Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry
This has been a very thorough and comprehensive report. As always the MOD has covered all aspects, though I suspect, given the high profile of the unit that suffered the accident, it was possibly more comprehensive that maybe some others. The bottom line for the summery is basically that the pilot made a significant error during a practice EFATO which led to a stall too close to the ground to recover. Ejection was then the only solution and that was initiated rather late. Very sadly, a valuable engineer lost his life. The report mentions lack of continuity training and possible over work and tiredness. But of course it still mentions that the pilot was more than capable of carrying out this manoeuvre. During my 1000+ hours on the Hawk, I did many PEFATOS. I still do so with my Bulldog, including turnbacks. When I misjudge them (as one does) I throw them away good and early. I just wonder if in this case the fact that the pilot was subconsciously thinking that he 'Was a Red Arrow' and thus did not want to fail. There are no old bold pilots. Were there here any similarities with the Shoreham crash? Just a thought.
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I just wonder if in this case the fact that the pilot was subconsciously thinking that he 'Was a Red Arrow' and thus did not want to fail
.......and that, gentlemen, is EXACTLY why in an earlier post I was suggesting a. GATE at low key, but no-one seems to have taken that onboard.
Perhaps AOC 22 group, and Commandant CFS ( once my student, then AC Roy Crompton, on his refresher course) may care to consider it.
Forget all the other stuff, keep it clear and simple so everyone knows the drill, it you dont make low key you SHALL throw it away, just as we long in the tooth airline pilots captains called it a day if we did not see the lights at DH, no argument or indecision, a GA was carried out.
Have to disagree about gliding, gliding-a Blanik or whatever or a large jet ( I used to practice PFLS in Canberras) the principles are exactly the same, only the numbers change.Its all about energy management.
The captain who saved the AC B 767 at Gimli was an experienced glider pilot, ( as was the captain of the Air Transat A 330 in the Azores double flameout incident ) whichI believe greatly helped them get the jets down in one piece without seriously injuring a single person.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 19th Oct 2019 at 17:49.
Given that from an PEFATO one never makes it to high key on any type how exactly would that work? It is widely discussed in the report that even low key for a fast type is extremely variable depending on what kind of conditions are assumed (weather, start point etc).
Would it be practical to only perform these drills with an equally qualified pilot in the backseat.One with the authority to throw it away if felt necessary ? A sort of second opinion ?
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I had a couple of back seat fast jet trips back in the 80's including on a post major servicing Jaguar airtest. I know for certain that I would have done the same as the unfortunate Cpl Bayliss. I would have reacted to a call from the pilot to eject but only experienced aircrew could appreciate that the aircraft was heading rapidly towards the ground and initiated ejection independently of the pilot within the limited timescale.
Absolutely no SA on closure rates or "my" how big the trees suddenly are etc.
RIP brother.
One of my buddies went for a spin,Leu to St M but ended up in the drink 1 minute or so from t/o.
I have no idea if Command Ejection was involved but the flight profile was "different" from expected I believe.
Fate is Indeed the Hunter.
I corrected that to LOW KEY. On the JP that was 1500, guess the Hawk is around 2000 plus. I make the point that the low key is a minimum height, its a Decision Height as to whether to continue. After the low key is made, it then becomes a matter of judgement as ever was. .
I don't recall having been taught turnbacks on the JP (1974) at RAFC or on the Gnat or Hunter. Neither do I recall having been taught turnbacks on the Hawk during my 4FTS refresher, but they were practised by staff pilots at Chivenor, although I don't think that they were included in student training.
Radar PFL to pick up the visual PFL pattern was quite common at Chivenor - even solo. Whereas on the Hunter, the 1-in-1 was preferable. Not on the Gnat though, due to the vagaries of the time it might take for the undercarriage to lock down. Horses for courses!
We taught turnbacks on the Bulldog, but with strict height gates and initial IAS / AoB requirements. But the aim was to land on the aerodrome, rather than necessarily on the RW. One of those exercises in which the QFI must take control instantly if the student starts to overcook it, or fails to keep the IAS / AoB until the turn has been completed.
However, due to the nature of their operations, RAFAT pilots are perhaps more likely to have a birdstrike close enough to the aerodrome to be able to fly some form of forced landing pattern from downwind. Other Hawk operators might suffer birdstrikes at low level and high IAS away from the aerodrome, but the main risk is probably from a shattered canopy and bird remains entering the cockpit - ask Sharpend AFC! So, horses for courses again, I can see the sense of RAFAT practising PEFATOs, although only down to a point from which a go-around will be flown - perhaps 200ft a.a.l.?. The wisdom of such practice with a non-pilot in the other seat or immediately after a simulator ride I leave to others to debate.
Radar PFL to pick up the visual PFL pattern was quite common at Chivenor - even solo. Whereas on the Hunter, the 1-in-1 was preferable. Not on the Gnat though, due to the vagaries of the time it might take for the undercarriage to lock down. Horses for courses!
We taught turnbacks on the Bulldog, but with strict height gates and initial IAS / AoB requirements. But the aim was to land on the aerodrome, rather than necessarily on the RW. One of those exercises in which the QFI must take control instantly if the student starts to overcook it, or fails to keep the IAS / AoB until the turn has been completed.
However, due to the nature of their operations, RAFAT pilots are perhaps more likely to have a birdstrike close enough to the aerodrome to be able to fly some form of forced landing pattern from downwind. Other Hawk operators might suffer birdstrikes at low level and high IAS away from the aerodrome, but the main risk is probably from a shattered canopy and bird remains entering the cockpit - ask Sharpend AFC! So, horses for courses again, I can see the sense of RAFAT practising PEFATOs, although only down to a point from which a go-around will be flown - perhaps 200ft a.a.l.?. The wisdom of such practice with a non-pilot in the other seat or immediately after a simulator ride I leave to others to debate.
Last edited by BEagle; 19th Oct 2019 at 07:59.
Treading Carefully
I am deliberately staying well out of some elements of the discussion in this thread.
I would like to clear up a couple of things here though.
I believe some posters are blurring the lines between PFLs and PEFATOs.
Before I continue, some caveats:
I haven’t flown the T1 since 2011.
I am not and never have been a member of RAFAT so can’t speak for their SOPs and I doubt very much that any of their number are about to chime in.
I wasn’t at or near Valley at the time of the accident.
I have not chatted with the pilot since so I have no more idea than anyone else on here about the circumstances.
Circling PFLs consist of a high key at 4500’, crossing the upwind end of the runway (the exact point depends on the runway length) at 90 degrees whereupon the gear is usually selected down.
Low key is abeam the landing threshold at 2500’ on a reciprocal heading.
Down flap is selected on finals when landing is assured.
There are minimum speeds specified for every configuration but, since they would be slightly different to my current mark of Hawk, I won’t put my neck on the line here.
Pilots are trained to intercept the pattern at any point and to make a decision (the contract) no later than 500’. As mentioned by another poster, Radar PFLs are also flown to arrive at the threshold at various heights (1200, 800 and 500 for RAFAT) but with usually 300 knots. SOPs then allow the final turn to be intercepted with gear and flap deployed at suitable times.
This system has worked very well for at least as long as I first started flying the Hawk (2002).
PEFATOs on the T1 were usually to an alternate runway and ‘turn backs’ were not flown on the T1 during my time. Of course this has a distinct Valley slant to it.
‘Reciprocal PEFATOs’ are practised on the T2 with a minimum of 300 knots to initiate them.
I do not know what additional profiles are practised on RAFAT.
For interest the T2 is able to fly straight in PFLs in any weather due to its improved avionics. An MDH is used in case of IMC.
As for mandating gate heights I am actually against it.
As an example, an RCAF Hawk (with a foreign pilot) had a genuine engine emergency a few years ago and reached high key with several thousand feet to spare. Since the teaching there was to stick to gate heights he elected to orbit to lose height. You can guess what’s coming. He ejected just short of the runway despite having had height to spare in the first instance.
Constant sight line angle and a solid understanding of the ‘contract’ is a well established technique and is safe.
BV
I would like to clear up a couple of things here though.
I believe some posters are blurring the lines between PFLs and PEFATOs.
Before I continue, some caveats:
I haven’t flown the T1 since 2011.
I am not and never have been a member of RAFAT so can’t speak for their SOPs and I doubt very much that any of their number are about to chime in.
I wasn’t at or near Valley at the time of the accident.
I have not chatted with the pilot since so I have no more idea than anyone else on here about the circumstances.
Circling PFLs consist of a high key at 4500’, crossing the upwind end of the runway (the exact point depends on the runway length) at 90 degrees whereupon the gear is usually selected down.
Low key is abeam the landing threshold at 2500’ on a reciprocal heading.
Down flap is selected on finals when landing is assured.
There are minimum speeds specified for every configuration but, since they would be slightly different to my current mark of Hawk, I won’t put my neck on the line here.
Pilots are trained to intercept the pattern at any point and to make a decision (the contract) no later than 500’. As mentioned by another poster, Radar PFLs are also flown to arrive at the threshold at various heights (1200, 800 and 500 for RAFAT) but with usually 300 knots. SOPs then allow the final turn to be intercepted with gear and flap deployed at suitable times.
This system has worked very well for at least as long as I first started flying the Hawk (2002).
PEFATOs on the T1 were usually to an alternate runway and ‘turn backs’ were not flown on the T1 during my time. Of course this has a distinct Valley slant to it.
‘Reciprocal PEFATOs’ are practised on the T2 with a minimum of 300 knots to initiate them.
I do not know what additional profiles are practised on RAFAT.
For interest the T2 is able to fly straight in PFLs in any weather due to its improved avionics. An MDH is used in case of IMC.
As for mandating gate heights I am actually against it.
As an example, an RCAF Hawk (with a foreign pilot) had a genuine engine emergency a few years ago and reached high key with several thousand feet to spare. Since the teaching there was to stick to gate heights he elected to orbit to lose height. You can guess what’s coming. He ejected just short of the runway despite having had height to spare in the first instance.
Constant sight line angle and a solid understanding of the ‘contract’ is a well established technique and is safe.
BV
Last edited by Bob Viking; 19th Oct 2019 at 14:03.
OK, so do tell me , how many. EFATOs have been successfully concluded , and how many , airframes and lives, have been lost in training for this event ? Lets make a realistic comparison. ... and ROD of 4,700 fpm, 50 deg angle of bank, at 345 feet at 147 k. In a swept wing jet, seriously ? Never saw anything remotely like that even in the JP.
and Beagle never saw turnbacks in the JP, at Cranwell because we had stopped them long before 1974, the risk outweighed the potential benefits, too dangerous..
I’ ll leave you guys to it !
and Beagle never saw turnbacks in the JP, at Cranwell because we had stopped them long before 1974, the risk outweighed the potential benefits, too dangerous..
I’ ll leave you guys to it !
This JP trivia has I am sure little if anything to do with the main thrust of the thread other than perhaps highlighting that there has always been some debate about the risk vs. benefits of practising some manoeuvres.
Last edited by wiggy; 19th Oct 2019 at 20:46.
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Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
LFH
...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
LFH
...
Just to be clear I assume you mean stopped doing them with students on board? As I recall it we were still teaching turnbacks to student QFIs at CFS on the MK 3 and MK 5 JP as late as ‘89, but as I recall it they were never to practised by QFIs at the BFTSs with a “real” student onboard.
This JP trivia has I am sure little if anything to do with the main thrust of the thread other than perhaps highlighting that there has always been some debate about the risk vs. benefits of practising some manoeuvres.
They were not done at CFS or SORF even though our “ students” were all qualified pilots, some highly so. That was 1970 to 73..
Retired BA/BY
I don’t think anyone is trying to belittle your experience but maybe questioning the relevance a little.
You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.
You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.
I am about to start my sixth consecutive Hawk tour (on four different marks of Hawk in three countries). All of them have involved at least an element of serving as part of standards. I feel sure Wiggy can make similar claims.
Nobody is trying to ignore the lessons of the past. It’s just that, as aircraft types change and time progresses, some things will inevitably change. Not always for the worse, but not always for the better either.
You can also rest assured that the current generation take these things very seriously and do not rush to hasty decisions about any element of any profiles/SOPs/procedures.
BV
You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.
You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.
I am about to start my sixth consecutive Hawk tour (on four different marks of Hawk in three countries). All of them have involved at least an element of serving as part of standards. I feel sure Wiggy can make similar claims.
Nobody is trying to ignore the lessons of the past. It’s just that, as aircraft types change and time progresses, some things will inevitably change. Not always for the worse, but not always for the better either.
You can also rest assured that the current generation take these things very seriously and do not rush to hasty decisions about any element of any profiles/SOPs/procedures.
BV
Last edited by Bob Viking; 20th Oct 2019 at 06:45.
In 2004, the RAF's last Canberra accident killed 2 pilots whilst they were practising a wholly unnecessary training event - a night asymmetric touch-and-go. With no representative simulator available, it would be quite reasonable for asymmetric full stop landings and asymmetric go-arounds from above VCH, but an asymmetric touch-and-go (asymmetric touchdown, take-off again under symmetric thrust) seems like a risk too far in my view.
Appetite for risk was perhaps greater then, but in today's safety-conscious world, perhaps a thorough review of high risk training events would be appropriate?
Appetite for risk was perhaps greater then, but in today's safety-conscious world, perhaps a thorough review of high risk training events would be appropriate?
I remember a crash 70-80's time period, possibly a Hawk and after a wire strike I think, the engineer ejected without pilot calling too and was killed.
Think you are referring to the RAFAT transit flight, where having got airborne with his circus engineer in the back (presumably as SC) he hit a wire, the engineer ejected and the pilot subsequently landed.
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Hi Beagle,
I would struggle to think of a PEFATO as a high risk exercise. From memory (of having messed up one in particular) you had to ‘get on with it’, sort your energy out and then make a couple of judgement calls as to where you were going to intercept the pattern, where to take gear and flap and when to curtail the exercise. I found all the emergency landings in a Hawk to be good exercises in the sense that they were a good work out, a useful handling exercise and allowed me to work on my airmanship. I never considered them to be high risk, but then my personal disposition was to chuck away an approach before attempting aggressive handling to rescue it. Just me but I was genuinely surprised to read the findings of the SI report.
I would struggle to think of a PEFATO as a high risk exercise. From memory (of having messed up one in particular) you had to ‘get on with it’, sort your energy out and then make a couple of judgement calls as to where you were going to intercept the pattern, where to take gear and flap and when to curtail the exercise. I found all the emergency landings in a Hawk to be good exercises in the sense that they were a good work out, a useful handling exercise and allowed me to work on my airmanship. I never considered them to be high risk, but then my personal disposition was to chuck away an approach before attempting aggressive handling to rescue it. Just me but I was genuinely surprised to read the findings of the SI report.
I don’t think anyone is trying to belittle your experience but maybe questioning the relevance a little.
You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.
You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.
BV
You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.
You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.
BV
It seems our opinions may differ but I got to the end of my career without breaking anything, ( well, not after my blamefree ejection ) !
Perhaps we can agree to disagree without you taking things out of context.
Back to the beach here in MRU !
In 2004, the RAF's last Canberra accident killed 2 pilots whilst they were practising a wholly unnecessary training event - a night asymmetric touch-and-go. With no representative simulator available, it would be quite reasonable for asymmetric full stop landings and asymmetric go-arounds from above VCH, but an asymmetric touch-and-go (asymmetric touchdown, take-off again under symmetric thrust) seems like a risk too far in my view.
When conducting Sim Asy flight in any jet aircraft, once you've closed the throttles in the flare, you are symmetric again. An Avon at idle needed care whenever it was accelerated, but not as a function of how long it had been at idle. If you had 2 Avons that were either side of the centreline then any T&G needed care; WJ866 crashed because of what happened after it landed from the Asy approach - not before! Furthermore, the Asy GA was the real handing issue. Whilst we had to complete many of these events as BCRs, it was the latter that was always the most demanding and therefore potentially dangerous exercise, especially IMC. That said, if you handled the Canberra iaw the Aircrew Manual, it would rarely let you down.
Last edited by H Peacock; 20th Oct 2019 at 11:02.