ASW and 1982 South Atlantic War
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I think it would be very interesting if someone could write about UK ASW in the Falklands war.
On one side, the Nimrod Squadrons based on ASI, the helicopters of the 820 and 826 NAS on the aircraft carriers and, finally, the surface ships (and the helicopters based there). On the other side, submarines ARA San Luis and ARA Santa Fe, the later disabled near South Georgia, and the former attacked on May 1, 1982 north of Macbride Head. Of course, some whales, soviet submarines, etc, could also enter the "red side".
There were 235 recorded incidents, and 314 contacts were made. 20 mk.46 torpedoes, 7 mk.44, 39 Depth Charges and 15 mortar salvoes were fired / launched at suspected contacts. I am writing here just about the Royal Navy. Maybe the Nimrod (which were cleared for the brand new Stingray torps) could also increase this numbers.
Gents, this is the story of so many people, doing a very proffesional job in very hard conditions. A lot of people (me first) need to read about it. I am willing to help if someone wants to write about it.
Best regards!
Marian
On one side, the Nimrod Squadrons based on ASI, the helicopters of the 820 and 826 NAS on the aircraft carriers and, finally, the surface ships (and the helicopters based there). On the other side, submarines ARA San Luis and ARA Santa Fe, the later disabled near South Georgia, and the former attacked on May 1, 1982 north of Macbride Head. Of course, some whales, soviet submarines, etc, could also enter the "red side".
There were 235 recorded incidents, and 314 contacts were made. 20 mk.46 torpedoes, 7 mk.44, 39 Depth Charges and 15 mortar salvoes were fired / launched at suspected contacts. I am writing here just about the Royal Navy. Maybe the Nimrod (which were cleared for the brand new Stingray torps) could also increase this numbers.
Gents, this is the story of so many people, doing a very proffesional job in very hard conditions. A lot of people (me first) need to read about it. I am willing to help if someone wants to write about it.
Best regards!
Marian
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Marcantilan
I do not know if you are aware of them but I have been reading some of the articles here
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/shore...carlos-beyond/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/raid-pebble-island/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/ascen...ands-conflict/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/san-carlos-fob/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/the-atlantic-conveyor/
I do not know if you are aware of them but I have been reading some of the articles here
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/shore...carlos-beyond/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/raid-pebble-island/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/ascen...ands-conflict/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/san-carlos-fob/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/the-atlantic-conveyor/
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Black Buck one is here and Ascension updated below
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/...on-black-buck/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/...ands-conflict/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/...on-black-buck/
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/...ands-conflict/
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Nutloose,
Thanks for posting that great link. Fascinating to hear from so many people who were involved in facilitating the RAF's air operations. It is quite clear that the whole affair would have been impossible without the active support of the US DoD. The paper is a must-read.
Three quotes that stood out for me:
Air Vice-Marshal John Price
Air Vice-Marshal Ron Dick
Air Vice-Marshal Tony Stables
Thanks for posting that great link. Fascinating to hear from so many people who were involved in facilitating the RAF's air operations. It is quite clear that the whole affair would have been impossible without the active support of the US DoD. The paper is a must-read.
Three quotes that stood out for me:
Air Vice-Marshal John Price
You will, I am sure, note one significant absentee; there was no financier. Margaret Thatcher in her book, The Downing Street Years, recalls that she sought the advice of Harold Macmillan about the composition of the War Cabinet. He said, ‘Keep the Treasury out.’ She followed that advice. We followed that precedent. The Prime Minister was reported at the time as saying, ‘We will not count the cost, but will keep an account of the cost.’ We did – sort of.
I asked if the US would help in providing whatever was necessary.
The admiral said that, of course they wanted to help, and asked how much fuel were we thinking of. I told him that we would like an eight- million gallon tanker full of jet fuel off the settlement of Georgetown within the next seven days. The UK could not provide one, but we hoped the US military could help us out. The admiral pulled the screens back on the big plotting chart on his wall showing the whereabouts of every tanker in which the military had an interest. After some discussion on the telephone, he fingered one of the plots and said they could divert it to do what we wanted. I seem to remember that it was a tanker on its way to Guantanamo. ‘How are you going to store and use the fuel?’, the admiral wanted to know. I told him that the ship would have to lie off Georgetown with lines ashore and be used as a floating fuel station until empty. ‘How long will that take and will you need any more?’, was his next question. I said that we would need a similar tanker seven days after the first, and then another in seven more days, and so on. ‘You can’t use that much fuel!’, he said. I assured him we were going to try, and he thereupon set about making long-term plans to meet the requirement.
...
There were, of course, many other instances of close Anglo-American co-operation besides the aviation fuel at Ascension. Among the more important were those in the fields of intelligence and communications, and there was an early request for AIM-9L Sidewinders. There was no fuss; our request for immediate delivery was quietly brought up to the top of the priority list as soon as I asked. We also bought navigation systems, like Omega, to cope with very long range over water missions, and other weaponry came in the form of Shrike and Harpoon missiles.
The admiral said that, of course they wanted to help, and asked how much fuel were we thinking of. I told him that we would like an eight- million gallon tanker full of jet fuel off the settlement of Georgetown within the next seven days. The UK could not provide one, but we hoped the US military could help us out. The admiral pulled the screens back on the big plotting chart on his wall showing the whereabouts of every tanker in which the military had an interest. After some discussion on the telephone, he fingered one of the plots and said they could divert it to do what we wanted. I seem to remember that it was a tanker on its way to Guantanamo. ‘How are you going to store and use the fuel?’, the admiral wanted to know. I told him that the ship would have to lie off Georgetown with lines ashore and be used as a floating fuel station until empty. ‘How long will that take and will you need any more?’, was his next question. I said that we would need a similar tanker seven days after the first, and then another in seven more days, and so on. ‘You can’t use that much fuel!’, he said. I assured him we were going to try, and he thereupon set about making long-term plans to meet the requirement.
...
There were, of course, many other instances of close Anglo-American co-operation besides the aviation fuel at Ascension. Among the more important were those in the fields of intelligence and communications, and there was an early request for AIM-9L Sidewinders. There was no fuss; our request for immediate delivery was quietly brought up to the top of the priority list as soon as I asked. We also bought navigation systems, like Omega, to cope with very long range over water missions, and other weaponry came in the form of Shrike and Harpoon missiles.
The Conveyor part of this equation went ahead, largely without hitch, as did our flight to Ascension, although the transfer to the Norland was not without its moments, given that, individually, it was impossible to carry the amount of flying and survival clothing with which we had been issued. Additionally, no one had thought to inform 2PARA that we were joining – or so they claimed. This resulted in an undignified shouting match while we sought to find somewhere to sleep, compounded by our being asked to leave the Officers Mess after 1800 hrs because the colonel insisted on jacket and tie!
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AVM Tony Stables. No, I haven’t, but, in the context of SNCOs, I would offer an observation on the quality of my airmen aircrew. They had originally enlisted as 18 or 19 year-old sergeants and I found that the quality of leadership was almost totally lacking. In fact, when we came back to the UK I made two specific recommendations. The first was that airmen aircrew should probably be employed as corporals to begin with and that they should be required to earn promotion to sergeant, and the second, that they should be subject to an annual assessment or appraisal,which they weren’t in those days. The assessment aspect was taken forward but the idea of starting out as corporals was not implemented, and I can, of course, appreciate the difficulties that the recruiters would have encountered in trying to sell the attractions of this option to the highly educated group of young people that we seek to attract to serve as aircrew. Nevertheless, the limitations of some of my airmen aircrew were very apparent. In fact, when we went ashore in the Falklands, the man I appointed to command the groundcrew element was the sergeant chef, because he had the most amazing qualities of leadership, far above those of my master aircrew, the warrant officers who worked for me. It was a very interesting lesson.
Mike Meech. We heard that one of the lessons taught by the Falklands
112 experience was that the Chinook demonstrated that it was the helicopter of choice, yet we seem to have overlooked this when it came to designing HMS Ocean. That ship was commissioned long after the Falklands but it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to get a Chinook into its hangar deck. Should we not have seen that one coming?
112 experience was that the Chinook demonstrated that it was the helicopter of choice, yet we seem to have overlooked this when it came to designing HMS Ocean. That ship was commissioned long after the Falklands but it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to get a Chinook into its hangar deck. Should we not have seen that one coming?
Thanks very much to Nutloose for the fascinating linked document that he provided.
Another Quote that caught my eye in the linked doc was from Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire:
"So from about 2006 the only fixed-wing aircraft which will be capable of embarking in the Invincible
class carriers will be the GR7s and we will maintain that capability until
the Joint Strike Fighter enters service with the two new big carriers in
around 2012".
This is from 2002 !!
Obviously we did not keep Harrier Gr7's in service until the new aircraft carrier(s) were available, but the F35 (JSF) is only being worked-up now in 2019.
IB
Another Quote that caught my eye in the linked doc was from Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire:
"So from about 2006 the only fixed-wing aircraft which will be capable of embarking in the Invincible
class carriers will be the GR7s and we will maintain that capability until
the Joint Strike Fighter enters service with the two new big carriers in
around 2012".
This is from 2002 !!
Obviously we did not keep Harrier Gr7's in service until the new aircraft carrier(s) were available, but the F35 (JSF) is only being worked-up now in 2019.
IB
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Shrikes fitted to the Vulcan were used against the Argentine’s Westinghouse radars near Port Stanley. At about this time, I was drinking for Queen and country at a Washington reception when the local Westinghouse representative drew me aside. ‘How are you getting on against their radars?’ he wanted to know. ‘Do you need any specs or drawings?’ I was quite shocked. I asked him if he was not in danger of pushing the limits of ethical behaviour. ‘Hell no!’ he said. ‘You knock that one out and we get to sell them another one.’
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‘You knock that one out and we get to sell them another one.’
In fact, Westinghouse charged the UK, for the refurbishment / service of the AN/TPS-43 / W430 Argentine Air Force radar captured at the end of the war.
Bussiness are bussiness:
In fact, Westinghouse charged the UK, for the refurbishment / service of the AN/TPS-43 / W430 Argentine Air Force radar captured at the end of the war.
Bussiness are bussiness:
I have probably misunderstood the previous post, but wouldn’t it have been better to accept the offer of the Westinghouse radar specs rather than query the reps ethical behaviour?
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Yes. I’m not sure who the quote is attributed to, but to have not taken up the offer immediately would seem extraordinary. I’m assuming it was taken up.
Then again - in what was an amazing feat of arms with great acts of ingenuity and heroism - there are a few other notable examples of ‘peacetime’ thinking and naivety.
Then again - in what was an amazing feat of arms with great acts of ingenuity and heroism - there are a few other notable examples of ‘peacetime’ thinking and naivety.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
If you read Ron Dick's original lecture you will appreciate that it is the sort of chit chat at a cocktail party and not an admonishment.
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