Who Speaks for the Dead ?
The fact that so many people have died as a direct result of the mismanagement of safety by VSOs and MOD over many years is bad enough. The fact that, in at least one case, innocent victims of this policy were blamed for the resultant accident is appalling. The fact that it took a 13 year campaign initiated by the parents to clear their sons' names should bring shame on all those VSOs, Ministers and the MOD is absolutely disgraceful. It also justifies family members of existing military personnel having the right to speak out.
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Chug,
I think we disagree. I think that you can be and remain totally objective. You think that because a Service Inquiry shares a typing pool with someone else that they can be influenced by them?
Perhaps you could identify a couple of SI paragraphs that demonstrate the Panel didn’t remain objective due to a link to the MAA?
It’s a bit like saying that you need a QWI from another squadron to mark your boss’s weapon tape...which would of course be nonsense.
I think we disagree. I think that you can be and remain totally objective. You think that because a Service Inquiry shares a typing pool with someone else that they can be influenced by them?
Perhaps you could identify a couple of SI paragraphs that demonstrate the Panel didn’t remain objective due to a link to the MAA?
It’s a bit like saying that you need a QWI from another squadron to mark your boss’s weapon tape...which would of course be nonsense.
Orca, it is not the sharing of typists that concerns me, it is the fact that typists, investigators, and regulators come under the same umbrella, ie the MOD! Before you point to your wiring diagram to show that they bypass the CoC and are answerable only to the very top of the tree, much the same was said of the old RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety. No-one in the CoC could intercept and subvert the safety system we were told. That held good until the Inspector ordered the various ARTs to be produced; Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, etc, etc, and uncovered severe airworthiness shortcomings across the RAF Airfleets. Somehow this supposedly inviolate system was violated, to the extent that the reports were pulped (but not entirely thanks to those who hung onto their copies) and the Inspectorate 'disappeared'. So much for notion of independence within the MOD!
Then I have not expressed myself clearly enough. Sorry! The most recent airworthiness related fatal air accident thread on this forum relates to Sean Cunningham's tragic death in a MB Mk10 seat. The SI to its credit determined that the seat (and all the others of that particular type) lacked a Safety Case. It did not then go on to reveal that it was therefore unairworthy. Nor did it reveal that as a consequence the aircraft it was fitted in was unairworthy.
I suggest that the lack of a Safety Case doesn't have the same impact as simply saying that both aircraft and seat were unairworthy. The former sounds as though some back office apparatchik had slipped up in their bureaucratic duties, the latter immediately points to the Air Regulator having failed in its duty. The SI didn't say so clearly though.
The wiring diagram this week puts the Defence AIB (DAIB) and the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) under the Defence Safety Authority:-
https://www.gov.uk/government/organi...fety-authority
and thus both report to its Director General, although where an Accident Report reflects on the MAA then that must be referred to PuS MOD. That may mean they are independent of each other in MOD speak but others may differ. Interestingly this site says that the DAIB is actually a part of the MAA!
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/...aib&gsc.page=1
or was that last week?
I suggest that the lack of a Safety Case doesn't have the same impact as simply saying that both aircraft and seat were unairworthy. The former sounds as though some back office apparatchik had slipped up in their bureaucratic duties, the latter immediately points to the Air Regulator having failed in its duty. The SI didn't say so clearly though.
The wiring diagram this week puts the Defence AIB (DAIB) and the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) under the Defence Safety Authority:-
https://www.gov.uk/government/organi...fety-authority
and thus both report to its Director General, although where an Accident Report reflects on the MAA then that must be referred to PuS MOD. That may mean they are independent of each other in MOD speak but others may differ. Interestingly this site says that the DAIB is actually a part of the MAA!
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/...aib&gsc.page=1
or was that last week?
Last edited by Chugalug2; 11th May 2019 at 14:49. Reason: skybrary link
racedo, the thread title is the sub-title (found on the rear cover) of David Hill's new book "Breaking the Military Covenant". I hope I am not misrepresenting Lordflasheart's OP in saying that the thread is about that book and, inter-alia, UK Military Airworthiness (or the lack thereof). It is not, with respect, about more general shortcomings in the modern world, its governments, its arms salesmen, and those who die as a result of their joint incompetence and malevolent designs.
In relation to breaking the Military Covenant, the more in it the more wriggle room and yup have low view of politicians and military leaders.
Thanks Racedo, and I agree about the wriggle room effect. Nonetheless, the RAF High Command is in contravention of the Covenant, or its Duty of Care as I prefer to call it, by continuing the cover up of illegal orders and actions by some of its predecessors and that led to the deaths of approx. 100 people in airworthiness related fatal military air accidents.
The cover up continues the lie in the Nimrod Report of Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period' of Air Safety, and which supposedly constitutes the foundation stone of the MAA. Until that lie is faced up to, and admitted, then the urgent need to make Regulation and Accident Investigation independent of the MOD and of each other is not clearly apparent and most probably will not happen. The RAF will continue to be infected with unairworthiness, leading to more avoidable accidents and a reduction in the Air Power that it can wield.
The cover up continues the lie in the Nimrod Report of Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period' of Air Safety, and which supposedly constitutes the foundation stone of the MAA. Until that lie is faced up to, and admitted, then the urgent need to make Regulation and Accident Investigation independent of the MOD and of each other is not clearly apparent and most probably will not happen. The RAF will continue to be infected with unairworthiness, leading to more avoidable accidents and a reduction in the Air Power that it can wield.
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Hi Chug,
Youre obviously someone who thinks or believes that if you keep on explaining your point then I will agree with you. I understand your point. I don’t agree with you.
I hold the honest belief that SIs and their Presidents are free to report as they wish and if there is a shortcoming in a report (finding, language or analysis) then I don’t believe it’s due to governance.
Feel free to make the same point again. I will understand it again.
Youre obviously someone who thinks or believes that if you keep on explaining your point then I will agree with you. I understand your point. I don’t agree with you.
I hold the honest belief that SIs and their Presidents are free to report as they wish and if there is a shortcoming in a report (finding, language or analysis) then I don’t believe it’s due to governance.
Feel free to make the same point again. I will understand it again.
orca, you asked for an example where a lack of independence of the MilAAIB from the MAA was reflected in an SI finding. I gave you one in my last reply to you. By all means go on acknowledging such replies by repeatedly saying that you do not agree with me though you understand the points I make. Such condescension may be par for the course in your line of work, but I can't see how it allows for the lateral thinking required in the investigation of air accidents.
Perhaps that is another of my points that you understand but do not agree with?
Perhaps that is another of my points that you understand but do not agree with?
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Chug,
You said that the SI report highlighted the lack of a safety case. It didn’t to your satisfaction explain that ergo the Hawk was not airworthy.
You have failed to attribute this to the link between the MAA to the MilAiB and then to the SI President.
You said that the SI report highlighted the lack of a safety case. It didn’t to your satisfaction explain that ergo the Hawk was not airworthy.
You have failed to attribute this to the link between the MAA to the MilAiB and then to the SI President.
orca, you want an investigation into an investigation? Then so do we both! Not only of the Cunningham accident, but of the Mull of Kintyre, the Tornado blue on blue, and many others. It isn't my satisfaction that is needed but that of the NoK and other loved ones who have been lied to repeatedly by the MOD.
This isn't a game, a debating society wherein point scoring and bon mots win the day. This is about discovering the truth and then fearlessly exposing it, no matter how much it embarrasses the Star Chamber or HMG. This is about the saving of both life and treasure, and keeping the Service airworthy. You don't do that by holding back in an SI report, knowing that saying that the aircraft was unairworthy will mean the unwelcome involvement of the PuS.
Or was it simply an oversight? A lack of a safety case clearly implies the lack of airworthiness, doesn't it? No need to dot the I's. Job's a good'un.
This isn't a game, a debating society wherein point scoring and bon mots win the day. This is about discovering the truth and then fearlessly exposing it, no matter how much it embarrasses the Star Chamber or HMG. This is about the saving of both life and treasure, and keeping the Service airworthy. You don't do that by holding back in an SI report, knowing that saying that the aircraft was unairworthy will mean the unwelcome involvement of the PuS.
Or was it simply an oversight? A lack of a safety case clearly implies the lack of airworthiness, doesn't it? No need to dot the I's. Job's a good'un.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 11th May 2019 at 21:36.
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Hi Chug - it’s taken a very helpful PM, from someone else 😉, for me to understand that we may be arguing at cross purposes.
My view is that Service Inquiry Presidents are able to remain objective, but I agree that the wider implications of their reports are not necessarily identified and acted upon. I also think that it isn’t clear where a specific SI ends and a ‘wider implcation’ starts.
As I wasn’t there for the Cunningham SI I cannot say why (or if) the President invoked the clause in his TORs where it is addressed what he must do if he considers the MAA itself to be at fault. He may have tried and failed - I don’t know.
A useful (for me) analogy is provided by The Cunningham case - wherein the report it clearly states that RAFAT personnel were falsifying records. Not VSOs, squadron personnel. When I read the report (and ergo the Panel would long ago have gone back to their primary duties) I couldn’t see any alternative but Courts Martial. That didn’t happen. Are we to blame the Panel for not chasing that up or should we have relied upon the C-O-C? I would argue that anyone who submitted a final report in the knowledge that he or she was probably triggering Courts Martial within RAFAT had probably remained objective and not swayed by governance. I’m sure others will argue that it’s an indicator that we go after the little man and will find some way of justifying the behaviour itself!
I wish you well.
Orca.
My view is that Service Inquiry Presidents are able to remain objective, but I agree that the wider implications of their reports are not necessarily identified and acted upon. I also think that it isn’t clear where a specific SI ends and a ‘wider implcation’ starts.
As I wasn’t there for the Cunningham SI I cannot say why (or if) the President invoked the clause in his TORs where it is addressed what he must do if he considers the MAA itself to be at fault. He may have tried and failed - I don’t know.
A useful (for me) analogy is provided by The Cunningham case - wherein the report it clearly states that RAFAT personnel were falsifying records. Not VSOs, squadron personnel. When I read the report (and ergo the Panel would long ago have gone back to their primary duties) I couldn’t see any alternative but Courts Martial. That didn’t happen. Are we to blame the Panel for not chasing that up or should we have relied upon the C-O-C? I would argue that anyone who submitted a final report in the knowledge that he or she was probably triggering Courts Martial within RAFAT had probably remained objective and not swayed by governance. I’m sure others will argue that it’s an indicator that we go after the little man and will find some way of justifying the behaviour itself!
I wish you well.
Orca.
Chug,
Whilst I suspect that there would be little daylight between our respective views of the Cunningham report in particular, I must take issue with your assertion that the lack of a safety case for the seat demands an automatic conclusion that the Seat, and hence the aircraft are unairworthy. As a simple matter of logic, it does not.
Allow me to explain with an everyday, if in the circumstances somewhat arcane example. My car requires an MoT test each year, If I fail to submit the car for inspection, it is illegal for me to drive it on the road, as a matter of law due to the statutory requirement to have a valid test certificate. The question of whether the vehicle is roadworthy is an entirely separate one, and if it was roadworthy the day before the certificate expired, it is highly likely that it would still be roadworthy the day after, notwithstanding it was now illegal to drive it. Equally, it could have a valid test certificate and be unroadworthy due to the emergence of an issue during the year.
Were I to drive the car without a valid certificate and be apprehended, I would be guilty of driving without a valid certificate, but could only be prosecuted for driving with an unroadworthy vehicle if actual fault could be identified. The lack of the document does not of itself render the vehicle unroadworthy.
As far as the Cunningham case is concerned, I do not accept that the lack of the safety case per se automatically demands the conclusion that the aircraft was unairworthy. I do however accept that a reasonable person upon examining the particular reasons for the lack of a safety case should have concluded that the aircraft was unairworthy. A distinction without a difference perhaps in the circumstances of the Cunningham case, but an important distinction more generally.
Whilst I suspect that there would be little daylight between our respective views of the Cunningham report in particular, I must take issue with your assertion that the lack of a safety case for the seat demands an automatic conclusion that the Seat, and hence the aircraft are unairworthy. As a simple matter of logic, it does not.
Allow me to explain with an everyday, if in the circumstances somewhat arcane example. My car requires an MoT test each year, If I fail to submit the car for inspection, it is illegal for me to drive it on the road, as a matter of law due to the statutory requirement to have a valid test certificate. The question of whether the vehicle is roadworthy is an entirely separate one, and if it was roadworthy the day before the certificate expired, it is highly likely that it would still be roadworthy the day after, notwithstanding it was now illegal to drive it. Equally, it could have a valid test certificate and be unroadworthy due to the emergence of an issue during the year.
Were I to drive the car without a valid certificate and be apprehended, I would be guilty of driving without a valid certificate, but could only be prosecuted for driving with an unroadworthy vehicle if actual fault could be identified. The lack of the document does not of itself render the vehicle unroadworthy.
As far as the Cunningham case is concerned, I do not accept that the lack of the safety case per se automatically demands the conclusion that the aircraft was unairworthy. I do however accept that a reasonable person upon examining the particular reasons for the lack of a safety case should have concluded that the aircraft was unairworthy. A distinction without a difference perhaps in the circumstances of the Cunningham case, but an important distinction more generally.
Last edited by falcon900; 12th May 2019 at 11:06. Reason: Spelling!
Falcon
If I could just say, the point with the Cunningham case is that MoD could not produce the documentation its own regulations require to support the Master Airworthiness Reference. The SI stated this quite clearly.
In the circumstances you describe, a period of administrative lag is permitted, and there are ways of managing that depending on urgency. But on XX177, and Hawk in general, a rogue (forbidden by mandated regulations) Routine Technical Instruction was issued that had no supporting evidence whatsoever; meaning there was no valid Safety Case Report or Safety Case. The audit trail was badly compromised.
Of course, there is a matter of degree, but implementing the RTI rendered the seat unserviceable, but its paperwork was signed to say it was serviceable. The Service Inquiry's Convening Authority was full party to this root cause. (Again, the SI report). If Martin-Baker's servicing instructions had been followed, the release mechanism jam would not have occurred. The RTI bypassed these instructions. MoD claimed never to have them, but the RAF training video evidence proved otherwise. The Prosecution deemed this 'irrelevant', and advised the Judge so. It ain't M-B or the maintainers fault if MoD issues instructions to ignore that training. But the information DID exist within MoD, and not following it killed Sean Cunningham.
If I could just say, the point with the Cunningham case is that MoD could not produce the documentation its own regulations require to support the Master Airworthiness Reference. The SI stated this quite clearly.
In the circumstances you describe, a period of administrative lag is permitted, and there are ways of managing that depending on urgency. But on XX177, and Hawk in general, a rogue (forbidden by mandated regulations) Routine Technical Instruction was issued that had no supporting evidence whatsoever; meaning there was no valid Safety Case Report or Safety Case. The audit trail was badly compromised.
Of course, there is a matter of degree, but implementing the RTI rendered the seat unserviceable, but its paperwork was signed to say it was serviceable. The Service Inquiry's Convening Authority was full party to this root cause. (Again, the SI report). If Martin-Baker's servicing instructions had been followed, the release mechanism jam would not have occurred. The RTI bypassed these instructions. MoD claimed never to have them, but the RAF training video evidence proved otherwise. The Prosecution deemed this 'irrelevant', and advised the Judge so. It ain't M-B or the maintainers fault if MoD issues instructions to ignore that training. But the information DID exist within MoD, and not following it killed Sean Cunningham.
orca, I am eternally grateful to the 'someone else' who pm'd you and for you so graciously pulling stumps on our increasingly unproductive exchanges.
Your point about those who deliberately falsified records, of whatever rank, and then not being subject to the taking of a Summary of Evidence (or are those consigned now to the dustbin of history?) and possible CM, is well taken. We are repeatedly told that all are equal in the eyes of the law, even military law. Experience tells us that some are more equal than others, but here it seems all are more equal, at least at RAFAT.
My sole purpose was to point out that the MAA is implicated in the Reds SI but was not stated as such in the findings. As you say we do not know why and it is that very anomaly that creates doubt when all should be clarity.
It is important that Accident Investigation not only be uninhibited but be seen to be so. If the MilAAIB (or whatever) were truly independent of the MOD and MAA that would be more clearly the case in my view.
Thanks again for your placatory words, which I return in full.
My warmest regards,
Chug
PS, just read tuc's response to falcon900 to which I can only add "What he said!".
Your point about those who deliberately falsified records, of whatever rank, and then not being subject to the taking of a Summary of Evidence (or are those consigned now to the dustbin of history?) and possible CM, is well taken. We are repeatedly told that all are equal in the eyes of the law, even military law. Experience tells us that some are more equal than others, but here it seems all are more equal, at least at RAFAT.
My sole purpose was to point out that the MAA is implicated in the Reds SI but was not stated as such in the findings. As you say we do not know why and it is that very anomaly that creates doubt when all should be clarity.
It is important that Accident Investigation not only be uninhibited but be seen to be so. If the MilAAIB (or whatever) were truly independent of the MOD and MAA that would be more clearly the case in my view.
Thanks again for your placatory words, which I return in full.
My warmest regards,
Chug
PS, just read tuc's response to falcon900 to which I can only add "What he said!".
Last edited by Chugalug2; 12th May 2019 at 12:21. Reason: follow up to tucumseh
Thanks Racedo, and I agree about the wriggle room effect. Nonetheless, the RAF High Command is in contravention of the Covenant, or its Duty of Care as I prefer to call it, by continuing the cover up of illegal orders and actions by some of its predecessors and that led to the deaths of approx. 100 people in airworthiness related fatal military air accidents..
1.) Officers will refuse to act in case they up on a CM unless it is a clear and direct order with zero ambiguity
2.) Officers will act even when order is incorrect and then go back to the "I was following a direct order" when challenged.
You then end up with a risk averse culture of people being too scared to act even when action is correct.
Witness what has occurred in Local Govt, culture is risk averse and it requires a committee before action, this didn't happen overnight but took 15-20 years to get there. The people 25 years ago who would act have retired and moved on, people replacing them are schooled in the "no risk and decision making culture". Danger is military would end up same way .
racedo, the illegal orders I refer to were of the "Subvert the airworthiness regs but sign them off as complied with" type. The requirement of all who serve in HM Forces, from Private to Field Marshal and their equivalents in the other Services, is that all illegal orders are to be refused but then reported up the CoC. This isn't as easy as it sounds but them's the rules.
"I was only following orders", has been tried and found wanting. In extremis people were hung for it at Nuremburg.
With respect, Local Govt is somewhat different to a fire fight in a sandy place. Being risk averse in such circumstances has its own drawbacks. The answer is training, lots of it. Our Armed Forces are rightly renowned for their professionalism. They are human though with human frailties. Short of using pre programmed robots (what could possibly go wrong?) mistakes will be made. Nonetheless there is a difference between obeying an improper order in the heat of action and doing so in an MOD office block. It seems at the moment the default is to chase after the former transgressors. Time perhaps to look at the latter!
"I was only following orders", has been tried and found wanting. In extremis people were hung for it at Nuremburg.
With respect, Local Govt is somewhat different to a fire fight in a sandy place. Being risk averse in such circumstances has its own drawbacks. The answer is training, lots of it. Our Armed Forces are rightly renowned for their professionalism. They are human though with human frailties. Short of using pre programmed robots (what could possibly go wrong?) mistakes will be made. Nonetheless there is a difference between obeying an improper order in the heat of action and doing so in an MOD office block. It seems at the moment the default is to chase after the former transgressors. Time perhaps to look at the latter!
Gents,
i was only attempting to make a simple point, which I do believe is important.
It does not AUTOMATICALLY follow that the absence of a documented safety case means that the aircraft is unairworthy.
I wholly agree that in the Cunningham case, the specific circumstances relating to the absence of the safety case did render the aircraft unairworthy.
i was only attempting to make a simple point, which I do believe is important.
It does not AUTOMATICALLY follow that the absence of a documented safety case means that the aircraft is unairworthy.
I wholly agree that in the Cunningham case, the specific circumstances relating to the absence of the safety case did render the aircraft unairworthy.
racedo, the illegal orders I refer to were of the "Subvert the airworthiness regs but sign them off as complied with" type. The requirement of all who serve in HM Forces, from Private to Field Marshal and their equivalents in the other Services, is that all illegal orders are to be refused but then reported up the CoC. This isn't as easy as it sounds but them's the rules.
Time for whistleblowers perhaps enshrined in Military conduct.
You may be right, racedo. It's called doing one's duty. A common enough concept in the Services. Less so perhaps amongst much of the civilian population.
As for whistleblowers, they tend to get short measure whether enshrined or not. C'est la vie....
As for whistleblowers, they tend to get short measure whether enshrined or not. C'est la vie....