New book - 'Red 5' - An investigation ...
Fair Minded
I've read the book and it is a well written and researched. It doesn't ram opinions down your throat, but leaves readers to think for themselves. It avoids criticising groundcrew and aircrew, even when the BOI did, although provides direct quotes from APs giving warnings which MoD said they never had. You're left wondering why the BOI didn't look at the pubs to check their facts. He is critical of Martin Baker's decision to plead guilty and the official reason is shocking. The insight into what was happening in MoD is an eye opener. That one page is sufficient to persuade me the prosecution was ill conceived. But the video evidence is the killer. As he says, we've all sat through training films, so who missed that?
I didn't think of it until Holelover commented, but it was obvious straight away what the source of the brief explanation of the accident was. What else could it be other than the BoI report. Totally uncalled for posts. Should the mods not be policing this? Play the ball, man.
BZ, David. You've done aircrew a favour. Required reading.
Edited now I've seen Homelover's reply. What a piece of work you are. Obviously not interested in the truth. Seen in your true colours.
I didn't think of it until Holelover commented, but it was obvious straight away what the source of the brief explanation of the accident was. What else could it be other than the BoI report. Totally uncalled for posts. Should the mods not be policing this? Play the ball, man.
BZ, David. You've done aircrew a favour. Required reading.
Edited now I've seen Homelover's reply. What a piece of work you are. Obviously not interested in the truth. Seen in your true colours.
It's clear what his source is, and no reasonable person is going to argue that he's plagiarised anything.
A popular one is Calibre, another epub as here :-
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile...-kindle-to-pdf
Alternatively, Amazon provide a free Kindle App for PC (Apple and Android versions also). Download that onto you PC etc and read Kindle content there :-
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seems strange that the 'lack of a safety case' issue for the Mk10 seat was never read across to the Moray Firth Tornado accident. Both SIs were taking place at the same time, under the same heads of the MAA and Mil AAIB.
DV
DV
Why is that strange? The Moray SI panel may well have been aware and not considered it germane; frankly it was miraculous that even one person survived given the nature of the impact. An investigation report does not need to include every piece of knowledge to which the panel was exposed. As for the convening authority and MAAIB, they knew that the Cunningham SI would report on the issue, forcing it to be addressed, so what’s the problem?
From an XX177 perspective, the relevant issue regarding Moray Firth is that (as DV says, at the same time) the Tornado Board (and hence the MAA) was aware of the Gas Shackle mod to the Mk10A seat in Tornado, which eliminated the risk of shackle jamming. This was designed in 1984, but rejected by MoD until adopted in Tornado in 2007.
But during the later XX177 court cases the Prosecution, acting with MoD, denied all knowledge of this. This evidence was presented to the HSE before the trial last year, but it maintained its position that MoD didn't have it. One of two prominent examples where it was denied MoD had the content of reports which it had signed off. On the other, the Judge actually named the MoD official who signed it; effectively pronouncing M-B innocent. (Something she did no fewer than eight times).
Had the XX177 Service Inquiry seen the same papers their Tornado counterparts cited, their report would have had to say: While the 1990-92 warning cannot be found (the warning M-B were accused of not providing), there is direct evidence of MoD’s prior and subsequent knowledge of the risk, and its elimination by Martin-Baker.
The MAA, having oversight, knew the XX177 report and the case against M-B was flawed, lacking this vital evidence.
That would have presumably stopped the HSE in its tracks.
But during the later XX177 court cases the Prosecution, acting with MoD, denied all knowledge of this. This evidence was presented to the HSE before the trial last year, but it maintained its position that MoD didn't have it. One of two prominent examples where it was denied MoD had the content of reports which it had signed off. On the other, the Judge actually named the MoD official who signed it; effectively pronouncing M-B innocent. (Something she did no fewer than eight times).
Had the XX177 Service Inquiry seen the same papers their Tornado counterparts cited, their report would have had to say: While the 1990-92 warning cannot be found (the warning M-B were accused of not providing), there is direct evidence of MoD’s prior and subsequent knowledge of the risk, and its elimination by Martin-Baker.
The MAA, having oversight, knew the XX177 report and the case against M-B was flawed, lacking this vital evidence.
That would have presumably stopped the HSE in its tracks.
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Moray SI panel may well have been aware and not considered it germane; frankly it was miraculous that even one person survived given the nature of the impact. An investigation report does not need to include every piece of knowledge to which the panel was exposed. As for the convening authority and MAAIB, they knew that the Cunningham SI would report on the issue, forcing it to be addressed, so what’s the problem?
Easy Street, you should also realise that the Tornado SI report was sent to the Procurator Fiscal and the Scottish Crown Office who decided, yet again, not to hold Fatal Accident Inquiry because it contained all the relevant information. They knew nothing about the Cunningham case and the importance of safety cases.
Last edited by Distant Voice; 24th Aug 2019 at 16:20.
I am advised that the SI panel was not made aware of the safety case issue, nor were the made aware of the incident involving Mike Harland in Nov 2007, and the issues with post mod 02198 seats. I suggest that flying with seats that do not have a safety case (not airworthy) is a point of some relevance and should have been mentioned in the Tornado SI report.
Easy Street, you should also realise that the Tornado SI report was sent to the Procurator Fiscal and the Scottish Crown Office who decided, yet again, not to hold Fatal Accident Inquiry because it contained all the relevant information. They knew nothing about the Cunningham case and the importance of safety cases.
Easy Street, you should also realise that the Tornado SI report was sent to the Procurator Fiscal and the Scottish Crown Office who decided, yet again, not to hold Fatal Accident Inquiry because it contained all the relevant information. They knew nothing about the Cunningham case and the importance of safety cases.
This cannot go on. The MOD is an unsafe pair of hands for Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation to be in. Both must be removed from its maw, and become independent of it and of each other.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If evidence is withheld from an Accident Investigation then that Investigation is compromised, findings are skewed, and more accidents result. That sequence has been seen time and time again within the fatal accident threads of this forum. It seems that lies, omissions, and an appalling corporate memory is the stock in trade of the MOD and its Apparatchiks.
DV
In the current climate, (locked down at home and fed up to the teeth) what could be a better time for all on here to read David’s excellent investigative work. Proceeds go to charity after all.
It certainly opened my eyes..
It certainly opened my eyes..
MOD and its Apparatchiks
The MOD is an unsafe pair of hands for Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation
CG
The term 'MOD' is being used as the body in whom Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation is vested, via its various subordinate (oh, and 'independent'!) authorities. Of course it entails all three of the human components of which you speak. My point is that Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation must be outwith the MOD and independent of it and of each other. These new bodies can retain their existing titles if so needed, what they can no longer retain is their subservience to those who have compromised military airworthiness and accident investigation, as witnessed in the sad series of fatal accident threads that litter this forum. That compromising was of course done by those of whom you speak (though I would add the word 'very' before 'senior officer'), simply because they could. We have to ensure in future that they cannot.
On page 223 of my copy of David's book I see that the MOD denied the existence of HEART. If that denial was of the team and not just the report then I wonder what else they have conveniently 'forgotten'. I was one of the two aircrew members of the four man HEART in 1997. Our start was delayed by a progressive restricting of our TOR no doubt as a result of previous reviews especially the in house Canberra review.
I learnt the basics of flight safety through my years in the RAF and after 10 years of managing it in civvy aviation went back to military work expecting some quality time - which, I now realise, only happens at Station levels.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
You would be far better to quote “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.”
If I may:
ancientaviator62 - From memory, MoD denied having the report. It was sought by another ppruner who was directly involved in the XV179 Inquest. Like other Coroners, Mr Masters wasn't amused when the public provided copies of documents MoD denied the existence of. MoD also denied the CONTENT of the CHART (Chinook/Puma/Wessex) report, claiming only 53 pages existed (which had been withheld from Inquiries). The author came forward with just under 400, plus early drafts and covering letters proving who'd seen it. Lord Philip was not amused. MoD then maintained the lie to Ministers, and Dr Fox misled parliament. He was later forced to retract, but did not apologise in the House. Similarly, MoD stated to a Mull of Kintyre widow that there was no such thing as Releases to Service in 1994 - that it was Controller Aircraft who signed the only release. The Air Staff copy of the Chinook Mk2 RTS was sent to Lord Philip. Again, not amused. Things like that win cases.
Edit: You are right about restrictive TORs (set by the RAF Chief Engineer). He also delayed CHART in 1992, specifically prohibiting the team leader from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists or Fleetlands, who were preparing Mk1s for induction. You may recall that he (Alcock) and CAS (Graydon) denied CHART or its TORs mentioned the Mk2, again repeated by Ministers. It was referred to 373 times, and when the TORs were later uncovered they revealed, at para 4(f), a directive to address the Mid Life Upgrade. The Director of Flight Safety reported the failure of Configuration Control (a major component of airworthiness, and a pre-requisite to a valid safety case), and that it must be regained for the 'Mk2'. In 1999, the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed to the Public Accounts Committee that the situation remained, although omitted that this had been RAF policy since 1991. Something he had known since at least June 1996. I couldn't possibly comment on why he withheld this, but revealing it would have destroyed the RAF's case against the Mull pilots.
Rigga - There may be a fourth part to the trilogy. Viruses permitting.
B Word - While you are of course correct about many other users, the issue with MoD is that it flatly refuses to learn lessons or, in many cases, implement recommendations from previous fatal accidents. Seven years after Sean Cunningham died, 12 of the recommendations, which MoD claimed in 2014 to be addressing, were factors in Jonathan Bayliss's death. Most, if not all, were mandated anyway. And most of the Cunningham ones were repeated from previous accidents. For example, the main failure (not conducting disturbed systems testing) repeated that of the Simon Burgess case in 1996. It is the alarming number of recurrences that is the problem; and that is down to the user/regulator. 'Independence' is a cornerstone of airworthiness. There is none in MoD.
ancientaviator62 - From memory, MoD denied having the report. It was sought by another ppruner who was directly involved in the XV179 Inquest. Like other Coroners, Mr Masters wasn't amused when the public provided copies of documents MoD denied the existence of. MoD also denied the CONTENT of the CHART (Chinook/Puma/Wessex) report, claiming only 53 pages existed (which had been withheld from Inquiries). The author came forward with just under 400, plus early drafts and covering letters proving who'd seen it. Lord Philip was not amused. MoD then maintained the lie to Ministers, and Dr Fox misled parliament. He was later forced to retract, but did not apologise in the House. Similarly, MoD stated to a Mull of Kintyre widow that there was no such thing as Releases to Service in 1994 - that it was Controller Aircraft who signed the only release. The Air Staff copy of the Chinook Mk2 RTS was sent to Lord Philip. Again, not amused. Things like that win cases.
Edit: You are right about restrictive TORs (set by the RAF Chief Engineer). He also delayed CHART in 1992, specifically prohibiting the team leader from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists or Fleetlands, who were preparing Mk1s for induction. You may recall that he (Alcock) and CAS (Graydon) denied CHART or its TORs mentioned the Mk2, again repeated by Ministers. It was referred to 373 times, and when the TORs were later uncovered they revealed, at para 4(f), a directive to address the Mid Life Upgrade. The Director of Flight Safety reported the failure of Configuration Control (a major component of airworthiness, and a pre-requisite to a valid safety case), and that it must be regained for the 'Mk2'. In 1999, the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed to the Public Accounts Committee that the situation remained, although omitted that this had been RAF policy since 1991. Something he had known since at least June 1996. I couldn't possibly comment on why he withheld this, but revealing it would have destroyed the RAF's case against the Mull pilots.
Rigga - There may be a fourth part to the trilogy. Viruses permitting.
B Word - While you are of course correct about many other users, the issue with MoD is that it flatly refuses to learn lessons or, in many cases, implement recommendations from previous fatal accidents. Seven years after Sean Cunningham died, 12 of the recommendations, which MoD claimed in 2014 to be addressing, were factors in Jonathan Bayliss's death. Most, if not all, were mandated anyway. And most of the Cunningham ones were repeated from previous accidents. For example, the main failure (not conducting disturbed systems testing) repeated that of the Simon Burgess case in 1996. It is the alarming number of recurrences that is the problem; and that is down to the user/regulator. 'Independence' is a cornerstone of airworthiness. There is none in MoD.
Last edited by tucumseh; 14th Apr 2020 at 08:11.
This always makes me chuckle... As an overused and alarmist strap line, it just doesn’t work for me. Why? Because there are literally thousands of self-regulated aircraft flying in the world right now in civil hands and they aren’t killing people any faster than any other?
You would be far better to quote “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.”
You would be far better to quote “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.”
D’accord...
