F-22 Prang at NAS Fallon, Nevada
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On the other hand he could just assume that all FJ pilots are skygods and turn a blind eye to tools available since they're not required
BigDotStu
Thankyou. I thought I was going mad but I’m glad somebody else has finally understood my point.
Beardy you say you are an ex FJ QFI but now an airline guy. Think back to your time on FJs and apply what you now know about FDR monitoring.
Imagine yourself on a FJ unit with a jet that has more performance than virtually any other aircraft ever made. Imagine you have an FDR that monitors every known parameter and you are the guy who is responsible for deciding what parameters to specifically monitor. Can you honestly say you would have thought to monitor rotate speeds?
I’m an experienced guy and quite possibly the kind of guy that might have been responsible for setting parameters. I wouldn’t have thought of it.
On most FJs someone (probably a QFI) would have been responsible for trawling the ODM and devising a list of SOP rotate speeds, Vstops etc for various aircraft fits, temperatures and altitudes.
Would you, as the QFI, then suspect that your Sqn mates were routinely ignoring the rotate speed that you had so kindly calculated?
Anyway, in the absence of a crowd of people who can see my point I am starting to sound like a stuck record.
BV
Beardy you say you are an ex FJ QFI but now an airline guy. Think back to your time on FJs and apply what you now know about FDR monitoring.
Imagine yourself on a FJ unit with a jet that has more performance than virtually any other aircraft ever made. Imagine you have an FDR that monitors every known parameter and you are the guy who is responsible for deciding what parameters to specifically monitor. Can you honestly say you would have thought to monitor rotate speeds?
I’m an experienced guy and quite possibly the kind of guy that might have been responsible for setting parameters. I wouldn’t have thought of it.
On most FJs someone (probably a QFI) would have been responsible for trawling the ODM and devising a list of SOP rotate speeds, Vstops etc for various aircraft fits, temperatures and altitudes.
Would you, as the QFI, then suspect that your Sqn mates were routinely ignoring the rotate speed that you had so kindly calculated?
Anyway, in the absence of a crowd of people who can see my point I am starting to sound like a stuck record.
BV
. Would you, as the QFI, then suspect that your Sqn mates were routinely ignoring the rotate speed that you had so kindly calculated?
Normalisation of the deviation is a big problem, especially in small 'elite' units. Monitoring helps prevent it. We had formal interviews and pilots sent home from detachments for cowboy behaviour and cavalier attitudes. The monitoring then was human navigators and they only reported a part of the problem. We lost a crew a year in fatalities, I lost good friends.
Last edited by beardy; 23rd Nov 2018 at 07:31.
I'd be surprised indeed if any routine monitoring of rotate speeds was conducted. But for a Sqn QFI to devise SOP speeds from the ODM seems so last century - these days a simple software program should be able to provide the necessary 'on the day' values given aerodrome elevation, slope, OAT, W/V, QNH and aircraft AUW / fit.
Deviance from TOLD values should have been picked up by whoever was conducting the simulator training, surely? As there's no 2-seat F-22, it'd be difficult to check pilot standardisation any other way.
Back in the Stone Age, Pilot's Notes would include handling information, e.g.:
Surely much more modern aircraft will have been assessed by test pilots and similar information included in the aircrew manual flying?
Deviance from TOLD values should have been picked up by whoever was conducting the simulator training, surely? As there's no 2-seat F-22, it'd be difficult to check pilot standardisation any other way.
Back in the Stone Age, Pilot's Notes would include handling information, e.g.:
Take-off
[…]
(b) Keep straight initially by the use of gentle braking until the rudders become effective at 50-55 knots.
(c) Raise the nose wheel at 80-85 knots, maintain this attitude and fly the aircraft off at 105-110 knots at typical service load. At maximum all-up weight raise the nose wheel at 105-110 knots, the aircraft then becomes airborne at 120-125 knots.
[…]
[…]
(b) Keep straight initially by the use of gentle braking until the rudders become effective at 50-55 knots.
(c) Raise the nose wheel at 80-85 knots, maintain this attitude and fly the aircraft off at 105-110 knots at typical service load. At maximum all-up weight raise the nose wheel at 105-110 knots, the aircraft then becomes airborne at 120-125 knots.
[…]
I am clearly not articulating myself very well but I will try one last time to get an answer to the question I’m trying to ask.
I understand the system we are discussing. I realise what parameters are recorded and how they can be used to find data.
My question relates to how it would have fit into daily operations on the Raptor Sqn such that the trend for underspeed rotates could have been spotted and eradicated.
So, for instance, jets go flying then come back. FDR traces are downloaded. Somebody sits down and looks at the data, having previously been notified of key points to look out for. That person looks at all the fight parameters and says “‘ere guv’, that’s the third time this week I’ve seen aft stick pressure applied at a speed several knots less than the correct rotate speed of the day given the prevalent meteorological conditions”. The guv’ says “do you know what mate, you’re right I must go and see the Sqn Boss and let him know I’ve noticed several of the Sqn pilots apparently rotating at a speed below the ideal” (because the FDR analyst guy has an encylopaedic knowledge of the TOLD computer as well as being a trained FDR guy).
The Boss says “by Jove buddy, you’re quite right. Good spot. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. I must put a stop to this dangerous and incorrect habit immediately”.
A $400,000,000 jet is thus saved by the clairvoyant FDR guy who just happened to be looking at a parameter at a certain stage of fight that nobody had told him to look for.
I realise this appears like I am being glib and facetious but do you at least understand the point I’m making?
How could this accident have been prevented by FDR monitoring without the benefit of the hindsight this accident has provided us with?
If I have not made my point my now I will give up.
BV
I understand the system we are discussing. I realise what parameters are recorded and how they can be used to find data.
My question relates to how it would have fit into daily operations on the Raptor Sqn such that the trend for underspeed rotates could have been spotted and eradicated.
So, for instance, jets go flying then come back. FDR traces are downloaded. Somebody sits down and looks at the data, having previously been notified of key points to look out for. That person looks at all the fight parameters and says “‘ere guv’, that’s the third time this week I’ve seen aft stick pressure applied at a speed several knots less than the correct rotate speed of the day given the prevalent meteorological conditions”. The guv’ says “do you know what mate, you’re right I must go and see the Sqn Boss and let him know I’ve noticed several of the Sqn pilots apparently rotating at a speed below the ideal” (because the FDR analyst guy has an encylopaedic knowledge of the TOLD computer as well as being a trained FDR guy).
The Boss says “by Jove buddy, you’re quite right. Good spot. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. I must put a stop to this dangerous and incorrect habit immediately”.
A $400,000,000 jet is thus saved by the clairvoyant FDR guy who just happened to be looking at a parameter at a certain stage of fight that nobody had told him to look for.
I realise this appears like I am being glib and facetious but do you at least understand the point I’m making?
How could this accident have been prevented by FDR monitoring without the benefit of the hindsight this accident has provided us with?
If I have not made my point my now I will give up.
BV
Sorry to quote your whole post Bob but, you are a stuck record and, you keep missing the points, like the leader of the opposition!
I was going to try and cover some of this again but, I have re-read and, everything has been covered but you have a fixed opinion, in my opinion.
The simple reality is, Flight Data Monitoring does provide early heads-up on trends and errors.
On a happier note, it is a good thing that modern automated monitoring of flight parameters and crew performance will eventually cross over into FJ flying. It gives a real benefit in improving standards and is actually the friend of professional aircrew.
Cheers
OAP
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Unfortunately BV, I am neither military nor a pilot (my qualifications in either category are limited to a few trips in the back of a Chipmunk with 5AEF in the 80s), but I am a software engineer (sometimes on projects in the military arena), and this approach to detecting 'defects' in pilots is remarkably similar to various of the testing approaches used in software. No matter how many things you instrument and test, you will always find a tester/end-user who finds new and interesting ways to abuse the product that are neither expected nor intended. It seems to me that pilots and aircraft are subject to the same sorts of issues - once you've seen someone do it, it's obvious it needs handling....
No matter how many things you instrument and test, you will always find a tester/end-user who finds new and interesting ways to abuse the product that are neither expected nor intended. It seems to me that pilots and aircraft are subject to the same sorts of issues - once you've seen someone do it, it's obvious it needs handling....
Yes, there are always things that can jump up and surprise everyone. However, inaccurate flying and non adherence to targets/limits of flying SOP's, equipment use, procedures and the flight envelope are the bread and butter of automated flight data monitoring. In this case, any half-decent FDM application would have picked this up in short order. TBH, I do not know how such basic mishandling became so entrenched as the report seems to indicate. Of course, I know no detail of F-22 training and procedures, only what is listed in that unclassified report. I do wonder if the F-22 uses a FDM system but, they failed to consider the non-compliance with TOLD parameters as worthy of tracking or taking action on? If that was the case, they were plain dumb. Maybe that is the great unpublished part of this report? Anybody know? OTOH, I do know what an effective tool and contributor to Flight Safety FDM can be. Cheers
OAP
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I do wonder if the F-22 uses a FDM system but, they failed to consider the non-compliance with TOLD parameters as worthy of tracking or taking action on? If that was the case, they were plain dumb. Maybe that is the great unpublished part of this report? Anybody know? OTOH, I do know what an effective tool and contributor to Flight Safety FDM can be
I think your question above ties in with BVs perspective - he wouldn't have considered it worthy of consideration prior to this event. I can understand his perspective, especially if (like myself prior to now) he was not aware of what is considered standard coverage in FDM. I don't think anyone would deny it is a valuable tool which can only improve flight safety.
Every day is a school day...
Stu
BV - I was in a similar situation to you when my unit introduced FDM .The mindset you're in is "what would I think is important to look at" and obviously rotate speed doesn't make the cut.
The misunderstanding is the mindset there - you don't look at what's important, you look at literally everything on the aircraft that has a limit or rule that has any chance of being machine processed.
The challenge on a unit that flies dynamically rather than procedurally (FJ Vs multi as an example) is that last bit. For example, FDM would never be able to tell you that you were using too much or too little G in BFM to get a shot, but it could easily be programmed to recognise someone routinely using more G than the Sqn beefer is comfortable with on a VRIAB.
We had basically every parameter from the ODM, RTS and FOB looked at, plus all "standard" profiles that could be automatically analysed. The FDM provider was helpful in that regard. Even ground taxy speed was included.
All of the above said, I've yet to ever actually see anyone get booked by it, but I can conceive how it would have picked up the trend of underspeed rotating - the key is in looking at every bit of performance data and limitations/rules that you use when you fly, whether you think it'll be broken or not - it doesn't cost extra!
The misunderstanding is the mindset there - you don't look at what's important, you look at literally everything on the aircraft that has a limit or rule that has any chance of being machine processed.
The challenge on a unit that flies dynamically rather than procedurally (FJ Vs multi as an example) is that last bit. For example, FDM would never be able to tell you that you were using too much or too little G in BFM to get a shot, but it could easily be programmed to recognise someone routinely using more G than the Sqn beefer is comfortable with on a VRIAB.
We had basically every parameter from the ODM, RTS and FOB looked at, plus all "standard" profiles that could be automatically analysed. The FDM provider was helpful in that regard. Even ground taxy speed was included.
All of the above said, I've yet to ever actually see anyone get booked by it, but I can conceive how it would have picked up the trend of underspeed rotating - the key is in looking at every bit of performance data and limitations/rules that you use when you fly, whether you think it'll be broken or not - it doesn't cost extra!
It's not about anyone 'being booked by it' it's about stopping people killing themselves or wasting valuable resources through unchecked human frailties (hubris etc..) if it's used wrongly it becomes counterproductive.
PBA
Thanks for your explanation. I understand now.
Previous explanations had just tried to paint me as someone trying to resist the advent of a new bit of technology and (like a broken record) never gave me an answer to my original question that made sense (to me at least).
As an aside, I watched my own rotate during my morning trip. My jet has nowhere near the performance of a Raptor. I looked at my rotate speed (we do not have an EODM so we do have SOP speeds for each fit) and noted when I was 5 knots below it. The numbers in the HUD changed so rapidly it was hard to perceive. I say again, this is not a Raptor so the numbers probably change even quicker in that jet. In the back seat I would see the stick move and probably get a feeling for an underspeed rotate. There are no two seat Raptors and it was suggested that a sim instructor could have caught it.
I could not honestly say I would notice during a routine simulator sortie if someone was doing it incorrectly. Not with the likely rate of acceleration of a Raptor. And not with your likely average Raptor pilots level of concern about their rotate speed (I suspect they never believed for one second it could be so sensitive - in a Jaguar or Tornado, or similar older US jet yes, but not a Raptor).
I still think some posters here are using 20/20 hindsight and living in a perfect world if they think it could reasonably have been noticed before the accident though, but if you are telling me that FDM (we don’t know if such a system actually exists on Raptor) could have caught it then I have to believe you.
I accept I may be wrong and you may be right but I can’t help having my opinion based on my experiences to date.
BV
Previous explanations had just tried to paint me as someone trying to resist the advent of a new bit of technology and (like a broken record) never gave me an answer to my original question that made sense (to me at least).
As an aside, I watched my own rotate during my morning trip. My jet has nowhere near the performance of a Raptor. I looked at my rotate speed (we do not have an EODM so we do have SOP speeds for each fit) and noted when I was 5 knots below it. The numbers in the HUD changed so rapidly it was hard to perceive. I say again, this is not a Raptor so the numbers probably change even quicker in that jet. In the back seat I would see the stick move and probably get a feeling for an underspeed rotate. There are no two seat Raptors and it was suggested that a sim instructor could have caught it.
I could not honestly say I would notice during a routine simulator sortie if someone was doing it incorrectly. Not with the likely rate of acceleration of a Raptor. And not with your likely average Raptor pilots level of concern about their rotate speed (I suspect they never believed for one second it could be so sensitive - in a Jaguar or Tornado, or similar older US jet yes, but not a Raptor).
I still think some posters here are using 20/20 hindsight and living in a perfect world if they think it could reasonably have been noticed before the accident though, but if you are telling me that FDM (we don’t know if such a system actually exists on Raptor) could have caught it then I have to believe you.
I accept I may be wrong and you may be right but I can’t help having my opinion based on my experiences to date.
BV
Last edited by Bob Viking; 25th Nov 2018 at 07:16.
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Do people actually read the evidence before pontificating?
BV,
The rotate and take off speeds for the incident were 143/164 respectively.
The MP achieved 120/135.
That disparity was conclusively proven as common across the F-22 community. The high altitude of NAS Fallon compounded the incident because of slow acceleration at a high density altitude.
A blind man would have noticed the failure to adhere to TOLD let alone an automated monitoring system.
IF ANYONE HAD BEEN LOOKING.
BV,
The rotate and take off speeds for the incident were 143/164 respectively.
The MP achieved 120/135.
That disparity was conclusively proven as common across the F-22 community. The high altitude of NAS Fallon compounded the incident because of slow acceleration at a high density altitude.
A blind man would have noticed the failure to adhere to TOLD let alone an automated monitoring system.
IF ANYONE HAD BEEN LOOKING.
Arty
I will admit my error. I didn’t read it as closely as you. However, you are so keen to nitpick you completely ignore my other points.
20 knots during a Raptor acceleration could happen in the blink of an eye. And who the hell would have noticed the pilots doing it?
I think everyone is being too keen to cast aspersions without putting themselves in the same position as the mishap pilot.
It’s very easy after the event to find fault, apportion blame and think of ways to avoid it in future.
It’s just like the classic gear up landing. When it happens we all think ‘what an idiot, I would never do that’...
Apparently, I’m the only one on this forum who isn’t perfect.
Must have a word with myself.
BV
20 knots during a Raptor acceleration could happen in the blink of an eye. And who the hell would have noticed the pilots doing it?
I think everyone is being too keen to cast aspersions without putting themselves in the same position as the mishap pilot.
It’s very easy after the event to find fault, apportion blame and think of ways to avoid it in future.
It’s just like the classic gear up landing. When it happens we all think ‘what an idiot, I would never do that’...
Apparently, I’m the only one on this forum who isn’t perfect.
Must have a word with myself.
BV
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I now remember why I don’t engage in discussions on the internet...
Raptor is an aeroplane not a spaceship, it’s engines are powerful but they aren’t warp drives.
At no point was I, or as I can recall anyone, impugning the MP. Organisational failures were large contributors to execution failures.
If you’d like me to be obvious I was actually impugning your ability to objectively assess the ability of appropriately devised monitoring mechanisms to recognise the normalisation of deviance and risky shift that had occurred in the Raptor community.
Raptor is an aeroplane not a spaceship, it’s engines are powerful but they aren’t warp drives.
At no point was I, or as I can recall anyone, impugning the MP. Organisational failures were large contributors to execution failures.
If you’d like me to be obvious I was actually impugning your ability to objectively assess the ability of appropriately devised monitoring mechanisms to recognise the normalisation of deviance and risky shift that had occurred in the Raptor community.
Arty
You may not personally have impugned the MP but, if you had been reading the thread since the start, you would see that others definitely have.
I never wanted to start an argument but, against my better judgment, I appear to have done just that.
I had intended to present a different angle to the conversation which seemed to be heading down the route of blaming the pilot with the benefit of hindsight.
I think it’s terrible that an F22 has been severely damaged as the result of a handling error and I can now see how FDM could prevent it in future. I agree that it could have been avoidable but none of us are F22 pilots so we can’t honestly state we wouldn’t have made the same error or could have stopped it had we been there.
I understand the term ‘normalisation of deviance’ and I also understand why we make such efforts to stop it happening.
Anyway, I’ve said enough.
BV
I never wanted to start an argument but, against my better judgment, I appear to have done just that.
I had intended to present a different angle to the conversation which seemed to be heading down the route of blaming the pilot with the benefit of hindsight.
I think it’s terrible that an F22 has been severely damaged as the result of a handling error and I can now see how FDM could prevent it in future. I agree that it could have been avoidable but none of us are F22 pilots so we can’t honestly state we wouldn’t have made the same error or could have stopped it had we been there.
I understand the term ‘normalisation of deviance’ and I also understand why we make such efforts to stop it happening.
Anyway, I’ve said enough.
BV
We seem to assume all FJ pilots are the same, regarding planning and procedures. My experience of operating with FJ on numerous AAR Trails and AAR supported operations and exercises over 40 years ,is that they are not.
As an example, an AAR Trail to Alaska via Goose Bay for Tornado GR1 and F3. At the Face to Face Brief at Goose Bay the GR1 crews all had Terminal Approach Plates for all possible diversion airfields and were aware of facilities available such as LOX. Also Runway lengths and Take Off requirements, as well as full chart coverage of the route. Not so the F3 crews.
After the brief the Sqn Cdr of the F3 squadron asked to borrow the 1:6 million scale chart of the whole of Canada/ Northern USA which had the route marked on it, together with Refuelling Brackets and Abort Points in such a way as to be visible at the back of the briefing room. When I asked him why he told me it was so he could photocopy it and gives his crews copies "so they had some idea of where they were going!". Several questions were asked about my choice of Diversion Airfields, one being " Why are we not using Lynn Lake, as it en-route?" " Because it is a lake! You need floats to land there!"
Unlike the tankers who were used to frequently operate at MTOW for the conditions and therefore calculated the Take Off Data accurately and flew within the narrow performance margins available, the F3s seemed to work on the principal that if the runway was 6000ft plus, all you did was "Bang it into Burner and Go". There was always Martin Baker if it went wrong.
In the case of this F22 incident, it appears that the training unit was teaching/accepting the 120kt rotation technique, as half the pilots were doing it. The TOLD Data was also wrong, but if nobody was using it that was no big deal. They were also retracting the undercarriage below Take off speed. Spicy!
If the person who was doing the FDM was an F22 pilot who used the 120kt technique, would he have flagged it up as a problem?
As an example, an AAR Trail to Alaska via Goose Bay for Tornado GR1 and F3. At the Face to Face Brief at Goose Bay the GR1 crews all had Terminal Approach Plates for all possible diversion airfields and were aware of facilities available such as LOX. Also Runway lengths and Take Off requirements, as well as full chart coverage of the route. Not so the F3 crews.
After the brief the Sqn Cdr of the F3 squadron asked to borrow the 1:6 million scale chart of the whole of Canada/ Northern USA which had the route marked on it, together with Refuelling Brackets and Abort Points in such a way as to be visible at the back of the briefing room. When I asked him why he told me it was so he could photocopy it and gives his crews copies "so they had some idea of where they were going!". Several questions were asked about my choice of Diversion Airfields, one being " Why are we not using Lynn Lake, as it en-route?" " Because it is a lake! You need floats to land there!"
Unlike the tankers who were used to frequently operate at MTOW for the conditions and therefore calculated the Take Off Data accurately and flew within the narrow performance margins available, the F3s seemed to work on the principal that if the runway was 6000ft plus, all you did was "Bang it into Burner and Go". There was always Martin Baker if it went wrong.
In the case of this F22 incident, it appears that the training unit was teaching/accepting the 120kt rotation technique, as half the pilots were doing it. The TOLD Data was also wrong, but if nobody was using it that was no big deal. They were also retracting the undercarriage below Take off speed. Spicy!
If the person who was doing the FDM was an F22 pilot who used the 120kt technique, would he have flagged it up as a problem?
