ASW and 1982 South Atlantic War
There is a paper on the net, written in the early nineties, in which a US Navy Officer offers an analysis of the submarine and ASW operations in 1982. It is a bit flawed. I think that the author was called Harper.
1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.
2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.
3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.
4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,
1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.
2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.
3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.
4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,
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There is a paper on the net, written in the early nineties, in which a US Navy Officer offers an analysis of the submarine and ASW operations in 1982. It is a bit flawed. I think that the author was called Harper.
1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.
2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.
3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.
4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,
1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.
2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.
3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.
4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,
SSNs were tasked a few times against Argentine SSKs. Conqueror vs Santa Fe near South Georgia, Spartan vs San Luis in late April 82 (north of the islands) and Valiant vs San Luis, near Mar del Plata, mid May. No contacts were made by either side. San Luis had a noise advantage (-8db) over a British SSN of the period.
This is Spartan vs San Luis:
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Perhaps the real success of the Argentine submarine campaign was that it forced us to counter it. Numerous Sea Kings, and the odd Wessex, were required to maintain a constant screen around the carrier task force, while others had to be detached from the main force to escort ships in and out of Falkland Sound. The logistic tail required for this was huge, and the Sea Kings took up valuable capacity on the carriers.
The Argentine submarines' mere existence was enough to cause us problems. In terms of Naval warfare, a small conventional submarine must be one of the most cost-effective weapons available.
The Argentine submarines' mere existence was enough to cause us problems. In terms of Naval warfare, a small conventional submarine must be one of the most cost-effective weapons available.
Likewise the carrier with multiple ASW helicopters is an effective counter, as they can put their dipping sonar below the thermal layer, and support operations around the clock. The Sea Kings also did surface search (both visually, and with radar) and SAR as well, As for the capacity aboard the carriers - we deployed pretty much evert single Sea Harrier in existence. ASW was their day to day NATO role.
Submarines on both sides also collected intelligence and landed special forces.
Submarines on both sides also collected intelligence and landed special forces.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 22nd Oct 2021 at 18:50.
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Agree regarding the number of Sea Harriers but, if there were no submarine threat, more deck space would have been available and I'm pretty sure that we could have deployed more RAF GR3s. These would have significantly enhanced our ability to support the ground campaign.
The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.
The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.
Agree regarding the number of Sea Harriers but, if there were no submarine threat, more deck space would have been available and I'm pretty sure that we could have deployed more RAF GR3s. These would have significantly enhanced our ability to support the ground campaign.
The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.
The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.
You fight as you are.
The submarine was invented as an asymmetric weapon.
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Agreed; however, my intention wasn't to focus on the low cost and sophistication of the Argentine submarines compared with ours. Rather, it was to draw attention to their effectiveness in tying down our assets, forcing us to consume valuable resources and limiting our options. From that point of view, they were very successful indeed.
Of course our SSNs did the same, arguably to an even greater extent, to the Argentine Navy. After the sinking of Belgrano, the UK SSN threat was clear and they had no effective counter to it. Consequently, the Argentine carrier task group could no longer be risked at sea.
Of course our SSNs did the same, arguably to an even greater extent, to the Argentine Navy. After the sinking of Belgrano, the UK SSN threat was clear and they had no effective counter to it. Consequently, the Argentine carrier task group could no longer be risked at sea.
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Luck on both sides, if their weapons had worked as they should have we could have been looking at a loss of a lot of assets and people.
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The Sea King M5's new passive ASW equipment had to be removed because it was next-to-useless against a conventional submarine threat. Although it had the Sea Searcher radome, it was still fitted with the old Mk2 radar system. It's fair to say that the Sea Kings were Mk5s in name only.