Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry
The section in the report entitled ‘Work Routine’ should IMHO, act as a red flag for Senior Officers.
Most of you will be aware how ‘2ndary Duties’ have morphed over the last 20 years. What once was considered a minor / non-onerous duty intended to aid the day to day running of a Sqn, has in most instances, become a gargantuan duty, worthy of a full time job in itself. Sadly, the reality is that 2ndary duties are now used to make up for the enormous deficiencies in resource and personnel allocated to most flying units.
As an example, all of the JP’s on my most recent unit were quite literally working ‘balls to the wall’, and even in peacetime / non-op periods, working 60+ hour weeks, rising to the order of 80+ hours after a day in the ‘shed’ was factored in. That’s an incredible ask of our JP cadre, but to a man, they accept and deliver exceptional results without complaint. But that doesn’t make it right.
18 years ago, a JP would land, debrief, and then have time to study the RTS, Tactics Manual, SOPs, Threat and other documents which allowed them to become better at their primary duty. Nowadays, the majority of guys land, debrief and are straight into their 2ndary duties. I don’t blame them for this, rather, it’s a toxic outcome of a system which no longer rewards excellence in the flying role, and places primacy on 2ndary duties.
If you don’t believe me, have a look round your respective fleets and ponder. How many of those who have been promoted are actually ‘Above Average’ in the air? I’d suggest its way less than 50%. The reality of the current promotion system is, that exceptional aviators are deemed subservient to individuals that have completed high profile 2ndary duties.
So what?
In 1.4.292 - ‘R3 felt he lacked the opportunity to apply as much thought as he would have liked pre and post sorties to consider what he had done or was going to do next; the only time he sat down was in a brief, debrief or in an aircraft.’ I’d say the same could currently be said of every single pilot on every current FJ Sqn. (NB I don’t intentionally mean to single out FJ as being ‘special’ or working harder than other fleets, but it’s the only thing I have direct experience of and feel able to comment on).
1.4.294 - ‘RAFAT was busy and all persons worked hard; there was acknowledgement that flying was intense but that secondary duties should be achievable within the working day’. I’d say this phrase represents the collective ‘head in sand’ policy adopted by most SO’s and FHQ’s. It’s a total leadership failure by those in a position to recognise that 2ndary duties cannot actually be completed within an acceptable working day, but by saying that they think it should, somehow absolves them of any responsibility.
1.4.298 - ‘Specialist HF advice counselled that a high level of workload reduced the readiness of personnel by acting as a stressor and so reduced the ability to gather information, influencing decision making, and reducing capacity for undertaking her tasks.’ Once again a sentence that when extrapolated, means that every pilot on every current FJ Sqn is working at a reduced capacity.
1.4.301 - ‘The Sqn CoC maintained oversight of personnel fatigue and held the view that as the aircrew worked closely together they could have identified if anyone appeared to be stressed or tired; crew rest regulations were adhered to.’ Crew rest as defined in GASO’s has become a target to work to, not a rule to prevent infrequent overwork. What was once considered ‘surge’ is now considered the ‘normal’ tempo. HQ’s are fully aware of the current unacceptable task and working tempo, yet persist with the 'head in sand' approach whilst resisting all efforts to monitor and log the number of hrs actually spent in work by their personnel each week. Personnel that have previously tried to highlight inconsistencies with the Working Time Regulations(1998) have essentially been ‘persona non grata’d’ from the Force.
1.4.306 - ‘R3 was working hard in a high tempo environment and as a consequence was experiencing a degree of fatigue. Every pilot, on every FJ Sqn currently in the RAF.
I could go on, but the bottom line is that if statements made in this report are to be taken at face value, then it would be very easy to argue that every single FJ pilot in the RAF is currently suffering from chronic stress and fatigue. And if I’m being honest, I actually believe that to be the case.
Given this report is signed off by DG DSA, I hope measures are currently being put in place to alleviate the factors causing chronic stress and fatigue to aircrew.
Perhaps the first place to start would be by alleviating highly trained pilots of non essential tasks by:-
1./ Ensuring that Stn Catering Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn Rations.
2./ Ensuring Sqn MSF Flt take all responsibilities for day to day Flight Scheduling and Mission Planning.
3./ Ensuring Stn Ops Flt take all responsibilities for Trail planning.
4./ Ensuring Stn Intelligence Flt take all responsibilities for providing intelligence functions and threat briefs.
5./ Ensuring Stn MT Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn vehicles.
6./ Ensuring Stn Admin start assisting Sqn personnel in all welfare and allowance matters.
This event was a horrific tragedy resulting in the loss of a fine young Airman.
R3 was not able to function at the top of his game, in part, because he was busy dealing with the Sqn sandwiches.
Similar sets of circumstances are conspiring to distract the current generation of RAF pilots from their primary duty, on every single RAF FJ Sqn currently in existence.
Most of you will be aware how ‘2ndary Duties’ have morphed over the last 20 years. What once was considered a minor / non-onerous duty intended to aid the day to day running of a Sqn, has in most instances, become a gargantuan duty, worthy of a full time job in itself. Sadly, the reality is that 2ndary duties are now used to make up for the enormous deficiencies in resource and personnel allocated to most flying units.
As an example, all of the JP’s on my most recent unit were quite literally working ‘balls to the wall’, and even in peacetime / non-op periods, working 60+ hour weeks, rising to the order of 80+ hours after a day in the ‘shed’ was factored in. That’s an incredible ask of our JP cadre, but to a man, they accept and deliver exceptional results without complaint. But that doesn’t make it right.
18 years ago, a JP would land, debrief, and then have time to study the RTS, Tactics Manual, SOPs, Threat and other documents which allowed them to become better at their primary duty. Nowadays, the majority of guys land, debrief and are straight into their 2ndary duties. I don’t blame them for this, rather, it’s a toxic outcome of a system which no longer rewards excellence in the flying role, and places primacy on 2ndary duties.
If you don’t believe me, have a look round your respective fleets and ponder. How many of those who have been promoted are actually ‘Above Average’ in the air? I’d suggest its way less than 50%. The reality of the current promotion system is, that exceptional aviators are deemed subservient to individuals that have completed high profile 2ndary duties.
So what?
In 1.4.292 - ‘R3 felt he lacked the opportunity to apply as much thought as he would have liked pre and post sorties to consider what he had done or was going to do next; the only time he sat down was in a brief, debrief or in an aircraft.’ I’d say the same could currently be said of every single pilot on every current FJ Sqn. (NB I don’t intentionally mean to single out FJ as being ‘special’ or working harder than other fleets, but it’s the only thing I have direct experience of and feel able to comment on).
1.4.294 - ‘RAFAT was busy and all persons worked hard; there was acknowledgement that flying was intense but that secondary duties should be achievable within the working day’. I’d say this phrase represents the collective ‘head in sand’ policy adopted by most SO’s and FHQ’s. It’s a total leadership failure by those in a position to recognise that 2ndary duties cannot actually be completed within an acceptable working day, but by saying that they think it should, somehow absolves them of any responsibility.
1.4.298 - ‘Specialist HF advice counselled that a high level of workload reduced the readiness of personnel by acting as a stressor and so reduced the ability to gather information, influencing decision making, and reducing capacity for undertaking her tasks.’ Once again a sentence that when extrapolated, means that every pilot on every current FJ Sqn is working at a reduced capacity.
1.4.301 - ‘The Sqn CoC maintained oversight of personnel fatigue and held the view that as the aircrew worked closely together they could have identified if anyone appeared to be stressed or tired; crew rest regulations were adhered to.’ Crew rest as defined in GASO’s has become a target to work to, not a rule to prevent infrequent overwork. What was once considered ‘surge’ is now considered the ‘normal’ tempo. HQ’s are fully aware of the current unacceptable task and working tempo, yet persist with the 'head in sand' approach whilst resisting all efforts to monitor and log the number of hrs actually spent in work by their personnel each week. Personnel that have previously tried to highlight inconsistencies with the Working Time Regulations(1998) have essentially been ‘persona non grata’d’ from the Force.
1.4.306 - ‘R3 was working hard in a high tempo environment and as a consequence was experiencing a degree of fatigue. Every pilot, on every FJ Sqn currently in the RAF.
I could go on, but the bottom line is that if statements made in this report are to be taken at face value, then it would be very easy to argue that every single FJ pilot in the RAF is currently suffering from chronic stress and fatigue. And if I’m being honest, I actually believe that to be the case.
Given this report is signed off by DG DSA, I hope measures are currently being put in place to alleviate the factors causing chronic stress and fatigue to aircrew.
Perhaps the first place to start would be by alleviating highly trained pilots of non essential tasks by:-
1./ Ensuring that Stn Catering Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn Rations.
2./ Ensuring Sqn MSF Flt take all responsibilities for day to day Flight Scheduling and Mission Planning.
3./ Ensuring Stn Ops Flt take all responsibilities for Trail planning.
4./ Ensuring Stn Intelligence Flt take all responsibilities for providing intelligence functions and threat briefs.
5./ Ensuring Stn MT Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn vehicles.
6./ Ensuring Stn Admin start assisting Sqn personnel in all welfare and allowance matters.
This event was a horrific tragedy resulting in the loss of a fine young Airman.
R3 was not able to function at the top of his game, in part, because he was busy dealing with the Sqn sandwiches.
Similar sets of circumstances are conspiring to distract the current generation of RAF pilots from their primary duty, on every single RAF FJ Sqn currently in existence.
In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he was 'scorched' by the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft. That is why it is important for the rear seat to go first.
Typhoon Driver
Excellent post.
The only thing I would add is Admin Orders and Op Orders. Why are pilots writing them when we have Admin Officers and Ops Officers?
Actually, I could go on. But I won’t.
BV
The only thing I would add is Admin Orders and Op Orders. Why are pilots writing them when we have Admin Officers and Ops Officers?
Actually, I could go on. But I won’t.
BV
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JTO
Everything associated with Cpl Bayliss's death was macabre, which tends to get lost amongst all the talk about safe altitudes, bank anglles, air speed etc. I suggest you read para 1.3.19 of the Sean Cunningham accident, "Two RAFAT engineering personnel suffered minor injuries due to canopy fragmentation, and their proximity to the efflux from the ejection seat rocket pack". And they were outside the aircraft.
DV
Emotive hyperbole is not warrantied and the suggestion that Cpl Bayliss suffered scorching from the front seat is both macabre and technically dubious.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 14th Oct 2019 at 20:01. Reason: typo correction
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Distant Voice
You are wrong. The occupant in the rear seat is unlikely to be injured by the front seat rocket motor firing because there is a blast screen between the cockpits in a Hawk T1 and the rear canopy would remain intact until the rear seat firing handle was pulled.
In Sean Cunningham’s accident the RAFAT engineers were outside the aircraft and therefore not protected to the same extent as the occupant of the rear cockpit would be. And your ‘scorching’ comments are distasteful.
You are wrong. The occupant in the rear seat is unlikely to be injured by the front seat rocket motor firing because there is a blast screen between the cockpits in a Hawk T1 and the rear canopy would remain intact until the rear seat firing handle was pulled.
In Sean Cunningham’s accident the RAFAT engineers were outside the aircraft and therefore not protected to the same extent as the occupant of the rear cockpit would be. And your ‘scorching’ comments are distasteful.
Last edited by Homelover; 15th Oct 2019 at 07:10.
The Hawk canopy is one piece covering front and rear seats, there is no rear canopy. The blast screen is only there to protect the back seater, who sits higher than the pilot in front from the slipstream, in case of loss of canopy.
If you look at the XX177 SI report, para 1.3.14 Fig 2, it shows the empty front seat, the ejection gun rod, the missing front canopy section and an intact rear canopy and blast screen.
k3k3 and DV
I find it upsetting when individuals post in threads, especially emotive ones like this, with ‘facts’ that are blatantly wrong.
If a thread is not in your area of expertise why state, as fact, something about which you know very little?
For clarification, the MDC trip arm (initiated by the seat moving up the rail) will only fire the MDC for the specific cockpit. Canopy fracture handles (they are located inside and outside the cockpit) will blow all the MDC. This is a fact. I even checked an aircrew manual to be sure.
I could rant on about other facts but I won’t. Don’t even get me started on gliding versus Hawk PFLs/PEFATOs. I have done both.
BV
If a thread is not in your area of expertise why state, as fact, something about which you know very little?
For clarification, the MDC trip arm (initiated by the seat moving up the rail) will only fire the MDC for the specific cockpit. Canopy fracture handles (they are located inside and outside the cockpit) will blow all the MDC. This is a fact. I even checked an aircrew manual to be sure.
I could rant on about other facts but I won’t. Don’t even get me started on gliding versus Hawk PFLs/PEFATOs. I have done both.
BV
Like many on here I have flown the Hawk T1, including the tail number involved in this accident. I have also experienced a front seat canopy loss at around 480kts. Quite any event for the front seat but relatively benign for me in the intact rear cockpit. The Hawk was designed to protect the rear seat instructor / occupant from a front-seat ejection sequence.
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BV and JTO
In the end the cause of Cpl Bayliss's death, and the circumstances surrounding it, will be determined by HM Senior Coroner for North West Wales, based on the balance of probability. I suspect the coroner has little on type experience, but like Andrew Walker at the Nimrod inquest, has meaningful investigators skills to offer. Sometimes you can stand too close to the coal face.
DV
In the end the cause of Cpl Bayliss's death, and the circumstances surrounding it, will be determined by HM Senior Coroner for North West Wales, based on the balance of probability. I suspect the coroner has little on type experience, but like Andrew Walker at the Nimrod inquest, has meaningful investigators skills to offer. Sometimes you can stand too close to the coal face.
DV
DV
You made a statement, about a very emotive subject, that was factually incorrect and clearly upset people.
You don’t get to pretend to be the grown up and then use your supposed wealth of experience to tell us what happens next without first offering an apology.
I thought you were better than that.
BV
You don’t get to pretend to be the grown up and then use your supposed wealth of experience to tell us what happens next without first offering an apology.
I thought you were better than that.
BV
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You don’t get to pretend to be the grown up and then use your supposed wealth of experience to tell us what happens next without first offering an apology.
My post would have been better had it read,
"In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he saw the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft".
DV
DV
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Retired BA/BY
There was one accident involving a colleague at Valley in Feb 2002. The aircraft suffered a bird strike shortly after take off which caused an engine surge. The pilot attempted an AFL but ejected when he judged he wouldn’t make it back to the airfield. Aircraft was Cat5 but pilot suffered only minor injuries. BBC News | WALES | Jet crashes near RAF base
I don’t know of any others in the UK.
There was one accident involving a colleague at Valley in Feb 2002. The aircraft suffered a bird strike shortly after take off which caused an engine surge. The pilot attempted an AFL but ejected when he judged he wouldn’t make it back to the airfield. Aircraft was Cat5 but pilot suffered only minor injuries. BBC News | WALES | Jet crashes near RAF base
I don’t know of any others in the UK.