Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Dark Side of West Wales
Age: 85
Posts: 161
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just to add a further thought to Easy Street's comments about being "maxed out". Please excuse the slight divergence form the main thread.
It is worth considering what happened to a Red Arrows pilot (Jon Egging) at the Bournemouth Air Show back in I think 2011. He died following a formation break to land. If I remember correctly the following C of I attributed at least some of the cause to possibly pulling too much G (up to 6G+) in trying to avoid flying over the built up part of Bournemouth and consequently became maxed out or CI to use the latest vernacular. For those that don't know, flying over that part of Bournemouth particularly in circuit or at low level is almost a hanging offence and I guess this was at the forefront of the Eggmans mind at that time.
I am not trying to relate the Bournemouth accident to the Shoreham and AH but just pointing out that even current military display pilots can run into trouble from time to time.
It is worth considering what happened to a Red Arrows pilot (Jon Egging) at the Bournemouth Air Show back in I think 2011. He died following a formation break to land. If I remember correctly the following C of I attributed at least some of the cause to possibly pulling too much G (up to 6G+) in trying to avoid flying over the built up part of Bournemouth and consequently became maxed out or CI to use the latest vernacular. For those that don't know, flying over that part of Bournemouth particularly in circuit or at low level is almost a hanging offence and I guess this was at the forefront of the Eggmans mind at that time.
I am not trying to relate the Bournemouth accident to the Shoreham and AH but just pointing out that even current military display pilots can run into trouble from time to time.
Last edited by DODGYOLDFART; 29th Mar 2019 at 09:53.
DODGYOLDFART
To give my reply some context I am a Bournemouth lad who has used the airport multiple times in both Hawk and Jaguar. I also knew Eggman and read the report with interest as we all did.
I think it would be fair to say there are quite a few inaccuracies in your post and you may wish to do more research and edit it accordingly.
For starters, Poole is miles away and not even a Jaguar would struggle to stay away from it during a break to land. If you understood the RAFAT break you’d know what profile they were flying and local geography had nothing to do with it.
As for the cause of Eggmans crash it was ALOC/GLOC related. From what I’m beginning to understand this CI phenomenon is different to GLOC. I don’t think we should confuse the two.
That was as polite as I could make it.
BV
I think it would be fair to say there are quite a few inaccuracies in your post and you may wish to do more research and edit it accordingly.
For starters, Poole is miles away and not even a Jaguar would struggle to stay away from it during a break to land. If you understood the RAFAT break you’d know what profile they were flying and local geography had nothing to do with it.
As for the cause of Eggmans crash it was ALOC/GLOC related. From what I’m beginning to understand this CI phenomenon is different to GLOC. I don’t think we should confuse the two.
That was as polite as I could make it.
BV
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Dark Side of West Wales
Age: 85
Posts: 161
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BV I am happy to stand corrected due to your superior knowledge of the area. However as you admit it was ALOC/GLOC related and according to the trial so was AH's hypoxia or whatever his form of CI was.
DODGYOLDFART
Without wishing to read the entire report again and, since I have not read the court transcripts, I will trust that you are correct on the CI vs ALOC/GLOC issue.
I personally had not made a connection between the Bournemouth and Shoreham events. I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest.
I will leave it there since I don’t want to drag this too far off topic.
BV
I personally had not made a connection between the Bournemouth and Shoreham events. I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest.
I will leave it there since I don’t want to drag this too far off topic.
BV
Easy Street, BV and andrewn.
I don't necessarily disagree with the general sense of your responses to my two posts. But I would like to point out that I was mostly writing about what took place at Court 8 at the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey) between 16 January and 8 March 2019.
I do believe that the ramifications of this case have hardly started, and I was aware, E Street, of the military interest in CI that you mention.
The next significant happening will probably be the inquest. At the moment, the West Sussex Senior Coroner, Penelope Schofield, plans to hold a case management hearing on the afternoon of 8 April 2019. I understand it is not expected to last longer than that day. At that stage, she may reveal the start date for the full hearing, and also whether this will be an Article 2 Inquest (in which a state organisation may be implicated).
airsound
I don't necessarily disagree with the general sense of your responses to my two posts. But I would like to point out that I was mostly writing about what took place at Court 8 at the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey) between 16 January and 8 March 2019.
I do believe that the ramifications of this case have hardly started, and I was aware, E Street, of the military interest in CI that you mention.
The next significant happening will probably be the inquest. At the moment, the West Sussex Senior Coroner, Penelope Schofield, plans to hold a case management hearing on the afternoon of 8 April 2019. I understand it is not expected to last longer than that day. At that stage, she may reveal the start date for the full hearing, and also whether this will be an Article 2 Inquest (in which a state organisation may be implicated).
airsound
BV - "I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest."
100%
Ex-mil FJs are expensive to operate - even more so than a SEP Warbird (with the exception of acquisition cost & hull cost insurance). Therefore, selected pilots fly few hours with irregular currency. Perhaps its time for a more stringent look at "who flies what" in front of the public. By all means, if you have the money and can afford the training, take your Spitfire, P51 or JP up for a dance amongst the clouds at Medium Level (which is 500ft and above in my terms…). I am, however, very nervous when I see the same set of names dynamically displaying lots of different aircraft with relatively low hours on each in front of the public. Yes, I appreciate that this could cause issues and the increased costs might remove popular aircraft from public display, but there's nowt to stop the larger operators restricting their pilots to a couple of types to display, and rotating every couple of years. It might encourage the training and selection of new pilots, and prevent the "he's a great bloke, everybody likes/rates him, he's got thousands of hours - I'm sure he'll be fine displaying the Gnat/JP/Hunter/T33 with less than enough hours for a Prog Check on an OCU spread out over 3 years…." oh, and of course, no simulator to practise emergencies in. The Boultbee Spitfire simulator initiative is to be applauded, and, IMHO, should be something that Insurance companies start to insist that pilots conduct recurrent training in, including emergencies at various stages of their display. sequence...
100%
Ex-mil FJs are expensive to operate - even more so than a SEP Warbird (with the exception of acquisition cost & hull cost insurance). Therefore, selected pilots fly few hours with irregular currency. Perhaps its time for a more stringent look at "who flies what" in front of the public. By all means, if you have the money and can afford the training, take your Spitfire, P51 or JP up for a dance amongst the clouds at Medium Level (which is 500ft and above in my terms…). I am, however, very nervous when I see the same set of names dynamically displaying lots of different aircraft with relatively low hours on each in front of the public. Yes, I appreciate that this could cause issues and the increased costs might remove popular aircraft from public display, but there's nowt to stop the larger operators restricting their pilots to a couple of types to display, and rotating every couple of years. It might encourage the training and selection of new pilots, and prevent the "he's a great bloke, everybody likes/rates him, he's got thousands of hours - I'm sure he'll be fine displaying the Gnat/JP/Hunter/T33 with less than enough hours for a Prog Check on an OCU spread out over 3 years…." oh, and of course, no simulator to practise emergencies in. The Boultbee Spitfire simulator initiative is to be applauded, and, IMHO, should be something that Insurance companies start to insist that pilots conduct recurrent training in, including emergencies at various stages of their display. sequence...
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: New Braunfels, TX
Age: 70
Posts: 1,954
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BV - "I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest."
100%
Ex-mil FJs are expensive to operate - even more so than a SEP Warbird (with the exception of acquisition cost & hull cost insurance). Therefore, selected pilots fly few hours with irregular currency. Perhaps its time for a more stringent look at "who flies what" in front of the public. By all means, if you have the money and can afford the training, take your Spitfire, P51 or JP up for a dance amongst the clouds at Medium Level (which is 500ft and above in my terms…). I am, however, very nervous when I see the same set of names dynamically displaying lots of different aircraft with relatively low hours on each in front of the public. Yes, I appreciate that this could cause issues and the increased costs might remove popular aircraft from public display, but there's nowt to stop the larger operators restricting their pilots to a couple of types to display, and rotating every couple of years. It might encourage the training and selection of new pilots, and prevent the "he's a great bloke, everybody likes/rates him, he's got thousands of hours - I'm sure he'll be fine displaying the Gnat/JP/Hunter/T33 with less than enough hours for a Prog Check on an OCU spread out over 3 years…." oh, and of course, no simulator to practise emergencies in. The Boultbee Spitfire simulator initiative is to be applauded, and, IMHO, should be something that Insurance companies start to insist that pilots conduct recurrent training in, including emergencies at various stages of their display. sequence...
100%
Ex-mil FJs are expensive to operate - even more so than a SEP Warbird (with the exception of acquisition cost & hull cost insurance). Therefore, selected pilots fly few hours with irregular currency. Perhaps its time for a more stringent look at "who flies what" in front of the public. By all means, if you have the money and can afford the training, take your Spitfire, P51 or JP up for a dance amongst the clouds at Medium Level (which is 500ft and above in my terms…). I am, however, very nervous when I see the same set of names dynamically displaying lots of different aircraft with relatively low hours on each in front of the public. Yes, I appreciate that this could cause issues and the increased costs might remove popular aircraft from public display, but there's nowt to stop the larger operators restricting their pilots to a couple of types to display, and rotating every couple of years. It might encourage the training and selection of new pilots, and prevent the "he's a great bloke, everybody likes/rates him, he's got thousands of hours - I'm sure he'll be fine displaying the Gnat/JP/Hunter/T33 with less than enough hours for a Prog Check on an OCU spread out over 3 years…." oh, and of course, no simulator to practise emergencies in. The Boultbee Spitfire simulator initiative is to be applauded, and, IMHO, should be something that Insurance companies start to insist that pilots conduct recurrent training in, including emergencies at various stages of their display. sequence...
Administrator
For jindabyne:
The discussion is in touch. So no, "knock it off" is not the correct call.
Carry on, please keep it professional.
The discussion is in touch. So no, "knock it off" is not the correct call.
Carry on, please keep it professional.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: The Alderaan System
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Err, probably the crashing part?
Dr Stephen Jarvis. He adduced seven, eight, or possibly even twelve, piloting errors in the 23 seconds leading up to the aircraft’s arrival at the apex of the accident manoeuvre (the bent loop). They included:
- Unexplained power reduction.
- Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track.
- Failure to notice low speed.
- Pitch oscillations.
- Incorrect roll in the vertical.
- After, the apex, the failure to eject. That would have been a rule-based action, from his training.
- Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track. We do not know precisely what point on the display line AH planned to point towards. From the height and distance that he was from the display line the sightline angle was very shallow and he may not have had a full perspective of the runway. Similarly, judgement of the required pull-up point is difficult and is a purely visual assessment and that is one of the biggest potential errors in flying this manoeuvre. There is a great deal of scope for all of us to make an error with judging this aspect of such a manoeuvre.
- Pitch oscillations. This reference was to immediately after rolling out of the turn prior to the pull-up when about 2 cycles of a very low amplitude pitch oscillation occurred. This is a normal open loop Hunter response, and if anyone wishes I am quite happy to give a full explanation.
- Incorrect roll in the vertical. In this manoeuvre, the required roll angle will always be different every time that you fly it due to the angle off the display line, distance from the display line and on/off crowd wind component. There are no visual cues that you can use when the roll angle required is small; you make the input with partial aileron by cadence alone and there is a great tendency to 'over-roll', especially if, during the pull-up, you realise that you have pulled up too soon and try to roll through more than the angle required for the heading change in order to displace and exit on the display line.
All of the above potential error mechanisms may occur without cognitive impairment. With respect to a rule based ejection option, this would have included rolling wings level then pulling to a level or slightly nose high pitch attitude which is the same as an escape manoeuvre. However, no competent display pilot would ever consider that ejection should be an option at the apex of a loop when the gate height has not been achieved and, therefore, I contend that ejection would never be a rule-based action in this situation.
There have been many comments on here regarding hours on type, currency and flying multiple types. A few points to ponder:
- Military display pilots, except for those involved with dedicated display teams such as RAFAT or BBMF, typically fly only one or occasionally two display seasons. Therefore, they have low overall display experience which is mitigated by flying rigidly defined sequences with a great deal of practise and stringent currency requirements. These mitigations are not necessary to the same extent for pilots who have decades of display experience on multiple types.
- Flying and displaying multiple types can be done safely but does require the pilot to have a robust philosophy and protocol for how they will refresh their competence. Under MAA (and precursor organisation) regulation pilots have maintained type currency on up to 9 widely different types of aircraft, including displaying some of them. What is interesting is that significantly different types are not a problem; it is types that are similar where cognitive errors tend to be made. The worst aspect is flying different airframes of a given type with some ASIs in KIAS and some in mph!
- An experienced display pilot can start displaying safely a new type on which he has few hours and with little practise or recency if the display sequence and the manoeuvres are appropriate ie. no pulling through the down vertical in looping manoeuvres, all rolls on a climbing line, no maximum AOA turns. I am happy to give examples.
- All of the above require two factors. First, a pilot with the requisite experience, ability and attitude. Please note that I am making no comment here about Shoreham but I am talking generically. Not all pilots and not all display pilots do have the required attributes, but those who do should not be prevented from flying displays which they are capable of doing safely just because other pilots cannot. Secondly, mentoring/supervision/training. Some pilots need more than others but these are essential aspects that are not always to the required standard.
Again, I will not make any comments about Shoreham specifically but mentoring and supervision need to be considered. However, I will raise one specific aspect regarding training and that is flying escape manoeuvres. At the time of the accident CAP403 did not require pilots to ever practise or demonstrate their ability to fly escape manoeuvres and AH stated that he had not done so. It was only required to be discussed under the 'Emergencies' aspect of DA issue. Thankfully, this is now a requirement for DA issue. Allied to this, an Aircrew Manual such as that for the Hunter will never cover in detail, if at all, how to fly these manoeuvres, especially at low IAS. This has to be an essential aspect of training, even if it is just a briefing on how to do so. The Hunter has outstanding handling qualities in this respect and the AAIB flying demonstrated that an escape manoeuvre could be flown safely at 80 KIAS without any abnormal skill. Any skill based activity is ~70% confidence, and if a pilot has never been briefed or practised an escape manoeuvre in a swept wing aircraft at an IAS significantly below the 1g stall speed then they may lack the confidence to do so for real when required.
The fact that the escape manoeuvre had not been practised or demonstrated is yet another red herring. It is not possible for an RAF QFI who taught aerobatics not to know what to do when a vertical manoevre goes wrong. The argument suggests that an experienced low-level aerobatic pilot did not have the knowledge, and possibly skill, to safely escape his predicament if he did not make the ‘gate’ at the top of the loop. Not possible and I would consider it wreckless to pull up for loop without that knowledge.
Dear Lomcevak, I enjoyed your post - sounds like the case could have benefitted from your expertise as an expert witness (assuming you didn't indeed do so)
If you don't mind me asking, I am very interested in the cognitive aspects of these sort of activities You stated that some of the errors could occur without cognitive impairment and as you are clearly an expert in the field, could you help clarify some of the points you robustly made? Every day is a school day as they say!
[Similarly, judgement of the required pull-up point is difficult and is a purely visual assessment and that is one of the biggest potential errors in flying this manoeuvre. There is a great deal of scope for all of us to make an error with judging this aspect of such a manoeuvre]. If, as you suggest, cognitive impairment wasn't necessarily present in this error, can you describe what aspects of the judging/visual assessment could cause an error?
[This is a normal open loop Hunter response, and if anyone wishes I am quite happy to give a full explanation]. Please do, this sounds unusual and interesting!
[during the pull-up, you realise that you have pulled up too soon and try to roll through more than the angle required for the heading change in order to displace and exit on the display line]. What cues would be used to inform the realisation that you'd pulled up too soon? If a pilot didn't realise they had pulled up soon, what would they need to do next?
[Any skill based activity is ~70% confidence] Please can you let me know what research produced that finding? I've never seen this statement before. For example, Fitts & Posners' 1967 three stage model of skill acquisition doesn't mention confidence at all. Obviously it's plausible confidence plays a role but I'm fascinated by a potential of 70%. Is the other 30% perception and judgement?
Sorry for the questions but I never pass up an opportunity to learn something new!
If you don't mind me asking, I am very interested in the cognitive aspects of these sort of activities You stated that some of the errors could occur without cognitive impairment and as you are clearly an expert in the field, could you help clarify some of the points you robustly made? Every day is a school day as they say!
[Similarly, judgement of the required pull-up point is difficult and is a purely visual assessment and that is one of the biggest potential errors in flying this manoeuvre. There is a great deal of scope for all of us to make an error with judging this aspect of such a manoeuvre]. If, as you suggest, cognitive impairment wasn't necessarily present in this error, can you describe what aspects of the judging/visual assessment could cause an error?
[This is a normal open loop Hunter response, and if anyone wishes I am quite happy to give a full explanation]. Please do, this sounds unusual and interesting!
[during the pull-up, you realise that you have pulled up too soon and try to roll through more than the angle required for the heading change in order to displace and exit on the display line]. What cues would be used to inform the realisation that you'd pulled up too soon? If a pilot didn't realise they had pulled up soon, what would they need to do next?
[Any skill based activity is ~70% confidence] Please can you let me know what research produced that finding? I've never seen this statement before. For example, Fitts & Posners' 1967 three stage model of skill acquisition doesn't mention confidence at all. Obviously it's plausible confidence plays a role but I'm fascinated by a potential of 70%. Is the other 30% perception and judgement?
Sorry for the questions but I never pass up an opportunity to learn something new!
As an example, landing an aircraft on a naval ship at night.
Unless you know how to do it, have done it before (both are elements of confidence), and have some recency of experience, and at least minimum proficiency, you are more likely to cock it up.
I've seen lack of confidence lead people to turn in their wings and deselect from flying status. So yeah, confidence is necessary.
Aerobatics, particularly at low level/display, is similarly a non trivial task to get right.
I won't comment further on aerobatics as Lomcevak has the floor and is a far better source.
Was Fitts and Posners' work to do with aviation, or something else? We have a variety of skill sets that call for mastery or proficiency, particularly perishable skills, that also have currency requirements.
As an example, landing an aircraft on a naval ship at night.
Unless you know how to do it, have done it before (both are elements of confidence), and have some recency of experience, and at least minimum proficiency, you are more likely to cock it up.
I've seen lack of confidence lead people to turn in their wings and deselect from flying status. So yeah, confidence is necessary.
Aerobatics, particularly at low level/display, is similarly a non trivial task to get right.
I won't comment further on aerobatics as Lomcevak has the floor and is a far better source.
As an example, landing an aircraft on a naval ship at night.
Unless you know how to do it, have done it before (both are elements of confidence), and have some recency of experience, and at least minimum proficiency, you are more likely to cock it up.
I've seen lack of confidence lead people to turn in their wings and deselect from flying status. So yeah, confidence is necessary.
Aerobatics, particularly at low level/display, is similarly a non trivial task to get right.
I won't comment further on aerobatics as Lomcevak has the floor and is a far better source.
The fact that the escape manoeuvre had not been practised or demonstrated is yet another red herring. It is not possible for an RAF QFI who taught aerobatics not to know what to do when a vertical manoevre goes wrong. The argument suggests that an experienced low-level aerobatic pilot did not have the knowledge, and possibly skill, to safely escape his predicament if he did not make the ‘gate’ at the top of the loop. Not possible and I would consider it wreckless to pull up for loop without that knowledge.
Low speed light aircraft do not use a gate height during low level looping manoeuvres because it is not appropriate with the high pitch rate at the apex and the small radius. Therefore, rigid application of a gate height protocol will not be a familiar procedure for a display pilot whose experience is mainly light aircraft, however experienced he is.
I most certainly agree that a pilot who pulls up for a looping manoeuvre at a display and does not have a robust plan of what to do at any stage around the manoeuvre when the airspeed and height are insufficient to continue the manoeuvre safely is indeed being reckless.
Ridger,
The errors in the pull-up point are because there are many variables (airspeed, wind, angle off the display line, unfamiliar display site etc) and the pilot has to make a purely visual judgement, often with a very shallow sightline angle and, therefore, little plan view perspective. Therefore, it is easy to make a misjudgement. During the pull up more plan view is available aiding judgement and allowing for corrections to be planned. If the roll angle is not varied on the way up then a 'bend' can be used on the vertical down line to help regain positioning.
The pitch oscillations following a rapid change in angle of attack are (and you did ask!) caused by a low frequency and only moderately damped short period pitch oscillation, resulting from high pitch inertia and low angle of attack stability.
The '70% confidence' comment comes from something that I was told many years ago but I am afraid that I cannot remember the source. However, it is consistent with what I have observed in pilots over many years. The other ~30% is motor skills, hand-eye co-ordination etc. I will admit that this is not a real area of expertise for me and there are others far more knowledgeable than I am on this.
The RAF teaching for what to do when a vertical manoeuvre goes wrong is to close the throttle and centralise the stick and rudder pedals.