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Vulcan and Lancaster

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Vulcan and Lancaster

Old 14th Apr 2019, 13:55
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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The faster/higher Lancaster existed in the form of the B.VI with the two stage Merlin 85/87.

OAP
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 16:04
  #22 (permalink)  
 
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The faster/higher Lancaster existed in the form of the B.VI with the two stage Merlin 85/87.
Which I think was designed to carry the 10-ton Grand Slam bomb, so the crews' fears were probably justified!
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 17:09
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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Geriaviator - what a fascinating article.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 09:52
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The important thing about the "faster/higher" WW2 bomber and loss rate is, that the concept was proven by the Mosquito, hugely reduced loss rate to defences in the night bombing role due to speed and height. The German night fighters were always vulnerable to being too slow to achieve kills. The Do217 night fighter was phased out due to this and, the Bf110G would have been seriously reduced in effectiveness by any increase in the speed or altitude capability of the night bombers. I suspect that more effort could have been made to achieve higher/faster but it wasn't and the bomber crews paid a heavy price.

OAP
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 17:37
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I for one have never come across the Avro suggestion or indeed that it was turned down because of the views of aircrew, but I stand to be corrected. I think a lot of people miss the point. The Germans didn't have to worry about the mosquitoes too much as the brunt of the force were the heavies. The Germans did use nitrous oxide injected Ju88s to hunt mosquitoes and were successful. If the game had changed then the Germans would have adapted accordingly. They were an ingenious and formidable foe. The Ju88 was responsible for more nightfighter kills than all the other German types combined. If higher flying heavy bombers had evolved, then the Germans would have had an answer.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 19:47
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I think a lot of peoples opinions can ignore the reality. The concept that the enemy could always up his game to meet the difficulties in shooting down better bombers and defeating countermeasures was regularly spouted by the knuckle-draggers that infected various levels of Allied technical intelligence in WW2. Reginald Victor Jones CH, CB, CBE, FRS, FRSE, LLD pointed out many of the gross errors in scientific tactics that were made, including the criminally delayed introduction of Window tactics on the pathetic assertion, by some, that the Germans would develop countermeasures and also use Window against the Allies and lose the effectiveness, which they did, but with very limited effect! But that false assertion cost thousands of Allied aircrew lives in the months of the Bombing offensive when Window was withheld. Likewise, to assert that the Germans had no need to counter the Mosquito bombing contribution is crass. The use of Nitrous-Oxide powerboosting illustrates the difficulties that the enemy faced in engaging fast and high flying bombers. The Mosquito itself, in nightfighter form used Nitrous oxide power boosting for the same purpose, to increase the speed advantage of the interceptor . The simple fact is, that Airborne Interception becomes exponentially more difficult as the speed advantage of the interceptor is reduced. For every single mph that the Allied bombers could increase their speed, ANY interceptor faces a lower chance of a successful intercept and it increases the time/distance taken for intercepts of otherwise similar geometry to occur, makes no difference if the nightfighter is an Me262, the faster bomber is less likely to be intercepted than a slower bomber. Rolling, your last sentence is also incorrect.

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Old 15th Apr 2019, 19:52
  #27 (permalink)  
 
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After Harris conceded that the Battle of Berlin was unwinnable using heavies [prohibitive loss rates] Bomber Command switched to using Mosquitoes and visited the German capital frequently ........ not doing enormous physical damage but demonstrating that we could bomb whenever we wished, thus keeping a very large number of resources tied up. German morale could not be improved by air raid after air raid. Mosquito losses were negligible by comparison to the heavies.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:33
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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OAP, pray tell why my last sentence is incorrect? Who asserted that the Germans had no need to counter the mosquito? I didn't. The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance, depriving sleep to the population and keeping the defences alert. Window had a brief period of success during the Battle of Hamburg, after that the German defences recovered, because they adapted to the threat. Bomber Command suffered horrendous losses in the winter of 43/44 and those losses very nearly broke it. Schrage Musik took a terrible toll and no one knew anything about it. Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage, no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at. The Germans were the premier nightfighters of WW2. Why? Because they had the most experience and opportunities presented themselves on an almost nightly basis.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:35
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Originally Posted by langleybaston View Post
After Harris conceded that the Battle of Berlin was unwinnable using heavies [prohibitive loss rates] Bomber Command switched to using Mosquitoes and visited the German capital frequently ........ not doing enormous physical damage but demonstrating that we could bomb whenever we wished, thus keeping a very large number of resources tied up. German morale could not be improved by air raid after air raid. Mosquito losses were negligible by comparison to the heavies.
​​​​​​Agree entirely Langleybaston.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 05:43
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I think a lot of peoples opinions can ignore the reality. The concept that the enemy could always up his game to meet the difficulties in shooting down better bombers and defeating countermeasures was regularly spouted by the knuckle-draggers that infected various levels of Allied technical intelligence in WW2. Reginald Victor Jones CH, CB, CBE, FRS, FRSE, LLD pointed out many of the gross errors in scientific tactics that were made, including the criminally delayed introduction of Window tactics on the pathetic assertion, by some, that the Germans would develop countermeasures and also use Window against the Allies and lose the effectiveness, which they did, but with very limited effect! But that false assertion cost thousands of Allied aircrew lives in the months of the Bombing offensive when Window was withheld. Likewise, to assert that the Germans had no need to counter the Mosquito bombing contribution is crass. The use of Nitrous-Oxide powerboosting illustrates the difficulties that the enemy faced in engaging fast and high flying bombers. The Mosquito itself, in nightfighter form used Nitrous oxide power boosting for the same purpose, to increase the speed advantage of the interceptor . The simple fact is, that Airborne Interception becomes exponentially more difficult as the speed advantage of the interceptor is reduced. For every single mph that the Allied bombers could increase their speed, ANY interceptor faces a lower chance of a successful intercept and it increases the time/distance taken for intercepts of otherwise similar geometry to occur, makes no difference if the nightfighter is an Me262, the faster bomber is less likely to be intercepted than a slower bomber. Rolling, your last sentence is also incorrect. OAP
The problem with this comment OAP is that the Germans were quite capable of rapidly changing how they dealt with countermeasures, which is exactly what they did after window was employed in 1943. Fighter Command had done trials with window in 1942 and it totally disrupted the effectiveness of A.I. Mk VII and Mk VIII (The 2 centimetric A.I. Radars under development and early production) plus everything that worked on 1.5 metres wavelength. It wasn't until A.I. Mk X (SCR 720) was trialled in early 1943 and found to be able to deal with the effects of Window that the decision to allow the use of Window over Hamburg in the July was made (around about the time that the first production A.I. Mk X's were going to be introduced into service). However the introduction of the radar was delayed and the equipment didn't actually become operational until January 1944. This however was just in time to allow Fighter Command to give the Luftwaffe a bit of a shoeing during the Baby Blitz, in which the Luftwaffe made heavy use of Duppel (as they called Window) and that did play havoc with the 1.5 metre band G.C.I. radars just as Fighter Command had feared. However there were enough centimetric G.C.I stations then available, along with the A.I. Mk X equipped Mossies and AAA batteries equipped with centimetric gun laying radars to literally decimated the German bomber force every time they launched an attack. What did the German's learn from Hamburg?? Well for starters it showed that the Himmelbett system was extremely wasteful in resources and there were better ways to get the night fighters into the Bomber Stream, like use the bombers own radar transmissions with homing systems like Flensburg (which worked against the Monica system extremely well) and Naxos (which was designed to track H2S, but wasn't so actuate), plus they rapidly build a radar using a lower frequency that was immune to the effects of Window designed to effect the earlier German Lichtenstein A.I. set which became the Lichtenstein SN2. None of those German countermeasures were exposed until a Ju-88 fitted with those systems landed at Woodbridge by mistake in July 1944. Yep Schräge Musik was most definitely a killer and the really strange thing is that the RAF had actually trailed such a weapon system in 1940 on a Havoc and the Defiant night fighters used almost such an attack method as a standard tactic.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 06:36
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Hi MJ. I know the history of these developments, and your chosen description is superficially fair. Although the main argument here is not about the history of WW2 ECM, I offer a few thoughts on points that you raise. The decision to delay the use of Window was badly mistaken. By that time, the positive weight of disruption from its use was grossly in favour of the Allies. The Germans had realised this and they did not first use Duppel themselves because they correctly saw how they would suffer worse effects if its use started! So, stupidly, the British delayed the use of an effective countermeasure, and incurred huge losses, while the Germans developed their own countermeasures while still not suffering degredation of their defences in the meantime. Stupid, likewise, was the casual Allied EMCON.

OAP

Last edited by Onceapilot; 16th Apr 2019 at 07:30.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 07:01
  #32 (permalink)  
 
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In one of their few intelligence successes during the War, the Germans managed to get back to RAF aircrew that IFF would jam the blue master radar guided searchlights - pilots would switch on the IFF and some of the blue searchlights would wander around as if not under direction. Despite strict orders to the contrary, crews would leave IFF switched on as they approached searchlight belts, little knowing that the bomber stream was being tracked by their own IFF transmissions. The bomber stream appeared as flames on the German radar screens, and this became the German codeword for detection by this method: "Flamen". Once the route of Main Force was calculated then night fighters using NAXOS which picked up the H2S radar at about 60km were directed towards the bombers, . At 10km from the bomber stream, Flensberg would pick up individual bombers Monica transmission allowing them to be tracked into 5km range where the night fighter's own radar took over until visual, and a descent under the bomber to allow attack by Schragemusik. Very efficient: very lethal.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 07:29
  #33 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rolling20 View Post
. If higher flying heavy bombers had evolved, then the Germans would have had an answer.
That is your "last sentence". Do you stand by that?
How about this one, " The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance"
Now, in the light of your opinion that the speed/height inferiority of the heavy bombers was not an important factor, you state, "Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage" , so what is that "advantage"? Speed? No, it can't be because you conclude "no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at."
I am sorry rolling, but firing-off random historical opinions and failing to understand the dynamics of AI in the gun only days of WW2 is no basis to contend that faster/higher bombers would not have altered the loss rate!

OAP
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 09:22
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Imagine if the He-219 Uhu had been available in significant numbers. According to various sources it had the performance to meet the Mosquito on equal terms, but was the victim of a strange vendetta by Milch to get it cancelled in favour of the Ju-88 developments, despite Kammhuber's support for the aircraft. Had the He-219 been available in numbers, might the bomber losses have become too high to be sustainable?
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 09:31
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The He-219 was indeed on a par with the Mosquito in many respects. However, by the time it entered service, it was too late to make a real difference, plus the Germans were running out of resources to build in greater numbers. As the Allies drove across Western Europe then the Germans lost advance warning and had a much reduced airspace in which to deploy their aircraft. Add to that the reduced range to allow Allied fighters to rove over Germany in daylight then pilot numbers became a major problem for Germany also. Bomber Command losses fell during the last quarter of '44 and into '45 for these reasons and had the UHU been in service much earlier, then it may have had an effect, but as it was it was all too little too late.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 09:36
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Originally Posted by Onceapilot View Post
That is your "last sentence". Do you stand by that?
How about this one, " The fact is that the mosquito even in the LNSF was seen more as a nuisance"
Now, in the light of your opinion that the speed/height inferiority of the heavy bombers was not an important factor, you state, "Further, when you have 700+ bombers all going to the same target, once the nightfighter is 'in the stream', then they have the advantage" , so what is that "advantage"? Speed? No, it can't be because you conclude "no matter what speed the bomber is travelling at."
I am sorry rolling, but firing-off random historical opinions and failing to understand the dynamics of AI in the gun only days of WW2 is no basis to contend that faster/higher bombers would not have altered the loss rate!

OAP
Oh yes I stand by everything and it seems I am not the only one who thinks the same. I trust you have studied B29 operations? They were fairly invulnerable to Japanese attacks at 30,000 feet until the Japanese adapted aircraft that could reach that height. The B29s were however ineffectual at that height with regard to bombing accuracy and could only carry small loads. It was only when they went to medium level that they became effectual.Further, B29s were operating at 10+ hours round trip time. Losses granted were only 1.38%, but of around 30,000 sorties flown, 1/3 of B29s reported fighter attacks. Remember the Zero was fairly lightly armed.Unlike in Europe the B29s were not over enemy territory for long periods, the Japanese also had no benefit of early warning of raids as the Germans did. Wensleydale mentions IFF this was still being taught as late as 42,that it jammed German radar, which as Wensleydale states was the opposite. The Germans could even detect radio signals from bombers on air tests prior to a raid, so knew a raid was possibly on. The Germans only lost this advantage when the invasion of Europe moved towards the Low Countries. These advantages the Japanese never had. Also the Germans over Europe had had 4 years to perfect their skills, before the offensive in 43 began to reach its crescendo. If the Japanese had had as long to hone their skills, then I am sure B29 losses would have been higher. The B29 offensive only really got going in early 45 and that was against unprepared enemy. I stand by my opinion and and happy to fire off more random historical facts, not opinions if you so wish. The Germans would have adapted.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 09:41
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Thanks rolling. Interesting to see you fire-off to the B29. I feel it is a waste of my time replying to your ramblings, although I guess you think the Germans could have won the war if they had tried harder? Cheers

OAP
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 18:13
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Originally Posted by Onceapilot View Post
Thanks rolling. Interesting to see you fire-off to the B29. I feel it is a waste of my time replying to your ramblings, although I guess you think the Germans could have won the war if they had tried harder? Cheers

OAP
I shall be forever grateful, that a number of years ago my 12000 word dissertation, Air Power: The Strategic Offensive 1939-45, wasn't marked by you and that my Professor gave me the mark he did. Ramblings indeed......
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 20:26
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Originally Posted by rolling20 View Post
I shall be forever grateful, that a number of years ago my 12000 word dissertation, Air Power: The Strategic Offensive 1939-45, wasn't marked by you and that my Professor gave me the mark he did. Ramblings indeed......
Does the dissertation deal with the nuisance value of Mosquitos over Berlin ? If so, I would love to see the evidence. Think of all the AA and personnel deployed, 88s into the bargain. Lost production, office workers tired with low morale ..................

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Old 17th Apr 2019, 07:02
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Originally Posted by langleybaston View Post
Does the dissertation deal with the nuisance value of Mosquitos over Berlin ? If so, I would love to see the evidence. Think of all the AA and personnel deployed, 88s into the bargain. Lost production, office workers tired with low morale ..................
Langley, I did mention that above.....'The fact is that the mosquito ,even in the LNSF, was seen more as a nuisance, depriving sleep to the population and keeping the defences alert.' Don't forget it was Speer, who said the real success of the offensive, was the resources needed to fight it. A million men tied up who could have been used on the Russian front and the thousands of 88s that would have also been sorely needed. Gentlemen I am not here to score points, but to just tell you as I see it. Everyone has their own theory and I respect that, even if I don't agree.
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