Heads Up! Fighter Pilot: The Real Top Gun
Just got around to watching Ep1. Emminently more watchable than the dire 80s offering IMO. I also liked the contrasted training vs conversion aspect of the 2 locations.
CG
CG
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Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
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If someone doesn’t make the grade, even after 7 years, you have to chop them. The reason for that is because they could potentially kill a lot of people if they get things wrong. It’s harsh, but funerals are harsher
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BV,
You stated;
As far as I know TCAS was designed as a Collision Avoidance System for civilian aircraft and/or Low performance Military aircraft. It was not designed for high performance fighter aircraft conducting ACT. Has the RAF changed the TCAS software to make it any more usable or reliable in a multi aircraft ACT environment? I believe that it was/is not technically feasible.
If the "Avionics" warning occurs every time the TCAS trips, it is distracting and annoying. More important is that if every time you point at another aircraft you get a "Traffic" warning your senses will become dulled to the warning. Unless TCAS gained a "Fast Jet" mode able to discriminate in a rapidly changing environment it is not viable for collision avoidance. Unless you can convince me otherwise I still believe that TCAS should be in Standby when conducting ACT. If need be operate in "Protected Airspace" such as a TRA.
You stated;
As for ‘avionics’ warnings, they are usually generated by the TCAS tripping off as it’s attitude or AoB limits are breached, ie in every dynamic manoeuvre.
‘Traffic’ warnings are from other formation members. Annoying yes, but since the Moray Firth accident it is very hard to convince a duty holder that TCAS should ever be set to standby whilst airborne. Could you imagine if formation members collided and the SI reported that the collision avoidance system had deliberately been turned off?
‘Traffic’ warnings are from other formation members. Annoying yes, but since the Moray Firth accident it is very hard to convince a duty holder that TCAS should ever be set to standby whilst airborne. Could you imagine if formation members collided and the SI reported that the collision avoidance system had deliberately been turned off?
If the "Avionics" warning occurs every time the TCAS trips, it is distracting and annoying. More important is that if every time you point at another aircraft you get a "Traffic" warning your senses will become dulled to the warning. Unless TCAS gained a "Fast Jet" mode able to discriminate in a rapidly changing environment it is not viable for collision avoidance. Unless you can convince me otherwise I still believe that TCAS should be in Standby when conducting ACT. If need be operate in "Protected Airspace" such as a TRA.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
There is no point in having a final check if you cannot fail it.
You can even get chopped years down the line.
Dominator
I will not try to convince you that TCAS is suitable for ACT sorties. That’s because I don’t believe it is. But I don’t make the rules.
The warnings are annoying. However, as I said, after the Moray Firth crash it is hard to argue that it should ever be turned off.
Every argument you are about to say has already been considered. We are all aware of its limitations but it also has its benefits at times. In IFR airspace it has obvious uses but it has also proved it’s worth at low level when big sky theory has let us down.
I’m sure Distant Voice would remind us that, despite it’s drawbacks, it probably would have prevented the Moray Firth collision even in its present form.
BV
The warnings are annoying. However, as I said, after the Moray Firth crash it is hard to argue that it should ever be turned off.
Every argument you are about to say has already been considered. We are all aware of its limitations but it also has its benefits at times. In IFR airspace it has obvious uses but it has also proved it’s worth at low level when big sky theory has let us down.
I’m sure Distant Voice would remind us that, despite it’s drawbacks, it probably would have prevented the Moray Firth collision even in its present form.
BV
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I recall in the mid 80s a Re-role Nav Student who was chopped on his final trip on the OCU for "Safety. He had been on review and given extra hours on every phase of the course. Each time Group over-rode the OCU Staff decision and approved the extra Sims and Flying.
On the final trip the poor chap (8000+ hours and 36 years old) was told that he had failed the course. On the final trip he would have allowed his pilot to fly them both into the sea in blissful ignorance. Afterwards he has relieved that it was all over. 16 years of AEW is not a great lead-in to becoming a Fast Jet Nav.
Sometimes very difficult decisions have to be made. That is how we earned the extra "Instructional Pay"!
On the final trip the poor chap (8000+ hours and 36 years old) was told that he had failed the course. On the final trip he would have allowed his pilot to fly them both into the sea in blissful ignorance. Afterwards he has relieved that it was all over. 16 years of AEW is not a great lead-in to becoming a Fast Jet Nav.
Sometimes very difficult decisions have to be made. That is how we earned the extra "Instructional Pay"!
I recall in the mid 80s a Re-role Nav Student who was chopped on his final trip on the OCU for "Safety. He had been on review and given extra hours on every phase of the course. Each time Group over-rode the OCU Staff decision and approved the extra Sims and Flying.
On the final trip the poor chap (8000+ hours and 36 years old) was told that he had failed the course. On the final trip he would have allowed his pilot to fly them both into the sea in blissful ignorance. Afterwards he has relieved that it was all over. 16 years of AEW is not a great lead-in to becoming a Fast Jet Nav.
Sometimes very difficult decisions have to be made. That is how we earned the extra "Instructional Pay"!
On the final trip the poor chap (8000+ hours and 36 years old) was told that he had failed the course. On the final trip he would have allowed his pilot to fly them both into the sea in blissful ignorance. Afterwards he has relieved that it was all over. 16 years of AEW is not a great lead-in to becoming a Fast Jet Nav.
Sometimes very difficult decisions have to be made. That is how we earned the extra "Instructional Pay"!
Nothing like chopping for job security.
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Alred,
You missed the point, the poor guy was never suitable for the role. HQ 11 Gp posted the navigator internally within the Group AEW to AD. To save face Group Staff subsequently refused to accept a recommendation to suspend training a number of times. The chap always just made the grade with extra Sims and Flights on every phase. If a person has little or no aptitude for a task how long should you persevere with their training?
When lives may be put at risk its time to call it a day!
You missed the point, the poor guy was never suitable for the role. HQ 11 Gp posted the navigator internally within the Group AEW to AD. To save face Group Staff subsequently refused to accept a recommendation to suspend training a number of times. The chap always just made the grade with extra Sims and Flights on every phase. If a person has little or no aptitude for a task how long should you persevere with their training?
When lives may be put at risk its time to call it a day!
I'm pretty sure TCAS is totally unsuitable for ACT sorties. However, in real life there will be multiple other potential distractions, so I don't think it's an undesirable feature.
The problem with TCAS in environments for which it was never initially intended, is that 'nuisance alerts' may cause pilots to assume that the device is crying wolf. Don't forget that the original idea was to protect airliners from ATC incompetence...
When evolving AAR SOPs for the A310MRTT, we discussed TCAS at length. During transits to an AARA, it would be normal to select TA/RA for best protection. But outside controlled airspace with VFR traffic nearby, crews needed to be aware that they may receive RAs prompted by GA traffic going about its business, so we suggested that TA would be preferable. In AARAs, TCAS TA would warn of approaching receivers, which was no bad thing, but RA was pointless - it would require pilots either to ignore it, risking a culture of ignoring TCAS, or follow the RA pursued by the receiver trying to join formation! So we agreed that TCAS went to TA only in the Before Tanking checklist and went back to TA/RA in the After Tanking checklist.
If the Hawk ACT sorties are flown in segregated airspace, then why not put TCAS to Standby when entering and back to TA after leaving? Otherwise nuisance alerts risk developing a culture of ignoring TCAS advisory alerts, which could one day prove fatal.
A bit like the GPWS warning for Avianca flight 011, which the pilot ignored for 15 sec mumbling "Bueno, bueno" until his Boeing 747 collided with the terrain, killing 181 of the 192 people on board.
There's no point in any alerting system unless it is used only within an environment where it will work correctly, with pilots responding instinctively to genuine warnings.
When evolving AAR SOPs for the A310MRTT, we discussed TCAS at length. During transits to an AARA, it would be normal to select TA/RA for best protection. But outside controlled airspace with VFR traffic nearby, crews needed to be aware that they may receive RAs prompted by GA traffic going about its business, so we suggested that TA would be preferable. In AARAs, TCAS TA would warn of approaching receivers, which was no bad thing, but RA was pointless - it would require pilots either to ignore it, risking a culture of ignoring TCAS, or follow the RA pursued by the receiver trying to join formation! So we agreed that TCAS went to TA only in the Before Tanking checklist and went back to TA/RA in the After Tanking checklist.
If the Hawk ACT sorties are flown in segregated airspace, then why not put TCAS to Standby when entering and back to TA after leaving? Otherwise nuisance alerts risk developing a culture of ignoring TCAS advisory alerts, which could one day prove fatal.
A bit like the GPWS warning for Avianca flight 011, which the pilot ignored for 15 sec mumbling "Bueno, bueno" until his Boeing 747 collided with the terrain, killing 181 of the 192 people on board.
There's no point in any alerting system unless it is used only within an environment where it will work correctly, with pilots responding instinctively to genuine warnings.
CG
Two episodes in and despite the Americanisms and political correctness, the series is streets ahead of the woeful effort of the early eighties. I was at Linton when John McCrea and his mates went through BFTS and it was a very, very different world to the one are seeing on the box today, ditto Valley. Not so long ago I watched the full series of 'Fighter Pilot' and it was utterly cringeworthy with far too much time spent at Biggin Hill and Henlow and not enough at BFTS, AFTS and TWU. Only redeeming feature for me the glimpses of old colleagues such as Louis Mcquade and Bill Edward, sadly no longer with us.
Times change, we must change with them......well, to some extent anyway !
Times change, we must change with them......well, to some extent anyway !
Recalling the moment when reality bit and I realised I was not destined to follow my father’s footsteps, I can fully appreciate how he and countless others have felt and will continue to feel, but, everything happens for a reason. Good or bad. Students are chopped for a very good reason. As you all know.
Better to be around still and able to comment as I just have.
TN.
I recall a (possibly CR) Harrier pilot in 1980s RAFG, walking into his boss and standing himself down. He felt he was always just behind the aeroplane, and that it was only a matter of time... Not sure whether he was re-roled, but that was very clearly the correct thing for him to do, as well as for his family and friends too.
CG
CG
A friend who was squadron boss at an F-15 unit in Europe in the 1990s recalls a similar tale, CG.
In his retelling of the story, the two go out and fly BFM. Wingman penetrates the bubble on one of the setups, so they knock it off and RTB. Back at the HAS, my friend climbs down from his Eagle to be met at the bottom by his wingman, white as a ghost. Wingman throws in the towel there and then: "I'm scared to death every time I fly". Wingman eventually gets re-rolled into something more sedate (AWACS) and seems to get on fine with that.
In his retelling of the story, the two go out and fly BFM. Wingman penetrates the bubble on one of the setups, so they knock it off and RTB. Back at the HAS, my friend climbs down from his Eagle to be met at the bottom by his wingman, white as a ghost. Wingman throws in the towel there and then: "I'm scared to death every time I fly". Wingman eventually gets re-rolled into something more sedate (AWACS) and seems to get on fine with that.
Originally Posted by BEagle
If the Hawk ACT sorties are flown in segregated airspace, then why not put TCAS to Standby when entering and back to TA after leaving?
Alfred,
I’m sorry to inform you that ‘chopping’ doesn’t stop at OCUs. I know of 3 pilots and a WSO who were removed from fast-jet duties during their first tours for failing to develop at the expected rate, and another WSO in his 40s who scraped through a refresher OCU after serving in staff for a few years but never got properly back on the horse and soon shuffled permanently to staff by mutual agreement. You can view it as a waste if you like, but the fact is that the instructional and supervisory capacity needed to keep such individuals operating safely is a finite resource that needs to be invested in those with capacity to repay it in future. With so few front-line squadrons, sustainability of the whole edifice is finely balanced and regrettably that means tough decisions being taken from time to time. Increasing the size of the supervisory cadre doesn’t help: they all need to fly, which means larger squadrons (needing more future supervisors) or less flying for junior pilots (hindering their development).
The common weakness was in overall capacity. By virtue of reaching the front line they had obviously demonstrated the required minimum standards in a variety of skills. But as the complexity of the task ramped up or as ‘post-graduate’ skills and knowledge were introduced, basic errors crept in. That much is pretty common: errors can be addressed and ironed out, that is the process of learning and few get it right first time, every time. The problem comes when addressing errors creates new errors elsewhere, especially in basic skills. I seem to remember that reluctance to take captaincy decisions, repeatedly missing radio calls and inability to recall sortie events were common to all 3 pilots: classic symptoms of being maxed-out.
The WSO was subtly different: the aircraft’s role, weapons and software had changed a lot during his time away and he couldn’t un-learn his prior (obsolete) knowledge or assimilate new knowledge to the extent required to be an effective operator. I guess you could lay some blame on the OCU refresher course, which might have exposed the issue earlier had it not focussed on ‘legacy’ skills which our man could just about cope with. But I think that would just have weeded him out earlier. (Incidentally there are plenty of counter-examples of seriously aged aircrew coming back from long layoffs and doing just fine!)
The WSO was subtly different: the aircraft’s role, weapons and software had changed a lot during his time away and he couldn’t un-learn his prior (obsolete) knowledge or assimilate new knowledge to the extent required to be an effective operator. I guess you could lay some blame on the OCU refresher course, which might have exposed the issue earlier had it not focussed on ‘legacy’ skills which our man could just about cope with. But I think that would just have weeded him out earlier. (Incidentally there are plenty of counter-examples of seriously aged aircrew coming back from long layoffs and doing just fine!)
Last edited by Easy Street; 28th Aug 2019 at 23:58.
It does, Beagle is talking nonsense.
TCAS was conceived to minimise collision risk however caused, ATC or pilot. My guess is that more RAs have resulted in pilot error, not necessarily incompetence, than by mistakes, or “ incompetence” by controllers.
The 2 RAs in my experience were caused by altitude busts , mis set.MCP, misunderstood clearance, I don’t know but TCAS saved the day.
Using TCAS during ACT , are you guys kidding ?
TCAS was conceived to minimise collision risk however caused, ATC or pilot. My guess is that more RAs have resulted in pilot error, not necessarily incompetence, than by mistakes, or “ incompetence” by controllers.
The 2 RAs in my experience were caused by altitude busts , mis set.MCP, misunderstood clearance, I don’t know but TCAS saved the day.
Using TCAS during ACT , are you guys kidding ?