 4% a year for 5 years, commencing later.
To place this in context, in a contemporary ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (a retired Vice Admiral), and later Ministers, upheld that it is a routine expectation of any project manager to make 33% savings on a project, while delivering early and to a better specification, and without affecting operational capability or effectiveness. Perhaps, instead of arbitrarily chopping the Defence budget, this could be put to the test and measured against projects that have achieved it?
The reason for H-C's deliberate error is clear. Had he reported the truth, he would not have been able to name and shame those that he did, especially General Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Malcolm Pledger. Instead, he would have had to criticise those whom he praised, including the said Chief Engineer. At the time, the major headache for the RAF was Mull of Kintyre. The truth would immediately be recognised as exculpatory evidence in that case, as the effect of the policy could be seen in the mandate placed upon the Air Staff that the aircraft was not to be flown. (See Mull of Kintyre Review). The same names cropped up.
Hope this clarifies matters a little and adds a little context.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://www.defensenews.com/global/e...-into-estonia/
Britain vows to flow artillery, helicopters into Estonia
WASHINGTON — British and Estonian officials have inked a road map for beefing up their military ties that will boost the remaining U.K. contingent in the Baltic nation with short-range air defense weapons and multiple-launch rocket systems, the two governments announced Tuesday.
The agreement, signed in London by British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and his Estonian counterpart, Hanno Pevkur, aims to implement NATO plans approved in Madrid, Spain, over the summer for hardening the alliance’s eastern front.
Also part of the deal are pledges by Britain to rotate “additional capabilities and enablers,” including attack and cargo helicopters, into Estonia throughout 2023, according to a joint statement.
“In January, Chinook helicopters will arrive in Estonia, in March Apache helicopters, in April Typhoon fighters, and in May an additional battlegroup will be deployed to Estonia for the large-scale exercise Spring Storm,” Pevkur said in a statement on the deal from the Estonian Defence Ministry. “The UK will maintain the multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), brought to Estonia in summer 2022 to reinforce the allied battlegroup, and the short range air defense systems Stormer.”…
Britain vows to flow artillery, helicopters into Estonia
WASHINGTON — British and Estonian officials have inked a road map for beefing up their military ties that will boost the remaining U.K. contingent in the Baltic nation with short-range air defense weapons and multiple-launch rocket systems, the two governments announced Tuesday.
The agreement, signed in London by British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and his Estonian counterpart, Hanno Pevkur, aims to implement NATO plans approved in Madrid, Spain, over the summer for hardening the alliance’s eastern front.
Also part of the deal are pledges by Britain to rotate “additional capabilities and enablers,” including attack and cargo helicopters, into Estonia throughout 2023, according to a joint statement.
“In January, Chinook helicopters will arrive in Estonia, in March Apache helicopters, in April Typhoon fighters, and in May an additional battlegroup will be deployed to Estonia for the large-scale exercise Spring Storm,” Pevkur said in a statement on the deal from the Estonian Defence Ministry. “The UK will maintain the multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), brought to Estonia in summer 2022 to reinforce the allied battlegroup, and the short range air defense systems Stormer.”…
Thread Starter
"What is not clear is the extent to which politicians in the 21st century want, or see a need for, a force capable of taking and holding ground abroad. There is little interest in fighting wars of conquest, and any major land war is likely to be fought under Article 5, and involve NATO partners and allies. .................. it comes down to whether politicians feel that they want to invest in keeping the UK as a credible ‘heavy’ power, or if they feel that their strategic goals can be delivered through other means.
In simple terms the decision they face is whether to invest more money in the Army to keep it able to fight in the most complex and intense threat environments, reducing resources for other areas given the likely cost of bringing large scale forces up to standard, or alternatively to step back from it. There may be an argument for a token brigade to deploy if needed on a short term mission, but what is the gain to the UK of being able to deploy and sustain a large ground force at distance from home for months at a time, compared to say peacekeeping operations?
This is not an argument against global deployments – ...................... It remains a globally focused organisation, and is one of the very few army’s out there able to deploy acclimatised reserves of troops with jungle, desert and arctic experience at pretty much the same time. It has global mobility and the ability to deploy on smaller raiding expeditions, training and working alongside peers, but the question has to be asked – what is the scale at which the Army needs to operate in future?
Similar questions will likely be asked of the RN and RAF too – for example, in a world where there is very limited appetite for interventions, and where being able to put a force ashore is complex and time consuming, is there really still a need for amphibious shipping? While it looks impressive, and can be occasionally helpful, does the UK really benefit or need a significant amphibious force, supported by the Royal Marines, given that it is highly unlikely that the UK will ever launch an amphibious operation at scale again? Has the time come to ask really difficult questions of sacred cows that perhaps need to be turned into BBQ?
It feels increasingly like the UK is facing a rerun of the 1980 ‘Nott Review’ and has a similar policy challenge. A resurgent and aggressive Russia, coupled with an unstable wider world, aspirations for global operations but a need to credibly support NATO on land, sea and air and an expensive and unaffordable equipment programme (as well as the affordability of Trident) means that tough choices are unavoidable. In 1980 the RN focused on the ASW ‘deep battle’ at the cost of intending to get out of the amphibious game – will history repeat itself?
In simple terms the decision they face is whether to invest more money in the Army to keep it able to fight in the most complex and intense threat environments, reducing resources for other areas given the likely cost of bringing large scale forces up to standard, or alternatively to step back from it. There may be an argument for a token brigade to deploy if needed on a short term mission, but what is the gain to the UK of being able to deploy and sustain a large ground force at distance from home for months at a time, compared to say peacekeeping operations?
This is not an argument against global deployments – ...................... It remains a globally focused organisation, and is one of the very few army’s out there able to deploy acclimatised reserves of troops with jungle, desert and arctic experience at pretty much the same time. It has global mobility and the ability to deploy on smaller raiding expeditions, training and working alongside peers, but the question has to be asked – what is the scale at which the Army needs to operate in future?
Similar questions will likely be asked of the RN and RAF too – for example, in a world where there is very limited appetite for interventions, and where being able to put a force ashore is complex and time consuming, is there really still a need for amphibious shipping? While it looks impressive, and can be occasionally helpful, does the UK really benefit or need a significant amphibious force, supported by the Royal Marines, given that it is highly unlikely that the UK will ever launch an amphibious operation at scale again? Has the time come to ask really difficult questions of sacred cows that perhaps need to be turned into BBQ?
It feels increasingly like the UK is facing a rerun of the 1980 ‘Nott Review’ and has a similar policy challenge. A resurgent and aggressive Russia, coupled with an unstable wider world, aspirations for global operations but a need to credibly support NATO on land, sea and air and an expensive and unaffordable equipment programme (as well as the affordability of Trident) means that tough choices are unavoidable. In 1980 the RN focused on the ASW ‘deep battle’ at the cost of intending to get out of the amphibious game – will history repeat itself?
The future is an uncharted country. I was told by my immediate boss, an air rank, that there would not be another war at a time when he was looking to save money. In my next tour, I was sending people to risk their lives somewhere hot and dusty.
Never say never.
Never say never.
Thread Starter
Problem is there is no unlimited supply of money or people - somethings have to be prioritised and TBH defence of the UK has to be the No.1 Priority
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Very true, but politicians have short memories and are always very keen to reduce capability (and spending) whenever they get a sniff of a short term change in the global political situation that hints at there being some sort of "peace dividend". We saw this with the collapse of the Soviet Union, an unholy rush to save money by reducing military capability. The idiots never appreciate, or simply do not care that it takes time to both rebuild physical capability and train and recruit people. I've long suspected that this is largely because most politicians are selfish creatures that never see further ahead than the next election, and just don't give a **** about how the people at the sharp end are going to be affected. You can be sure that they will never, ever, carry the can for their own failings.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
We have to get used to a world where any country, 3rd world or not, will able to launch 1000nm+ drones with 100kg+ warheads.
Which means SAW, including energy weapons, such as on Stryker*, have suddenly become a high priority - not just for the army but all HVA in the UK - as well as MSAM and AD.
Not sure what has to give to provide that, but something must.
* https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/...-next-45-days/
Which means SAW, including energy weapons, such as on Stryker*, have suddenly become a high priority - not just for the army but all HVA in the UK - as well as MSAM and AD.
Not sure what has to give to provide that, but something must.
* https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/...-next-45-days/
Thread Starter
"I've long suspected that this is largely because most politicians are selfish creatures that never see further ahead than the next election" - thats the old school - the curretn lot can only see to tomorrows media headlines.
Hard to blame people for taking a "peace dividend" after the fall of the Soviet Union - like the post WW1 "10 year rule". In both cases the old enemy WAS quiet for well over 10 years - the problem is having to suddenly say "we need to re-arm" after a long period of peace and no visible threat
Hard to blame people for taking a "peace dividend" after the fall of the Soviet Union - like the post WW1 "10 year rule". In both cases the old enemy WAS quiet for well over 10 years - the problem is having to suddenly say "we need to re-arm" after a long period of peace and no visible threat
The Treasury also failed to realise there was only one peace dividend. They tried to take it year after year.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
“eight equipment programmes as red, meaning that successful delivery appears to be unachievable. These include [F35] Lightning, Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, Ajax, and Core Production Capability for nuclear submarine reactors….”
A challenging read. MOD needs to make £1.9bn of unfunded savings in next 10yrs, and find some £3.7bn in cuts to Service projects.
Major programmes unfunded, Royal Marines appear unsustainable, no extra A400M and shipbuilding underfunded.
https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-e...-2022-to-2032/
NAO: The Equipment Plan 2022 to 2032
A challenging read. MOD needs to make £1.9bn of unfunded savings in next 10yrs, and find some £3.7bn in cuts to Service projects.
Major programmes unfunded, Royal Marines appear unsustainable, no extra A400M and shipbuilding underfunded.
https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-e...-2022-to-2032/
NAO: The Equipment Plan 2022 to 2032
Thread Starter
what is awful is that has been the case for years and years - the MoD etc have serial convictions for optimism
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
BREAKING: Royal Navy purchases its first uncrewed submarine.
https://www.navylookout.com/royal-na...wed-submarine/
https://www.navylookout.com/royal-na...wed-submarine/
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Also discusses E-7 and CrowsNest programmes.
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/...400m-programs/
UK industry official raise eyebrows over RAF F-35 and A400M programs
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/...400m-programs/
UK industry official raise eyebrows over RAF F-35 and A400M programs
Thread Starter
On combat air matters, the decision to slow the pace of F-35 deliveries was revealed by Paul Livingston, chief executive of Lockheed Martin UK.
“Just to be clear it’s not our deliveries that are slipping, it’s when the MoD are choosing to take their options in those [current] production lots,” he said. “That has been a change.”
“Just to be clear it’s not our deliveries that are slipping, it’s when the MoD are choosing to take their options in those [current] production lots,” he said. “That has been a change.”
Not that it means much to LM, theres plenty of people who will take their spots
Also curious about the part "Core Production Capability for nuclear submarine reactors" guess that means funding to RR for reactors for the dreadnought SSBN's
Also curious about the part "Core Production Capability for nuclear submarine reactors" guess that means funding to RR for reactors for the dreadnought SSBN's
Last edited by rattman; 4th Dec 2022 at 09:39.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Also curious about the part "Core Production Capability for nuclear submarine reactors" guess that means funding to RR for reactors for the dreadnought SSBN's
On combat air matters, the decision to slow the pace of F-35 deliveries was revealed by Paul Livingston, chief executive of Lockheed Martin UK.
“Just to be clear it’s not our deliveries that are slipping, it’s when the MoD are choosing to take their options in those [current] production lots,” he said. “That has been a change.”
“Just to be clear it’s not our deliveries that are slipping, it’s when the MoD are choosing to take their options in those [current] production lots,” he said. “That has been a change.”
Same happened on Apache, due to PFI'ing the sim, causing it to be years late. MoD asked (demanded) Westland cut delivery rate in half, at nil cost. The knock-on effect on other programmes (Lynx, Merlin, etc.) would have been catastrophic, and they politely refused.
Do you think the committee regrets inviting LM? They probably thought, we'll make a name here and give the company rocks. Looking forward to MoD's reply.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The review of data collected in the AJAX trials to test vibration and noise fixes proposed by General Dynamics has now concluded. The result was positive: noise and vibration levels remained within safe levels.
AJAX will now progress to Reliability Growth Trials in January.
AJAX will now progress to Reliability Growth Trials in January.
