Still broken? Is the RAF in better or worse shape than ten years ago
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I cannot understand how we can have one of the largest budgets in the world, but shrinking assets. I still cannot believe we are closing airfields at the rate we are, stick the army on them, you can build a barracks, but a new airfield, forget it, the locals would be up in arms and a barracks is cheaper to build. it also makes no sense to clump all your transport assets at one airfield, not just from a war point of view, but any problems at Brize on the runway and you in effect shut the transport fleet down in one go.
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It's not about numbers.
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I cannot understand how we can have one of the largest budgets in the world, but shrinking assets. I still cannot believe we are closing airfields at the rate we are, stick the army on them, you can build a barracks, but a new airfield, forget it, the locals would be up in arms and a barracks is cheaper to build. it also makes no sense to clump all your transport assets at one airfield, not just from a war point of view, but any problems at Brize on the runway and you in effect shut the transport fleet down in one go.
Who knows? But I don't think we have the capability of yesteryear. OK, so some of the hardware is more modern. But with complexity comes problems. I gather we have problems with Typhoon; spares being a bit of an issue. But that pales into insignificance when we see what happens with F35. And don't even think about numbers. I watched a program on TV yesterday re HMS Queen Elizabeth. What a farce! Not an aeroplane in sight, expect for one or two imported helos. Excuse me, what is the purpose of an aircraft carrier (there is a clue in the name). If the Isle of White declared independence now, we would lose.
Its akin to expecting a Typhoon fresh out of build at Warton to immediately fill up with munitions and go bomb somewhere without having had a test flight first.
Leafing through an ancient issue of Air Forces Monthly (dated October 2007) I came across a piece entitled 'Is the RAF broken?'
The article went into detail about the definition of stretch and ‘overstretch’, and discussed sustainability (whether the RAF could achieve the tasks set without breaking harmony guidelines), readiness, retention and the mismatch between actual operations and planning assumptions. It talked about the RAF’s diminishing force structure and the fact that the UK was spending 2.2% of GDP on defence - which it said was the lowest proportion since 1930. It criticised what it called 'the ill conceived rush towards PFIs and PPPs, and towards availability based contracting, which it averred would see the loss of key competences and skills among the uniformed engineers.
Out of curiosity, I looked at an order of battle for the RAF in 2007, and saw that it included 15 frontline fast jet squadrons (two Typhoon, three Tornado F3, seven Tornado GR4, two Harrier, and one Jaguar), while we still had 18 Nimrod MR2s for MPA and ASW duties, and a 'gold standard' military SAR provision…..
Size-wise, it looked like a no-brainer, but we all know that size isn't everything?
So is today's 'Agile, Adaptable and Capable' RAF in better shape than ten years ago?
Has the flood of leavers at the 38/16 point slowed, or does it no longer matter?
Is morale better? Has faith in the senior leadership been restored?
The article went into detail about the definition of stretch and ‘overstretch’, and discussed sustainability (whether the RAF could achieve the tasks set without breaking harmony guidelines), readiness, retention and the mismatch between actual operations and planning assumptions. It talked about the RAF’s diminishing force structure and the fact that the UK was spending 2.2% of GDP on defence - which it said was the lowest proportion since 1930. It criticised what it called 'the ill conceived rush towards PFIs and PPPs, and towards availability based contracting, which it averred would see the loss of key competences and skills among the uniformed engineers.
Out of curiosity, I looked at an order of battle for the RAF in 2007, and saw that it included 15 frontline fast jet squadrons (two Typhoon, three Tornado F3, seven Tornado GR4, two Harrier, and one Jaguar), while we still had 18 Nimrod MR2s for MPA and ASW duties, and a 'gold standard' military SAR provision…..
Size-wise, it looked like a no-brainer, but we all know that size isn't everything?
So is today's 'Agile, Adaptable and Capable' RAF in better shape than ten years ago?
Has the flood of leavers at the 38/16 point slowed, or does it no longer matter?
Is morale better? Has faith in the senior leadership been restored?
Precision has its place but it should not have become as all-consuming as it has. Watching a successful Brimstone hit slicing through a car, before some of the occupants opened doors and exited with little more than tinnitus, suggests that surgical strikes can sometimes be too clinical.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Consider counter air mission. The ultimate aim is to destroy the enemy aircraft. The traditional approach was to crater the runway thus pinning the aircraft to the ground. The program then continued with further attacks on the runway with the hope of collateral damage hitting the aircraft. HAS were a counter and area denial a counter-counter.
These programs need lots of aircraft. PGM may reduce the number of aircraft needed to crater the runway and PGM can more easily plink the HAS, but you still need lots of weapons over target. 4 Paveway on a Typhoon don't cut it.
These programs need lots of aircraft. PGM may reduce the number of aircraft needed to crater the runway and PGM can more easily plink the HAS, but you still need lots of weapons over target. 4 Paveway on a Typhoon don't cut it.
Consider counter air mission. The ultimate aim is to destroy the enemy aircraft. The traditional approach was to crater the runway thus pinning the aircraft to the ground. The program then continued with further attacks on the runway with the hope of collateral damage hitting the aircraft. HAS were a counter and area denial a counter-counter.
These programs need lots of aircraft. PGM may reduce the number of aircraft needed to crater the runway and PGM can more easily plink the HAS, but you still need lots of weapons over target. 4 Paveway on a Typhoon don't cut it.
These programs need lots of aircraft. PGM may reduce the number of aircraft needed to crater the runway and PGM can more easily plink the HAS, but you still need lots of weapons over target. 4 Paveway on a Typhoon don't cut it.
Of course, a degree of depth and resilience would go some way to mitigating those risks.
Last edited by Melchett01; 1st May 2018 at 19:16.
I do subscribe to the ‘precision isn’t a substitute for mass’ argument somewhat, but arguing that 8x airburst 1000lb’ers is going to have a lasting effect on a target is probably a little disingenuous.
We would have to find the Isle of White first. Is it in the White Sea?
That’s not the “white answer”.
It’s in the Bay of Plenty!White Island is New Zealand’s most active volcano.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Melchett, that was the regular security issue in Cyprus. In the exercise, one year we would lose the aircraft, the next the crews.
Frodo, what you are saying is a mobility kill will enable freedom of movement by friendlies. This is true. Similarly disabling systens will achieve a firepower kill. Ultimately only a hard kill will give you freedom of movement. Pebble Island was an effective firepower kill whereas the Vulcan attack was a mobility kill.
A B2 with JADM or TLAM attacks can achieve the firepower kill without the need to deny movement and then plink each aircraft. To achieve the first strike kill you might need 8 or more Typhoon with 4 missiles each.
Against a modern air force you need mass and precision.
Oh, and I never suggested 8x1000 was an effective solution. In my day we planned 36 with aircraft unrevetted and that was still not enough.
Frodo, what you are saying is a mobility kill will enable freedom of movement by friendlies. This is true. Similarly disabling systens will achieve a firepower kill. Ultimately only a hard kill will give you freedom of movement. Pebble Island was an effective firepower kill whereas the Vulcan attack was a mobility kill.
A B2 with JADM or TLAM attacks can achieve the firepower kill without the need to deny movement and then plink each aircraft. To achieve the first strike kill you might need 8 or more Typhoon with 4 missiles each.
Against a modern air force you need mass and precision.
Oh, and I never suggested 8x1000 was an effective solution. In my day we planned 36 with aircraft unrevetted and that was still not enough.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 1st May 2018 at 20:51.
Considering the RAF could not even keep a fleet of Gliders and SLMG serviceable to the point that the SLMG's are having to go back to the manufacturer and hardly any of the VGS Squadrons (those that are left) are operating as normal must be an indicator as to level of technical ability actually at the head of the service nowadays. Surprising :- NO Disappointing :- YES. Once you loose the 'Technical' control and the bean counters think that outsourcing is the way ahead then all is lost. Has this saved shed loads of money ! NO; it merely wastes loads of money on trying to keep old equipment going, and also puts the whole organisation under even more stress trying to keep up a capability level. The people at the coal face do a good job 'making it work', but get little back up from those that should be supporting them, and the 'leadership' that has allowed the decline to continue for many years. Many people in the service took their skills on into another related career that also passed on a valuable experience level gained in service of the Country, the true benefit of that has never been considered when looking at defence spending, and is now being felt with a lack of expertise out in the workplace.
I think rather than comparing RAF capability with yesteryear, surely you need to compare capability relative to a potential enemy against time.
Are we safer now than before?
We certainly have been worse - 1940 and the cold war for example.
Its very difficult to imagine a scenario where UK air defence could be challenged.
And how different is our ability to project airpower from 10 years ago?
But having said that I think we get very little for our defence spend. We spend more than France and (I understand) we have less than half the fast jets in service.
Also they have a (functioning) carrier with aircraft that they don't share with the airforce - how does that work?
Train crashes in slow motion are a bit more painful to watch.
I think our carriers and F-35B purchase is an albatross around our financial neck - not just the (lack of) capability they will offer but the drain on resources from the services will hurt.
Are we safer now than before?
We certainly have been worse - 1940 and the cold war for example.
Its very difficult to imagine a scenario where UK air defence could be challenged.
And how different is our ability to project airpower from 10 years ago?
But having said that I think we get very little for our defence spend. We spend more than France and (I understand) we have less than half the fast jets in service.
Also they have a (functioning) carrier with aircraft that they don't share with the airforce - how does that work?
Train crashes in slow motion are a bit more painful to watch.
I think our carriers and F-35B purchase is an albatross around our financial neck - not just the (lack of) capability they will offer but the drain on resources from the services will hurt.
POB - The glider situation is a poor bellwether when you are struggling to produce crews, technicians, aircraft and weapons for recent conflicts. Running out of Brimstone missiles during 2 simultaneous conflicts whilst keeping the glider fleet in top shape could be seen as odd. Non-combat units have always suffered when resources are stretched and air cadets are as far away from combat as it gets.
That said, the glider issues were a shambles and I breath a sigh of relief in that the air cadets still exist and still receive MoD money.
That said, the glider issues were a shambles and I breath a sigh of relief in that the air cadets still exist and still receive MoD money.
The french look good by prioritising shop window projects and not the enablers, hence a major reliance on UK and US strat airlift. They also pay appallingly and offer little support to troops who get bad equipment.
I shared a room on HERRICK with a French Officer who told me a few horror stories of how bad the French military is beyond their shop window.
I shared a room on HERRICK with a French Officer who told me a few horror stories of how bad the French military is beyond their shop window.
Just This Once My point being how would you expect the 'High Tec' part of the service to be fit for purpose when the same responsible people (Up Top) can not even organise something simple. It is not even about money in that case, its about not having the right people being in charge who any idea about tech matters and or how to organise themselves. The ATC case was just an example of a system not being fit for purpose despite it being funded and not getting anything for large sums of money already spent. The same scenario is the same even at the higher level of hands on 'Combat' part of the service, in that large amounts of money are wasted yet there s a lack of capability at the sharp end due to poor leadership and past decisions. Every sympathy with those who actually strive to keep it going DESPITE the poor leadership and back up from up top.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Traditionally the VSO in the RAF were from the cohorts that had trained for 3 years as cadets. In 1990 they led an air force of over 100,000. Shortly after the numbers dropped to under 60,000 and the last of these cohorts will have retired a few years ago. The strength is now below 35,000.
The point is that the pool from which VSO are appointed has declined to third; admittedly the RAF 4* posts are now only CAS/CinC Air Command.
Will this impact on leadership capability, especially as the proportion of capable SNCO/JO/SO who chose to leave early is probably greater in relation to the strength now?
The point is that the pool from which VSO are appointed has declined to third; admittedly the RAF 4* posts are now only CAS/CinC Air Command.
Will this impact on leadership capability, especially as the proportion of capable SNCO/JO/SO who chose to leave early is probably greater in relation to the strength now?
