Vulcan and Lancaster
The faster/higher Lancaster existed in the form of the B.VI with the two stage Merlin 85/87.
The important thing about the "faster/higher" WW2 bomber and loss rate is, that the concept was proven by the Mosquito, hugely reduced loss rate to defences in the night bombing role due to speed and height. The German night fighters were always vulnerable to being too slow to achieve kills. The Do217 night fighter was phased out due to this and, the Bf110G would have been seriously reduced in effectiveness by any increase in the speed or altitude capability of the night bombers. I suspect that more effort could have been made to achieve higher/faster but it wasn't and the bomber crews paid a heavy price.
OAP
OAP
I for one have never come across the Avro suggestion or indeed that it was turned down because of the views of aircrew, but I stand to be corrected. I think a lot of people miss the point. The Germans didn't have to worry about the mosquitoes too much as the brunt of the force were the heavies. The Germans did use nitrous oxide injected Ju88s to hunt mosquitoes and were successful. If the game had changed then the Germans would have adapted accordingly. They were an ingenious and formidable foe. The Ju88 was responsible for more nightfighter kills than all the other German types combined. If higher flying heavy bombers had evolved, then the Germans would have had an answer.
I think a lot of peoples opinions can ignore the reality. The concept that the enemy could always up his game to meet the difficulties in shooting down better bombers and defeating countermeasures was regularly spouted by the knuckle-draggers that infected various levels of Allied technical intelligence in WW2. Reginald Victor Jones CH, CB, CBE, FRS, FRSE, LLD pointed out many of the gross errors in scientific tactics that were made, including the criminally delayed introduction of Window tactics on the pathetic assertion, by some, that the Germans would develop countermeasures and also use Window against the Allies and lose the effectiveness, which they did, but with very limited effect! But that false assertion cost thousands of Allied aircrew lives in the months of the Bombing offensive when Window was withheld. Likewise, to assert that the Germans had no need to counter the Mosquito bombing contribution is crass. The use of Nitrous-Oxide powerboosting illustrates the difficulties that the enemy faced in engaging fast and high flying bombers. The Mosquito itself, in nightfighter form used Nitrous oxide power boosting for the same purpose, to increase the speed advantage of the interceptor . The simple fact is, that Airborne Interception becomes exponentially more difficult as the speed advantage of the interceptor is reduced. For every single mph that the Allied bombers could increase their speed, ANY interceptor faces a lower chance of a successful intercept and it increases the time/distance taken for intercepts of otherwise similar geometry to occur, makes no difference if the nightfighter is an Me262, the faster bomber is less likely to be intercepted than a slower bomber. Rolling, your last sentence is also incorrect. 
OAP
OAP
After Harris conceded that the Battle of Berlin was unwinnable using heavies [prohibitive loss rates] Bomber Command switched to using Mosquitoes and visited the German capital frequently ........ not doing enormous physical damage but demonstrating that we could bomb whenever we wished, thus keeping a very large number of resources tied up. German morale could not be improved by air raid after air raid. Mosquito losses were negligible by comparison to the heavies.
OAP, pray tell why my last sentence is incorrect? Who asserted that the Germans had no need to counter the mosquito? I didn't. The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance, depriving sleep to the population and keeping the defences alert. Window had a brief period of success during the Battle of Hamburg, after that the German defences recovered, because they adapted to the threat. Bomber Command suffered horrendous losses in the winter of 43/44 and those losses very nearly broke it. Schrage Musik took a terrible toll and no one knew anything about it. Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage, no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at. The Germans were the premier nightfighters of WW2. Why? Because they had the most experience and opportunities presented themselves on an almost nightly basis.
After Harris conceded that the Battle of Berlin was unwinnable using heavies [prohibitive loss rates] Bomber Command switched to using Mosquitoes and visited the German capital frequently ........ not doing enormous physical damage but demonstrating that we could bomb whenever we wished, thus keeping a very large number of resources tied up. German morale could not be improved by air raid after air raid. Mosquito losses were negligible by comparison to the heavies.
I think a lot of peoples opinions can ignore the reality. The concept that the enemy could always up his game to meet the difficulties in shooting down better bombers and defeating countermeasures was regularly spouted by the knuckle-draggers that infected various levels of Allied technical intelligence in WW2. Reginald Victor Jones CH, CB, CBE, FRS, FRSE, LLD pointed out many of the gross errors in scientific tactics that were made, including the criminally delayed introduction of Window tactics on the pathetic assertion, by some, that the Germans would develop countermeasures and also use Window against the Allies and lose the effectiveness, which they did, but with very limited effect! But that false assertion cost thousands of Allied aircrew lives in the months of the Bombing offensive when Window was withheld. Likewise, to assert that the Germans had no need to counter the Mosquito bombing contribution is crass. The use of Nitrous-Oxide powerboosting illustrates the difficulties that the enemy faced in engaging fast and high flying bombers. The Mosquito itself, in nightfighter form used Nitrous oxide power boosting for the same purpose, to increase the speed advantage of the interceptor . The simple fact is, that Airborne Interception becomes exponentially more difficult as the speed advantage of the interceptor is reduced. For every single mph that the Allied bombers could increase their speed, ANY interceptor faces a lower chance of a successful intercept and it increases the time/distance taken for intercepts of otherwise similar geometry to occur, makes no difference if the nightfighter is an Me262, the faster bomber is less likely to be intercepted than a slower bomber. Rolling, your last sentence is also incorrect. OAP
Hi MJ. I know the history of these developments, and your chosen description is superficially fair. Although the main argument here is not about the history of WW2 ECM, I offer a few thoughts on points that you raise. The decision to delay the use of Window was badly mistaken. By that time, the positive weight of disruption from its use was grossly in favour of the Allies. The Germans had realised this and they did not first use Duppel themselves because they correctly saw how they would suffer worse effects if its use started! So, stupidly, the British delayed the use of an effective countermeasure, and incurred huge losses, while the Germans developed their own countermeasures while still not suffering degredation of their defences in the meantime. Stupid, likewise, was the casual Allied EMCON.
OAP
OAP
Last edited by Onceapilot; 16th Apr 2019 at 07:30.
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In one of their few intelligence successes during the War, the Germans managed to get back to RAF aircrew that IFF would jam the blue master radar guided searchlights - pilots would switch on the IFF and some of the blue searchlights would wander around as if not under direction. Despite strict orders to the contrary, crews would leave IFF switched on as they approached searchlight belts, little knowing that the bomber stream was being tracked by their own IFF transmissions. The bomber stream appeared as flames on the German radar screens, and this became the German codeword for detection by this method: "Flamen". Once the route of Main Force was calculated then night fighters using NAXOS which picked up the H2S radar at about 60km were directed towards the bombers, . At 10km from the bomber stream, Flensberg would pick up individual bombers Monica transmission allowing them to be tracked into 5km range where the night fighter's own radar took over until visual, and a descent under the bomber to allow attack by Schragemusik. Very efficient: very lethal.
How about this one, " The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance"
Now, in the light of your opinion that the speed/height inferiority of the heavy bombers was not an important factor, you state, "Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage" , so what is that "advantage"? Speed? No, it can't be because you conclude "no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at."
I am sorry rolling, but firing-off random historical opinions and failing to understand the dynamics of AI in the gun only days of WW2 is no basis to contend that faster/higher bombers would not have altered the loss rate!
OAP
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Imagine if the He-219 Uhu had been available in significant numbers. According to various sources it had the performance to meet the Mosquito on equal terms, but was the victim of a strange vendetta by Milch to get it cancelled in favour of the Ju-88 developments, despite Kammhuber's support for the aircraft. Had the He-219 been available in numbers, might the bomber losses have become too high to be sustainable?
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The He-219 was indeed on a par with the Mosquito in many respects. However, by the time it entered service, it was too late to make a real difference, plus the Germans were running out of resources to build in greater numbers. As the Allies drove across Western Europe then the Germans lost advance warning and had a much reduced airspace in which to deploy their aircraft. Add to that the reduced range to allow Allied fighters to rove over Germany in daylight then pilot numbers became a major problem for Germany also. Bomber Command losses fell during the last quarter of '44 and into '45 for these reasons and had the UHU been in service much earlier, then it may have had an effect, but as it was it was all too little too late.
That is your "last sentence". Do you stand by that?
How about this one, " The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance"
Now, in the light of your opinion that the speed/height inferiority of the heavy bombers was not an important factor, you state, "Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage" , so what is that "advantage"? Speed? No, it can't be because you conclude "no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at."
I am sorry rolling, but firing-off random historical opinions and failing to understand the dynamics of AI in the gun only days of WW2 is no basis to contend that faster/higher bombers would not have altered the loss rate!
OAP
How about this one, " The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance"
Now, in the light of your opinion that the speed/height inferiority of the heavy bombers was not an important factor, you state, "Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage" , so what is that "advantage"? Speed? No, it can't be because you conclude "no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at."
I am sorry rolling, but firing-off random historical opinions and failing to understand the dynamics of AI in the gun only days of WW2 is no basis to contend that faster/higher bombers would not have altered the loss rate!
OAP
Thanks rolling. Interesting to see you fire-off to the B29. I feel it is a waste of my time replying to your ramblings, although I guess you think the Germans could have won the war if they had tried harder? Cheers
OAP
OAP
I shall be forever grateful, that a number of years ago my 12000 word dissertation, Air Power: The Strategic Offensive 1939-45, wasn't marked by you and that my Professor gave me the mark he did. Ramblings indeed......
Langley, I did mention that above.....'The fact is that the mosquito ,even in the LNSF, was seen more as a nuisance, depriving sleep to the population and keeping the defences alert.' Don't forget it was Speer, who said the real success of the offensive, was the resources needed to fight it. A million men tied up who could have been used on the Russian front and the thousands of 88s that would have also been sorely needed. Gentlemen I am not here to score points, but to just tell you as I see it. Everyone has their own theory and I respect that, even if I don't agree.
