Harrier Demise - Help!
Sadly, this is an all too familiar tale of the type which pervades almost every branch of government finance.
Simplistically, ministries are told "Thou shalt not spend more that £x next year" Adding up the list of evisting commitments and new pet projects produces a figure greater than £x. Even after trimming back the existing commitments and killing off the frothier new pet projects, the answer is still greater than £x . Much grinding of teeth and sucking of gums.
Step forward the ever helpful service providers / contractors, who you had been in discussions with about how to reduce costs to meet the £x challenge. I say old boy, we could help you out of the jam: what if we were to take on the obligation, and charge it back to you in convenient annual instalments spread over the next Y years. Make the annual charge as small as you want, and we will just add a few years on to the contract. Oh, just a small point, we may need a little flexibility in terms of delivery and deliverables, but that shouldnt be a problem, should it?
Insert the name of the government ministry of your choice...... And ask yourself how many Ministers, officials, and officers made them selves look good by kicking the can down the road in this way.
As the years went by, it became not unlike a drug addiction; the first few experiences seemed uplifting and not harmful....the rest we know.
To the thread starters original point, yes, it would have been cheaper to borrow the money, but government borrowing is a separate function, and was already reaching very high levels.
Simplistically, ministries are told "Thou shalt not spend more that £x next year" Adding up the list of evisting commitments and new pet projects produces a figure greater than £x. Even after trimming back the existing commitments and killing off the frothier new pet projects, the answer is still greater than £x . Much grinding of teeth and sucking of gums.
Step forward the ever helpful service providers / contractors, who you had been in discussions with about how to reduce costs to meet the £x challenge. I say old boy, we could help you out of the jam: what if we were to take on the obligation, and charge it back to you in convenient annual instalments spread over the next Y years. Make the annual charge as small as you want, and we will just add a few years on to the contract. Oh, just a small point, we may need a little flexibility in terms of delivery and deliverables, but that shouldnt be a problem, should it?
Insert the name of the government ministry of your choice...... And ask yourself how many Ministers, officials, and officers made them selves look good by kicking the can down the road in this way.
As the years went by, it became not unlike a drug addiction; the first few experiences seemed uplifting and not harmful....the rest we know.
To the thread starters original point, yes, it would have been cheaper to borrow the money, but government borrowing is a separate function, and was already reaching very high levels.
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 164
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sadly, the same questions can be applied to the grounding of the Nimrod fleet. At least the Tornado was available to cover most if not all the Harrier mission capability. However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission. Some senior officers have a lot to answer for but as is usual no one at that level is ever held accountable for their decisions.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Hanging off the end of a thread
Posts: 32,763
Received 2,747 Likes
on
1,171 Posts
And the Jag fleets early departure, they in my opinion stopped sending it out to the sandbox so they could show it hadn't really a useful role, easier to bin if it's not in active use.
Sadly, the same questions can be applied to the grounding of the Nimrod fleet. At least the Tornado was available to cover most if not all the Harrier mission capability. However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission. Some senior officers have a lot to answer for but as is usual no one at that level is ever held accountable for their decisions.
Fighting the capabilityor personnel corner too hard as a VSO is merely a route to unemployment.
N
"However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission" - The RN claimed that the Merlin could deliver the ASW element of protecting the CASD and fleet (in concert with DD/FF and SSNs) and the RAF insisted that the C130 could fulfil our long range SAR commitment. The overland role of the Nimrod was, it seems, significantly understated and, allegedly, Cameron was quite angry when he found out what capability gaps the decision caused…...
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Longton, Lancs, UK
Age: 80
Posts: 1,527
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
IMV, I couldn't comprehend the decision to get rid of the Harrier at the time we needed to preserve both it and its 'carrier- expertise' (mainly on-deck stuff) for QE2 operations. Cameron - ********.
The only discriminators were Storm Shadow and RAPTOR, and there is a compelling argument to suggest that those are key.
I don’t think that there is any truth to the lack of upgrade potential - indeed at Cap EA the Harrier was Saturn capable and had a path to a MIDS capability.
For a time the jet could carry 6 x PW4 plus Sniper whereas the Tornado could carry fewer - I think because the SMS had an issue born out of its original KRET functionality.
At the end of the day though it matters not!!
I don’t think that there is any truth to the lack of upgrade potential - indeed at Cap EA the Harrier was Saturn capable and had a path to a MIDS capability.
For a time the jet could carry 6 x PW4 plus Sniper whereas the Tornado could carry fewer - I think because the SMS had an issue born out of its original KRET functionality.
At the end of the day though it matters not!!
The most challenging project was getting the RAPTOR data-link kit to work in the heat and dust of Basra. Much sweat and tears were expended trying to keep a dark green portacabin full of servers cool in 40 Deg heat during a sortie...
The BIG mistake was losing the SHAR F/A2 with AIM-120, Blue Vixen and Link 16. An exceptionally capable fleet defence fighter, whereas the plastic bomber, once operated on land, lost its unique selling point. When embarked it lacked the air defence capability of the Scimitar of previous generations.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Up the creek
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The documents I read about the practice of MOD spending echo what Easy Street / falcon900 say; it had become routine to get through ‘today’ by pushing more into ‘tomorrow’.
One parliamentary document pointed to the practice being done back in 1995.
Interesting to hear more detail on the inner workings.
My memory is vague now, but I think it was the legendary USAF fighter pilot, Robin Olds, who during ground duties in 1950s or 60s did a form of audit of the USAF bomber force and found that in fact at one point in time they had much less availability of aircraft/weapons than was being declared because some people were so reluctant to reveal missing their quotas that they ‘fiddled’ the figures to avoid revealing the true situation. I think it was stated that the prevailing culture at the time had contributed to this, i.e. it was repressive to anyone reporting otherwise, as well as due to individuals looking after their careers.
Regarding the QE carriers, initially the reason given for the delay was due to the delay of the JSF.
It appears that it was not clear about fundamental reason of the QE delay (i.e. to reduce spending in short term) and to put it as simply a result of the JSF delay.
What is important is that whoever was responsible for constraining borrowing for MOD projects, was aware of the consequences of that constraint in this case i.e. two major military assets delayed by up to two years and at £674m cost (£650m added to that initial estimate later). This could not be the case if it was not known what the cost implications were when the decision to delay was made. It implies that the decision was based solely on how much spend could be decreased now and not on how much spend would be increased later.
One parliamentary document pointed to the practice being done back in 1995.
Interesting to hear more detail on the inner workings.
My memory is vague now, but I think it was the legendary USAF fighter pilot, Robin Olds, who during ground duties in 1950s or 60s did a form of audit of the USAF bomber force and found that in fact at one point in time they had much less availability of aircraft/weapons than was being declared because some people were so reluctant to reveal missing their quotas that they ‘fiddled’ the figures to avoid revealing the true situation. I think it was stated that the prevailing culture at the time had contributed to this, i.e. it was repressive to anyone reporting otherwise, as well as due to individuals looking after their careers.
Regarding the QE carriers, initially the reason given for the delay was due to the delay of the JSF.
It appears that it was not clear about fundamental reason of the QE delay (i.e. to reduce spending in short term) and to put it as simply a result of the JSF delay.
What is important is that whoever was responsible for constraining borrowing for MOD projects, was aware of the consequences of that constraint in this case i.e. two major military assets delayed by up to two years and at £674m cost (£650m added to that initial estimate later). This could not be the case if it was not known what the cost implications were when the decision to delay was made. It implies that the decision was based solely on how much spend could be decreased now and not on how much spend would be increased later.
Last edited by Wingless Walrus; 20th Jul 2019 at 19:22.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Up the creek
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DM Brimstone
In 2010, the DM Brimstone missile was well underway to being fitted to Harrier according to an article on Defence Codex website, March 2010. It covered missile manufacturer MBDA (maker of Brimstone and Storm Shadow) and interviewed the MBDA Future Systems Director regarding Dual Mode Brimstone (DMB). The website stated (at bottom): -
(https://web.archive.org/web/20100323105933/http://www.science.mod.uk/codex/issue5/features/features8.aspx)
“DMB is in-service on the Tornado GR4/4A and nearing completion for integration on the Harrier GR7 and GR9A aircraft.”
As the article appears to be from March 2010, is it possible that had Harrier not been removed from service and the Dual Mode Brimstone upgrade completed, that it could have been available for the start of the Libyan campaign that started one year later in March 2011?
(https://web.archive.org/web/20100323105933/http://www.science.mod.uk/codex/issue5/features/features8.aspx)
“DMB is in-service on the Tornado GR4/4A and nearing completion for integration on the Harrier GR7 and GR9A aircraft.”
As the article appears to be from March 2010, is it possible that had Harrier not been removed from service and the Dual Mode Brimstone upgrade completed, that it could have been available for the start of the Libyan campaign that started one year later in March 2011?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Up the creek
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pre-2010 Plans for Harrier
Prior to the general election of 2010, the government had intended to remove Tornado GR4 from service by 2015, ten years earlier than planned and use the savings from this to fund putting upgrades onto Typhoon. They also planned to keep carrier strike until the QE class carrier was ready and then embark the Harriers onto the new QE class carrier until F-35 was ready.
Defence Equipment 2008
“The MoD plans to keep the Harrier GR9 aircraft in service until around 2018 and to operate these aircraft from the new carriers.”
Defence Equipment 2009
“The second question you ask is what does that mean for the existing three carriers. The Invincible is already at some notice in fact; Ark Royal will probably be withdrawn from service before too long, in the course of the next few years, and we will need to have Illustrious certainly remain in-service until it is quite clear that the Queen Elizabeth has passed her sea trials and that her aircraft complement, whether they are still Harriers or JSFs at that stage, are fully worked up and operational."
The OSD for GR4 was 2025 and logistic support of GR4 from April 2011 was put at £4.8 billion, in Nov. 2010.
The savings from removing carrier strike (including Harrier) were put at £1.6 billion; the savings specifically from removing Harrier were put at £0.9 billion to 2018.
The saving from retiring Tornado GR4 early could have paid for carrier strike to be maintained, by extending the OSD of at least one carrier and maintaining Harrier until JSF was available. It also would have left a considerable sum to pay costs of Typhoon air to surface upgrades (Storm Shadow and DMS Brimstone for example; later included with other upgrades in Project Centurion costing about £425m).
The pre-2010 plan to maintain carrier strike and update Typhoon by retiring GR4 in 2015 looks a reasonable option financially.
Defence Equipment 2008
“The MoD plans to keep the Harrier GR9 aircraft in service until around 2018 and to operate these aircraft from the new carriers.”
Defence Equipment 2009
“The second question you ask is what does that mean for the existing three carriers. The Invincible is already at some notice in fact; Ark Royal will probably be withdrawn from service before too long, in the course of the next few years, and we will need to have Illustrious certainly remain in-service until it is quite clear that the Queen Elizabeth has passed her sea trials and that her aircraft complement, whether they are still Harriers or JSFs at that stage, are fully worked up and operational."
The OSD for GR4 was 2025 and logistic support of GR4 from April 2011 was put at £4.8 billion, in Nov. 2010.
The savings from removing carrier strike (including Harrier) were put at £1.6 billion; the savings specifically from removing Harrier were put at £0.9 billion to 2018.
The saving from retiring Tornado GR4 early could have paid for carrier strike to be maintained, by extending the OSD of at least one carrier and maintaining Harrier until JSF was available. It also would have left a considerable sum to pay costs of Typhoon air to surface upgrades (Storm Shadow and DMS Brimstone for example; later included with other upgrades in Project Centurion costing about £425m).
The pre-2010 plan to maintain carrier strike and update Typhoon by retiring GR4 in 2015 looks a reasonable option financially.
But the demise of SHAR came as no surprise to us. The writing was on the wall from around 91. Perhaps changing designation from FRS2 to F/A2 was a clue; others would know more than I. But there was just a lack of interest, almost a resignation. AMSO were either pouring vast amounts of RN funding down the drain, or robbing it for the RAF. (Same thing in many ways). A 15-year spares buy for Fox six months shy of complete disposal. What genius approved that? Actually I know. His reply was the RN can go take a jump. At least he replied, the RN didn't. The funding line simply said 'Sea Harrier radar', so there was nothing left for Vixen support. And AMSO/AML never did grasp the concept of support at sea for 6 months, their assumption being that a CVS would immediately fly home any unserviceable LRU; and a C-130 would land-on to deliver it back a year later. (Not a replacement - the same LRU. Only let a repair contract when you're got an outstanding demand. New policy as of Oct 1990). RN HQ didn't give a toss. Individuals did, of course, but my abiding memory is that important parts of the RN didn't fight too hard.
Extending Harrier to 2018? I think fatigue life might have been against that.
It might have seemed financially sensible but from a practical point of view, how would Harrier completed Herrick, Ellamy Shader etc? There were simply not enough airframes to go around and IIRC the Harrier fleet was pretty tired when it was replaced in Herrick.
It might have seemed financially sensible but from a practical point of view, how would Harrier completed Herrick, Ellamy Shader etc? There were simply not enough airframes to go around and IIRC the Harrier fleet was pretty tired when it was replaced in Herrick.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Up the creek
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Insty66 -
I read that Harrier fatigue was less than normal during Afghanistan, thus extending its fatigue life; see also comment from orca. Possibly due to the nature of the flying not involving as much ‘G’?
The Harriers were expected to be capable of operating until 2020; according to a parliamentary report a senior officer stated in December 2009 that Harrier could be kept flying until at least the end of the next decade. Similar statements were made in the House of Commons claiming that Harriers could be used beyond the planned 2018 removal date.
The early 2010 government plan was to keep both GR4 and Harrier until Typhoon updated with key GR4 capability. House of Lords, Nov. 2010:
“to withdraw them [GR4] as and when we were able to upgrade the Typhoon with a ground support capability, with a full suite of weapons, with Paveway IV, Brimstone or its successor, with Storm Shadow and with a sensor equivalent of the Raptor, which has done so well in the Tornado. That was why, last year, we put more money into the Typhoon enhancement programme. I was hoping to be able to withdraw the Tornados by 2014 or 2015. There would have been a considerable saving there, but we would have continued to have a carrier strike capability right the way through.”
Under this plan GR4 would have been kept until around 2015 or until Typhoon had the key GR4 capability. This implies that until around 2015 there would have been more aircraft available for operations, as Harrier would have been maintained beyond 2010.
Harrier numbers were significant, about 72 were sold to USMC in 2011 (see also orca comment). I don’t know their condition but published figures for 1st April 2010 put the Harrier FAF at 32, down from 52 in 2009. No indication given of the status of non-FAF aircraft. The 40% FAF reduction may have been part of plans to use Harrier mainly for carrier strike.
I read that Harrier fatigue was less than normal during Afghanistan, thus extending its fatigue life; see also comment from orca. Possibly due to the nature of the flying not involving as much ‘G’?
The Harriers were expected to be capable of operating until 2020; according to a parliamentary report a senior officer stated in December 2009 that Harrier could be kept flying until at least the end of the next decade. Similar statements were made in the House of Commons claiming that Harriers could be used beyond the planned 2018 removal date.
The early 2010 government plan was to keep both GR4 and Harrier until Typhoon updated with key GR4 capability. House of Lords, Nov. 2010:
“to withdraw them [GR4] as and when we were able to upgrade the Typhoon with a ground support capability, with a full suite of weapons, with Paveway IV, Brimstone or its successor, with Storm Shadow and with a sensor equivalent of the Raptor, which has done so well in the Tornado. That was why, last year, we put more money into the Typhoon enhancement programme. I was hoping to be able to withdraw the Tornados by 2014 or 2015. There would have been a considerable saving there, but we would have continued to have a carrier strike capability right the way through.”
Under this plan GR4 would have been kept until around 2015 or until Typhoon had the key GR4 capability. This implies that until around 2015 there would have been more aircraft available for operations, as Harrier would have been maintained beyond 2010.
Harrier numbers were significant, about 72 were sold to USMC in 2011 (see also orca comment). I don’t know their condition but published figures for 1st April 2010 put the Harrier FAF at 32, down from 52 in 2009. No indication given of the status of non-FAF aircraft. The 40% FAF reduction may have been part of plans to use Harrier mainly for carrier strike.
The one thing MoD does finally seem to have accepted is that building smaller ships always ends up costing more in the long run. Hulls are surprisingly cheap, longer ships use less fuel than shorter ones, and it's easier to upgrade something that's already got heaps of space. Plus there's more bunkerage, stores, munitions, fewer RASes, fewer port calls on the way to wherever.
Harrier numbers were significant, about 72 were sold to USMC in 2011 (see also orca comment). I don’t know their condition but published figures for 1st April 2010 put the Harrier FAF at 32, down from 52 in 2009. No indication given of the status of non-FAF aircraft. The 40% FAF reduction may have been part of plans to use Harrier mainly for carrier strike.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 764
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Political answer is very simple, the coalition and in particular George Osborne came into power with a financial plan. On Day 1 George found a note on his desk from Liam saying "sorry chum their is no money left" and on Day 2 Sir Humphrey from MOD and the usual senior officer suspects admitted they had something to confess...... Ask Lord West why the RN were punished by Osborne?
https://www.theguardian.com/politics...lion-blackhole
https://www.theguardian.com/politics...lion-blackhole
In the unlikely circumstances that folk here aren't aware of the SHAR flying privately in the USA, here's a comforting series of vids about a former USMC pilot with a good taste in aircraft:
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Up the creek
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No doubt, ‘Salami slicing’ it was.
The size of the ‘salami slice’ may have been limited by the pre-2010 policy to maintain carrier strike until JSF. A FAF of 32 (including OCU aircraft; 27x GR7/9 + 5x T10/T12) seems to be enough to maintain a carrier strike force.
A while ago I compiled a scrap book of ‘Harrier demise’ info when I had enough energy to run around parliamentary/official online records like a ferret in a rabbit warren.
If memory serves me right, the SDSR10 was done in record time, about 4-5 months; all others I think were longer, at least a year or more?
The reasons given for removing Harrier was that 1) money needed to be saved (to tackle the UK deficit and MOD ‘black hole’) which meant losing one FJ type, and 2) that carrier strike was deemed as ‘not essential’.
1) Money Saved
According to parliament debates in the Lords and Commons, Harrier cost was put as £100m annually (in 2010), which is less than 0.3% of the annual defence budget (around £35-£37 billion annually). An Invincible class carrier was put at £35m annually (0.1% of the annual defence budget).
Maintaining carrier strike cost £135m annually (less than 0.4% of the annual defence budget).
Opposition in Lords agreed cuts needed but queried the size and speed of the cuts.
2) Carrier Strike Not Essential
Judging something solely on whether it is essential could lead to not buying a hammer on the grounds that you can knock nails in with a brick and so it is not essential. Not essential but it is very useful, efficient and effective in certain tasks. If not destitute any person would buy the hammer.
SDSR10 got rid of a very useful capability for ten years and saved 0.4% of the defence budget.
Just months after binning carrier strike, up popped Libya, a scenario in which carrier strike would have been very useful, although not essential. Especially if DM Brimstone integration onto Harrier was completed (was ongoing in Mar 2010 according to one article; see comment #31).
I think USA, France and Italy all utilised carriers in this campaign, I cant remember if Spain used its carrier/Harriers (USA and Italy used Harriers, I think).
What difference would carrier strike have made to Libya? Would it have reduced the Tornado numbers or just added to them? I imagine GR4/RAPTOR and Harrier (10min away on a carrier; possibly also with DM Brimstone?) may have complemented each other well?
The size of the ‘salami slice’ may have been limited by the pre-2010 policy to maintain carrier strike until JSF. A FAF of 32 (including OCU aircraft; 27x GR7/9 + 5x T10/T12) seems to be enough to maintain a carrier strike force.
A while ago I compiled a scrap book of ‘Harrier demise’ info when I had enough energy to run around parliamentary/official online records like a ferret in a rabbit warren.
If memory serves me right, the SDSR10 was done in record time, about 4-5 months; all others I think were longer, at least a year or more?
The reasons given for removing Harrier was that 1) money needed to be saved (to tackle the UK deficit and MOD ‘black hole’) which meant losing one FJ type, and 2) that carrier strike was deemed as ‘not essential’.
1) Money Saved
According to parliament debates in the Lords and Commons, Harrier cost was put as £100m annually (in 2010), which is less than 0.3% of the annual defence budget (around £35-£37 billion annually). An Invincible class carrier was put at £35m annually (0.1% of the annual defence budget).
Maintaining carrier strike cost £135m annually (less than 0.4% of the annual defence budget).
Opposition in Lords agreed cuts needed but queried the size and speed of the cuts.
2) Carrier Strike Not Essential
Judging something solely on whether it is essential could lead to not buying a hammer on the grounds that you can knock nails in with a brick and so it is not essential. Not essential but it is very useful, efficient and effective in certain tasks. If not destitute any person would buy the hammer.
SDSR10 got rid of a very useful capability for ten years and saved 0.4% of the defence budget.
Just months after binning carrier strike, up popped Libya, a scenario in which carrier strike would have been very useful, although not essential. Especially if DM Brimstone integration onto Harrier was completed (was ongoing in Mar 2010 according to one article; see comment #31).
I think USA, France and Italy all utilised carriers in this campaign, I cant remember if Spain used its carrier/Harriers (USA and Italy used Harriers, I think).
What difference would carrier strike have made to Libya? Would it have reduced the Tornado numbers or just added to them? I imagine GR4/RAPTOR and Harrier (10min away on a carrier; possibly also with DM Brimstone?) may have complemented each other well?
Last edited by Wingless Walrus; 24th Jul 2019 at 02:59.