Heads Up! Fighter Pilot: The Real Top Gun
BA/BY
I can reconfirm that TCAS is not used for ACT.
Having now caught up with the second episode I would just like to add that we should bear in mind that some details (ie comm etc) have clearly been added post edit and some of the comm quite obviously doesn’t match the footage. The best example was the beeps as the gun sight was brought to bear.
Anyway, another good episode. Even pissy Chrissy managed to act all grown up.
BV
Having now caught up with the second episode I would just like to add that we should bear in mind that some details (ie comm etc) have clearly been added post edit and some of the comm quite obviously doesn’t match the footage. The best example was the beeps as the gun sight was brought to bear.
Anyway, another good episode. Even pissy Chrissy managed to act all grown up.
BV
Retired BA/BY, the origin of TCAS was as the result of inadequate ATC leading to the Grand Canyon collision in the '50s. Another example was the Japanese near mid-air caused by ATC error. The Uberlingen tragedy was initiated by ATC error, but incorrect RA action by one of the crews resulted in the mid-air.
So don't be so rude and accusatory.
So don't be so rude and accusatory.
Retired BA/BY, the origin of TCAS was as the result of inadequate ATC leading to the Grand Canyon collision in the '50s. Another example was the Japanese near mid-air caused by ATC error. The Uberlingen tragedy was initiated by ATC error, but incorrect RA action by one of the crews resulted in the mid-air.
So don't be so rude and accusatory.
So don't be so rude and accusatory.
What you may not know is that before the 757/ 154 collision there was no SOP as to how to deal with a situation where TCAS and ATC disagreed. That was corrected very soon after the accident . Get your facts right !
Further the JAL near miss aircraft both had TCAS, so that incident did not LEAD to
TCAS.
Civil Aviation, certainly, has long encouraged a “JUST” culture where we identify , report and analyse our mistakes and errors. You should, perhaps, know better than to confuse genuine mistakes with incompetence.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 29th Aug 2019 at 19:35.
TCAS/ACAS Origins and Guidance Material
From late 1981 to early 1982 an early version of TCAS II was installed in two Piedmont B727s, and in 1984 N857N was cleared for use by all Piedmont's B727 crews. I have a copy of their operations manual before me as I write, and later in that decade I both flew their TCAS-equipped B727 flight simulator and observed from within the flight deck how the crews used this equipment in line operations.
Just a word about TCAS and ACAS. The acronym 'TCAS' stands for 'Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System' and was used in a generic sense in the early years when its equipment status was MOPS 6, 6.02, 6.04 and 6.04A. Subsequently TCAS II with MOPS 7 and 7.01 installed has become a solution to the operational standards inherent in ACAS II. TCAS I would not be capable of posting RAs, TCAS II can post RAs that advise avoidance manoeuvres in the vertical plane, and TCAS III would post avoidance manoeuvres in the horizontal plane as well as in the vertical plane. (As a guest of the FAA I flew a B727 in an encounter trial near Atlantic City with a breadboard version of TCAS III installed - it worked just fine, but subsequently the addition of horizontal advisories was never considered necessary.)
My involvement with TCAS/ACAS came about because as a Flight Operations Inspector in the UK CAA's Flight Operations Department I was tasked to participate in the likely introduction of TCAS II as a safety modification to UK commercial air transport/public transport aeroplanes. In the course of our early meetings that included representatives of NATS, airlines and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Procurement Executive, the latter explained that fast jet pilots would probably not want to have a Resolution Advisory (RA) facility but rather a means by which they could be told/shown where to look to see any potentially conflicting aircraft and then make their own decisions as to what manoeuvre would be appropriate. Within a few years they produced a trials version of such a device that I seem to recall was installed in a Tornado but I don't know if a general modification programme followed.
To go back to Retired BA/BY's comment that at the time of the Uberlingen accident in July 2002 there was no guidance as to how pilots should respond when an ATC instruction disagreed with a TCAS RA: this was not the case in Europe where explicit guidance existed. First, the UK CAA published Civil Air Publication 579 'Airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) guidance material' in March 1991 (before any UK air operator had installed this equipment or begun training their crews). This CAP included the text in paragraph 6.2.4 (b), "If pilots receive simultaneously an instruction to manoeuvre from ATC and an RA, and both conflict, the advice given by the RA should be followed'. As the main author of this CAP and also the UK member on the Joint Aviation Authorities' Flight Operations Committee (later, 'Sectorial Team') I inserted a similar text into the first version of Temporary Guidance Leaflet No 11 published in October 1998 thus, "If pilots simultaneously receive instructions to manoeuvre from ATC and an RA which are in conflict, the pilot should follow the RA". Finally, as the UK nominee to the ICAO Operations Panel (yes, I was quite busy for a while!) I was able to ensure that similar text was written into the guidance contained in PANS-OPS Volume I Chapter 3 'Operation of Airborne Collision Guidance System (ACAS) Equipment' published in November 2008, "In the event of an RA, pilots shall .... follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an air traffic control (ATC) instruction to manoeuvre". The rationale is that the ACAS refresh rate was some ten times faster than information displayed to air traffic controllers, and of course the information transfer was much faster within a flight deck than from ground to air.
The point here is that it is essential that all pilots who have ACAS equipment in the aircraft they are flying (General Aviation as well as Commercial Air Transport) must have first received training in accordance with the ICAO guidance - this should ensure that pilots throughout the world comply with the same rules. Both ICAO Annex 6 Part I (CAT) and Annex 6 Part II (GA) contain this Standard. The only exception I can envisage is military fast jet aeroplanes when not in transit.
One other point: it is really important that all aircraft that are required to be equipped with SSR use it with altitude reporting enabled, for this will allow them to be detected by ACAS-equipped aircraft and the risk of conflict mitigated accordingly. Without altitude-reporting enabled in one aircraft, pilots in the ACAS-equipped aircraft might have a Traffic Advisory (TA) posted even though the former is some 7,000ft below (or possibly above). This is a real distraction as the pilots with an ACAS display don't know whether the intruder is co-altitude, and hence a hazard, or well distant and thus not a concern.
Finally, ACAS doesn't care how a potential conflict has come about, whether through ATC error, pilot non-compliance with ATC instruction, altitude bust on climb or descent, emergency descent, incorrect setting of altimeter sub-scale or whatever. If the ACAS algorithms detect a breach by an intruder of their time-to-CPA (closest point of approach) they will post accordingly - and this is regardless of ATC separation standards.
I hope that this submission will help resolve a few issues!
From late 1981 to early 1982 an early version of TCAS II was installed in two Piedmont B727s, and in 1984 N857N was cleared for use by all Piedmont's B727 crews. I have a copy of their operations manual before me as I write, and later in that decade I both flew their TCAS-equipped B727 flight simulator and observed from within the flight deck how the crews used this equipment in line operations.
Just a word about TCAS and ACAS. The acronym 'TCAS' stands for 'Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System' and was used in a generic sense in the early years when its equipment status was MOPS 6, 6.02, 6.04 and 6.04A. Subsequently TCAS II with MOPS 7 and 7.01 installed has become a solution to the operational standards inherent in ACAS II. TCAS I would not be capable of posting RAs, TCAS II can post RAs that advise avoidance manoeuvres in the vertical plane, and TCAS III would post avoidance manoeuvres in the horizontal plane as well as in the vertical plane. (As a guest of the FAA I flew a B727 in an encounter trial near Atlantic City with a breadboard version of TCAS III installed - it worked just fine, but subsequently the addition of horizontal advisories was never considered necessary.)
My involvement with TCAS/ACAS came about because as a Flight Operations Inspector in the UK CAA's Flight Operations Department I was tasked to participate in the likely introduction of TCAS II as a safety modification to UK commercial air transport/public transport aeroplanes. In the course of our early meetings that included representatives of NATS, airlines and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Procurement Executive, the latter explained that fast jet pilots would probably not want to have a Resolution Advisory (RA) facility but rather a means by which they could be told/shown where to look to see any potentially conflicting aircraft and then make their own decisions as to what manoeuvre would be appropriate. Within a few years they produced a trials version of such a device that I seem to recall was installed in a Tornado but I don't know if a general modification programme followed.
To go back to Retired BA/BY's comment that at the time of the Uberlingen accident in July 2002 there was no guidance as to how pilots should respond when an ATC instruction disagreed with a TCAS RA: this was not the case in Europe where explicit guidance existed. First, the UK CAA published Civil Air Publication 579 'Airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) guidance material' in March 1991 (before any UK air operator had installed this equipment or begun training their crews). This CAP included the text in paragraph 6.2.4 (b), "If pilots receive simultaneously an instruction to manoeuvre from ATC and an RA, and both conflict, the advice given by the RA should be followed'. As the main author of this CAP and also the UK member on the Joint Aviation Authorities' Flight Operations Committee (later, 'Sectorial Team') I inserted a similar text into the first version of Temporary Guidance Leaflet No 11 published in October 1998 thus, "If pilots simultaneously receive instructions to manoeuvre from ATC and an RA which are in conflict, the pilot should follow the RA". Finally, as the UK nominee to the ICAO Operations Panel (yes, I was quite busy for a while!) I was able to ensure that similar text was written into the guidance contained in PANS-OPS Volume I Chapter 3 'Operation of Airborne Collision Guidance System (ACAS) Equipment' published in November 2008, "In the event of an RA, pilots shall .... follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an air traffic control (ATC) instruction to manoeuvre". The rationale is that the ACAS refresh rate was some ten times faster than information displayed to air traffic controllers, and of course the information transfer was much faster within a flight deck than from ground to air.
The point here is that it is essential that all pilots who have ACAS equipment in the aircraft they are flying (General Aviation as well as Commercial Air Transport) must have first received training in accordance with the ICAO guidance - this should ensure that pilots throughout the world comply with the same rules. Both ICAO Annex 6 Part I (CAT) and Annex 6 Part II (GA) contain this Standard. The only exception I can envisage is military fast jet aeroplanes when not in transit.
One other point: it is really important that all aircraft that are required to be equipped with SSR use it with altitude reporting enabled, for this will allow them to be detected by ACAS-equipped aircraft and the risk of conflict mitigated accordingly. Without altitude-reporting enabled in one aircraft, pilots in the ACAS-equipped aircraft might have a Traffic Advisory (TA) posted even though the former is some 7,000ft below (or possibly above). This is a real distraction as the pilots with an ACAS display don't know whether the intruder is co-altitude, and hence a hazard, or well distant and thus not a concern.
Finally, ACAS doesn't care how a potential conflict has come about, whether through ATC error, pilot non-compliance with ATC instruction, altitude bust on climb or descent, emergency descent, incorrect setting of altimeter sub-scale or whatever. If the ACAS algorithms detect a breach by an intruder of their time-to-CPA (closest point of approach) they will post accordingly - and this is regardless of ATC separation standards.
I hope that this submission will help resolve a few issues!
A really excellent explanation, thank you.
I had retired at the time of that collision but when I did my TCAS training ( B757/767) we certainly would have gone for an RA until the situation was fully resolved.
At the time of the accident, discussion with former colleagues, after reading the report, we gained the impression that might not have been the case in Russia, which , perhaps is why the Russian pilot did what he did.
Again thank you for such a detailed and authorative explanation.
I had retired at the time of that collision but when I did my TCAS training ( B757/767) we certainly would have gone for an RA until the situation was fully resolved.
At the time of the accident, discussion with former colleagues, after reading the report, we gained the impression that might not have been the case in Russia, which , perhaps is why the Russian pilot did what he did.
Again thank you for such a detailed and authorative explanation.
The programme is good overall, despite the pandering to the female stude and all her guff about being female aircrew for the muslim schoolgirls.
Last edited by Training Risky; 30th Aug 2019 at 18:48.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Did I get it wrong, or was there the situation in both episodes where the F35 failed to recognise the pilot's log-in, and refused to start? That doesn't bode well for QRA. "A password link has been sent to your email address"
I'd suggest the bigger problem may be finding yourself in a situation where the F-35 is required to stand Q in the first place!
Mustn't let women be women, it confuses the men.
BTW, your taxi to the 1950s is waiting at the front gate. Take your snowflake attitudes back there will you?
Training Risky, your constant problem with women is revealing that you have issues, were you chopped by a female by any chance?
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,807
Received 135 Likes
on
63 Posts
As an ATCO, from 1965 I worked alongside female colleagues. Just like the rest if us, some were good, most average and a few cr@p. I can’t recall any gender issues, apart from one who seemed more interested in doing her knitting than paying attention to r/t calls. 
Hope you never need a surgeon who happens to be female and more importantly an anaesthetist who is female, sleeping during the operation maybe a problem, if you have an attitude like that when talking to or is it your case at them. One of the best surgeons I have ever worked with was a female along with several anaesthetists who I would let put me to sleep any time far ahead of many of their male colleagues.
Air pig
I think that I know what you are getting at but I am not sure!! It is not (in my humble opinion) worth raising the "sex" banner, either pro-male or female, in this day and age. Both sexs are equally competent when trained and qualified (as used to be the case during my service time, many years ago). I got a "bol****ing in 1965 for sending a young lady solo in a Chipmunk - could not see why as she was an RAF sponsered undergrad. on a UAS (had to be!) and I was told (correctly) she was to be treated like any other student. Today there would have been no comment but then...!
Bill
I think that I know what you are getting at but I am not sure!! It is not (in my humble opinion) worth raising the "sex" banner, either pro-male or female, in this day and age. Both sexs are equally competent when trained and qualified (as used to be the case during my service time, many years ago). I got a "bol****ing in 1965 for sending a young lady solo in a Chipmunk - could not see why as she was an RAF sponsered undergrad. on a UAS (had to be!) and I was told (correctly) she was to be treated like any other student. Today there would have been no comment but then...!
Bill
When I ran the recruiting session at the UAS one year, I discovered a number of forms from young ladies which hadn't been processed - the adjutant had put them on one side. I asked why - to which he replied "We've got our 10% females". So I told him that there was no such limit and to process the applications - the girls were equally entitled to apply for membership. We managed to contact most of them, but one never received the message. Her father later wrote to ask why she'd been excluded, so I apologised and told him what had happened; sadly by then we had no more vacancies for the current intake - but encouraged him to ask her to reapply for the following year. Which she did, but unfortunately the quacks found a medical issue; however we made her a 'social member'.
I found that there was a distinct difference in attitude between males and females - if you said to one of the lads "That was an average trip", he'd think "Good, I'll be off to the pub later". But say the same thing to one of the girls and she'd usually put in the effort to do better next time. Rather more rewarding to instruct! It also helped that they washed their flying suits more often than the lads and were less likely to turn up with hangovers.
I found that there was a distinct difference in attitude between males and females - if you said to one of the lads "That was an average trip", he'd think "Good, I'll be off to the pub later". But say the same thing to one of the girls and she'd usually put in the effort to do better next time. Rather more rewarding to instruct! It also helped that they washed their flying suits more often than the lads and were less likely to turn up with hangovers.
My my, lots of 'White Knights' on here! Dry your eyes ladies. I have worked with lots of women while I was in, some good, some bad, but not one of them ever needed to be the centre of attention for a TV programme or be filmed talking to kids and getting special attention for their gender. That bit was cringeworthy...
Last edited by Training Risky; 1st Sep 2019 at 15:34.
My my, lots of 'White Knights' on here! Dry your eyes ladies. I have worked with lots of women while I was in, some good, some bad, but not one of them ever needed to be the centre of attention for a TV programme or be filmed talking to kids and getting special attention for their gender. That bit was cringeworthy...